BZAHM v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BZAHM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 675

Citation: BZAHM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 675
Parties: BZAHM , BZAIS, BZAIT and BZAIV v THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION, THE REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL and THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
File number: QUD 62 of 2015
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 3 July 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for review of decision of Federal Circuit Court refusing extension of time to seek judicial review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision – where Tribunal affirmed decision of the Minister to refuse to grant a protection visa – consideration of ss 476 and 477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – consideration of the test to be applied under s 477(2)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 – where Tribunal made decision in absence of applicant – whether primary judge failed to take into account a relevant consideration – whether primary judge erred in deciding that conducting the hearing in applicant’s absence was not unreasonable – whether primary judge denied the applicant procedural fairness – whether primary judge erred in finding no reasonable prospect of success – consideration of whether any difference between “no real prospect of success”, “no prospect of success” and “no reasonable prospect of success”
Legislation: Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited: BZAHM & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 49
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Kalanje v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1618
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597; [2002] HCA 11
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SZFHC (2006) 150 FCR 439; [2006] FCAFC 73
SZHFX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 355
SZIQP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 169
SZNZI v Minister for Immigration [2010] FMCA 57
SZOZG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 756
SZOZO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 944
SZQGO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 125 ALD 449; [2012] FCA 177
SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia [2013] FCA 1284
SZSXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1394
SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCA 224
Tang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 217 FCR 55; [2013] FCAFC 139
Vu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCAFC 59
Yu v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2009] FMCA 1161
Date of hearing: 27 April 2015
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Solicitor for the Applicants: Mr S Nguyen of Essen Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr S Richardson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Solicitor for the Third Respondent: Submitting notice

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 62 of 2015

BETWEEN:

BZAHM
First Applicant

BZAIS
Second Applicant

BZAIT
Third Applicant

BZAIV
Fourth Applicant

AND:
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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 675
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BZAHM v Minister for Immigration concerns an application for judicial review of the Federal Circuit Court's decision to refuse an extension of time to seek judicial review of the Refugee Review Tribunal's decision to affirm the Minister's refusal to grant a protection visa to the applicant. The applicant, a Vietnamese national, arrived in Australia in 2007 and had previously been refused a visa under the Employer Nomination Scheme. After applying for a protection visa, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision to refuse the visa. The applicant then applied to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review outside the 35-day statutory limit, and subsequently sought an extension of time. The Federal Circuit Court refused the extension, and the applicant now seeks judicial review of that decision.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Federal Circuit Court judge made a legal error in determining the applicant's application for an extension of time, and whether such an error, if any, constituted a jurisdictional error. The applicant argued that the judge set the test too high when concluding that the applicant's application for review had "such little prospect of success" that the application for extension of time should be rejected. The applicant also argued that the judge failed to take into account the unfairness occasioned by the circumstances in which the Tribunal made its decision, including its failure to make any inquiries about the applicant's absence, and the "rush" with which it made its decision.

The court found that the judge applied the correct test when assessing the merits of the applicant's substantive claims. The court held that there was no identified legal error made by the judge in determining the applicant's application for an extension of time. The court further found that even if there had been an error, it would not necessarily constitute a jurisdictional error. The court held that the judge was entitled to accept the Minister's submission that the Tribunal was entitled to make its decision when it did, and that there was nothing in the evidence to suggest that the applicant could not have contacted the Tribunal before the hearing to provide information about his difficulties.

The orders of the court were that the amended originating application filed on 23 March 2015 is dismissed, and the applicant pay the respondents' costs of and incidental to this proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The amended originating application filed on 23 March 2015 is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to this proceeding.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant provided the following particulars of these grounds:(a)On 4 September 2014, the applicant applied to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal to affirm the decision of the Minister.(b)That application was made outside the statutory limit of 35 days. Therefore, the matter was heard by Jarrett J as an application for extension of time.(c)On 23 January 2015, Jarrett J refused to extend time to review the application.(d)Jarrett J decided the applicant’s claim had no merits. The applicant contends his Honour set the bar too high in arriving at his decision on the merits of the applicant’s claim. As a result, the applicant was required to prove more than a reasonably arguable case.(e)Under s 476A(3) of the Act, that decision cannot be appealed. As a result, the applicant was denied his right to appeal.THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND The factual background to the applicant’s claims was aptly summarised by Jarrett J in the following terms (see BZAHM & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 49 (BZAHM)):[6]The applicant is a national of Vietnam, born on 30 March, 1981. He came to Australia on 13 August, 2007. He held a Temporary Work (Skilled) Principal applicant Offshore (UC 457) visa and worked as a butcher. This visa ceased on 23 July, 2011.[7]On 30 June, 2011 the first applicant lodged an application for an Employer Nomination Scheme (Full) (BW 856) visa which was refused on 25 October, 2011.[8]The first applicant applied for review of that decision and on 22 April, 2013 a migration review tribunal affirmed the first respondent’s delegate’s decision to refuse the first applicant the Employer Nomination Scheme (Full) (BW856) visa.[9]On 6 June, 2013 the first applicant lodged an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa. Claims were also made by the first applicant’s wife and their two daughters. They did not advance their own claims for protection, but relied upon their membership of the first applicant’s family unit. He also has a son, but he did not seek protection. He is in the care of the first applicant’s parents in Vietnam.[10]A delegate of the first respondent refused to grant that visa on 26 November, 2013. The first applicant thereafter applied to a refugee review tribunal on 19 December, 2013 for review of the delegate’s decision.[11]The tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 18 June, 2014.[12]The first applicant made a further application for a protection visa on 10 July, 2014 and a delegate of the first respondent notified the first applicant that his further application would be considered as a request by the first applicant for ministerial intervention.[13]The first applicant did not apply for judicial review of the decision of the refugee review tribunal within the 35 days mandated for such applications. He says that he was waiting to receive the outcome of the ministerial intervention request. However, the ministerial intervention was refused on 19 August, 2014.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 20 June 2014, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant’s representative enclosing a letter to the applicant noting that, while the medical certificate had been received by the Tribunal, by that time it had already made its decision and it therefore had no power to take any further action on the review.THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT In determining the applicant’s application for an extension of time, Jarrett J considered the applicant’s delay of 43 days in filing his application. His Honour observed that this delay “was not particularly lengthy” (BZAHM at [23]) and appears to have accepted the applicant’s explanations for that delay (BZAHM at [89]), which he summarised in the following terms:[23]Here, the 35 day time limit expired on 23 July, 2014. The application for review was not filed until 4 September, 2014 - some 43 days late. The delay was not particularly lengthy.[24]During that period, the first applicant was not idle. He filed a second (albeit misguided) application for a protection visa. That was dealt with pursuant to s 417 of the Act and he awaited that outcome.[25]… There is no evidence suggestive of an oversight by the first applicant’s representative after the tribunal’s decision, nor any attempt to seek judicial review before the date the application was filed. It might be inferred that the time limit was allowed to pass intentionally.[26]However, once notified of the first respondent’s refusal to substitute a more favourable decision on 19 August, 2014 the application for review was filed relatively promptly. Notwithstanding these conclusions, Jarrett J observed that there were other factors bearing upon the exercise of his discretion, specifically the substantive merits of the applicant’s review application and he then turned to consider that issue. Ultimately, Jarrett J formed the view that “the proposed application for review has such little prospect of success that to grant an extension of time within which to commence these proceedings would not be in the interests of the administration of justice”: BZAHM at [89]. His Honour therefore dismissed the applicant’s claim. Set out hereunder is a series of extracts which will serve to identify the salient aspects of his Honour’s reasons for reaching this conclusion. The applicant’s first ground of review was that the Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness in proceeding to make a decision on 18 June 2014 in the absence of the applicant. Jarrett J concluded that there was no merit in this ground essentially because it was not unreasonable for the Tribunal to proceed in the absence of the applicant when there was nothing before it to indicate why he had not attended the hearing. His Honour said:[63]In my view, there was nothing unreasonable about the tribunal’s determination to proceed in the absence of the first applicant. The first applicant had been appropriately notified of the first hearing date and had responded to that invitation. At the first applicant’s request that date was postponed and the first applicant was appropriately advised of the rescheduled hearing date. The evidence demonstrates that the first applicant knew of the rescheduled hearing date. The second invitation letter made clear to the first applicant and his representative what was required if a further postponement on medical grounds was necessary.[64]The first applicant did not seek any form of adjournment prior to the rescheduled hearing date on 18 June, 2014 nor did the tribunal receive any communications from the first applicant’s representative after 12 May, 2014. The next contact from the first applicant’s representative was after the hearing and the decision had been made.[65]The tribunal’s reasons indicate that the tribunal gave consideration as to whether or not to exercise the discretion.[66]In my view there was no unreasonableness affecting the tribunal’s decision. This ground of review has no real prospect of success.(Emphasis in original)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to the second ground, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal was entitled to make its decision when it did, and Jarrett J was entitled to accept this as a matter of law. The Minister also reiterated the observation of Jarrett J that there was nothing in the evidence to suggest that the applicant could not have contacted the Tribunal before the hearing to provide information about his difficulties: see BZAHM at [71]. The Minister cited SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCA 224 (SZTSU) at [16] and contended that this proposed ground amounted to a “quarrel with the view formed by [Jarrett J] appropriately instructed as to the law and within his jurisdiction, and it does not itself disclose error”.CONSIDERATIONThe jurisdiction point is conceded The Minister conceded that this Court had jurisdiction to deal with the applicant’s application. This concession was correctly made because the applicant is relying on s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act to seek a constitutional writ to quash an order of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court. That being so, the Full Court of this Court has held that such a proceeding is not “in relation to a migration decision” and is therefore not affected by the provisions of s 476A(1) of the Act, which remove certain migration decisions from the original jurisdiction of this Court: see Tang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 217 FCR 55; [2013] FCAFC 139 (Tang) at [2] to [11], followed recently in SZTSU at [2].The first step – did Jarrett J make an identified legal error? In an application of this kind, the first step is to determine whether Jarrett J made an identified legal error in determining the applicant’s application for an extension of time under s 477(2) of the Act. It is only if that question is answered in the affirmative that there will be a need to move to decide whether the legal error so identified constituted a jurisdictional error: see Tang at [31] and SZTSU at [11], citing SZRIQ at [40] and SZSXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1394 at [14]–[15]. In this respect, the distinction drawn in Craig between the decisions of an administrative tribunal and those of an inferior court becomes important: see Craig at 179–180 and SZTSU at [12].The errors of law advanced by the applicant On the basis of the applicant’s submissions outlined above, the errors of law he claims that Jarrett J made, can be distilled into two primary propositions, as follows:(a)by concluding that the applicant’s application for review had “such little prospect of success” that his application for extension of time should be rejected, his Honour set the test too high. Instead, the correct test was whether the applicant had no prospect of success: relying on SZQGO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 125 ALD 449; [2012] FCA 177 (SZQGO) at [29] per Murphy J; and(b)in assessing whether or not it was in the interests of the administration of justice to grant the extension of time sought, his Honour failed to have regard to the “quintessential” importance of the applicant’s evidence for the success of his review application and the effect his decision would have on the applicant’s substantive review rights, and he failed to take account of the unfairness occasioned by the circumstances in which the Tribunal made its decision, including its failure to make any inquiries about his absence, and the “rush” with which it made its decision.The correct test was used to assess the merits of the applicant’s substantive claims