FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
BLR19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1386
ORDERS
ADG 126 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BLR19
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GERRARD
DATE OF ORDER:
18 DECEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g)
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 1386
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the IAA made a jurisdictional error in its decision. The applicant's arguments centred on the IAA's alleged failure to consider specific claims and information. The court noted that the applicant did not have a brother involved with the LTTE, and the claim regarding en masse processing was not substantiated in the material before the IAA. The court found that the IAA had considered the relevant information and applied the correct legal standards in its decision. The IAA did not err in failing to consider claims or information that were not properly before it. The court concluded that no jurisdictional error was established in the IAA's decision.
Given that no jurisdictional error was found in the IAA's decision, the court dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review. The IAA's decision to uphold the delegate's refusal to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa was affirmed. The court found that the IAA appropriately exercised its discretion and applied the relevant legal principles in reaching its decision. The applicant's claims did not warrant overturning the IAA's decision.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant had nothing to say in reply to the Minister’s submissions, save to repeat that he did not have a brother.CONSIDERATION As outlined above, there are four grounds of review advanced in these proceedings. Where an applicant is unrepresented, the Court endeavours to interpret the applicant’s grounds as broadly as possible (as per the principles in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392). That is more acute in this case where the applicant confirmed that the grounds were prepared by another person and at least one of those grounds patently bears no resemblance to the applicant’s circumstances. Whilst those grounds clearly were made in respect of another person, they were not abandoned by the applicant who did not make any further submissions at the hearing of this matter. In those circumstances, the Court will consider the grounds to see whether they reveal error in the IAA decision. Grounds one and two Grounds one and two can be dealt with together. Through these grounds, the applicant submits that the IAA’s decision was “inconsistent, illogical and so unreasonable” by not considering his brother’s involvement in the LTTE. The applicant confirmed to the Court that he did not have a brother. The Minister did not wish to make submissions in respect of ground one, where the applicant did not understand he was alleging such a ground in relation to a brother. Whilst the ground was not formally abandoned by the applicant it is clear from his confirmation in this Court and the evidence which was before the IAA that it has no nexus to the claims actually made by the applicant. Indeed, it is completely inconsistent with his evidence that he did not have any siblings and that none of his family members had ever associated with the LTTE. In relation to ground two, it is obvious that this is not an intentional ground but rather an example of the kind of rudimentary drafting styles often seen in this Court from self-represented applicants unfamiliar with the niceties of legal drafting. That is not a criticism. The Court well appreciates the difficulties a self-represented applicant with limited English faces in preparing a formal legal document. As stated above, the Court will always endeavour to ascertain the gist of an applicant’s ground where that is apparent. What is apparent here is that no ground is actually pressed. Noting these circumstances, the Court accepts that no jurisdictional error arises in respect of these grounds. Grounds three and four Grounds three and four can also be dealt with together. Through these grounds, the applicant submits that the IAA’s decision was “inconsistent, illogical and so unreasonable” by not accepting the information associated in processing en masse, and that it was not satisfied there were exceptional circumstances to consider such information. The applicant did not seek to elaborate on these grounds at the hearing of this matter. In written submissions, the Minister submitted that the applicant did not make any claims or provide any information about en masse processing, nor is there anything before the Court to show that any such claim or information clearly emerged from the material before the authority (citing NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1; [2004] FCAFC 263 at [55], [68]; AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 503; [2018] FCAFC 89 at [18]).