FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
DDF18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 38
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 38
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court assessed the application for an extension of time by considering several factors, including the length and reason for the delay, any prejudice to the respondent, and the merits of the substantive application. In Tu’uta Katoa, the High Court highlighted that the Court must be satisfied not only that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice. The Court also referenced Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen to guide its consideration of the principles relevant to decisions on extending time. The applicant’s grounds for an extension of time included a claim of unawareness of the time limit and a belief that the Tribunal had made factual and legal errors. However, the Court found that the significant delay and lack of explanation for the non-attendance at the Tribunal hearing did not meet the required threshold to extend the time for judicial review.
The Court concluded that it was not satisfied that extending the time was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice. The application for an order extending the 35-day period within which the application for judicial review could be made was dismissed. The Court did not find the reasons provided by the applicant sufficient to warrant an extension of time, given the significant delay and the absence of any compelling justification.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As a result, the Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant met the refugee criterion, nor that he was a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under ss 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act: Decision at [29]-[32], and affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa: CB72. CONSIDERATION On 15 June 2018, the applicant applied to the Court for judicial review of that decision as well as an extension of time. An application to the Court for review of a decision by the Tribunal must be made within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal’s decision: s 477(1) of the Act. The Tribunal made its decision on 7 October 2016, and the final day to make the application was 11 November 2016. The applicant therefore made the application 581 days after the time prescribed had lapsed. Section 477(2) of the Act allows the Court, by order, to extend the 35-day period as the Court considers appropriate if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to do so. As the applicant was not represented before the Court, at the commencement of the hearing of this application I explained to the applicant that as his judicial review application was made outside of the time prescribed in the Act, the issue before the Court would be to consider whether it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend the period within which the application could be made. I explained by reference to Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; 276 CLR 579, discussed further below, the correct approach to the exercise of the Court’s discretion whether to extend time and some of the matters that the Court considers relevant in assessing whether extending time is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice, including the extent and reason for the delay, whether there is any prejudice to the first respondent and the merits of the substantive judicial review application. The applicant’s grounds in support of an extension of time specify the following (reproduced verbatim): 1.I was not aware of the limit for the judicial review in Court and I required extension of time to seek justice where I believe there was a lack of procedural fairness. 2.The Applicant met the key elements of the Subclass 866 visa but the Tribunal member did not consider and therefore committed factual and legal error. In Tu'uta Katoa Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ explained the exercise of the Court's discretion under s 477(2) of the Act, by reference to the corresponding provision for applications made to the Federal Court of Australia in s 477A(2). In short compass, the focus of s 477A(2)(b) (and so also s 477(2)(b)) is not on the interests of the applicant, but the broader interests of the administration of justice. This allows the Court to consider “a myriad of facts and circumstances, including the length of the applicant's delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application”: Tu'uta Katoa at [12]. Their Honours noted that the level of satisfaction that must be reached is not low because the Court “must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice”: at [12]. In this regard, their Honours noted that it is appropriate to consider the well-established principles guiding decisions whether to extend time in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349: Tu’uta Katoa at [13].