FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZNYE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 500
Citation: SZNYE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 500 Appeal from: SZNYE v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2010] FMCA 164 Parties: SZNYE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 382 of 2010 Judge: KATZMANN J Date of judgment: 21 May 2010 Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M
Federal Court Rules O 52 r 15
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 91R, 474, 476Cases cited: Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 applied
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 applied
Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 applied
Metwally v University of Wollongong(No 2) (1985) 60 ALR 68 applied
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 259 ALR 429 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Re; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 198 ALR 59 cited
Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 applied
Plaintiff S157 v The Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476 cited
SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 361; (2002) 194 ALR 749 cited
SZJRV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 298 cited
Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491 citedDate of hearing: 18 May 2010 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No catchwords Number of paragraphs: 38 The applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for the Respondents: DLA Phillips Fox
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 382 of 2010
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZNYE
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
KATZMANN J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 MAY 2010
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time within which to file and serve a notice of appeal is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 382 of 2010
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: SZNYE
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
KATZMANN J
DATE:
21 MAY 2010
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The applicant is 18 years old and a citizen of the People’s Republic of China. He arrived in Australia on a short-term student visa in November 2007. He applied for a protection (class XA) visa because he claims to fear persecution if he were to return home because of his father’s (and also his own newfound) Christian beliefs. But he failed…
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- Case
- [2010] FCA 500
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in the case revolved around the jurisdiction of the Federal Magistrate and the scope of review of the Tribunal's decision. The applicant argued that the Federal Magistrate had erred in refusing to allow him to call further evidence, which was a fundamental misunderstanding of the Magistrate's jurisdiction. Additionally, the applicant contended that the Tribunal's adverse findings may have been influenced by an alleged problem with the interpreter's translation, a submission that was not raised before the Federal Magistrate. Finally, the applicant claimed that the Tribunal was biased, a complaint that was not presented to the Federal Magistrate.
The Court found that the Federal Magistrate had not refused to allow the applicant to call further evidence, and even if she had, it would not have constituted an error as the Magistrate could only review the Tribunal's decision for jurisdictional error. The Court also found that the applicant's argument about the interpreter's translation lacked substance and was not supported by evidence. Furthermore, the Court held that the applicant's claim of bias was not raised before the Federal Magistrate and was therefore not properly before the Court. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
The Federal Circuit Court confirmed that the Federal Magistrate's decision dismissing the applicant's appeal was correct, and there was no error in her Honour's reasons. The Court held that the applicant's arguments did not fall within any recognised exceptions and that the appeal was accordingly dismissed. No further orders were made by the Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There is nothing on the face of the Federal Magistrate’s reasons to support the submission that she refused to allow him to call further evidence. However, even if the contention is accepted, the submission betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the Federal Magistrate’s jurisdiction and of her reasons. Her Honour could only review the Tribunal’s decision for jurisdictional error: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act), ss 474, 476 and Plaintiff S157 v The Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476. Put simply, she had no power to receive evidence concerning the merits of the application. The remarks in her reasons about an absence of evidence related to a submission that he had asked the Tribunal for additional time to provide documents and information which, he said, had been refused. Her point (as I understand it) was that, to the extent that the applicant might have been arguing he had been denied procedural fairness in the Tribunal, which, if proved, would amount to jurisdictional error, the argument would need to be supported by evidence. There is no error in that observation. The exception, which I mentioned in paragraph 19 above, is an argument the applicant advanced before me, but which was not raised in the Court below. The argument was that the Tribunal’s adverse findings were (or may) have been reached because of some problem with the way the interpreter may have translated what he said. If there were any substance in the submission, I would have expected it to have been raised before the Federal Magistrate. It does not even rate a mention in the draft notice of appeal. The precise nature of the problem was never articulated. And there is no evidence to support it. Save in exceptional circumstances, it is considered “contrary to all principle” to permit a party, after the case has been decided against him, to raise a new argument which, whether deliberately or inadvertently, he did not put at the hearing when he had an opportunity to do so: Metwally v University of Wollongong (No 2) (1985) 60 ALR 68 at 71 and Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1; Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491 at 497. These circumstances do not fall within any recognised exception. On its face the draft notice of appeal raises a jurisdictional error: the claim of bias. Bias was not a complaint before the Federal Magistrate either. In Liteky v United States (1994) 510 US 540 at 550 Scalia J said that:The words [bias or prejudice] connote a favourable or unfavourable disposition or opinion that is somehow wrongful or inappropriate, either because it is undeserved, or because it rests upon knowledge that the subject ought not to possess (for example, a criminal juror who has been biased or prejudiced by receipt of inadmissible evidence concerning the defendant’s prior criminal activities), or because it is excessive in degree (for example, a criminal juror who is so inflamed by properly admitted evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal activities that he will vote guilty regardless of the facts). [emphasis in the original]