DGE17 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DGE17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 567

Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal: DGE17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1682
File number: NSD 1743 of 2018
Judge: GLEESON J
Date of judgment: 16 April 2019
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time for leave to appeal decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where applicant seeking to rely on grounds of appeal not raised previously – where application has no reasonable prospects of success – application dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 35.13, 35.14

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 44.12

Cases cited:

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart IndustriesInc [1991] FCA 655; (1991) 33 FCR 397

DZAAD v Department of Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 204

SZQCZ v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 91

SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2015] FCAFC 86

WAAD v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 399

Date of hearing: 16 April 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 36
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr T Hillyard of Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

NSD 1743 of 2018
BETWEEN:

DGE17

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GLEESON J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 APRIL 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

3.The name of the first respondent in this proceeding be amended to “Minister for Home Affairs”.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Ex tempore judgment revised from transcript)

GLEESON J:

  1. The applicant seeks an extension of time and leave to appeal from the judgment of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”), given on 26 June 2018: DGE17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1682. The FCCA judge dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (“Tribunal”), affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) not to grant him a protection (Class XA) visa, under r 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“FCCA Rules”) because his Honour concluded that the applicant was unable to demonstrate an arguable case of jurisdictional error.

  2. The applicant represented himself at the hearing before this Court today. He did not file written submissions. Although assisted by an interpreter in the Malay language, he did not make any oral submissions.

    BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS FOR PROTECTION

  3. The applicant, a citizen of Malaysia, entered Australia as the holder of an Electronic Travel Authority visa in October 2016. On 9 January 2017, the applicant applied for a protection visa.

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 567
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, a Malaysian citizen, sought an extension of time and leave to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA), which had affirmed a decision of the delegate to refuse the grant of a protection visa. The application was filed 71 days out of the prescribed time limit. The applicant, who appeared before the Court unrepresented and without an interpreter, did not make any submissions. The Court was required to determine whether the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal ought to be granted. In determining whether to grant an extension of time, the Court considered the reasons for and length of the delay, any prejudice to the respondents, and the merits of the appeal. To grant leave to appeal, the Court had to be satisfied that there was sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration of the FCCA judge’s decision and that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused. The Minister submitted that the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal should be refused as the proposed appeal had no prospects of success. The Minister submitted that the draft grounds of appeal failed to identify any basis for the Court to be satisfied that an extension of time was warranted. The Minister further submitted that the FCCA judge’s decision was not attended by any doubt or error and that there was no arguable jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. The Minister submitted that, in those circumstances, there would not be substantial injustice if leave to appeal were refused. The Court dismissed the application. The Court accepted the Minister’s submission that the proposed appeal had no prospects of success and it would be futile to grant the relief sought. The Court held that, once it was accepted that the proposed appeal had no prospects of success, it would be an inappropriate exercise of the Court’s discretion to grant the relief sought. The Court further held that it was unnecessary to consider the significance of the delay or the applicant’s explanation for that delay. The Court ordered that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the Minister’s costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

3. The name of the first respondent in this proceeding be amended to “Minister for Home Affairs”.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant represented himself at the hearing before this Court today. He did not file written submissions. Although assisted by an interpreter in the Malay language, he did not make any oral submissions. BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS FOR PROTECTION The applicant, a citizen of Malaysia, entered Australia as the holder of an Electronic Travel Authority visa in October 2016. On 9 January 2017, the applicant applied for a protection visa. The applicant’s claims in his visa application were set out in the reasons of the FCCA judge, at [5] of his Honour’s reasons, as follows:[5] In his visa application, the applicant advanced the following claims: a)he left Malaysia because of the economic conditions. He had been unemployed since December 2015, when his employer retrenched half of the workforce without compensation. As he had lost his monthly income, he decided to leave Malaysia to “seek fortune and gain life experience”;b)if returned to Malaysia, he would face difficulties obtaining employment suitable to his qualifications, due to the “worrying” employment market and the economic downturn, which forced companies to retrench employees. The inflation rate was increasing and he would struggle to survive; andc)he had sought new jobs, but his applications were not successful as many of the companies in Malaysia were downsizing. The protection visa application was refused by the delegate on 7 March 2017. The applicant sought merits review of the delegate’s decision and attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 22 June 2017. According to the FCCA judge (at [6] of his Honour’s reasons), the applicant advanced the following additional claims at the Tribunal hearing:a)he came to Australia to earn a better income in order to fund renovations on his family home and tuition fees for his brother at a religious school; andb)if returned to Malaysia, he would be “chased and looked for” by the police. The police had “chased” him and his friend two years prior because his friend had stolen a motorbike. The police were in the area not long before he travelled to Australia and he was concerned that they were still looking for him. On 28 June 2017, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse the grant of the visa. At para 16 of its decision record, the Tribunal stated:16.As discussed above, the Tribunal has not accepted that the applicant was wanted or being sought out by the police or authorities in relation to a criminal incident involving a friend. It follows that the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant would be sought out by police or authorities in the future on this basis. The Tribunal is not satisfied therefore that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm based on this criminal incident. At paras 19 and 20, the Tribunal stated:19.The applicant has stated that he travelled to Australia to find a better job. He claims that the harm he will suffer will be receiving a lower income, which may mean he cannot support his brother at religious school or provide money for renovation of the family home. He has not claimed that he fears this harm for one of the reasons set out in s.5J(1)(a) if he returned to Malaysia in the reasonably foreseeable future, and nor is there evidence that the harm would be for one of those reasons. On the evidence before it, the Tribunal is not satisfied that there is a real chance of serious harm for reasons of race, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.20.The Tribunal is not satisfied therefore that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for one of the reasons set out in the legislation were he to return to Malaysia in the reasonably foreseeable future.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Once it is accepted that the proposed appeal has no prospects of success, it would be futile to grant the relief sought. Accordingly, it would not be an appropriate exercise of the Court’s discretion to grant the relief sought and it is unnecessary to consider the significance of the delay in this case or the applicant’s explanation for that delay.CONCLUSION The application must be refused. Costs should follow the event.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In circumstances where leave to appeal is required, the application for leave to appeal had to be filed within 14 days of the date on which the judgment was pronounced on 26 June 2018 (that is, by 10 July 2018), pursuant to r 35.13 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (“Rules”). The application for leave to appeal is therefore 71 days out of time.Considerations for extending time and granting leave to appeal Rule 35.14 of the Rules provides a discretionary power to extend time to seek leave to appeal: DZAAD v Department of Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 204 at [28]. The relevant considerations in deciding whether to grant an extension of time include: (1)The reasons for and length of the delay. The Court must be satisfied that it is proper to grant an extension of time, noting the prescribed period is not to be ignored.(2)Any prejudice to the respondents, noting that the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension: SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6] per Flick J.(3)The merits of the appeal: SZQCZ v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 91 at [19]; WAAD v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 399 at [9]; DZAAD at [28]. Further, in order for the Court to grant leave to appeal, the applicant must satisfy the Court of the cumulative test set out in Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart IndustriesInc [1991] FCA 655; (1991) 33 FCR 397, namely, whether:(1)in all the circumstances the judgment of the primary judge is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by the Full Court; and(2)substantial injustice would result if leave were refused supposing the decision to be wrong. If the proposed appeal is doomed to fail, or if no arguable ground of appeal is raised by the applicant, then it would be futile to grant leave to appeal and, accordingly, leave should not be granted: BZACZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1230; (2013) 139 ALD 140 at [25]. The Minister accepts that there is little prejudice to him if the Court were to grant an extension of time, beyond the public interest in the finality of administrative decision-making. However, as he noted, the absence of prejudice without more is not a sufficient basis for an extension of time.MERITS OF THE PROPOSED APPEAL The Minister submits that the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal ought to be refused because the proposed substantive appeal is without merit, noting that the draft grounds of appeal fail to identify any basis for the Court to be satisfied that an extension of time is warranted. The Minister further submitted that the FCCA judge’s decision to dismiss the application is not attended by any, let alone sufficient, doubt or error and nor is there any arguable jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. The Minister submitted that in those circumstances there would not be substantial injustice if leave to appeal were refused.First proposed ground of appeal