CBY18 v Minister for Home Affairs
[2024] FedCFamC2G 1417
•18 December 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
CBY18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1417
File number: SYG 1164 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE D HUMPHREYS Date of judgment: 18 December 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION- Immigration Assessment Authority – Safe Haven Enterprise Visa – Whether the Authority erred in its consideration of new information pursuant to s 473DD – The Authority’s reference to “credible or corroborative” information –Imposing a higher standard of satisfaction in considering s 473DD - jurisdictional error established – Application allowed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5J, 5H, 473CB, 473DD. Cases cited: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; 256 FCR 593
AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 37; 269 CLR 494
DYS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 33; 260 FCR 260
Fattah v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 31
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176
NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 61 Date of hearing: 5 December 2024 Place: Parramatta Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr Hodges (Hodges Legal) Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Liu Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr Cacaj (Clayton Utz) Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
SYG 1164 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: CBY18
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
DATE OF ORDER:
18 DECEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Applicant has leave to rely on an amended application filed on 26 November 2024.
2.The amended application filed on 26 November 2024 is allowed.
3.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 23 March 2018.
4.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Immigration Assessment Authority requiring it to determine the applicant’s application according to law.
5.The First Respondent is to pay the Applicant’s costs fixed in the sum of $8,371.30.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
INTRODUCTION
This is an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the Authority”) to refuse to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (subclass 790) (“SHEV”) on 23 March 2018.
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a male Tamil citizen of Sri Lanka.
The applicant arrived in Australia on 26 May 2013 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. On 6 March 2017, he lodged an application for the SHEV.
The applicant claimed to fear harm from Sri Lankan authorities due to family links to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), his personal involvement in the LTTE, his claimed Tamil ethnicity and his status as an asylum seeker.
On 21 September 2017, the delegate refused to grant the applicant a SHEV. The applicant’s matter was referred to the Authority and accordingly refused.
The matter is now before this Court for judicial review. For the reasons outlined below this application must be allowed.
THE IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY’S DECISION
The Authority noted the material before it given by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).
The applicant provided new information to the Authority on 6 October 2017 including:
(a)An affidavit of a Ms “KK” with a United Kingdom address dated 31 August 2017.
(b)A decision of the UK Immigration and Asylum Chamber decision dated 1 October 2010.
(c)Two UK passport bio data pages of an “SS” and “AS” issued on 2 April 2014.
At [5] – [6], the Authority was not satisfied of the following:
a.that the affidavit and accompanying documents established the applicant’s claimed familial relationship with Colonel J;
b.that the new information could not have been provided to the delegate’s before the delegate’s decision under s 473DD(b)(i);
c.that the affidavit and decision record provide credible personal information that Colonel J was the applicant’s uncle as claimed;
d.that the document provides credible or corroborative evidence as to the relationship with Colonel J emphasis added); or
e.that the applicant had housed Colonel J’s two children.
Following this finding, the Authority did not consider that there were exceptional circumstances to justify consideration of the new information under s 473DD(a).
The applicant’s claims for protection were summarised at [7]. They are as follows:
•The applicant housed the wife and two children of his cousin, a high profile Liberation tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) commander 'SB' known as Colonel J towards the end of 2009 after Colonel J was killed in the final stage of the war. He also housed his wife's uncle 'JM' after he got out of a camp and went missing after leaving the house for a hospital visit.
•The LTTE operated from a house next to his, which was used to collect taxes but also conducted other activities. He helped the three people (who) worked from the office by travelling with them and looking after their mobile phones and other belongings. One of them, 'C', who became his close friend, who was caught in an operation in 2005/2006. The authorities were aware of his connection with C.
•From 2005, as part of his work as a driver, he transported people for some NGOs between Mullativu and Vavuniya.
•He began receiving anonymous calls around 2006 enquiring about his activities in the LTTE controlled area and threatened to take him for questioning.
•In March 2006 while in Vavuniya, he was abducted by two men in a van and held for 3 hours.
•He escaped to India in 2006 and returned to Sri Lanka in 2007. He was in hiding in his house.
•He answered another call in April 2013. The unidentified caller said 'they' suspected him of being involved with the LTTE. The applicant was told that someone would come to collect him and take him to their offices for interrogation. He stayed at home but bolted the outside of their gate so it looked like nobody was home until he fled Vavuniya to Batticoloa from where he left by boat to Australia. His neighbours later told his wife that they had seen motorbikes come down the dead-end street to their house at that time. His house was also visited after he departed Sri Lanka.
•He fears harm from the authorities because his home was in an area used as a base for operations by the LTTE, and his personal involvement with the LTTE during that time. He fears harm for reasons of his race as a Tamil and being a failed Tamil asylum seeker who illegally fled Sri Lanka and sought asylum in Australia.
It is accepted at [10] that the applicant departed Sri Lanka illegally by boat.
In relation to the applicant’s claims about his employment, the Authority accepted at [13] that the applicant worked as a driver for SEED, transporting people between Mullativu and Vavuniya in 2005-2006 and that he transported people as a contractor for various NGOs from 2008 onwards until he left Sri Lanka.
In relation to the applicant’s claims about his family’s LTTE involvement, the Authority made the following factual findings:
·Although the Authority accepted that the applicant’s older brother ‘V’ joined the LTTE in 1988, and was killed in 1992 in the conflict, it did not accept that he was a high-ranking member or that he held a significant role.
·The applicant claimed that one uncle, ‘N’ was killed in 1998 as a member of the LTTE village council and another uncle ‘B’ who was Colonel J’s father was killed in 1998 due to the known profile of his son. The Authority did not accept that uncle ‘B’ was killed in 2005 because of his son’s claimed LTTE profile.
·The Authority was not convinced on the facts that the applicant was close to Colonel J. It was not satisfied that Colonel J’s brother, ‘S’ would approach the applicant for help, given there was no claim advanced to the Authority that he was close to either ‘S’ or Colonel J’s wife [19].
·The Authority did not find that it was plausible that Colonel J’s wife and children were able to escape or hide by staying in the home area in Vavuniya. The Authority regarded that the applicant did not mention Colonel J in his entry interview, despite mentioning his eldest brother and his wife’s uncle as members of the LTTE. The Authority found that Colonel J was not the applicant’s cousin and did not accept that he housed Colonel J’s wife and two children before they escaped to the UK.
·In regard to his wife’s uncle ‘JM’, the Authority did not accept claims that he was an LTTE combatant and had escaped from a camp. It did not find that ‘JM’ was of interest to the authorities at the time he went missing [21].
As to the applicant’s personal involvement in the LTTE, the Authority found at [24] that this was an invention to boost the applicant’s chances of claiming asylum. The Authority did not accept that; the applicant’s house was close to the offices used by LTTE to collect taxes; that he had any involvement with those people including ‘C’, who was claimed to be in one of the offices and was a close friend to the applicant; that the applicant provided transport to the LTTE or minded their belongings and did not accept the 2005-2006 incident summarised at [22] of the decision record, as this was inconsistent with his evidence that he worked for SEED during that period. Whilst it is accepted that the LTTE may have had operations in the same area as the applicant, it did not accept that the applicant had any personal involvement.
The applicant claims that he was abducted for three hours in March 2006, but also made a separate claim that he was abducted in 2013. The applicant claims that after the abduction incident he escaped to India with his family. These abductions allegedly followed him receiving threatening phone calls from February 2006, where he was questioned about his travels to Mullativu and links with the LTTE. The Authority did not accept that the applicant was abducted in 2006 or 2013, that he escaped to India or that he was ever in hiding. It did not find that the applicant was of interest to Sri Lankan authority groups before leaving Sri Lanka.
The applicant further claimed that after he left Sri Lanka his family home was visited by two people who questioned his wife and his whereabouts. Additionally, the Authority did not have any evidence before it to suggest that he had been in anti-Sri Lankan government or pro-LTTE activities since arriving in Australia. Accordingly, the Authority found that the applicant is not of ongoing interest to the Sri Lankan authorities.
The Authority instructed itself as to the criteria for a refugee assessment under s 5H(1) and the components under s 5J of the Act. At [41], the Authority noted that it had considered the applicant’s matter in the context of whether the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm or persecution on returning to Sri Lanka having regard to the country information before the delegate.
The Authority had regard to the UNHCR 2012 Eligibility Guidelines for Sri Lanka (‘the Guidelines”), the report of UN Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson of July 2017 and the DFAT Country Information Report – Sri Lanka dated 24 January 2017(“2017 Country Information”).
On an assessment of the country information and the applicant’s circumstances in relation to his claim of ‘Male Tamil former LTTE controlled area and family LTTE links’ the Authority was not satisfied there was a real chance that the applicant faces discrimination amounting to serious harm upon return to Sri Lanka or that he will be perceived to be a LTTE supporter or be the subject of monitoring, harassment, questioning or arrest.
The Authority was not satisfied that the applicant faces harm if he returns to Sri Lanka as a returning Tamil asylum seeker, or that the applicant is likely to be arrested by the police at the Colombo international airport, charged and transported to the nearest Magistrates’ Court. The Authority however does not find that there is a chance of mistreatment or torture while being questioned and detained on his arrival in Sri Lanka, and that any questioning, receipt of a fine, detention or imprisonment in the circumstances of this case would amount to serious harm. Although a fine of 200,000 rupees could be imposed on the applicant the Authority was not satisfied that the Applicant could not pay the amount or that it would cause him financial hardship to the extent of serious harm.
Additionally, given that the applicant would be likely charged under the Immigrant & Emigrants Act 1948, any procedures under which the applicant is dealt with will be applied on a non-discriminator basis as the Act applies to all Sri Lankans and therefore as the law has a general application it does not constitute persecution under s 5J of the Act.
The Authority could not have regard to a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal provided by the applicant’s former representative.
The applicant did not meet the criterion under s 36(2) (aa). The Authority affirmed the decision under review to not grant the applicant a protection visa.
GROUNDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The applicant initially filed an Originating Application on 24 April 2018 with two grounds of review. On 26 November 2024, without leave of the Court, the applicant attached to their filed written submissions, an Amended Originating Application.
The amended three grounds of judicial review are as follows (less particulars):
Ground 1
The Authority erred in the manner in which it considered new information pursuant to s473DD of the Act.
Ground 2
The Authority's decision was illogical and so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker would have made a similar finding.
Ground 3
The Authority erred by failing to consider an integer of the Applicant's claim.
THE APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
Ground one is a complaint that the Authority took an impermissible approach to considering new information in accordance with s 473DD.
Section 473DD provides:
Considering new information in exceptional circumstances
For the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless:
(a) the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and
(b) the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information:
(i) was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65;
(ii) is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant's claims.
The Authority should have assessed the new evidence, and whether the documents were considered credible personal information under s 473DD(b)(ii) and if the information contained affected the applicant’s claims.
The applicant submits that the Authority’s finding at [5] of its decision (CB 241), that the applicant’s family link to Colonel J “is one of his central claims” is an apparent concession that the information about the family link to the LTTE may have affected considerations.
The Tribunal is required to assess if the information provided was credible personal information. The personal criterion, required under s 473DD(b)(ii) is submitted to have been conceded by the Authority at the observation made at [5] of the decision. Following this, the Authority should consider if the personal information was credible. The applicant alleges that the Authority failed to undertake this task as they only found that the documents provided were not “credible or corroborative”, which is not the task required under 473DD(b)(ii). This subsection requires an assessment of the information as to credibility only and “corroboration” in this assessment is not permissible under the section.
Ground two alleges that the Authority’s decision was marred with illogicality and unreasonableness to the extent that it could not have been made by another reasonable decision maker. The ground relates to the ‘new information’ documents provided to the Authority and their subsequent findings that the documents were not credible or probative. The applicant submits that this finding was not open to the Authority on the evidence.
The evidence of the applicant’s family links is found firstly in the applicant’s answers at the arrival interview (CB, 1) and the statutory declaration provided in his SHEV application along with a birth certificate, family tree and photographs of Colonel J. Additionally, the applicant, as part of the new information documents, provided an affidavit (CB, 226). The applicant notes that although the affidavit contains handwritten notes of an unknown origin, the original contents of the document, being a sworn affidavit recognised under UK law are identifiable.
The applicant also points to the decision of the UK Tribunal provided as new information and argues that it is relevant as it properly identifies that the deponent in that decision is the applicant in these proceedings, it states that the deponent of the affidavit is the mother of Colonel J, and that the Colonel was recognised in LTTE.
All the documents provided to elucidate the applicant’s family LTTE links are credible and corroborative. Further, the Authority did not give reasons for the finding that the documents were not credible or corroborative, it is simply asserted.
The proposed ground three is an additional ground raised in the Amended Originating Application. It alleges that the Authority purported to deal with a claim by the applicant in relation to risks associated with his family links to the LTTE which is a risk acknowledged in DFAT country information from 2017. The Authority however avoided consideration of the applicant’s actual claim by observing that the situation in Sri Lanka has significantly improved based on information from 2012 Country information. Therefore, the applicant’s claim based on the 2017 DFAT material was not dealt with.
THE FIRST RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
The first respondent did not oppose the applicant’s having leave to file an amended application however noted that the application sought to include a third ground within the application.
It is noted that the applicant’s written submissions and proposed amendments to ground one of the application departs from the original emphasis of the ground which was asserted by reference to Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176 (“BBS16”) specifically at paragraph 13 and 14 of the particulars.
As to the complaint in ground one, the first respondent referred to the High Court’s decision in AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 37 (“AUS17”) where the operation of s 473DD was discussed at [11]:
Logic and policy therefore demand that the Authority assess such new information as it might obtain from the referred applicant first against the criteria specified in both s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) and only then against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a). If neither of the criteria specified in s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) is met, the Authority is prohibited from taking the new information into account in making its decision on the review. Further assessment of the new information against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a) is redundant. If either the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(i) or the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(ii) is met, that is a circumstance which must be factored into the subsequent assessment of whether the new information meets the criterion specified in s 473DD(a). If both the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(i) and the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(ii) are met, that too is a circumstance which must be factored into the subsequent assessment of whether the new information meets the criterion specified in s 473DD(a) and which must heighten the prospect of that criterion being met.
The Authority’s process of reasoning aligns with the assessment of s 473DD as explained in AUS17 and this is apparent at [6] of the Authority decision, in that it considered both s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) before considering it against the criterion in s 473DD(a).
Further, as recognised in BBS16 by the Full Court, the Authoriy’s reasoning explained that it had considered the circumstances as a whole before reaching a conclusion that it “was not satisfied exceptional circumstances exist”. The applicant’s analysis of s 473DD(b)(ii) is asserted to be an “unduly narrow” approach and differs from the decision in BBS16 at [105] where it was observed that the section requires the significance of the new information to be evaluated in the context of the applicant’s case more generally and not only to evaluate whether the personal information was credible, as advanced by the applicant.
The Authority’s reference to “credible or corroborative” evidence shows that the new information was evaluated in the context of the applicant’s claims.
As to ground two, the first respondent argues that the Court should not accept that the applicant’s argument that there was illogicality or legal unreasonableness in the Authority’s decision not to consider the new information.
The first respondent applies the principles explained in Fattah v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 31 at [46] to encourage the Court to find that there was a logical connection between the evidence relied upon by the Authority and the inference it drew. These findings were open to the Authority and there are intelligible justifications provided at [5]-[6] of the decision. The Authority’s analysis demonstrates an evaluative judgment which the Full Court DYS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 33 observed at [17] the “IAA is not required [under s 473DD], to be satisfied of the existence of a particular fact or facts. Rather it has to make an evaluative judgment.”
The applicant supports their argument in ground two by contending at [24] of their submissions that it is a bold finding to conclude that a printed decision of a UK Tribunal is not a credible document. This argument however suggests that the Authority should have made findings of fact such as deducing that the person referred to in the affidavit is the same person referred to in the decision of the UK Tribunal, or to find that this Tribunal decision was credible. The Authority was not bound by principles of legal reasonableness and logicality to make those findings or accept any document as credible, as such it did not fall into jurisdictional error in declining to consider new information.
As to the proposed ground three, the applicant’s misapprehended the Authority’s findings and the country information it relied upon to make those findings. The first respondent submits that there is no merit in the applicant’s proposed grounds to warrant the Court granting leave for the applicant to rely upon it.
The applicant submitted claims in reference to 2017 DFAT country information which appear at page 169 of the Court Book as follows:
8. DFAT's Country Information Report on Sri Lanka of 24 January 2017 reiterates the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) advice that 'previous (real or perceived) links that go beyond prior residency within an area controlled by the LTTE continue to expose individuals to treatment which may give rise to a need for international refugee protection', and that although 'the nature of these more elaborate links to the LTTE can vary', they may include:
1) Persons who held senior positions with considerable authority in the LTTE civilian administration, when the LTTE was in control of large parts of what are now the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.
2) Former LTTE combatants or "cadres".
3) Former LTTE combatants or "cadres" who, due to injury or other reason, were employed by the LTTE in functions within the administration, intelligence, "computer branch" or media (newspaper and radio).
4) Former LTTE supporters who may never have undergone military training, but were involved in sheltering or transporting LTTE personnel, or the supply and transport of goods for the LTTE.
5) LTTE fundraisers and propaganda activists and those with, or perceived as having had, links to the Sri Lankan diaspora that provided funding and other support to the LTTE.
6) Persons with family links or who are dependent on or otherwise closely related to persons with the above profiles.
This ground is unclear as to which finding or paragraph of the Authority’s findings they are referring to.
The Authority did not state that it relied on 2012 country information, except for references made to 2012 country information at [42] and [45] of its decision in which comments are made as to UNCHR 2012 Eligibility Guidelines for Sri Lanka. The Authority at [45] indicated that the UNHCR 2012 Eligibility Guidelines highlighted that a person with claims of real or perceived links with the LTTE including family links may give rise to international refugee protection, however since the Guidelines were issued in 2012, the situation in Sri Lanka has improved. The Authority continued on to support its findings with reference to 2017 DFAT country information that the security situation has improved since the end of the conflict.
The 2017 country information was dealt within in context to the applicant’s claims, however the Authority gave greater emphasis in rejecting the applicant’s overarching claims, a choice that is a matter for the Authority as a decision maker; (see: NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [13]).
Citing Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184 at [47], the first respondent submits that the Authority could “make findings of greater generality” and reject the “factual premise upon which” the applicant’s claim rests, due to the country information it relied on.
CONSIDERATION
At the commencement of the hearing the parties agreed it was appropriate to consider all the grounds, including the proposed amended ground on the merits. If merit was found, then leave should be granted for ground one to be amended.
Ground one
Ground one is an assertion that the Authority applied the incorrect test when considering whether or not to accept the new information that was provided to it. First it is to be noted that the test in s 473DD relates to whether or not the information should be received. It is an anterior test in that if the information is received, it is still open to the Authority to reject the information later in its consideration as to if the claims for protection are made out. Receiving the information is to be differentiated from accepting or believing that information is true; (see: CSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474 (“CSR16”) at [41] – [42].
A two-stage process under s 473DD is required. As found is AUS17 at [11], the Authority must first consider if the requirements in s 473DD(b)(i) or s 473DD(b)(ii) are satisfied. This consideration will then inform the Authority as to whether the requirements of s473DD(a) are met, that being there are exceptional circumstances to justify the receipt of the new information.
At [6] of the decision record, when considering whether information that was provided about the applicant’s relationship with Colonel J was credible, the Authority first considered if the information could have been provided to the delegate prior to the delegate making their decision (s 473DD(b)(i)). The Authority was not so satisfied. No attack is made on this part of the decision.
Next, the Authority turned its attention to the requirements of s 473DD(b)(ii), that being if the information was ‘personal credible information which was not previously known and had it been known may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims’. The use of the word ‘may’ indicates a low threshold for the materiality of the information at this stage of the consideration process.
The Authority found that it was not satisfied that ‘the documents provided are credible or corroborative evidence to support his claimed familial relationship with Colonel J’ (emphasis added). Had the Authority simply found the documents were not ‘credible personal information’ no issue would arise. It is the use of the word ‘corroborative’ in addition to the word ‘credible’ that is impugned.
The respondent relies upon BBS16 at [105] which states as follows:
For the reasons given by his Honour, including his references to relevant extrinsic material, we respectfully agree that subparagraphs (b)(i) and (ii) should be understood as referring to different kinds of new information. The former provision requires a factual inquiry as to whether or not the new information could have been presented to the Minister. The latter provision requires an evaluation of the significance of the new information in the context of the referred applicant’s claims more generally.
While the Court accepts that s 473DD(b)(ii) requires an evaluation of the significance of the new information generally, it is satisfied that by making reference to the word ‘corroborative’ the Authority imposed a higher standard of satisfaction than the criteria in s 473DD(b)(ii) requires. It is only material that is evidently not credible that fails to meet the criteria in s 473DD(b)(ii) not ‘credible or corroborative’. In so doing it misconceived what the exercise of statutory power entailed (see: CSR16 at [43]).
Ground one must be upheld. Leave will be granted to amend Ground one. Further, it is accordingly not necessary to consider grounds two and three.
DETERMINATION
Accordingly, it follows that the application must be allowed.
I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge D Humphreys. Associate:
Dated: 18 December 2024
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