FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
EEF18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 335
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 335
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court considered the relevant principles for extending time, as outlined in Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28. The Court held that the focus of the exercise of its discretion under s 477(2) of the Act is on the broader interests of the administration of justice, rather than solely on the interests of the applicant. The Court noted that the applicant must show an acceptable explanation for the delay, and that any prejudice to the respondent or third parties caused by the delay is a material factor against granting an extension. The Court also considered the merits of the underlying application. In this case, the Court found that the applicant had not provided an acceptable explanation for the delay and that the delay had caused prejudice to the respondent. The Court was not satisfied that it was in the interests of the administration of justice to extend the time limit for making the application for judicial review.
The Court dismissed the application for an order extending the 35-day period within which an application under s 477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) may be made.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Tribunal reasoned at [16] of the Decision that absent further information, and its inability to make further inquiries of the applicant at the hearing about the claims, the Tribunal was not satisfied that: the applicant borrowed money from loan sharks; was beaten for money he owes; the applicant owes anyone in Malaysia money; nor would he be killed or harmed for not repaying the money that he allegedly owes. Consequently, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations, nor are there substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia, there is a real risk he will suffer significant harm under ss 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act. The Tribunal therefore affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa: at [22] of the Decision. CONSIDERATION On 13 August 2018, the applicant applied to the (then) Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of that decision as well as an extension of time. An application to the Court for review of a decision by the Tribunal must be made within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal’s decision: s 477(1) of the Act. The Tribunal made its decision on 19 October 2015, and the final day to make the application within time was 23 November 2015. The applicant therefore made the application 994 days after the time prescribed had lapsed. Section 477(2) of the Act allows the Court, by order, to extend the 35-day period as the Court considers appropriate if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to do so. In Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28, 276 CLR 579 Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ explained the exercise of the Court's discretion under s 477(2) of the Act, by reference to the corresponding provision for applications made to the Federal Court of Australia in s 477A(2). In short compass, the focus of s 477A(2)(b) (and so also s 477(2)(b)) is not on the interests of the applicant, but the broader interests of the administration of justice. This allows the Court to consider “a myriad of facts and circumstances, including the length of the applicant's delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application”: Tu'uta Katoa at [12]. Their Honours noted that the level of satisfaction that must be reached is not low because the Court “must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice”: at [12]. In this regard, their Honours noted that it is appropriate to consider the well-established principles guiding decisions whether to extend time in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349: Tu’uta Katoa at [13]. The non-exhaustive principles set out in Hunter Valley to which reference in Tu'uta Katoa is made were cited with approval in Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6] as follows: 1.applications for an extension of time are not to be granted unless it is proper to do so; the legislated time limits are not to be ignored. The applicant must show an "acceptable explanation for the delay"; it must be "fair and equitable in the circumstances" to extend time; 2.action taken by the applicant, other than by way of making an application for review, is relevant to the consideration of the question whether an acceptable explanation for the delay has been furnished; 3.any prejudice to the respondent in defending the proceedings that is caused by the delay is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension; 4.however, the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension; and 5.the merits of the substantial application are to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted. See also Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113 at [33]-[36]; SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6]; BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218 at [33]; Porter v Ghasemi [2021] FCAFC 144, 286 FCR 556 at 566, [40].