CVK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CVK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1434

Appeal from: CVK16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 235
File number: WAD 169 of 2017
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 1 December 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Pt 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether a ‘new claim’ is within the definition of ‘new information’ as defined by s 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the statutory prohibition against receiving ‘new information’ under s 473DD of the Act also applied to appellant’s ‘new claim’ – whether there is an impediment on the Immigration Assessment Authority considering new claims based on pre-existing evidence and information
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7AA, ss 5AAA(2), 5(1), 36(1C), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 46A(1), 46A(2), 65, 189(3), 423A, 473BA, 473BB, 473CA, 473CC(2), 473DB, 473DC, 473DC(1), 473DD, 473DD(b)(ii), 473GA, 473GB

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)

Cases cited:

AFK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 1826

AMA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 136

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27

CDR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2759

Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters Subscribing to Contract No IHOOAAQS v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176

Thiess v Collector of Customs (2014) 250 CLR 664

Date of hearing: 31 July 2017
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 54
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr FA Robertson (Pro Bono)
Solicitor for the Appellant: AUM Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr PR Macliver
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits to any order of the Court, save as to the question of costs

ORDERS

WAD 169 of 2017
BETWEEN:

CVK16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 DECEMBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant to pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCKERRACHER J:

BACKGROUND

  1. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia at Christmas Island on 14 November 2012. He was taken into immigration detention as an unlawful non-citizen pursuant to s 189(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). By letter dated 28 August 2015 the Department of Immigration and Border Protection advised the appellant that the Minister had now exercised his power under s 46A(2) of the Migration Act to lift the bar under s 46A(1) to…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1434
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of CVK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority to refuse him a Safe Haven visa. The appellant argued that the Authority had erred in concluding that his claim constituted "new information" and, as a result, failed to exercise its jurisdiction to review the decision. The central legal issues were whether a "new claim" fell within the definition of "new information" under section 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and whether the statutory prohibition against receiving "new information" under section 473DD also applied to the appellant’s "new claim".

The court held that the new claim did indeed involve "new information" and that the statutory prohibition against receiving "new information" applied to the appellant’s new claim. The court rejected the appellant's interpretation that there was a meaningful distinction between information and claims that would exclude the new claim from the statutory prohibition. The court found that the statutory scheme was designed to restrict applicants to material presented before the delegate, except in exceptional circumstances. Given the appellant's new claim involved a different fear unrelated to the material previously presented, it qualified as "new information" within the statutory definition.

Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to the statutory framework governing the presentation of new information in migration cases, ensuring that the review process remains focused on the material originally before the decision-maker.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant to pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellant says that:(a)section 473DC(1) permits the Authority, subject to Pt 7AA, to ‘get any documents or information’ (called ‘new information’) that ‘were not before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65’ and ‘the [Authority] considers may be relevant’;(b)new information is defined by virtue of s 473BB as ‘any documents or information’. The section expressly omits any reference to claims. Parliament could have defined new information to constitute ‘any documents, information or claims’ which were not before the primary decision maker;(c)the difference between a claim and new information could also arise where a further claim arises based upon findings made by the primary decision maker;(d)for example, if a primary decision maker concludes (in the face of a denial by an applicant) that an applicant has committed an offence. The fact that the primary decision maker has made that conclusion may give rise to an additional claim of fear of harm arising out of the finding that the offence had been committed; (e)the decision of the primary judge would have the effect that, on review, that additional claim could not be made (absent a conclusion that s 473DD(b)(ii) is engaged). Using the example cited, the appellant says it is difficult to see how a finding of fact that an offence was committed by an applicant would constitute ‘credible personal information which was not previously known’;(f)the argument in relation to the distinction between information and claims can also be demonstrated by reference to s 423A which provides:How Tribunal is to deal with new claims or evidence (1)this section applies if, in relation to an application for review of an RRT-reviewable decision (the primary decision) in relation to a protection visa, the applicant: (a)raises a claim that was not raised in the application before the primary decision was made; or (b)presents evidence in the application that was not presented in the application before the primary decision was made. …(g)section 423A expressly distinguishes between a claim on one hand and ‘evidence’ on the other. It expressly provides for the consequences of a claim being raised that was not raised in the application before the primary decision was made. No such distinction appears in Pt 7AA. It was within the gift of Parliament, the appellant contends, to use the same wording in Pt 7AA when defining ‘new information’. It chose not to do so. For that reason, the primary judge’s conclusion that ‘it is plain that Parliament’s intention in enacting these provisions was to restrict applicants to material put before the delegate, save in exceptional circumstances’ (at [44] of the reasons) was, the appellant argues, erroneous in so far as the conclusion extends to a claim based on pre-existing evidence and information. THE MINISTER’S CONTENTIONS The Minister argues that the primary judge’s reasons for rejecting the appellant’s interpretation of the statutory provisions in Pt 7AA dealing with new information are correct. The primary judge observed (at [44]) that it was plain that Parliament’s intention in enacting s 473DC and s 473DD of the Migration Act was to restrict applicants to material put before the delegate, save in exceptional circumstances.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Minister makes a further point that, even if there was jurisdictional error in failing to take into account the new claim, to remit it would be pointless as the existing information could not possibly support the new claim. Implicitly, the appellant tends to accept this would be so. However, he argues that the difference is that the Authority does have the power to seek additional information in relation to the claim, should it wish to do so. Therefore, it cannot be said that it would be futile to remit it to the Authority if there has been jurisdictional error because it is possible that the Authority may choose to get new information, especially if the claim has merit. However, having rejected the appellant’s interpretation of the statutory provisions, his application must fail. CONCLUSION The new claim did involve ‘new information’ and therefore the statutory prohibition against receiving ‘new information’ also applies to the appellant’s new claim. It pertained to a different fear. Although the submissions of the Minister have prevailed on this occasion, the Court is grateful to the helpful argument and assistance given by pro bono counsel, Mr Robertson.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia at Christmas Island on 14 November 2012. He was taken into immigration detention as an unlawful non-citizen pursuant to s 189(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). By letter dated 28 August 2015 the Department of Immigration and Border Protection advised the appellant that the Minister had now exercised his power under s 46A(2) of the Migration Act to lift the bar under s 46A(1) to allow him to lodge a valid application for either a Temporary Protection Subclass 785 visa or a Safe Haven Enterprise Subclass 790 visa (Safe Haven visa). The letter invited the appellant to lodge an application for a protection visa of one of these two classes. On 13 October 2015, the appellant made an application for a Safe Haven visa. The application was supported by a written statement by the appellant and various attached documents. On 15 February 2016, the Department invited the appellant to accept assistance through the Primary Application and Information Service (PAIS) to assist him in making his application for protection, and the appellant consented to receiving assistance from PAIS. On 27 May 2016, the Department invited the appellant to attend an interview on 1 June 2016 to discuss his visa application and his protection claims. The appellant attended a protection visa interview on that date. On 15 July 2016, a delegate of the Minister made a decision refusing to grant the appellant a Safe Haven visa, as the delegate of the Minister found that the appellant is not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations pursuant to subs 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Migration Act. The delegate also was satisfied that the appellant did not meet the definition of ‘excluded fast track review applicant’ in s 5(1) of the Migration Act. In accordance with s 473CA of the Migration Act, on 19 July 2016 the delegate’s decision was automatically referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority to conduct a review of the delegate’s decision. On 19 July 2016, the Authority notified the appellant that the decision to refuse him a Safe Haven visa had been referred to the Authority. The Authority also provided the appellant with information about the Authority and the review process in the English and Tamil languages, and the Practice Direction issued by the President of the Authority on 21 April 2016. The Authority’s procedures were explained to the appellant by his migration agent on 25 July 2016. On 4 August 2016, the appellant provided submissions to the Authority together with a number of supporting documents. The appellant provided further submissions to the Authority on 10 August 2016. On 2 September 2016, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a visa. On 29 September 2016, the appellant lodged an application with the Federal Circuit Court of Australia seeking judicial review of the Authority’s decision. The appellant filed an amended application with the Federal Circuit Court on 22 December 2016. The sole ground of application was that the Authority ‘erred in concluding, at [11], that the [appellant’s] claim was ‘new information’ and in doing so constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction to review the decision.’