FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DGE17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 567
Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal: DGE17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1682 File number: NSD 1743 of 2018 Judge: GLEESON J Date of judgment: 16 April 2019 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time for leave to appeal decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where applicant seeking to rely on grounds of appeal not raised previously – where application has no reasonable prospects of success – application dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 35.13, 35.14
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 44.12
Cases cited: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart IndustriesInc [1991] FCA 655; (1991) 33 FCR 397
DZAAD v Department of Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 204
SZQCZ v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 91
SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2015] FCAFC 86
WAAD v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 399
Date of hearing: 16 April 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 36 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr T Hillyard of Sparke Helmore ORDERS
NSD 1743 of 2018 BETWEEN: DGE17
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GLEESON J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 APRIL 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.
3.The name of the first respondent in this proceeding be amended to “Minister for Home Affairs”.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Ex tempore judgment revised from transcript)GLEESON J:
The applicant seeks an extension of time and leave to appeal from the judgment of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”), given on 26 June 2018: DGE17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1682. The FCCA judge dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (“Tribunal”), affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) not to grant him a protection (Class XA) visa, under r 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (“FCCA Rules”) because his Honour concluded that the applicant was unable to demonstrate an arguable case of jurisdictional error.
The applicant represented himself at the hearing before this Court today. He did not file written submissions. Although assisted by an interpreter in the Malay language, he did not make any oral submissions.
BACKGROUND AND CLAIMS FOR PROTECTION
The applicant, a citizen of Malaysia, entered Australia as the holder of an Electronic Travel Authority visa in October 2016. On 9 January 2017, the applicant applied for a protection visa.
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 567
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.
3. The name of the first respondent in this proceeding be amended to “Minister for Home Affairs”.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In circumstances where leave to appeal is required, the application for leave to appeal had to be filed within 14 days of the date on which the judgment was pronounced on 26 June 2018 (that is, by 10 July 2018), pursuant to r 35.13 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (“Rules”). The application for leave to appeal is therefore 71 days out of time.Considerations for extending time and granting leave to appeal Rule 35.14 of the Rules provides a discretionary power to extend time to seek leave to appeal: DZAAD v Department of Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 204 at [28]. The relevant considerations in deciding whether to grant an extension of time include: (1)The reasons for and length of the delay. The Court must be satisfied that it is proper to grant an extension of time, noting the prescribed period is not to be ignored.(2)Any prejudice to the respondents, noting that the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension: SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6] per Flick J.(3)The merits of the appeal: SZQCZ v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 91 at [19]; WAAD v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 399 at [9]; DZAAD at [28]. Further, in order for the Court to grant leave to appeal, the applicant must satisfy the Court of the cumulative test set out in Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart IndustriesInc [1991] FCA 655; (1991) 33 FCR 397, namely, whether:(1)in all the circumstances the judgment of the primary judge is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by the Full Court; and(2)substantial injustice would result if leave were refused supposing the decision to be wrong. If the proposed appeal is doomed to fail, or if no arguable ground of appeal is raised by the applicant, then it would be futile to grant leave to appeal and, accordingly, leave should not be granted: BZACZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1230; (2013) 139 ALD 140 at [25]. The Minister accepts that there is little prejudice to him if the Court were to grant an extension of time, beyond the public interest in the finality of administrative decision-making. However, as he noted, the absence of prejudice without more is not a sufficient basis for an extension of time.MERITS OF THE PROPOSED APPEAL The Minister submits that the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal ought to be refused because the proposed substantive appeal is without merit, noting that the draft grounds of appeal fail to identify any basis for the Court to be satisfied that an extension of time is warranted. The Minister further submitted that the FCCA judge’s decision to dismiss the application is not attended by any, let alone sufficient, doubt or error and nor is there any arguable jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. The Minister submitted that in those circumstances there would not be substantial injustice if leave to appeal were refused.First proposed ground of appeal