FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
DRN19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1408
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1408
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether to extend the 35-day period for DRN19 to apply for judicial review of the AAT's decision. The court had to consider if it was in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time.
The court found that there was no acceptable explanation for the delay, and there was no arguable case of jurisdictional error. The court was not satisfied that it was in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time. The application to extend the 35-day period was dismissed with costs.
The final orders were that the application for an order extending the 35-day period within which an application under s 477(1) of the Act may be made is refused and the application will be dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Overall, the Tribunal did not find the applicant to be a credible witness and concluded that he had concocted his primary claim that he was threatened by gangsters to release information about his daughter’s whereabouts. The Tribunal found the applicant’s evidence to be vague, inconsistent and lacking plausibility: Decision at [24]. The Tribunal determined that there was no real chance that the applicant would suffer persecution involving serious harm from either gangsters or a mafia organisation if he were to return to Vietnam, and accordingly, was not satisfied that the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations under ss 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act. The Tribunal was also not satisfied that the applicant would suffer harm from anyone as a necessary or foreseeable consequence of him being removed from Australia to Vietnam, and was not satisfied that the applicant met the refugee criterion for the grant of a protection visa: at [37]. The Tribunal thereby affirmed the decision under review: at [39]. CONSIDERATION As earlier mentioned, the applicant applied to the Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision on 26 September 2019, as well as an extension of the time within which that application may be made. Such an application must be made within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal’s decision: s 477(1) of the Act. The Tribunal made its decision on 14 August 2019 and the 35-day period ended on 18 September 2019. The application was therefore made eight days after the prescribed period had lapsed. Section 477(2) allows the Court, by order, to extend the 35-day period as the Court considers appropriate, if it is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to do so. In Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28, 276 CLR 579 Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ explained the exercise of the Federal Court’s discretion under s 477A(2) of the Act, a provision which corresponds with this Court’s discretion to extend time in s 477(2). In short compass, the focus of s 477A(2)(b) (and so also s 477(2)(b)) is not on the interests of the applicant, but the broader interests of the administration of justice. This allows the Court to consider “a myriad of facts and circumstances, including the length of the applicant's delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application”: Tu'uta Katoa at [12]. Their Honours noted that the level of satisfaction that must be reached is not low because the Court “must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice”: at [12]. In this regard, their Honours noted that it is appropriate to consider the well-established principles guiding decisions whether to extend time in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186, 3 FCR 344 at 348–349: Tu’uta Katoa at [13].