BUJ20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

BUJ20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 739  

File number(s): SYG 1027 of 2020
Judgment of: JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
Date of judgment: 23 May 2025
Catchwords:  MIGRATION– Protection (class XA)(subclass 866) visa – whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) considered whether there was a real chance of significant harm to the applicant on return to Greece where her resident permit had expired – whether the Tribunal’s decision was legally unreasonable – application dismissed   
Legislation:  Migration Act 1958 ss 5(1), 36(2), 36(2A), 36(3)
Cases cited:

Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510; [1999] HCA 14

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; 250 FCR 109

AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 89; 261 FCR 503

BCK21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 475

Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143

BQG21 v Minister for Immigration [2023] FCA 865

Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379; [1989] HCA 62

Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3; (2022) 289 FCR 21

Markaj v Minister for Immigration [2020] FCA 1511

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16

Minister for Immigration v Li (Li) (2013) 297 ALR 225; [2013] HCA 18

Minister for Immigration v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; 210 FCR 505

Minister for Immigration v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99

NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10

Ngatoko v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1165

Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437; [1994] FCA 535

Selvaduri v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALR 347; [1994] FCA 301

 SZSZQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 403

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 68
Date of hearing: 13 May 2025
Place: Parramatta
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Jones
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr Panwala (Unisaj Legal)
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms Lloyd (Minter Ellison)
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

SYG 1027 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

BUJ20

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE D HUMPHREYS

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MAY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the First Respondent be amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.

2.The application is dismissed.

3.The Applicant is to pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $5,900.00.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 739
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, a 62-year-old female national of Iraq, sought judicial review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) to refuse her application for a Protection (class XA)(subclass 866) visa. The Tribunal's decision centred on whether the applicant had protection obligations towards Australia and whether protection was available to her in Greece, where her resident permit had expired. The applicant argued that she faced significant harm in Greece due to her ethnicity and the prevailing anti-immigrant sentiment, and that she was unable to access necessary medical assistance due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Tribunal rejected these claims, finding that the applicant had a right to reside in Greece under her 10-Year-Residence-Permit and that she did not face a real risk of significant harm there.

The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable and whether it had made a jurisdictional error. The applicant contended that the Tribunal failed to properly consider her claims regarding her risk of harm in Greece, specifically whether she was a secondary target of harm by the Greek police. The respondent argued that the Tribunal had considered the applicant's claims in the context of the evidence and country information regarding the treatment of migrants in Greece, and that it was not required to distinguish between primary and secondary targets of harm.

The court considered the established principles of judicial review, noting that the court does not assess the merits or wisdom of the decision but rather its legality. The court held that the Tribunal's reasons should be read fairly and as a whole, and that it is not required to accept uncritically any claims made by the applicant. The court also noted that the weight given to country information is a matter for the Tribunal. In this case, the court found that the Tribunal had considered the applicant's claims and the relevant country information, and that it had not made a jurisdictional error in its decision.

The court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the Tribunal's decision was lawful and not legally unreasonable. The court held that the Tribunal had considered the applicant's claims regarding her risk of harm in Greece, and that it had properly evaluated the evidence and country information in reaching its decision. The court found that the Tribunal was not required to distinguish between primary and secondary targets of harm, and that it had not made a jurisdictional error in failing to do so. The application was dismissed, and the Tribunal's decision was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons outlined below, the application should be refused. BACKGROUND The applicant is a 62-year-old female national of Iraq. She is of Christian and of Armenian ethnicity. In 1994, the applicant departed Iraq with her husband and their three children and, following a short stay in Jordan, moved to Greece. Following their daughter’s move to Australia, the applicant and her husband travelled to Australia in June 2014 on visitor visas. Subsequently, one of the applicant’s sons migrated to Australia, whilst the other has continued to reside in Greece. The applicant applied for the visa on 29 July 2014. Her husband was included in the application as a member of her family and did not make his own claims. Sadly, he has since passed away. In a statement attached to the visa application, the applicant made the following claims:·The applicant’s husband was a motor mechanic in Baghdad, and in the course of an altercation with a customer, her husband was physically beaten, verbally abused, and detained. As a result of the physical torture the applicant’s husband endured, his hearing was affected, and subsequently, his business failed. The applicant also suffered a miscarriage due to extreme fear. The applicant and her husband later became aware that the customer was an associate of Saddam Hussein.·On 15 April 1994, the applicant, her husband and their three children fled Iraq and stayed in Jordan for approximately two months. On 23 June 1994, the applicant, her husband, and their children moved to Greece. The applicant and her husband did not apply for protection in Greece as they were afraid that the regime would find out and harm their relatives in Iraq, and they were concerned they would be deported back to Iraq. ·The applicant received bad treatment from the Greek authorities, and her children were deprived of their right to go to school.·During the time the applicant resided in Greece, there was ‘a wave of hatred’ towards immigrants, foreigners and refugees, with all immigrants and refugees in Greece living in fear and insecurity. ·The applicant’s son was attacked in a park by a group of Black Shirts, an organisation affiliated with the extremist Golden Dawn Party.·The applicant became afraid of walking in the streets in broad daylight and could not go to public places. ·The applicant and her family also encountered bad treatment at the hands of the Greek police. ·The applicant and her family were abused and physically searched in the streets.·The applicant and her husband came to Australia to visit their daughter and were shocked to hear the news about Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and the killings in Iraq on a daily basis. ·The applicant claimed that Armenians had been a target of these attacks in Iraq and Syria. On 9 December 2014, the delegate refused the visa application. On 25 July 2016, the applicant applied to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for judicial review of the first Tribunal’s decision. On 17 July 2018, the Court remitted the matter, by consent, to the Tribunal to be reconsidered and determined according to law. This was on the basis of the Tribunal's failure to consider the integral claims raised by the applicants, namely the applicants' fear of harm in Greece due to their skin colour and ethnicity.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant now seeks judicial review of the second Tribunal’s decision of 6 April 2020. THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The applicant submitted at [34], that as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the applicant falls within a vulnerable group, being over the age of 60, with underlying physiological and mental health issues, and she would be unable to get the medical help that may otherwise be available to her in Australia. At [41], the Tribunal identified the task before them as determining whether the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations and, if so, whether protection is available to her in another country, namely Greece. At [48], the Tribunal accepted that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution in Iraq and would face serious harm in Iraq due to her religious faith, as well as her status as a widow. Further, the Tribunal found that there would not be adequate or effective state protection available to the applicant, nor would she be able to relocate internally in Iraq to avoid this harm. At [49], the Tribunal outlined that the qualification in s 36(3) of the Act provides that Australia is taken not to have protection obligations to non-citizens who have not taken all possible steps to avail themselves of a right to enter and reside in a country apart from Australia. There are exceptions to this qualification which operate, broadly, where a person has a well-founded fear of being persecuted or faces a real risk of significant harm in that country, or has a well-founded fear of refoulement from that country to a place where they face such treatment. At [58], the Tribunal found that the applicant had a right to enter and reside in Greece as she held a 10-Year-Residence-Permit (“residence permit”) that would expire in September 2022, and that she had not taken all possible steps to avail herself of this right [59]. In relation to the applicant's claims regarding Greece, the Tribunal at [60], was prepared to accept that the applicant's younger son had been assaulted by individuals suspected of being part of an anti-immigrant group, that her older son's business had been damaged, that the family had suffered occasional verbal and physical harassment, and that the Greek police had physically harassed her son. The Tribunal found that these claims were consistent with country information in relation to the situation in Greece at that time. Further, at [71]–[72], the Tribunal found that the applicant did not fall into a category of an 'at risk' person in relation to COVID-19, nor would she be denied access to health or medical services in Greece. At [73], the Tribunal stated: There was no persuasive evidence before the Tribunal, and the Tribunal is not satisfied, that there is a real chance that the applicant will experience significant economic hardship, or will be denied access to basic services or will be denied the capacity to earn a livelihood, where such hardship or denial threatens her capacity to subsist. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in Greece for reasons of her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The First Respondent submitted that the applicant seeks impermissible merits review by contending that the Tribunal erred in failing to grapple with the applicant's 'chance or risk of harm in circumstances where she was not the primary target of harm by the Greek police but may be a secondary object of such harm'. It was submitted that the Tribunal considered harm faced by migrants more generally and the former harm faced by the applicant and her family, that the Tribunal did not distinguish between 'primary' and 'secondary' objects of harm; nor was it required to do so, and rather, the Tribunal accepted the evidence regarding harm faced by migrants and reports of harassment against the applicant's family members, and evaluated the applicant's claims in the context of this evidence and the available country information. CONSIDERATION In Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3 at [17], the task of a court conducting judicial review was described in this manner:… An application for judicial review is one in which the judicial branch of government reviews, by reference to legality or lawfulness, the decision or decisions of the executive branch of government, here in the form of a decision of the Minister. The court does not consider the merits or wisdom the decision; nor does it remake the decision. The task of the court is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality the decision by reference to the complaints made about it. In BCK21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 475 at [19] Abraham J said the following:It is first appropriate to recall that a Tribunal’s reasons should be read fairly, and as a whole. The Tribunal’s reasons should not be construed minutely, with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error: Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 456; (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 271-272; Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 17; (2022) 400 ALR 417 at [38]. It is well established the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any and all claims made by an applicant: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at 451. Nor does the Tribunal Authority have to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular assertion was not made out: Selvaduri v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 34 ALD 347 at 348 It is well settled that the country information and the weight it gives to that information is a matter for the Tribunal: NAHI v Minister for Immigration& Multicultural &Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10. It is for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal, being the relevant decision maker, that the applicant meets the criteria for being a refugee: Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [187]. The sole ground of judicial review is that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error in relation to her lapse of permission to remain in Greece. What follows is ten particulars as set out above.