EBP19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 21 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EBP19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 262  

Appeal from: EBP19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 459
File number(s): SAD 121 of 2022
Judgment of: O'SULLIVAN J
Date of judgment: 27 March 2025

Catchwords:

MIGRATION — appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) dismissing application for judicial review of decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority not to grant protection visa — whether the primary judge erred in finding the Immigration Assessment Authority correctly applied criteria of s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) — where the Tribunal applied a higher standard of satisfaction than required by s 473DD(b)(ii) — whether the “new information” could have resulted in a different decision had it been taken into account — error material — appeal allowed

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 7AA, 473CA, 473CC, 473DD
Cases cited:

APH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 23

AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 37; (2020) 269 CLR 494

BTK19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 658

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34; (2019) 268 CLR 29

BYA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 44

CSR16 v Minister for immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474

EBP19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 332

FGI18 v Minister for immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 57

In Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; (2018) 254 CLR 217

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176, (2017) 257 FCR 111

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v BTW 17 [2020] FCA FC 159; (2020) 294 FCR 150

Division: General Division
Registry: South Australia
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 64
Date of hearing: 18 March 2025
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr D Hooke SC with Mr B Overend
Solicitor for the Appellants: Australian Criminal & Family Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr N Swan
Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

SAD 121 of 2022
BETWEEN:

EBP19

First Appellant

EBS19

Second Appellant

EBT19 (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

O'SULLIVAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 MARCH 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is allowed.

2.The orders of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia made 10 June 2022 are set aside.

3.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the affirmation by the Immigration Assessment Authority on 31 May 2021 of the decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse the appellants’ applications for Safe Haven Enterprise visas.

4.The matter be remitted to the Administrative Review Tribunal for reconsideration according…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read EBP19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2025] FCA 262
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of EBP19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the Court addressed an appeal concerning the dismissal of an application for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to refuse a protection visa. The appellants, EBP19, sought to challenge the IAA's decision not to grant them a visa, arguing that the IAA erred in its application of section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Federal Circuit Court and Family Court of Australia dismissed the application for judicial review, leading to the current appeal.

The central issues in the appeal were whether the primary judge was correct in finding that the IAA applied the criteria in section 473DD correctly and, if not, whether this error was material enough to warrant a different outcome. Section 473DD stipulates that the IAA must not consider any new information unless specific conditions are met, including that the new information is credible and was not previously known. The appellants argued that the IAA applied a higher standard of satisfaction than required by section 473DD(b)(ii), leading to an incorrect application of the statutory criteria.

The court found that the primary judge erred in concluding that the IAA had correctly applied the criteria of section 473DD. The IAA had imposed a higher standard of satisfaction by requiring that the new information be true, rather than merely capable of being believed. This misinterpretation led to a jurisdictional error. The court held that the error was material, as it affected the outcome of the visa application. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, the orders of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Administrative Review Tribunal for reconsideration according to law.

The court also ordered that the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs pay the appellants' costs of the appeal and the judicial review proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia made 10 June 2022 are set aside.

3. A writ of certiorari issue quashing the affirmation by the Immigration Assessment Authority on 31 May 2021 of the decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse the appellants’ applications for Safe Haven Enterprise visas.

4. The matter be remitted to the Administrative Review Tribunal for reconsideration according to law.

5. The first respondent is to pay the appellants’ costs of and incidental to the appeal to this Court and of and incidental to the judicial review proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 21 May 2021, the Authority again affirmed the refusal of the visa applications (Decision). The appellant sought judicial review of the Decision before the Federal Circuit Court and Family Court of Australia which dismissed the application for judicial review on 10 June 2022. It is from that dismissal that the appellants now appeal.Grounds of appeal Although the notice of appeal sets out two grounds, ground two is not pressed such that there is a single ground which contends that the primary judge erred in failing to find jurisdictional error on the part of the Authority in failing to apply the correct test for considering “new information” pursuant to s 473DD of the Act, including by:(a)Finding at [20] that the second respondent had “implicitly” accepted that the information in question “may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims” (sic) and was “information not previously known by either the Minister or the applicant”.(b)Finding at [22] that the Tribunal did (or did not have to) apply the ‘two stage process’ stated by Bromberg J in CSR16 v Minister for immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474.Issues There are three issues arising on appeal:(a)Was the primary judge correct to find the Authority had implicitly accepted the matters identified?(b)Was the primary judge correct in finding that the Authority applied the criteria in s 473DD correctly?(c)If no, to either (a) or (b), was the error material? It is for the reasons which follow that:(a)the primary judge erred in finding that the Authority applied the criteria in s 437DD correctly; and(b)the error was material; such that the primary judge’s error was jurisdictional.Principles Section 473DD provides:For the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless:(a)the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and(b)The referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information:(i)was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or(ii)is credible personal information which was not previously known and had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims. This section has been the subject of judicial consideration on a number of occasions. In CSR16 [41]-[43] (Bromberg J) observed:41.In my view all that the “credible” element of the s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria requires is the Authority’s satisfaction that the “new information” is information which is open to be or capable of being accepted by the Authority as truthful (or accurate, or genuine). It is only at the deliberative stage of its review that the Authority will be required to determine whether or not the “new information” is true. The s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria is concerned with an earlier or anterior stage of the review directed at whether “new information” should be received by the Authority so that it may be considered at the deliberative stage.42.The criteria is a filtering mechanism designed to separate information worthy of consideration at the deliberative stage from that which is not. In that context, the word “credible” is used in relation to information, not in the sense that the information is believed, but in the sense that the information is capable of being believed. It is only information that the Authority is satisfied is “evidently not credible” (VEAL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88 at [17] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ) that fails to meet the credibility requirement imposed by the s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria.43The Authority determined that the “new information” that the appellants sought to have it consider did not meet the s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria by imposing a higher standard of satisfaction than the criteria requires. The Authority required satisfaction that the “new information” was true when all that the s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria requires is the Authority’s satisfaction that the new information is capable of being believed at the deliberative stage of the Authority’s review. In so doing the Authority misconstrued s 473DD(b)(ii) and misconceived what the exercise of its statutory power entailed. The Authority thereby fell into jurisdictional error: Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection; Te Puia v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 33 at [68] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, and Gordon JJ); Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391 at [82] (Gaudron J) and [196] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge continued: … The Authority said it had “concerns about the credibility of this information”. The Authority then listed four characteristics of the information relevant to its credibility, that is, to whether it was capable of belief:(1)it was vague and without detail about when the incident happened, beyond that it was in 2016;(2)there was an implausible lack of other detail given that the mother and brother were said to have made a report to the police;(3)it was implausible that the mother and brother would not have told the applicants about the incident if it was serious enough that they would go to the police about it; and (4)it was implausible that the alleged group would not already know the applicant was in Australia if they maintained an adverse interest in him.The Authority assessed, using appropriate language, matters going to the plausibility and internal consistency of the new information, that is, to its credibility. If it was not satisfied that the new information was credible it was not required to move on to the second, deliberative stage. I am not persuaded that the Authority failed to properly perform its statutory task. This ground is not made out.The parties’ submissions and consideration The appellants engaged in a detailed analysis of [10] of the Decision highlighting a number of sentences within the passage. The Minister submits that the Authority’s reasons must be read fairly and not in an unduly critical manner nor should they be construed with an eye keenly attuned to finding error. Further, the Authority’s reasons must be read in light of the content of the statutory obligation pursuant to which it was prepared: BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34 (2019) 268 CLR 29, [38]. Still further, a court should not be concerned with “looseness in the language” or “unhappy phrasing”: FGI18 v Minister for immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 57 at [27] (O’Callaghan J). As to this last point, the Minister submits that the Authority is not obliged to articulate its reasoning in a comprehensive way or in any great detail and that it is “difficult to draw an inference that a decision has been attended by an error of law from what has not been said”: BVD 17 at [39]-[44]. I accept the Minister’s submissions, however I do not consider that the appellants’ approach was one keenly attuned to finding error. The analysis embarked upon by the appellants in this matter necessarily focused upon the approach taken by the Authority in its reasons read in light of the content of the Authority’s statutory obligations. Such an exercise was necessary so as to gain an understanding of the approach taken by the Authority. I deal first with the appellant’s submissions that the Authority failed to adopt the two-stage process identified in CSR16. The appellants submit that in considering whether the new information was credible personal information, the primary judge erred in not finding that the Authority failed to apply the appropriate standard of satisfaction. The appellants point to the primary judge’s extraction from Decision [10], the Authority’s identification of four characteristics of information relevant to its credibility and whether it was capable of belief.