AFU19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

AFU19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 945

File number(s): MLG 192 of 2019
Judgment of: JUDGE CORBETT
Date of judgment: 19 June 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection visa - Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa – Application for judicial review – Whether Administrative Appeal Tribunal failed to consider a claim that was tolerably clear from the materials – Whether well-founded fear of persecution – No jurisdictional error – Application dismissed.
Legislation:

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 5J(5), 376, 499

Cases cited:

ARV17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 426

BCE20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 124

COE17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 669

EMZ18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1052

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Khadgi [2010] FCAFC 145

MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26

NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 64
Date of last submission/s: 7 May 2025
Date of hearing: 7 May 2025
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicants Mr S Sharify
Solicitor for the Applicants Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents Mr J Lessing
Solicitor for the Respondents Mills Oakley

ORDERS

MLG 192 of 2019

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

AFU19

First Applicant

AFV19

Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE CORBETT

DATE OF ORDER:

19 JUNE 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent is amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’;

2.The name of the second respondent is amended to ‘Administrative Review Tribunal’;

3.The amended application for judicial review dated 10 April 2025 be dismissed; and

4.The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of an incidental to the proceeding fixed in the sum of $8,371.30.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE CORBETT

  1. The applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) made on 7 January 2019. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 945
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, a husband and wife from Bangladesh, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) affirming a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship not to grant them a protection visa. The applicants had arrived in Australia in 2013 and had applied for a visa on the basis of a fear of persecution in Bangladesh due to domestic violence and threats from the husband's family. The AAT considered the applicants' claims and ultimately decided against them. The applicants argued that the AAT failed to consider a claim that arose tolerably clearly from the materials, specifically that they would be persecuted due to the stigma and discrimination associated with mental illness in Bangladesh.

The central legal issue was whether the AAT failed to consider a claim that was tolerably clear from the materials, and whether this constituted a jurisdictional error. The applicants argued that the AAT should have considered the stigma and discrimination arising from mental illness as a basis for persecution, given the country information and Pathways Report presented to the AAT. The court examined the applicable legal principles regarding the AAT's obligation to consider claims that arise from the materials before it and whether the applicants' claim met this threshold.

The court held that the AAT was not required to consider a claim that did not arise tolerably clearly from the materials before it. The court noted that the statutory task of the AAT is to assess the claims by reference to all the material, not to undertake an independent analytical exercise for the discovery of potential claims which have not been made. The medical and psychological reports submitted by the applicants did not identify a fear of persecution arising from mental illness. Consequently, the claim articulated by the applicants in their amended application did not arise tolerably clearly from the materials themselves. The court found no jurisdictional error in the AAT's decision and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The court's decision was that the application for judicial review was dismissed, and no orders were made in favour of the applicants.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Reference in these reasons to ‘CB’ pages are references to the Court Book that was tendered and admitted as evidence at the hearing before this Court and designated exhibit ‘R2’.BACKGROUND The applicants are husband and wife. Both are citizens of Bangladesh and first arrived in Australia on 3 September 2013 on Visitor visas (CB 1). On 4 October 2013, the applicants applied for the visa with the assistance of a solicitor (CB 1-179). The first applicant was the primary applicant and claimed protection due to fear of harm of abuse perpetrated by her former husband and his family (CB 18-21). The application included a comprehensive statutory declaration by the first applicant dated 3 October 2013 which explained the applicants’ claims for protection (CB 35-40) (Declaration). At paragraph [2] the first applicant said (CB 35):‘I fear returning to Bangladesh because my former husband {name} and his family will kill me and my husband…’ The first applicant explained in the Declaration the history of domestic violence perpetrated by her former husband, which was tolerated or ignored by her mother-in-law and father-in-law (CB 36 [9], [12]). The first applicant also explained that her former husband had a history of substance abuse (CB 35-7). The first applicant feared that local authorities would not assist her and her new husband because her former husband’s family were wealthy and powerful (CB 37 [14], 38 [29], 40 [40]). The first applicant claimed that on one occasion in April 2009, she reported an assault and threats to kill made by her ex-husband’s uncle to the local police, but the police refused to note her complaint (CB 38 [28]-[29]). The first applicant obtained a divorce on 28 July 2009, later remarried on 1 July 2011 and relocated to a different region of Bangladesh but the alleged assaults and threats did not stop (CB 38 [30], 39 [34]). On one occasion on 20 June 2013, the applicants were shot at by three or four unknown men who tried to stop them in the street (CB 39 [37]). The first applicant reported the incident to police, but again the police refused to assist (CB 39 [38]). The first applicant claimed that on 12 August 2013, the first applicant received a phone call during which she was told that she and her husband would be killed within the next three days (CB 39 [39]). A homemade explosive device was then thrown at the applicants’ home but did not explode (CB 39 [38]). The applicants reported this to the police but again, there was no action taken (CB 39 [39]). The applicants fled to Australia and applied for the visa. On 14 January 2015, a delegate of the Minister invited the applicants to attend an interview regarding their application for the visa (CB 201-4). The interview was scheduled to take place on 11 February 2015. On 6 February 2015, the solicitor for the applicants sent the delegate a detailed written submission in advance of the interview (CB 209–17). The submission included a confidential psychologist’s report prepared by the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre dated 5 February 2015 (CB 215-6). The report recorded that the first applicant was suffering from symptoms of post-traumatic stress, which were worsening.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 8 January 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicants the visa (CB 549–593) (Decision).TRIBUNAL DECISION The Decision contains 242 paragraphs and is forty pages in length. Attached to the Decision is a document designated ‘Attachment A’ which contains a summary of the criteria for a protection visa set out in s 36 of the Act and Sch 2 of the Regulations. The attachment also contains a summary of the complementary protection criterion and refers to Ministerial Direction No 56 made under s 499 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Act (Act). In the Decision, the Tribunal summarised all of the evidence and listed all of the documents submitted by the applicants in support of their claims. The Tribunal identified the applicants’ claims and comprehensively assessed them by reference to the evidence. The Tribunal then addressed the first applicant’s claim that she suffered from psychological harm and considered the various medical and psychological reports submitted to the Tribunal (CB 584–5 [198]–[206]). At paragraphs [207]–[208] (CB 585) the Tribunal found:[208] The applicant presented with a serious demeanour but generally the Tribunal found her to be intelligent, articulate and very responsive to questioning. When matters which may not have been favourable to the applicants’ claims were put to her, she responded in a manner which indicated she was thoughtful, persistent and quite resolute in her responses. She did not appear to have any difficulty in giving evidence and did not exhibit any confusion or hesitancy in giving evidence; quite the opposite. She reiterated explanations for anomalies in the evidence several times and was quite determined in arguing her case. [209] The Tribunal found that the limitations anticipated by her medical advisers as to her capacity to give evidence did not arise when she gave evidence. The Tribunal found her evidence to be extremely detailed and she was quite firm in giving her account of events. At paragraphs [217]–[218] of the Decision (CB 586-7) the Tribunal found:[217] The Tribunal has considered and weighed the material in the reports and found that the applicant wife’s mental health conditions are consistent with the findings made by the Tribunal, in particular its findings in relation to the applicant wife’s mistreatment by [OMITTED] and his family during the period of cohabitation and the period immediately following the separation. It also is consistent with the many difficult and traumatic events which have taken place in the last nine years, including her divorce, the death of both parents, the allegations of fraud made against the applicant husband, her miscarriage and fertility problems.[218] However, the Tribunal does not accept that after the applicant wife’s divorce [OMITTED], his family and associates continued to threaten the applicants with harm or attempted to harm them and does not consider that the material contained in the medical reports are evidence that these events took place despite the history provided to the medical advisors by the applicant wife.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In reply, Mr Sharify referred to the country information and Pathways Report, both of which referred to stigma and discrimination arising from mental illness of patients in Bangladesh. This stigma and discrimination could amount to persecution because of membership of a particular social group within the meaning of the Act to the satisfaction of a reasonably minded Tribunal. The reports also suggest that the discrimination was systematic and not just isolated to random or non-selective acts. The reliance on the country information and Pathways Report by the Tribunal should have put the Tribunal on notice of a claim squarely arising on the evidence that the Tribunal failed to consider. CONSIDERATION In NAVK at [15] Allsop J (as he then was) said:[15] The Full Court in NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 263 at [55] - [63] dealt with the question of what claims must be dealt with by the Tribunal to complete its statutorily required task (its jurisdiction) even though they may not be expressly articulated. See also Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389, 394 [24], 408 [95] and Applicant S 395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 203 ALR 112. From NABE I take it that the Tribunal is not required to consider a claim that is not expressly made or does not arise clearly on the materials before it: NABE at [61]. As the Full Court said at [63] much depends on the circumstances. Whatever adverb or adverbial phrase is used to describe the apparentness of the unarticulated claim, it must, it seems to me, either in fact be appreciated by the Tribunal or, if it is not, arise sufficiently from the material as to require a reasonably competent Tribunal in the circumstances to appreciate its existence. A practical and common sense approach to everyday decision-making requires the unarticulated claim to arise tolerably clearly from the material itself, since the statutory task of the Tribunal is to assess the claims by reference to all the material, not to undertake an independent analytical exercise of the material for the discovery of potential claims which might be made, but which have not been, and then subjecting them to further analysis to assess their legitimacy. The claim now articulated by the applicants in the amended application did not in my view arise tolerably clearly from the material itself. The Tribunal was required to assess the claims made by the applicants by reference to all the materials. The claims made were identified by the Tribunal in paragraphs [31]–[33] of the Decision. The Tribunal was asked by the solicitors for the applicants to consider a plethora of materials and submissions provided to the Tribunal over an almost four-year period. Those included some materials relating to the first applicant’s mental health which were submitted in advance of her interview with the delegate to explain her anxiety and the possible difficulty she may face in testifying (CB 215-6). A report was also submitted in support of a request for postponement of the Tribunal hearings and by way of corroboration of her claims to be a victim of domestic violence (CB 319-20, 389–393). None of the medical or psychological reports in the Court Book identified the applicant as having a fear of persecution arising from her mental illness.