AYK17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AYK17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1053

Appeal from: AYK17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2568
File number(s): NSD 1966 of 2017
Judge(s): FARRELL J
Date of judgment: 8 July 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where the FCCA Judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority to affirm a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa – whether FCCA Judge erred by not finding that the Authority failed to comply with s 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether FCCA Judge failed to deal with substantive integer of the application or provide adequate reasons for rejecting ground of review – where new ground raised alleging the Authority misconstrued s 473DD by unduly narrowing its consideration of the term “exceptional circumstances” – where leave granted to raise new ground – appeal allowed on the basis of the new ground
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473DC, 473DD
Cases cited:

ABC17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 254

AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 111

AYK17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2568

BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958; 254 FCR 221

BZC17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 902

CDZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 967

CMY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 133

CSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474

CVK16 v Minister for Immigration Border Protection [2017] FCCA 235

CVK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1434; 257 FCR 297

DYS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 33; 260 FCR 260

Minister for Immigration ad Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176; 257 FCR 111

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CLV16 [2018] FCAFC 80; 260 FCR 482

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQW17 [2018] FCAFC 110

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Boarder Protection [2018] HCA 16

Date of hearing: 21 June 2018
Date of last submissions: 1 July 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 70
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr M Seymour with Ms L Nurpuri
Solicitor for the Appellant: Tim Smith Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr C Lenehan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted to any order of the Court, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1966 of 2017
BETWEEN:

AYK17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FARRELL J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 JULY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave is refused to the…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1053
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of AYK17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, AYK17, sought judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to affirm a delegate's decision to refuse him a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The legal issues presented to the court were whether the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) judge erred in not finding that the IAA failed to comply with section 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and whether the FCCA judge failed to adequately address the substantive integer of the application or provide sufficient reasons for rejecting the ground of review. Additionally, a new ground of appeal was raised, alleging that the IAA misconstrued section 473DD by unduly narrowing its consideration of the term "exceptional circumstances".

The court found that the IAA's limited statutory role dictated its function, and it could only affirm the delegate's decision or remit the case for further consideration. The court held that the IAA did not stand in the shoes of the original decision maker and its function was to review adverse decisions referred to it by the Department. The court found that the appellant's new claim involved "new information" and, therefore, the statutory prohibition against receiving "new information" also applied to the appellant's new claim. It pertained to a different fear, and the appellant's application must fail.

The court allowed the appeal on the basis of the new ground raised by the appellant. The decision of the IAA made on 3 February 2017 was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the IAA (differently constituted) for determination in accordance with law. The first respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of and incidental to the appeal, to be fixed by way of a lump sum to be agreed between the parties. If the parties could not agree on a lump sum for the costs, the matter of fixing a lump sum for costs was to be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave is refused to the appellant to rely on ground 2 of a further amended notice of appeal filed on 27 June 2018.

2. Leave is granted to the appellant to rely on ground 3 of a further amended notice of appeal filed on 27 June 2018.

3. The appeal be allowed.

4. Order 2 made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 24 October 2017 be set aside and in its place it be ordered that the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 3 February 2017 is set aside and the matter be remitted to the Immigration Assessment Authority (differently constituted) for determination in accordance with law.

5. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the appeal, to be fixed by way of a lump sum to be agreed between the parties.

6. If the appellant and the first respondent do not agree as to a lump sum for the appellant’s costs, the matter of fixing a lump sum for costs is to be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In CVK16 at [49]-[53], McKerracher J said:49 The narrow point for the appellant is that:(a)there is no impediment on the Authority considering new claims based on the same existing information; and (b)if a new claim on the same information is put before it, it should consider it. 50Such a submission for the appellant might well have force in a different forum and thus does give pause for consideration. In courts of law, if all the same information or evidence is relied upon before the reviewing court and there is otherwise no prejudice, a different legal consequence could be advanced and considered. However, the Migration Act dictates a limited function of the Authority. As the primary judge observed (at [44]), if such a submission were accepted, it would disregard what is plainly Parliament’s intended interpretation of s 473DC and s 473DD. In my view, it is plain that Parliament’s intention in enacting these provisions was to restrict applicants to material put before the delegate, save in exceptional circumstances. The provisions must be read in their context. That context includes these factors:(a)The Authority does not stand in the shoes of the original decision maker in the same way as the AAT. It cannot substitute its own decision; it can only affirm the decision or remit the case for further consideration.(b)The Authority’s function is not to deal with the applications for review but to review adverse decisions referred to it by the Department. 51In my view, given the limited statutory role of the Authority, the reasons of the Federal Circuit Court were correct. The Explanatory Memorandum, if it were necessary, puts the matter beyond doubt.52The Minister makes a further point that, even if there was jurisdictional error in failing to take into account the new claim, to remit it would be pointless as the existing information could not possibly support the new claim. Implicitly, the appellant tends to accept this would be so. However, he argues that the difference is that the Authority does have the power to seek additional information in relation to the claim, should it wish to do so. Therefore, it cannot be said that it would be futile to remit it to the Authority if there has been jurisdictional error because it is possible that the Authority may choose to get new information, especially if the claim has merit. However, having rejected the appellant’s interpretation of the statutory provisions, his application must fail. CONCLUSION53The new claim did involve ‘new information’ and therefore the statutory prohibition against receiving ‘new information’ also applies to the appellant’s new claim. It pertained to a different fear. It may be accepted that, insofar as McKerracher J’s reasoning in CVK16 at [50]-[51] was based on the limited statutory role of the Authority taken with the finding that the Authority did not stand in the shoes of the delegate, that reasoning is inconsistent with the High Court’s finding in Plaintiff M174/2016 at [17] that the Authority conducts a de novo review. It may also be accepted that if the matter to be decided in CVK16 was accurately described at [49] of that decision (as potentially involving a different claim based on no “new information”), the outcome would be inconsistent with CLV16 at [35].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant says that it is not clear from J[24]-[25] that the FCCA Judge grappled with the appellant’s submissions on this ground. Further, he says that the FCCA Judge’s reasoning fails to disclose properly a rationale for rejecting the construction of s 473DC advanced in that Court. The appellant says that the reasons only repeat that what the Authority did was “patent” in “taking into account” the “alleged” new information but it failed to deal with the appellant’s submission that the relevant provision only applies to information and not substantive grounds or submissions.Consideration In CVK16 at [49]-[53], McKerracher J said:49 The narrow point for the appellant is that:(a)there is no impediment on the Authority considering new claims based on the same existing information; and (b)if a new claim on the same information is put before it, it should consider it. 50Such a submission for the appellant might well have force in a different forum and thus does give pause for consideration. In courts of law, if all the same information or evidence is relied upon before the reviewing court and there is otherwise no prejudice, a different legal consequence could be advanced and considered. However, the Migration Act dictates a limited function of the Authority. As the primary judge observed (at [44]), if such a submission were accepted, it would disregard what is plainly Parliament’s intended interpretation of s 473DC and s 473DD. In my view, it is plain that Parliament’s intention in enacting these provisions was to restrict applicants to material put before the delegate, save in exceptional circumstances. The provisions must be read in their context. That context includes these factors:(a)The Authority does not stand in the shoes of the original decision maker in the same way as the AAT. It cannot substitute its own decision; it can only affirm the decision or remit the case for further consideration.(b)The Authority’s function is not to deal with the applications for review but to review adverse decisions referred to it by the Department. 51In my view, given the limited statutory role of the Authority, the reasons of the Federal Circuit Court were correct. The Explanatory Memorandum, if it were necessary, puts the matter beyond doubt.52The Minister makes a further point that, even if there was jurisdictional error in failing to take into account the new claim, to remit it would be pointless as the existing information could not possibly support the new claim. Implicitly, the appellant tends to accept this would be so. However, he argues that the difference is that the Authority does have the power to seek additional information in relation to the claim, should it wish to do so. Therefore, it cannot be said that it would be futile to remit it to the Authority if there has been jurisdictional error because it is possible that the Authority may choose to get new information, especially if the claim has merit. However, having rejected the appellant’s interpretation of the statutory provisions, his application must fail. CONCLUSION53The new claim did involve ‘new information’ and therefore the statutory prohibition against receiving ‘new information’ also applies to the appellant’s new claim. It pertained to a different fear.