FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
EBP19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 262
Appeal from: EBP19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 459 File number(s): SAD 121 of 2022 Judgment of: O'SULLIVAN J Date of judgment: 27 March 2025 Catchwords:
MIGRATION — appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) dismissing application for judicial review of decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority not to grant protection visa — whether the primary judge erred in finding the Immigration Assessment Authority correctly applied criteria of s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) — where the Tribunal applied a higher standard of satisfaction than required by s 473DD(b)(ii) — whether the “new information” could have resulted in a different decision had it been taken into account — error material — appeal allowed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 7AA, 473CA, 473CC, 473DD Cases cited: AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 37; (2020) 269 CLR 494
BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34; (2019) 268 CLR 29
BYA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 44
CSR16 v Minister for immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474
In Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; (2018) 254 CLR 217
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176, (2017) 257 FCR 111
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v BTW 17 [2020] FCA FC 159; (2020) 294 FCR 150
Division: General Division Registry: South Australia National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 64 Date of hearing: 18 March 2025 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr D Hooke SC with Mr B Overend Solicitor for the Appellants: Australian Criminal & Family Lawyers Counsel for the Respondents: Mr N Swan Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers ORDERS
SAD 121 of 2022 BETWEEN: EBP19
First Appellant
EBS19
Second Appellant
EBT19 (and others named in the Schedule)
Third Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
O'SULLIVAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 MARCH 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is allowed.
2.The orders of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia made 10 June 2022 are set aside.
3.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the affirmation by the Immigration Assessment Authority on 31 May 2021 of the decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse the appellants’ applications for Safe Haven Enterprise visas.
4.The matter be remitted to the Administrative Review Tribunal for reconsideration according…
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 262
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central issues in the appeal were whether the primary judge was correct in finding that the IAA applied the criteria in section 473DD correctly and, if not, whether this error was material enough to warrant a different outcome. Section 473DD stipulates that the IAA must not consider any new information unless specific conditions are met, including that the new information is credible and was not previously known. The appellants argued that the IAA applied a higher standard of satisfaction than required by section 473DD(b)(ii), leading to an incorrect application of the statutory criteria.
The court found that the primary judge erred in concluding that the IAA had correctly applied the criteria of section 473DD. The IAA had imposed a higher standard of satisfaction by requiring that the new information be true, rather than merely capable of being believed. This misinterpretation led to a jurisdictional error. The court held that the error was material, as it affected the outcome of the visa application. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, the orders of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Administrative Review Tribunal for reconsideration according to law.
The court also ordered that the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs pay the appellants' costs of the appeal and the judicial review proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The orders of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia made 10 June 2022 are set aside.
3. A writ of certiorari issue quashing the affirmation by the Immigration Assessment Authority on 31 May 2021 of the decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse the appellants’ applications for Safe Haven Enterprise visas.
4. The matter be remitted to the Administrative Review Tribunal for reconsideration according to law.
5. The first respondent is to pay the appellants’ costs of and incidental to the appeal to this Court and of and incidental to the judicial review proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge continued: … The Authority said it had “concerns about the credibility of this information”. The Authority then listed four characteristics of the information relevant to its credibility, that is, to whether it was capable of belief:(1)it was vague and without detail about when the incident happened, beyond that it was in 2016;(2)there was an implausible lack of other detail given that the mother and brother were said to have made a report to the police;(3)it was implausible that the mother and brother would not have told the applicants about the incident if it was serious enough that they would go to the police about it; and (4)it was implausible that the alleged group would not already know the applicant was in Australia if they maintained an adverse interest in him.The Authority assessed, using appropriate language, matters going to the plausibility and internal consistency of the new information, that is, to its credibility. If it was not satisfied that the new information was credible it was not required to move on to the second, deliberative stage. I am not persuaded that the Authority failed to properly perform its statutory task. This ground is not made out.The parties’ submissions and consideration The appellants engaged in a detailed analysis of [10] of the Decision highlighting a number of sentences within the passage. The Minister submits that the Authority’s reasons must be read fairly and not in an unduly critical manner nor should they be construed with an eye keenly attuned to finding error. Further, the Authority’s reasons must be read in light of the content of the statutory obligation pursuant to which it was prepared: BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] HCA 34 (2019) 268 CLR 29, [38]. Still further, a court should not be concerned with “looseness in the language” or “unhappy phrasing”: FGI18 v Minister for immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 57 at [27] (O’Callaghan J). As to this last point, the Minister submits that the Authority is not obliged to articulate its reasoning in a comprehensive way or in any great detail and that it is “difficult to draw an inference that a decision has been attended by an error of law from what has not been said”: BVD 17 at [39]-[44]. I accept the Minister’s submissions, however I do not consider that the appellants’ approach was one keenly attuned to finding error. The analysis embarked upon by the appellants in this matter necessarily focused upon the approach taken by the Authority in its reasons read in light of the content of the Authority’s statutory obligations. Such an exercise was necessary so as to gain an understanding of the approach taken by the Authority. I deal first with the appellant’s submissions that the Authority failed to adopt the two-stage process identified in CSR16. The appellants submit that in considering whether the new information was credible personal information, the primary judge erred in not finding that the Authority failed to apply the appropriate standard of satisfaction. The appellants point to the primary judge’s extraction from Decision [10], the Authority’s identification of four characteristics of information relevant to its credibility and whether it was capable of belief.