CDA18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

CDA18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 276

File number(s): SYG 1329 of 2022
Judgment of: JUDGE LAING
Date of judgment: 18 April 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION – extension of time – where delay was significant – merits of substantive application such that extension of time granted – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority failed to consider centrally relevant evidence and/or a claim that clearly arose on the materials – application succeeds.
Legislation:

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 473DD, 476A, 477

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 256 FCR 593

AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 89; (2018) 261 FCR 503

BTI15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 49

BUD17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCAFC 140; (2018) 264 FCR 134

CTY20 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 1900

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114; (2013) 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99

MZZJO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 80; (2014) 239 FCR 436

Pearson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCAFC 203

Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 45; (1981) 147 CLR 589

Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; (2000) 177 ALR 491

Tu’uta  Katoa  v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 96 ALJR 819

WQRJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 736

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 83
Date of hearing: 28 March 2023
Place:  Sydney
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J. Widjaja (Counsel) appeared in person
Solicitor for the Applicant: Human Rights for All
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G. Johnson (Counsel) appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison

ORDERS

SYG 1329 of 2022

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

CDA18

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent

order made by:

JUDGE LAING

DATE OF ORDER:

18 APRIL 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.A writ of certiorari issue bringing the decision of the second respondent dated 7 March 2018 affirming the decision of a delegate of the first respondent not to grant the applicant a protection visa (original decision) into this Court and quashing it.

2.A writ of  mandamus  issue directing the second respondent to re-determine the review of the original decision according to law.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or…

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Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC2G 276
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

CDA18, a stateless individual from Gaza in the Palestinian Territories, challenged the decision of the Immigration and Asylum Division (IAA) affirming the Delegate's refusal to grant him a protection visa. The applicant, who arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival in 2013, contended that the IAA erred in its assessment of his claim for protection, particularly regarding his economic situation in Gaza and his ability to earn a sufficient income to support himself and his family. The court's role was to review whether the IAA appropriately considered the evidence and applied the relevant legal principles in its decision-making process.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the IAA properly evaluated the applicant's evidence concerning his economic situation in Gaza, including his employment history and the income he could earn. The applicant argued that the IAA failed to adequately consider his testimony regarding the difficulty of finding work in Gaza, the hazardous nature of tunnel work, and his inability to support his family based on the income he earned. The Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs contended that the IAA's decision was sound and that the applicant's claims did not meet the threshold for a protection visa.

In examining the IAA's decision, the court highlighted the importance of considering the cogency and centrality of new evidence in migration law. The court found that the IAA did not sufficiently address the applicant's evidence, including his testimony about the economic hardships he faced in Gaza and his attempts to find stable employment. The court noted that the applicant's description of his economic situation as "unbearable" and "insufficient to start life" was supported by the country information, which detailed the limited economic opportunities and high poverty rate in Gaza. The court concluded that the IAA's failure to properly consider this evidence was a material error that warranted the granting of the applicant's appeal.

The court granted the applicant's appeal, quashed the IAA's decision, and remitted the matter back to the IAA for reconsideration in light of the court's findings. The court emphasised the need for the IAA to thoroughly assess the applicant's evidence and the context in which it was presented, particularly in relation to his economic circumstances and the potential for serious or significant harm if returned to Gaza.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

At the hearing of this matter on 28 March 2023, after some discussion with the parties, I determined that the extension of time ought to be granted and reserved my reasons in that regard. The matter therefore proceeded to be heard by way of final hearing, following which judgment was reserved. These reasons encompass my reasons both in respect of the grant of the extension of time and the orders that I have determined ought to be made after the final hearing of this matter. BACKGROUND TO THE IAA’S DECISION The applicant is from Gaza in the Palestinian Territories. He arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 25 April 2013. On 30 November 2016, the applicant applied for a protection visa. The Delegate refused the application on 22 November 2017. On 27 November 2017, the matter was referred to the IAA for review. On 7 March 2018, the IAA affirmed the Delegate’s decision.THE IAA’S DECISION The IAA observed that it had received a submission from the applicant through his migration agent on 18 December 2017. To the extent that it advanced argument or submissions based upon information that was before the Delegate, the IAA stated that it had been considered. The IAA was not satisfied that a Human Rights Watch or media report that predated the Delegate’s decision could not have been provided to the Delegate. Considering this and the general nature of the new information, the IAA was not persuaded that the requirements of s 473DD of the Act were met (at [5]-[6]). The IAA therefore did not consider the Human Rights Watch report or the media report in coming to its decision (at [6]). The IAA summarised the applicant’s claims at [7] of its decision. This included what it characterised as the applicant’s claim that he “will not be able to find work because only people who have links to Hamas can get work”. At [11]-[12], the IAA summarised certain country information before it as follows (footnotes omitted): 11. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) country information report dated 15 March 2017, sets out the historical development of the Palestinian Territories. The Territories, which are within Israel, currently comprise two separate areas; the West Bank, a large territory to the east of Jerusalem, which includes the cities of Nablus, Ramullah and Hebron; and Gaza, which is a smaller territory on Israel’s south-west coast, including Gaza City and Rafah. The West Bank is currently under the control of the Palestinian Authority while Gaza has come under the effective control of Hamas. DFAT reports that Palestinian residents of Gaza can obtain travel documents under the seal of the Palestinian Authority and these documents are accepted by 37 countries.1 The Palestinian passport does not convey citizenship of a state (in the absence of a Palestinian state) but it does entitle the holder to leave and re-enter, in the applicant’s case, Gaza without the need for additional travel and re-entry permits (unless Israeli authorities have specific security reasons).2 I accept that the applicant was able to obtain a passport. There is nothing in the material which leads me to doubt the bona fides of his other identity documents.12. I also note information in the DFAT report that restrictions on freedom of movement enforced by Israeli authorities make it almost impossible for Palestinians to move between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israel maintains tight control of the Palestinian Population Registry and the residency status of all Palestinians; for example, there are separate permits that clearly denote if an individual is from Gaza or from the West Bank. It is not legally or physically possible to move between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, except in exceptional circumstances.3

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 7 March 2018, the IAA affirmed the Delegate’s decision.THE IAA’S DECISION The IAA observed that it had received a submission from the applicant through his migration agent on 18 December 2017. To the extent that it advanced argument or submissions based upon information that was before the Delegate, the IAA stated that it had been considered. The IAA was not satisfied that a Human Rights Watch or media report that predated the Delegate’s decision could not have been provided to the Delegate. Considering this and the general nature of the new information, the IAA was not persuaded that the requirements of s 473DD of the Act were met (at [5]-[6]). The IAA therefore did not consider the Human Rights Watch report or the media report in coming to its decision (at [6]). The IAA summarised the applicant’s claims at [7] of its decision. This included what it characterised as the applicant’s claim that he “will not be able to find work because only people who have links to Hamas can get work”. At [11]-[12], the IAA summarised certain country information before it as follows (footnotes omitted): 11. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) country information report dated 15 March 2017, sets out the historical development of the Palestinian Territories. The Territories, which are within Israel, currently comprise two separate areas; the West Bank, a large territory to the east of Jerusalem, which includes the cities of Nablus, Ramullah and Hebron; and Gaza, which is a smaller territory on Israel’s south-west coast, including Gaza City and Rafah. The West Bank is currently under the control of the Palestinian Authority while Gaza has come under the effective control of Hamas. DFAT reports that Palestinian residents of Gaza can obtain travel documents under the seal of the Palestinian Authority and these documents are accepted by 37 countries.1 The Palestinian passport does not convey citizenship of a state (in the absence of a Palestinian state) but it does entitle the holder to leave and re-enter, in the applicant’s case, Gaza without the need for additional travel and re-entry permits (unless Israeli authorities have specific security reasons).2 I accept that the applicant was able to obtain a passport. There is nothing in the material which leads me to doubt the bona fides of his other identity documents.12. I also note information in the DFAT report that restrictions on freedom of movement enforced by Israeli authorities make it almost impossible for Palestinians to move between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israel maintains tight control of the Palestinian Population Registry and the residency status of all Palestinians; for example, there are separate permits that clearly denote if an individual is from Gaza or from the West Bank. It is not legally or physically possible to move between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, except in exceptional circumstances.3 The IAA accepted that the applicant was an Arab Sunni from Gaza in the Palestinian Territories and that he was stateless. It found that the Palestinian Territories was the “receiving country” for the purposes of the review and that if the applicant were to return there, he would return to Gaza (at [13]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Where an inference is drawn that particular evidence has been overlooked, the consequences of this will depend upon the cogency and centrality of the material, within the context of the decision under review and the applicant’s claims: see SZRKT at [97]- [112]), BUD17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCAFC 140; (2018) 264 FCR 134 at [65] (per Robertson, Steward and Thawley JJ) and the cases cited therein.Consideration The applicant submitted that the IAA did not grapple with the evidence that was before it, including the evidence that the applicant gave at his Entry Interview regarding his ability to earn sufficient income from employment in Gaza to support himself and his family. That evidence relevantly included the following: Q: I need you to move along a little to what happened more recently?A: After that I tried to start a life, I tried to work for someone, help my family, help my brother's, help my relatives. The situation in Gaza is unbearable. I started to work in the tunnels, I worked for almost one year and 4 or 5 months, something like that. It is very exhausting work, we start at 7 and finish at 5. Or 7pm. It was like shift work. Some of our friends died as a result of tunnels collapsing on them.As a result of unemployment, I took this money and spent it on my family and brothers because their situation was no good. There is no way you can work, using your qualification. You need a middle man for that.After one year and four or five months, my mum had kidney failure. I had to stay home and look after her and take her to hospital. My work in the tunnels was disrupted. I would go for work for 3-4 days. I then went to hairdressing and learnt about that profession and at the [REDACTED] I learnt the profession. When I finished the course I went and worked at a hairdresser's place. I worked there for 3 months, along with the course, I worked there for 6 months. It was very hard work, not many clients, not much income. The income there was not enough to start life, buy house, so that is when I thought I should leave the country.Q: You left Palestine to have a better life?A: Yes, some freedom, I need to help my brother's, I need to help my nephews. And also to help myself to be something in the community. I accept, as the Minister submitted, that the applicant did not spell out the relationship between what was claimed in the Entry Interview and the criteria for the visa. This was not required. The Minister did not suggest otherwise in oral submissions. However, the Minister did dispute that what was raised in the Entry Interview amounted to evidence or any claim that the applicant and his family were unable to subsist on the income that the applicant earned from hairdressing, as opposed to doing such things as “buy[ing] [a] house”. Such considerations, it was submitted, did not attract the protection criteria. However, the applicant also referred in his Entry Interview to the income being insufficient to “start life”. Whilst not elegantly expressed, I accept the applicant’s submission that this expression was given context earlier in the record of the Entry Interview. There, the applicant had explained that in attempting to “start a life” and support his family through work, he and his family had faced an “unbearable situation” in Gaza. This, the applicant had said, had resulted in him undertaking dangerous and exhausting work in the tunnels through which some of his friends had been killed. Context to this was provided by the country information before the IAA, which referred to an illegal tunnel system for smuggling which the Israeli and Egyptian authorities were “actively engaged in finding and destroying”. Context was also provided by country information referring to the economic situation in Gaza, which indicated limited economic opportunities and a significant poverty rate. Even without this context, I find it difficult to accept that the applicant’s characterisation of his family’s economic situation as “unbearable” within the context of the employment that he was able to achieve, and insufficient to “start life”, as being of a level that was necessarily incapable of attracting the definitions of serious or significant harm.