CER19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

CER19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 37

File number: MLG 1802 of 2019
Judgment of: JUDGE GOSTENCNIK
Date of judgment: 21 January 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection (subclass 866) visa – review of decision of the (then) Refugee Review Tribunal – applicant applied for FOI request for access to documents – applicant applied for Ministerial Intervention request – extension of time – significant delay – where there is no acceptable explanation for the delay – where there is no arguable case of jurisdictional error – not satisfied it is in the interests of administration of justice to grant an extension of time – application to extend the 35-day period is dismissed
Legislation:

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) pts 5, 7, div 4, ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 375, 415, 417, 438, 422B(1), 477(1), 477(2), 477(2)(b), 477A(2), 477A(2)(b)

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) sch 2, pt 2, div 1, item 2

Cases cited:

BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218

Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic [1993] FCA 456; 43 FCR 280

Gallo v Dawson (1990) 64 ALJR 458; 93 ALR 479

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

M211 of 2003 v Refugee Review Tribunal [2004] FCAFC 293

Manna v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 400

McAuliffe v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1992) 28 ALD 609

Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang, Huang Cheng Jiang and Liu Jun Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259

Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133

Porter v Ghasemi [2021] FCAFC 144; (2021) 286 FCR 556

Re Commonwealth; Ex parte Marks [2000] HCA 67

SZMNO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 797

SZNYE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 500

SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86

Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; 276 CLR 579

Vella v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 42

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 39
Date of last submission/s: 22 November 2024
Date of hearing: 28 November 2024
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Berg
Solicitors for the Applicant: KWL Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr A Cunynghame
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

MLG 1802 of 2019

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

CER19

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE GOSTENCNIK

DATE OF ORDER:

21 JANUARY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an order extending the 35-day period within which an application for judicial review of…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 37
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of CER19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involves an applicant seeking judicial review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The Tribunal had affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The applicant applied for judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, well outside the statutory 35-day period for such applications. Consequently, the applicant sought an extension of time to file the application.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether it was appropriate to extend the 35-day period within which an application for judicial review of a Tribunal decision must be made. The court considered the relevant statutory provisions and case law, particularly focusing on the principles guiding decisions on extending time limits in judicial review applications. The court assessed whether the applicant had provided an acceptable explanation for the significant delay, the prejudice to the respondent if the extension was granted, and the merits of the application itself.

The court determined that the applicant had not provided an acceptable explanation for the significant delay in making the application. The applicant's delay was substantial and unexplained, which was a material factor against granting an extension. Additionally, the court considered the prejudice to the respondent and the merits of the application, concluding that an extension was not warranted in the interests of the administration of justice. Therefore, the court dismissed the application to extend the time for judicial review.

In light of the above, the court made no orders extending the time for the judicial review application. The applicant's application was dismissed.

Decision

Reasons for decision

By its decision on 3 January 2013, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa: CB71. The Tribunal notified the applicant of its decision on 4 January 2013: CB70.TRIBUNAL’S DECISION In its Statement of Decision and Reasons (Decision): CB71-CB96, the Tribunal set out at [1]-[3], a brief background and at [4]-[18], the relevant statutory provisions engaged by the applicant’s claims. At [19]-[101], the Tribunal discussed the applicant’s claims and evidence and other material including relevant country information. At [102], the Tribunal finds that it did not have jurisdiction to conduct a review in relation to the applicant's child, as a decision on the child's deemed protection visa application is still pending before the (then) Department of Immigration and Citizenship. The Tribunal’s findings about the applicant’s protection claims are summarised at [104]-[108] of the Decision. At [112]-[138], the Tribunal sets out its findings and reasons therefor. It noted that at times, the applicant’s claims were “patchy and lacked convincing detail”: at [116]; “illogical in the absence of further detail”: at [116]; contradictory: at [117]; inconsistent: at [120]; and further noted that “the applicant did not provide corroboration, documentary or otherwise, for any of her claims”, outside of her attendance at the church: at [122]. In substance, the Tribunal:(a)accepted the applicant is a Christian in Australia, and was so in China: at [105];(b)found that the applicant fabricated her claims that she had been arrested and detained in China in February 2007: at [112];(c)did not accept that her parents had been arrested and detained twice, in February 2007 and April 2010 for being religious organisers, nor that their shop had been closed by the police in April 2010: at [112];(d)found that the parents were of no adverse interest to the authorities at the time the applicant departed China: at [115];(e)found that the applicant was not subjected to any form of harm as a result of being a Christian, nor is she at risk of any harm if she returned to China by reason of her parents being religious organisers, and the Tribunal found that the applicant’s claims in this respect were fabricated as a means of promoting her migration intentions: at [125], and the chance that the applicant would be persecuted because of her religion if she returned to China is remote: at [106]; (f)accepted that the applicant was a Christian in China, she was baptised there and attended informal religious gatherings: at [126];(g)found that the applicant and her parents are not of a profile that would attract adverse attention by the Chinese authorities and was satisfied that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution: at [127]-[132]; and (h)did not accept that any harm which the applicant might experience in having a baby in breach of China’s family planning regulations is persecution for a Convention reason and does not amount to serious harm within the meaning of the Convention: at [136]-[138].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

By letter dated 4 November 2015, the applicant requested the (then) Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to substitute, under s 417 of the Act (as then in force), the Tribunal’s decision with a decision that was more favourable to the applicant: SCB30-SCB50. The applicant made submissions about being a young mother and sought consideration for the best interests of her children. On 12 November 2015, the Minister notified the applicant that the power of s 417 is not available in respect of the child, as there had been no decision made for them under s 415 of the Act (as then in force). The request for Ministerial Intervention in respect of the applicant was still ongoing: SCB65-SCB66. CONSIDERATION By application lodged on 8 June 2019 in the (then) Federal Circuit Court of Australia, the applicant seeks judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. An application to the Court for a review of a decision of the Tribunal must be made within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal’s decision: s 477(1) of the Act. The Tribunal made its decision on 3 January 2013 and the 35-day period within which an application to the Court must be made ended on 7 February 2013. The applicant therefore applied for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision 2,313 days after the time prescribed for making such an application had lapsed. Section 477(2) of the Act allows the Court, by order, to extend the 35-day period as the Court considers appropriate if it is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to do so. In Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; 276 CLR 579 Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ explained the exercise of the Court's discretion under s 477(2) of the Act, by reference to the corresponding provision for applications made to the Federal Court of Australia in s 477A(2). In short compass, the focus of s 477A(2)(b) (and so also s 477(2)(b)) is not on the interests of the applicant, but the broader interests of the administration of justice. This allows the Court to consider “a myriad of facts and circumstances, including the length of the applicant's delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application”: Tu'uta Katoa at [12]. Their Honours noted that the level of satisfaction that must be reached is not low because the Court “must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice”: at [12]. In this regard, their Honours noted that it is appropriate to consider the well-established principles guiding decisions whether to extend time in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349: Tu’uta Katoa at [13]. The non-exhaustive principles set out in Hunter Valley to which reference in Tu'uta Katoa is made were cited with approval in Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6] as follows:1.applications for an extension of time are not to be granted unless it is proper to do so; the legislated time limits are not to be ignored. The applicant must show an "acceptable explanation for the delay"; it must be "fair and equitable in the circumstances" to extend time;2.action taken by the applicant, other than by way of making an application for review, is relevant to the consideration of the question whether an acceptable explanation for the delay has been furnished;3.any prejudice to the respondent in defending the proceedings that is caused by the delay is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension;4.however, the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension; and5.the merits of the substantial application are to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted.See also Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113 at [33]-[36]; SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6]; BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218 at [33]; Porter v Ghasemi [2021] FCAFC 144; 286 FCR 556 at 566, [40].