BIK17 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BIK17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1086

Appeal from: BIK17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 2713
File number: NSD 1531 of 2018
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 29 July 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether the appellant should be given leave to raise and rely upon two fresh grounds of appeal not argued at first instance in the Circuit Court – whether a certificate issued by a delegate of the Minister pursuant to s 473GB(5) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is valid or invalid – the consequences of a finding that such certificate is invalid discussed – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority failed to exercise discretions reposed in it under s 473GB(3) or did so unreasonably – whether the Authority failed to exercise its discretion under s 473DC(3) – whether the Authority misconstrued s 473DD – whether the Authority misapplied s 473DD in relation to a submission made to it on behalf of the appellant/referred visa applicant by characterising certain material in that submission as “new information” and dealing with that material upon the basis that regard should not be had to that material unless exceptional circumstances are shown which justify consideration of that new material and by characterising certain other material in that submission as “submission” or “argument” thereby having regard to that material without the need to be satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist  
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5, 5H(1), 36(2), 57, 65, 422B, 473CB, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 473DE, 473GB, Pt 7 and Pt 7AA
Cases cited:

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 373 ALR 196

DKF17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1963

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 264 CLR 123

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 257 FCR 111

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CED16 [2020] HCA 24

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CLV16 (2018) 260 FCR 482

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421

MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 1

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217

Date of hearing: 27 February 2020
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 95
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms U Okereke-Fisher
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr JB Kay Hoyle
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1531 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BIK17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 JULY 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to amend his Notice of Appeal first notified by the appellant on 19 February 2019 and subsequently…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1086
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BIK17 v Minister for Home Affairs, the appellant sought judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) not to grant him a temporary protection visa. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed his application, and he appealed to the High Court. The appellant sought leave to amend his notice of appeal to include two new grounds of appeal that had not been argued before the Circuit Court. The central legal issues were whether the certificate issued by a delegate of the Minister was valid and, if not, the consequences of such invalidity. The court also considered whether the IAA had exercised its discretions reasonably and whether it had misconstrued or misapplied certain sections of the Act.

The court held that the certificate issued by the delegate of the Minister was valid and did not suffer from the defects argued by the appellant. Consequently, the court did not need to consider the consequences of invalidity of the certificate. The court found that the IAA had exercised its discretions reasonably and had not misconstrued or misapplied the relevant sections of the Act. The court also rejected the appellant's argument that the IAA had failed to exercise its discretion under s 473DC(3) of the Act. The court concluded that the IAA had not erred in law or failed to exercise its discretions reasonably and that the appeal should be dismissed.

The court refused the appellant's application for leave to amend his notice of appeal to include the two new grounds of appeal. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the first respondent's costs of and incidental to the amendment application and the appeal. The decision underscores the importance of adhering to the grounds of appeal specified in the original notice of appeal and the consequences of attempting to raise new grounds of appeal at a later stage.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to amend his Notice of Appeal first notified by the appellant on 19 February 2019 and subsequently made both in writing and orally before the Court in February 2020 be refused.

2. The Appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the Amendment Application referred to in Order 1 above and the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the Appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant appeals from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered by Judge Smith ex tempore on 7 August 2018 (BIK17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 2713). His Honour dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) given on 21 February 2017 (IAA’s decision). The IAA had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) dated 9 November 2016 (delegate’s decision) not to grant a temporary protection visa (TPV) to the appellant pursuant to s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). The delegate’s decision was referred to the IAA on 14 November 2016. The appellant met the definition of a “fast track applicant” specified in s 5(1)(a)(i)–(iii) of the Act. Accordingly, his application before the IAA was governed by Pt 7AA of the Act. There was no dispute about these matters in the Circuit Court or before me. The appellant is a Sunni Muslim of Arab ethnicity and a citizen of Iraq. At the present time, he is 40 years of age. He arrived in Australia by boat as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 14 March 2013. The appellant applied for a TPV on 31 March 2016. He attended interviews with departmental officers on 17 March 2013, 31 March 2013 and 21 September 2016. By his Amended Application in the Circuit Court filed on 5 July 2018, the appellant specified only one ground of review, namely:The Authority made a jurisdictional error by misunderstanding its task on review as it relied upon a failure to mention details at the entry interview of the Applicant. The primary judge rejected that ground of review and dismissed the appellant’s Application for Judicial Review. He also ordered the appellant to pay the Minister’s costs of the Circuit Court proceedings. By Notice of Appeal dated 13 August 2018 and filed on 22 August 2018, the appellant appealed to this Court from the decision of Judge Smith. In that Notice of Appeal, the appellant specified only one ground of appeal, namely: The primary judge erred in holding that the Authority did not make a legal error when it relied upon a failure to mention details at the entry interview of the applicant. In due course, the appellant’s Appeal in this Court was set down for hearing on 20 February 2019 before Wheelahan J. In the afternoon of 19 February 2019, the appellant attempted to file and seek to rely upon an Amended Notice of Appeal in which he abandoned the sole ground of appeal specified in his Notice of Appeal filed on 22 August 2018 and identified two new grounds of appeal which he then sought to press. Those proposed new grounds of appeal raised contentions and arguments which had not been raised at all in the Circuit Court in support of the appellant’s Application for Judicial Review in that Court. By those two new grounds, the appellant raised issues which were, as at February 2019, likely to be the subject of consideration by the High Court in the matter of BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 373 ALR 196 (BVD17). As at February 2019, the High Court had granted special leave in BVD17 but had not yet heard argument on the appeal in that case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant argued that the certificate was invalid because it did not comply with the requirements of s 473GB(1)(a) of the Act. Section 473GB(1) is in the following terms:473GBImmigration Assessment Authority’s discretion in relation to disclosure of certain information etc.(1) This section applies to a document or information if:(a)the Minister has certified, under subsection (5), that the disclosure of any matter contained in the document, or the disclosure of the information, would be contrary to the public interest for any reason specified in the certificate (other than a reason set out in paragraph 473GA(1)(a) or (b)) that could form the basis for a claim by the Crown in right of the Commonwealth in a judicial proceeding that the matter contained in the document, or the information, should not be disclosed; or(b)the document, the matter contained in the document, or the information was given to the Minister, or to an officer of the Department, in confidence. The appellant submitted that an assertion that a document “contains information relating to an internal working document and business affairs” could never have sustained a claim for public interest immunity with the consequence that the certificate could not be supported by s 473GB(1)(a) and, for that reason, was invalid. The appellant also argued that the certificate was invalid because it had been drafted in such a manner as to suggest that the separate statutory bases upon which a s 473GB(5) certificate might be supported (viz subpars (a) and (b) of s 473GB(1)) were, in fact, cumulative requirements, a proposition which was erroneous. The appellant did not submit that the validity of the certificate could not be supported by s 473GB(1)(b) if that subsection alone were to be relied upon as the appropriate statutory foundation for the issue of the certificate. It is to be remembered that the author of the certificate stated on the face of the certificate that the Applicant Integrity Form and the contents of that Form had been given to the Minister or an officer of the Department in confidence. Having submitted that the certificate was invalid, the appellant submitted that the invalidity of the certificate enlivened the operation of s 57(2) of the Act thereby requiring the Minister to disclose the contents of the Applicant Integrity Form to the appellant because the contents of that document were “relevant information” and were no longer protected by s 473GB. The appellant next submitted that, having been notified that s 473GB applied to the contents of the Applicant Integrity Form in circumstances where the section did not, in fact, apply, the IAA was required to exercise the discretions reposed in it pursuant to s 473GB(3) reasonably and affirmatively. A reasonable and affirmative exercise of those discretions inevitably required disclosure of the contents of the Applicant Integrity Form to the appellant. Alternatively, the appellant submitted that, upon the true construction of Pt 7AA of the Act, s 473DC was engaged in the circumstances of the present case and, as a consequence, the IAA was required to exercise the discretion reposed in it by s 473DC(3) reasonably and affirmatively. Such an exercise of that discretion would inevitably require the IAA to provide the contents of the Applicant Integrity Form to the appellant and invite him to respond to the information contained in that Form. The IAA failed to provide the contents of that document to the appellant and failed to invite him to respond to those contents. These failures were legally unreasonable and in contravention of s 57(2) of the Act.