FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WZAVC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 925
ORDERS
WAD 153 of 2017 BETWEEN: WZAVC
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BARKER J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 AUGUST 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be assessed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BARKER J:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the former Refugee Review Tribunal, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to grant the appellant a protection (class XA) visa.
The appellant, who was born on 3 December 1987, is a male citizen of Pakistan and of Muslim faith. He arrived in Australia on 15 July 2008 on a subclass 572 student visa and was granted a further student visa on 2 November 2010. His student visa was cancelled on 10 June 2011. He has been granted a number of bridging visas since then.
The appellant applied for a protection…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 925
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in this case centred on whether the primary judge had erred in not identifying any jurisdictional errors in the Tribunal's decision. The appellant sought to raise new grounds of appeal that had not been presented to the primary judge. The primary judge had already dismissed the appeal on the basis that the appellant's proposed grounds of appeal were either without merit or were new issues that had not been raised before the primary judge. The appellant argued that the delay in the primary judge delivering the judgment was so significant that it suggested a jurisdictional error, and he also attempted to introduce a new ground of appeal that had not been previously raised.
The court examined the appellant's arguments and found that the delay in the delivery of the judgment, while regrettable, was not sufficient to infer jurisdictional error. The court also noted that the second ground of appeal, which was new, lacked merit and was not raised before the primary judge. The court concluded that the proposed grounds of appeal did not demonstrate any appellable error on the part of the primary judge and that it would not be expedient in the administration of justice to allow the appellant to raise these grounds for the first time on appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be assessed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For these reasons, the Minister submits that the grounds of appeal fail to demonstrate any appellable error on the part of the primary judge, or any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. The Minister further submits that the proposed grounds are without merit, such that it would not be “expedient in the administration of justice” for leave to be granted to the appellant to raise them for the first time on appeal.CONSIDERATION As to ground one, it appears that the appellant wishes to argue that the effluxion of nearly two years between the date of his hearing before the primary judge and the delivery of judgment on that judicial review proceeding is so long as to suggest error of a jurisdictional nature. While there are instances of the fact of a long delay being sufficient for a court to infer such error (see NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 470; [2005] HCA 77), there is nothing in the circumstances of this case to suggest that the primary judge misunderstood or misconstrued or otherwise failed to conduct the hearing and make the determination in accordance with the materials before him or the applicable law (see SZFNX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 562). There is, for example, no obvious error in any findings made by the judge to suggest that the delay was the cause of that error and so that delay might be a factor that goes to undermine the whole of the judgment appealed from. I do not consider that the delay in question, a little less than two years, whilst regrettable, is of itself sufficient to infer jurisdictional error in this case. See Moussa and authorities there referred to. As to the second ground of appeal, that is a new ground not raised before the primary judge. It is indeed a little difficult to understand, when put in context of the various decisions made to this point, just what it is intending to target by way of error. The fact of the matter is that the Tribunal found against the appellant primarily on credibility grounds. It applied the Convention test appropriately but found that the appellant was not a person to whom Australia owed relevant obligations. In those circumstances, there is, as a matter of substance, no merit in this second ground. As it was not raised in the Court below and lacks merit in any event, leave to rely on it should not be permitted. The oral submissions of the appellant went to the merits and process of the Tribunal hearing and do not go to any question of jurisdictional error identified in the proposed grounds of appeal before the Court. In these circumstances, the appeal should be dismissed with costs.