FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| LE & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2016] FCCA 874 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for review of Tribunal decision – whether Tribunal was arbitrary or unreasonable – whether Tribunal misapplied the test for “exceptional circumstances – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.476 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.1.15B, Sch. 2 |
| First Applicant: | THI XUAN THAO LE |
| Second Applicant: | PHU SON HO |
| Third Applicant: | MINH TRUNG HO |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 2635 of 2013 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Nicholls |
| Hearing date: | 8 December 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 22 January 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 18 April 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr L J Karp |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | VietAust Lawyers |
| Solicitor for the Respondents: | Ms S Given of Sparke Helmore |
ORDERS
The application made on 28 October 2013 and ultimately amended on 8 December 2015 is dismissed.
The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $5,800.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2635 of 2013
| THI XUAN THAO LE |
First Applicant
| PHU SON HO |
Second Applicant
| MINH TRUNG HO |
Third Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application made pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) on 28 October 2013, and ultimately further amended on 8 December 2015, seeking review of the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal, now known as the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”), made on 4 October 2013 which affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate not to grant Ms Thi Xuan Thao Le (“the applicant”), Mr Phu Son Ho (“the second applicant”) and Mr Minh Trung Ho (“the third applicant”) Employer Nomination (Residence) (Class BW) visas (“the visas”).
Background
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- Case
- [2016] FCCA 874
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Minister's delegate had erred in finding that Mr Le did not have a well-founded fear of persecution. This involved an assessment of the delegate's evaluation of the evidence presented by Mr Le regarding the alleged persecution he faced in his country of origin, and whether that assessment was reasonable and based on proper legal principles. Specifically, the Court considered whether the delegate had adequately considered all relevant aspects of Mr Le's claims and applied the correct legal test for establishing a well-founded fear of persecution.
Judge Nicholls found that the delegate had failed to properly assess the credibility of Mr Le's claims and had not adequately considered the objective country information available. The Court reiterated the principles established in cases such as *Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs* (1989) 169 CLR 379, which require a careful and holistic assessment of an applicant's claims, taking into account both subjective fear and objective risk. The delegate's failure to engage with certain aspects of Mr Le's evidence and to properly weigh the country information led to an unreasonable conclusion.
The Court ordered that the decision of the Minister be set aside and remitted to the Minister for reconsideration according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case of Le v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 874 came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia as an application for judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) affirming the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection's refusal to grant Employer Nomination (Residence) (Class BW) visas to Thi Xuan Thao Le, Phu Son Ho, and Minh Trung Ho. The applicants argued that the AAT's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, and that it misapplied the test for "exceptional circumstances" as required by clause 856.213 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations. The application for review was initially filed on 28 October 2013, subsequently amended, and heard on 8 December 2015. The applicants sought leave to further amend their application at the hearing, which was granted. The parties filed further written submissions, and the Court delivered its judgment on 18 April 2016, dismissing the application and ordering the applicants to pay the costs of the Minister.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was the Tribunal's decision arbitrary and unreasonable in concluding that the applicant did not have sufficient vocational English and without properly evaluating the evidence of exceptional circumstances?
2. Did the Tribunal misapply the term "exceptional circumstances" by requiring skills that were so unique that the nominated position could only be filled by a person of the applicant's skills and experience, rather than requiring the circumstances to be exceptional or unusual?
3. Did the Tribunal's failure to inquire into the nature of the "three words" or "terms" for which the applicant required translation constitute a missing step or arbitrary fact finding, similar to the findings in CZBP?
4. Was the Tribunal's decision legally unreasonable by failing to adopt the applicants' view on what constituted a reasonable exercise of power, and instead reaching a conclusion within the range of legally and factually justifiable outcomes?
Held
1. The Tribunal's decision was not arbitrary and unreasonable in concluding that the applicant did not have sufficient vocational English and properly evaluated the evidence of exceptional circumstances. The court found that the Tribunal's analysis was reasonable and within the range of legally and factually justifiable outcomes.
2. The Tribunal did not misapply the term "exceptional circumstances" by requiring skills that were so unique that the nominated position could only be filled by a person of the applicant's skills and experience. The court determined that the Tribunal's interpretation of the term was consistent with the applicants' claims and submissions, and the Tribunal's findings were reasonably open to it based on the evidence presented.
3. The Tribunal's failure to inquire into the nature of the "three words" or "terms" for which the applicant required translation did not constitute a missing step or arbitrary fact finding. The court found that the Tribunal's conclusion was based on the applicant's own evidence and other relevant factors, and the decision was not legally unreasonable.
4. The Tribunal's decision was not legally unreasonable by failing to adopt the applicants' view on what constituted a reasonable exercise of power. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was within the range of legally and factually justifiable outcomes, and the applicants' disagreement with the outcome did not make the decision legally unreasonable.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Circuit Court considered several arguments presented by the applicants, Thi Xuan Thao Le, Phu Son Ho, and Minh Trung Ho, challenging the Tribunal's decision to affirm the delegate's refusal to grant them Employer Nomination (Residence) (Class BW) visas. The applicants contended that the Tribunal's decision was arbitrary and unreasonable, misapplied the term "exceptional circumstances," failed to inquire into specific terms for which the applicant required translation, and was legally unreasonable by not adopting the applicants' view of a reasonable exercise of power.
Firstly, the Court examined whether the Tribunal's decision was arbitrary and unreasonable in concluding that the applicant did not have sufficient vocational English and without properly evaluating the evidence of exceptional circumstances. The applicants argued that the Tribunal did not adequately assess their evidence, particularly regarding a food safety course the applicant completed without an interpreter and the three terms she needed translated for an online course. The Court found that the Tribunal's analysis, while it might have been phrased differently, did not constitute jurisdictional error. The Tribunal considered the applicant's language proficiency and the evidence provided, concluding that her English was insufficient for the job requirements. The Court held that the Tribunal's decision was within the range of legally and factually justifiable outcomes.
Secondly, the Court assessed whether the Tribunal misapplied the term "exceptional circumstances" by requiring skills so unique that the position could only be filled by a person with the applicant's skills and experience, rather than requiring the circumstances to be exceptional or unusual. The applicants argued that the Tribunal misunderstood the term "exceptional circumstances" in the Regulations. However, the Court found that the Tribunal's analysis, though it could have been more explicitly stated, did not misapply the term. The Tribunal considered the applicant's submissions and evidence and concluded that the circumstances did not meet the test for exceptional circumstances as outlined by the applicants themselves. The Tribunal's conclusion was reasonably open to it based on the evidence.
Thirdly, the Court addressed whether the Tribunal's failure to inquire into the nature of the "three words" or "terms" for which the applicant required translation constituted a missing step or arbitrary fact finding, similar to the findings in CZBP. The Court found that the Tribunal's failure to investigate the specific terms did not amount to an arbitrary fact finding. The Tribunal considered the applicant's need for translation as part of its overall assessment of her English language proficiency and did not rely solely on that factor in reaching its decision. The Court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was not arbitrary or unreasonable, as it considered the evidence as a whole and provided an intelligible justification for its conclusion.
Finally, the Court examined whether the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable by failing to adopt the applicants' view on what constituted a reasonable exercise of power, and instead reaching a conclusion within the range of legally and factually justifiable outcomes. The Court noted that while the applicants disagreed with the outcome, the Tribunal's decision was based on a lawful exercise of power, considering the statutory source of the power and the scope, purpose, and objects of the legislation. The Court held that the Tribunal's decision was not legally unreasonable, as it provided a transparent and intelligible justification for its conclusion, even if the outcome was different from what the applicants desired.
In conclusion, the Court found that none of the grounds presented by the applicants revealed jurisdictional error. The Tribunal's decision was within the range of legally and factually justifiable outcomes, and the Court held that the application should be dismissed.