DJN17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

Case •

[2025] FedCFamC2G 1306

•

14 August 2025

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

DJN17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1306   

File number(s): SYG 3019 of 2020
Judgment of: JUDGE ZIPSER
Date of judgment: 14 August 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Judicial review – decision of Immigration Assessment Authority refusing to grant protection visa – whether Authority erred in finding that information was not relevant within meaning of s 473DC(1) – whether Authority erred in not being satisfied that new information was credible within meaning of s 473DD(b)
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 473CC, 473DC, 473DD, 476.
Cases cited:

AZT22 vMinister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 90

CDZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 967

CSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Gill [2019] FCAFC 9; 268 FCR 575

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v BTW17 [2020] FCAFC 159; 294 FCR 150

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 50
Date of hearing: 12 August 2025
Place: Parramatta
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr R Selliah (Rasan T Selliah & Associates)
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr L Dennis (Mills Oakley)

ORDERS

SYG 3019 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN:

DJN17

Applicant
AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE ZIPSER

DATE OF ORDER:

14 AUGUST 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent is amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2.The application is dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in the sum of $6,700.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE ZIPSER

INTRODUCTION

  1. On 29 December 2020, the applicant lodged an application for judicial review, pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act), of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) dated 30 November 2020. The IAA affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent refusing to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (SHEV) under s 65 of the Act.

  2. For the reasons that follow, the application is dismissed.

    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

  3. In October 2012, the applicant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival.

  4. On 29 March 2016, the applicant applied for a SHEV, claiming to be at risk of harm if returned to Sri Lanka.

  5. On 3 November 2016, following an interview in August 2016, a delegate of the first respondent made a decision refusing to grant the applicant a SHEV.

  6. On 9 November 2016, the applicant’s matter was referred to the IAA for review under Part 7AA of the Act (as it then was).

  7. On 30 November 2016, the applicant’s representative provided a written submission and other documents to the IAA.

  8. On 8 June 2017, the IAA sent a letter to the applicant inviting him to comment on country information about current conditions in Sri Lanka, including information in a United Kingdom Home Office report dated 31 March 2017 (UKHO Report). On 22 June 2017, the applicant’s representative provided a response to the invitation to comment.

  9. On 29 June 2017, the IAA made a decision affirming the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a SHEV (2017 Decision).

  10. Following a judicial review application by the applicant to this Court, on 27 October 2020 the Court made an order by consent quashing the 2017 Decision.

  11. Upon remittal to the IAA, on 17 November 2020 the IAA provided the applicant with a further opportunity to provide material to the IAA. On 26 November 2020, the applicant’s representative emailed a submission to the IAA.

  12. On 30 November 2020, the IAA made a decision affirming the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a SHEV (2020 Decision).

    IAA’S 2020 DECISION

    Information before the IAA

  13. The IAA at [6]-[8] considered the material given by the Secretary to the IAA under s 473CB of the Act. Part of the material was the UKHO Report. The IAA at [8] did not consider the UKHO Report was relevant to the review.

  14. The IAA at [9]-[24] considered, with reference to s 473DD of the Act, whether it could consider the material provided by the applicant’s representative to the IAA on 30 November 2016, 22 June 2017 and 26 November 2020. The IAA made findings as to material it could consider and material it could not consider.

  15. In relation to the criterion for a protection visa in s 36(2)(a) of the Act, the IAA at [27]-[86] considered whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution. The IAA at [85] concluded that it was “not satisfied the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for any reason”.

  16. In relation to the criterion for a protection visa in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act, the IAA at [87]-[95] considered whether the applicant met s 36(2)(aa). The IAA at [95] concluded that the applicant did not meet s 36(2)(aa).

  17. It followed from the above findings that the IAA affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a SHEV.

    PROCEEDING IN THIS COURT

    Judicial review application and steps up to hearing on 12 August 2025

  18. On 29 December 2020, the applicant filed an application in this Court seeking judicial review of the IAA’s decision (Application). The Application contains three grounds. The applicant subsequently abandoned grounds 1 and 3, leaving ground 2 as follows (as written):

    2.The IAA fell into jurisdictional error by misapplying and misconstruing the test contained in s 473DD of the Act when determining whether it could consider the 'new information' provided by the applicant (CSRJ6 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474 ('CSR16') at [41]-(43]; AYKJ 7 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1053 ('AYK17') at [65], [68]).

    Particulars:

    a. s 473DD of the Act mandates that new information cannot be considered until the cumulative test in subsections (a) and (b) is satisfied (Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQWJ7 [2018] FCAFC 110 at [36]). For subsection (b), the IAA must be satisfied with respect to any one of the preconditions outlined. The IAA must always be satisfied that the precondition in s 473DD(a) of 'exceptional circumstances' is met to justify considering new information (Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16 at [29]-[31]).

    b.At [8], the IAA in its second decision did not consider that the UK Home Office's Fact Finding mission about the treatment of Tamils with a former LTTE is relevant or that there are exceptional circumstances that justify considering it 'given the findings below about the applicant's lack of LTTE profile'. In this case, the IAA failed to adequately consider whether exceptional circumstances exist to justify considering the new information and failed to consider the preconditions in s 473DD(b).

    c.At [13], the IAA in its second decision concluded that the information contained in the police report and the applicant's father's letter was not credible. However, it was not open for the IAA to make a credibility finding. All the 'credible' element of s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria requires is that the IAA was satisfied that the 'new information' is capable of being believed, as s 473DD(b)(ii) merely acts as a 'filtering mechanism' (CSR16 at [41]-[42]). By undertaking a prolonged and lengthy deliberation of the new information's credibility at [13], the IAA exceeded its jurisdiction by imposing a higher standard of satisfaction than the s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria requires (CSR16 at [43]). The IAA also did not adequately consider whether there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering this new information under s 473DD(a).

    d.The phrase 'exceptional circumstances' has a broad meaning and, at a minimum, it refers to circumstances that are not regularly or normally encountered.

  19. Following a period of inactivity, on 19 June 2025 the parties were notified by the registry of the Court that the matter was listed for hearing on 12 August 2025.

  20. On 24 July 2025, the applicant filed a written submission (AS).

  21. On 5 August 2025, the first respondent filed a written submission.

    Hearing on 12 August 2025

  22. At the hearing in this Court on 12 August 2025, Rasan Selliah of Rasan T Selliah & Associates appeared for the applicant. Liam Dennis from Mills Oakley appeared for the first respondent.

  23. A Court Book was tendered (CB) which contained the IAA’s 2020 Decision and documents before the IAA.

  24. On 30 November 2016, the applicant’s representative provided some documents to the IAA, including a “message form from Sri Lanka Police together with translation” and a “letter from the applicant’s father together with English translation”. (CB 169) The English translations, but not the Tamil originals, were in the Court Book. Mr Selliah tendered the Tamil originals.

  25. The parties’ lawyers made oral submissions which supplemented their written submissions. The submissions are addressed below.

    CONSIDERATION

  26. Sections 473DC and 473DD of the Act provided at the time of the IAA’s 2020 Decision:

    473DC Getting new information

    (1) Subject to this Part, the Immigration Assessment Authority may, in relation to a fast track decision, get any documents or information (new information) that:

    (a) were not before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65; and

    (b)      the Authority considers may be relevant.

    (2) The Immigration Assessment Authority does not have a duty to get, request or accept, any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by a referred applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances.

    (3) Without limiting subsection (1), the Immigration Assessment Authority may invite a person, orally or in writing, to give new information:

    (a)       in writing; or

    (b) at an interview, whether conducted in person, by telephone or in any other way.

    473DD Considering new information in exceptional circumstances

    For the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless:

    (a)the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and

    (b)the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information:

    (i) was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or

    (ii) is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims.

  27. The IAA at [6]-[24] undertook the preliminary task of identifying the information to which it could have regard in carrying out the review required by s 473CC(1). Ground 2 of the Application complains about the IAA’s treatment of three items of information in undertaking this task.

  28. The first item of information the subject of complaint is the UKHO Report. The IAA stated at [7]-[8]:

    [7] I note the delegate referred to the 2016 DFAT report. I note the applicant's representative commented on the then current DFAT report 2017 and UK Home Office Fact Finding mission about treatment of Tamils with a former LTTE association also and provided information (which I have considered below). The more recent DFAT 2017, 2018 and November 2019 reports, regarding treatment of Tamils, asylum seekers, and returnees were not before the delegate and are new information. The information is publicly available and reliable general country information. Given the passage of time since the delegate's decision and that they provide more recent information and they have been produced specifically for the purposes of protection status refugee determination, I am satisfied there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the 2017, 2018 and 2019 DFAT report information.

    [8] I do not consider the UK Home Office Fact Finding mission about treatment of Tamils with a former LTTE association is relevant or that there are exceptional circumstances that justify considering it given my findings below about the applicant's lack of LTTE profile. In any event the more recent DFAT information is before me.

  29. The “UK Home Office Fact Finding mission” referred to at [7] and [8] is the UKHO Report. It appears from the IAA’s letter dated 8 June 2017 (CB 203-206) that in June 2017 the IAA exercised its power under s 473DC(1) of the Act to get the UKHO Report, following which the IAA invited the applicant to comment on the report.

  30. While the IAA reviewer in 2017 considered the UKHO Report was relevant to the IAA’s task in 2017 (and referred to the document in the 2017 Decision at [8] as “an authoritative source of information [which] in particular addresses the processes and conditions of rehabilitation”), the IAA reviewer in 2020 had a different view. Hence, the reviewer found at [8] of the 2020 Decision:

    I do not consider the UK Home Office Fact Finding mission about treatment of Tamils with a former LTTE association is relevant ….

  31. The applicant’s complaint in particular (b) of ground 2 concerning the IAA’s findings at [8] is:

    … the IAA failed to adequately consider whether exceptional circumstances exist to justify considering the new information and failed to consider the preconditions in s 473DD(b).

  32. It is stated at AS [30]:

    … the IAA failed to conduct a proper analysis under either subsection (b)(i) or (b)(ii). Instead the Authority dismissed the UK Home Office Fact Finding mission based solely on its assessment about the applicant’s ‘lack of profile’. This approach fails to recognise the specific requirements set forth in the statute …

  33. The applicant’s complaint concerning the IAA’s treatment of the UKHO Report misunderstands the IAA’s finding at [8]. The IAA at [8] found, with respect to s 473DC(1)(a), that it did not consider the UKHO Report was “relevant” (Not Relevant Finding).

  34. As stated in CDZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 967 at [10]:

    In terms, s 473DC(1) consigns the subject of relevance to the Authority’s evaluative judgement and then only to the extent that the Authority “considers” that the information concerned “may”, not “must”, be relevant. Language of this kind has the effect that it is not for a court on judicial review … itself to determine whether the information is or is not relevant or even whether it may be relevant. It is enough that a conclusion is reasonably open to the Authority that the information may or, may not, be relevant … It was reasonably open to the Authority to consider that neither of the news articles might be relevant to a claimed basis of fear of persecution. That being so, it was unnecessary for the Authority to advert to any of the considerations specified in s 473DD, because the need to consider them is predicated upon the existence of “new information”, as defined. Neither article comprised “new information”.

  35. During the hearing in this Court on 12 August 2025, I invited Mr Selliah to identify a jurisdictional error in the Not Relevant Finding. Mr Selliah asserted that it was not reasonably open to the IAA to find that the UKHO Report was not relevant, but did not develop the submission further.

  36. Mr Selliah relied on the fact that the IAA reviewer in 2017 described the UKHO Report in the IAA’s 2017 Decision as “an authoritative source of information [which] in particular addresses the processes and conditions of rehabilitation”. However, that a reviewer in 2017 considered that a country information report was relevant to that reviewer’s task in 2017 does not mean that it was not reasonably open to a different reviewer in 2020 to decide that the same country information report was not relevant to the reviewer’s task in 2020.

  37. I asked Mr Selliah to identify any item of information in the UKHO Report (listed at CB 204-205) that he considered was clearly relevant to the IAA’s review in November 2020 of the delegate’s decision. Mr Selliah did not identify any item of information. The fact that the applicant was unable to identify to the Court any item of information in the UKHO Report which was clearly relevant to the IAA’s review task adds to the challenge of persuading the Court that the Not Relevant Finding contained a jurisdictional error.

  38. I consider that it was reasonably open to the IAA to find at [8] that it did not consider the UKHO Report was ‘relevant’ within the meaning of this word in s 473DC(1).

  39. The second and third documents or items of information the subject of complaint are the police message form and letter from the applicant’s father at CB 172-173. The IAA at [11]-[13], in considering whether it could consider the documents in light of s 473DD, stated:

    [11] The police message form required the applicant to attend Colombo CID on 12 October 2016. The father's letter indicated he had found out the police had issued an arrest warrant and that they had asked the applicant's father a lot of questions and made accusations about the applicant (that he received LTTE training, what works he did for the LTTE, where he kept weapons, how many houses he accommodated LTTE, the details of the persons and whether he fled to a foreign country and has contacts with the L TTE from there and is helping them).

    [12] According to the 2020 submissions the information was directly personal to the applicant and demonstrates that the authorities still had strong specific interest in the applicant. It was corroborative of his claims and buttresses the credibility of the applicants fears and therefore exceptional circumstances exist to consider the new information. The applicant's father's letter also addressed factual claims the delegate did not accept. It was submitted it demonstrates that the police are actively enquiring about the applicant's role in accommodating LTTE cadres in Chilaw and the delegate erred in their factual finding.

    [13] I consider the police report and letter from the applicant's father could have been provided to the delegate as they predate the delegate's decision. The applicant's representative in the 2016 submission states that they were not available at the time of the delegate's interview in August 2016 , but there is no explanation as to why they were not given, or the delegate not advised of the development of events in the weeks before the decision was made. Further, I do not consider the information is credible. Other than an illegible signature, there is no identifying evidence from the applicant's father that indicates the letter was actually from him. It is odd also that the father's own letter is addressed to the father as well. Further, while the NAATI accredited translation of the father's letter refers to the issuance of an arrest warrant, the document provided is a 'police message form' asking the applicant to attend CID. It is not an arrest warrant and does not appear to be a summons or indicate any consequence if not responded to. It is a pro forma message form which indicated it is used for sending messages from one police station to the next. Given it is police message pro forma between police stations it does not make sense that it is a message directed to the applicant. Further, there was no address given of Colombo CID or any contact details to enable the person to know where to attend. Further, I find it difficult to believe that the police message form would only give 2 days' notice requiring him to attend at the Colombo CID given the distance between Colombo and Kilinochchi. It [is] also not credible that police would issue such a message knowing he was not in the country (as indicated in the father's letter). While on the face of it the information may be corroborative, I do not consider the information is credible information. Further, I find it difficult to believe that the applicant would not have provided this information earlier or informed the delegate of such events or documents (even if he had not yet translated the documents) given their significance. I am not satisfied as to s.473DD(a) or (b)

  1. The applicant’s complaint in particular (c) of ground 2 concerning the IAA’s findings at [11]-[13] is:

    At [13], the IAA in its second decision concluded that the information contained in the police report and the applicant's father's letter was not credible. However, it was not open for the IAA to make a credibility finding. All the 'credible' element of s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria requires is that the IAA was satisfied that the 'new information' is capable of being believed, as s 473DD(b)(ii) merely acts as a 'filtering mechanism' (CSR16 at [41]-[42]). By undertaking a prolonged and lengthy deliberation of the new information's credibility at [13], the IAA exceeded its jurisdiction by imposing a higher standard of satisfaction than the s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria requires ( CSR16 at [43]). The IAA also did not adequately consider whether there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering this new information under s 473DD(a).

  2. One particular of the applicant’s complaint relies on CSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474 where Bromberg J stated that ‘credible’ in s 473DD(b)(ii) means ‘capable of being believed’, and it is not a condition of engagement with s 473DD(b)(ii) that the information be ‘true’. It is stated at AS [41]:

    As articulated in CSR16, the credibility standard outlined in section 473DD(b)(ii) requires only that the new information be "capable of being accepted by the authority as truthful", not to be inherently true. The IAA's analysis in paragraph 13 appears to impose a higher threshold, demanding definitive proof of credibility rather than acknowledging that the information, on its face, could be perceived as credible ("credible personal information") for the purpose of s473DD. The applicant's police report and father's letter directly relate to the applicant's safety and standing with authorities, aligning with the notion that they deserve to be considered at the deliberative stage together with all other evidence, once pass the s473DD threshold.

  3. I consider that the IAA at [13] correctly understood that ‘credible’ meant ‘capable of being believed’. The multiple concerns listed by the IAA at [13] concerning the two documents, based principally on the appearance and content of the documents, is consistent with a conclusion that the IAA understood that ‘credible’ meant ‘capable of being believed’. In CSR16 at [39] Bromberg J noted that “it was not in contest that the Authority was engaged in a process of assessing the veracity of the ‘new information’, not on its face, but by reference to ‘review material’ which had been received by the Authority”. In the present matter, in contrast, the IAA principally assessed the veracity of the two documents based on the appearance and content of the two documents.

  4. A second particular of the applicant’s complaint relies on Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v BTW17 [2020] FCAFC 159; 294 FCR 150 (BTW17), and AZT22 vMinister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 90 (AZT22). In BTW17 at [68]-[69], [73] and [76] the Full Court stated:

    [68] … what is contained in s 473DD is described as a “precondition”. That is, although it is part of the review function of the Authority, the exercise of power under s 473DD comes before the Authority can “consider new information that is given to it” by a referred applicant. It is thus part of the Authority’s preliminary decision-making about what is the complete scope of the material it will be considering on its review for the purpose of its statutory task …

    [69] … the precondition in s 473DD(b)(i) needs “[n]o explication”. It is a matter of objective fact, and straightforward. It would be curious if the precondition in s 473DD(b)(ii) were not also treated as involving a relatively straightforward assessment, being, as we have explained, a preliminary step the Authority must take before settling on the scope of the material which is to be before it on its review, so that it can consider afresh the protection visa application, and make its own decision.

    …

    [73] However, there comes a point at which such an assessment will go too far, and in reality will equate to, or become indistinguishable from, the Authority’s reasoning on its own — fresh — consideration of the protection visa application. That would not be the correct approach, because that is not the purpose for which the power is conferred.

    …

    [76]  Particularly in a scheme premised on a review “on the papers”, there is a real difficulty with the Authority undertaking some kind of substantively evaluative process at this point, and weighing the new information, the visa applicant’s explanation of why it should be considered, and the existing review material together, and then reaching some relatively definitive findings about the credibility of the visa applicant (which would occur in deciding if the new information were “true”). That difficulty is that the Authority is, in substance, taking into account material that is not before it on the review in determining the credibility of the visa applicant. That is neither what the legislative scheme of Pt 7AA contemplates nor what it permits. Fresh decisions on the review must be based on the review material before the Authority: they cannot be based on extraneous material, which is what “new information” is, until it is admitted. That, in our opinion, is an important reason why the approach identified by Bromberg J in CSR16 is correct.

  5. In AZT22, Banks-Smith and Jackson JJ found that the IAA made the type of error explained in BTW17 at [73] and [76]. As explained by their Honours at [55], the IAA applied a finding it made “at the deliberative stage of the review in assessing whether … new information, [being] information that might have been relevant to that finding, is credible”. This approach by the IAA mixed and confused:

    (a)the “Authority’s preliminary decision-making about what is the complete scope of the material it will be considering on its review” (BTW17 at [68]) or the “preliminary step the Authority must take before settling on the scope of the material which is to be before it on its review” (BTW17 at [69]) (the step of which s 473DD is a part); with

    (b)“the Authority’s reasoning on its own – fresh – consideration of the protection visa application” (BTW17 at [73]) or “the deliberative stage of the review” (AZT22 at [55]).

  6. In the present matter, the IAA at [11]-[13] has not made this error. Mr Selliah did not identify any part of the IAA’s reasons at [11]-[13] which indicated the error identified and explained in AZT22.

  7. A third particular of the applicant’s complaint is that, as stated in the last sentence of particular (c), “the IAA also did not adequately consider whether there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering this new information under s 473DD(a)”. It is asserted at AS [48]:

    The IAA also did not adequately consider whether there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering this new information under s 473DD(а). The phrase 'exceptional circumstances' has a broad meaning and, at a minimum, it refers to circumstances that are not regularly or normally encountered.

  8. Mr Selliah did not explain why the Court should infer that the IAA did not adequately consider whether there were exceptional circumstances. I consider that the IAA’s “reasons for decision [at [13]] disclose a logical and intelligible basis for” (Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Gill [2019] FCAFC 9; 268 FCR 575 at [54]) its finding in the last sentence of [13] that “I am not satisfied as to s 473DD(a)”.

  9. Even if I am wrong and the IAA erred in its finding concerning s 473DD(a), the IAA also found in the last sentence of [13] that “I am not satisfied as to s 473DD … (b)”. This is a separate and independent basis for the IAA’s conclusion that, pursuant to s 473DD, it “must not consider” the two documents.

  10. For the above reasons, ground 2 does not identify a jurisdictional error in the IAA’s decision.

    COSTS

  11. At the conclusion of the hearing, I invited submissions from the parties on costs. Mr Dennis sought an order that the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs in the sum of $6,700. Mr Selliah did not oppose this order. I consider the amount sought by the first respondent is reasonable. I will make this order.

I certify that the preceding fifty (50) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Zipser.

Associate:

Dated:       14 August 2025

Cases Citing This Decision

0

Cases Cited

8

Statutory Material Cited

1

CSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474
AYK17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1053
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQW17 [2018] FCAFC 110