FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
AEE19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 137
File number(s): SYG 84 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE SKAROS Date of judgment: 7 February 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Judicial Review – Where applicant was granted a refugee permit and permanent residence in third country prior to seeking protection in Australia – Where Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) found that Australia did not have protection obligations by operation of s 36(3) – Where Tribunal considered incorrect test as to the meaning of s 36(3) – Error but not materiality conceded by Minister - Where possible that had Tribunal engaged with correct test outcome could have been different – Materiality established – writs issued Legislation: Migration Act 1958 ss 36, 438, 499 Cases cited: ABB19v Minister forImmigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 715
AJN23 v Minister for Immigration [2024] FCAFC 103
DED16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 18
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Applicant C [2001] FCA 1332
Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship v SZRHU [2013] FCAFC 91
SZMWQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) [2010] FCAFC 97
V856/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1018
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 85 Date of hearing: 5 December 2025 Place: Parramatta Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Jones Solicitor for the Applicant: Alkafaji Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms Maddocks Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs. ORDERS
SYG 84 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: AEE19
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE SKAROS
DATE OF ORDER:
7 FEBRUARY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the First Respondent be amended to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.
2.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Second Respondent made on 20 December 2018.
3.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE SKAROS:
By application filed on 15 January 2019 and amended on 31 October 2024, the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal)[1] dated 20 December 2018. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of…
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- AGLC
- AEE19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 137
- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 137
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found the Tribunal's error in applying the wrong test under s 36(3) of the Migration Act 1958 was material. The proper test requires determining whether the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2). If so, s 36(3) is inapplicable. The Tribunal's reliance on s 36(3) when it should have assessed s 36(2) was an error of law. The Court held this error was material because, had the Tribunal engaged with the correct test, the outcome could have been different. The Minister conceded the error was material, and the Court found the applicant's claims for protection credible. Therefore, the Tribunal's affirmance of the delegate's decision was quashed and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration in light of the Court's reasons.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant submitted that the country information that answered the question of whether travel documents could be renewed was ‘yes, although they should normally apply for a transfer of responsibility for protection to the state of their current residence’; and that this means that there could not be renewal where the overseas location could assume responsibility for protection, which described Australia. Therefore, renewal so as to satisfy s 36(3) seems practically unlikely.CONSIDERATION Whilst the amended application contains one ground of review, there are, two interrelated arguments falling under that ground; that the Tribunal had misstated the correct statutory test in respect of s 36(3) of the Act and, in misdirecting itself as to the correct test to be applied under s 36(3), it acted unreasonably and/or failed to properly consider the evidence before it when concluding that the applicant could renew his French travel document. The Minister conceded that the Tribunal had applied the wrong test with respect to the proper construction of s 36(3) but argued that the error was not material. In oral submissions, counsel for the applicant clarified that, notwithstanding that the issue before the Court was whether the misconstruction of s 36(3) by the Tribunal was material to the outcome of the review, the applicant did not abandon the additional grounds of legal unreasonableness and/or want of proper consideration. Counsel nevertheless acknowledged that if the Court found against the applicant on the issue of materiality, then the additional grounds, which were based on the same underlying evidence, would also fall with that finding. Before turning to the issue of materiality, it is convenient to briefly say something about the approach taken by the Tribunal, some relevant facts and the proper construction of s 36(3) as set out in the relevant authorities. In the present case, the Tribunal did not assess whether the applicant, who is a citizen of Iraq, was a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations either because he was a refugee, as provided for in s 36(2)(a), or because he satisfied the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa). It relied on the qualification in s 36(3) which, subject to exceptions in s 36(4) – (5A), operates to exclude a person from being owed protection by Australia in circumstances where they have the right to enter and reside in any other country. Relevantly, s 36(3) of the Act provides that:Australia is taken not to have protection obligations in respect of a non-citizen who has not taken all possible steps to avail himself or herself of a right to enter and reside in, whether temporarily or permanently and however that right arose or is expressed, any country apart from Australia, including countries of which the non-citizen is a national. As noted by the Minister in oral submissions, this provision was introduced as part of amendments to the Act in 1999 for the purposes of preventing asylum seekers from ‘forum shopping’: SZRHU, per Flick J at [92].