Le v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 22 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Le v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2016] FCA 1455

Appeal from: Le & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 874
File number: NSD 649 of 2016
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 17 August 2016
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – visa applicant applied for employer nomination residence visa – Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – whether visa applicant fell within “exceptional circumstances” under subcl 856.213(c)(ii) – where “exceptional circumstances” not defined – where Tribunal applied tests of “so unique” and “essential” in considering whether “exceptional circumstances” – whether Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by departing from ordinary meaning of “exceptional circumstances”

MIGRATION – where Tribunal found there was “no evidence” of the visa applicant’s “exceptional circumstances” – where nominating employer provided a document in support of visa application that contained factual matters regarding the visa applicant’s “exceptional circumstances”  – whether Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by ignoring relevant material which would have affected the Tribunal’s exercise of its power

Legislation:

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.15B, subcl 856.213(c)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 140E, 140GB

Cases cited:

Hatcher v Cohn (2004) 139 FCR 425

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS (2014) 309 ALR 67

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Date of hearing: 1, 17 August 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 43
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr LJ Karp
Solicitor for the Appellants: Vietaust Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Francois
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 649 of 2016
BETWEEN:

THI XUAN THAO LE

First Appellant

PHU SON HO

Second Appellant

MINH TRUNG HO

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 AUGUST 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave be granted to the appellants to file and rely on the amended notice of appeal annexed to the affidavit of Cuong Nguyen of 2 August 2016.

2.Order 1 made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 18 April 2016 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a)the decision of the second respondent made on 4 October 2013 be quashed;

(b)the application for review be remitted to the second respondent to hear and determine according to law.

3.The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

  1. This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing the appellants’…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Le v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1455
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Le v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves Ms Thi Xuan Thao Le, a cook from Vietnam who applied for an employer nomination (residence) visa in 2011. The application was supported by her employer, Little Miss Saigon Pty Limited. The key issue before the court was whether Ms Le met the "exceptional circumstances" requirement under subcl 856.213(c)(ii) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). The court was required to determine whether the Migration Review Tribunal had correctly interpreted the term "exceptional circumstances" and whether it had properly considered all relevant material in making its decision.

The court held that the Tribunal had erred in its interpretation of "exceptional circumstances" by applying tests of "so unique" and "essential" which were not supported by the ordinary meaning of the term. The court further found that the Tribunal had committed a jurisdictional error by ignoring a document provided by Ms Le's employer, which contained factual information about her exceptional circumstances. This document would have affected the Tribunal's exercise of its power to decide the matter.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the Tribunal, and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal to be dealt with in accordance with law. The Federal Circuit Court's order for costs in favour of the Minister was upheld, and the Minister was ordered to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal. The court emphasised the importance of properly considering all relevant material and correctly interpreting legal terms in administrative decisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave be granted to the appellants to file and rely on the amended notice of appeal annexed to the affidavit of Cuong Nguyen of 2 August 2016.

2. Order 1 made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 18 April 2016 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a) the decision of the second respondent made on 4 October 2013 be quashed;

(b) the application for review be remitted to the second respondent to hear and determine according to law.

3. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing the appellants’ application for Constitutional writ relief in respect of the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal given on 4 October 2013 affirming the decision of the Minister’s delegate not to grant the appellants’ employer nomination (residence) (class BW) visas: Le v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 874.Background Ms Thi Xuan Thao Le is a cook by profession. She came to Australia from Vietnam in October 2007 as the holder of a subclass 457 visa and, on 17 October 2011, applied to the Minister’s department for the visa to which I have referred. She included her spouse and child in the application as secondary applicants. It is not necessary to consider any issues in relation to Ms Le’s family. Ms Le’s employer, Little Miss Saigon Pty Limited, a Canberra restaurant, supported her application. The Tribunal accepted that cooks, at the relevant time, were an occupation for whom there was a shortage of persons qualified in the Australian Capital Territory to fulfil that occupation. And, for that reason, Ms Le satisfied one element of the requirements for the visa. The criteria that Ms Le had to satisfy for the grant of her visa relevantly included those in subcl 856.213(c) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). It was common ground before the Tribunal that Ms Le was less than 45 years of age and did not have vocational English. Relevantly, subcl 856.213(c)(ii) (as at 17 October 2011) provided:856.213 Each of the following is satisfied:…(c) either:…(ii)in any other case – unless exceptional circumstances apply, the applicant:(A) is less than 45; and(B) has vocational English. (emphasis added) Thus, the critical issue for Ms Le’s application to succeed was whether or not the Tribunal was satisfied that exceptional circumstances applied within the meaning of that provision. The scheme that governed the grant of the visa for which Ms Le had applied appeared in Div 3A of Pt 2 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Under s 140E, the Minister had to approve a person as a sponsor in relation to, relevantly, Ms Le. It was common ground that the Minister had approved Little Miss Saigon as a sponsor of Ms Le. An approved sponsor had the right to nominate a proposed applicant for a visa of a prescribed kind, including that for which Ms Le applied, in relation to her actual or proposed occupation. The Minister had to approve an approved sponsor’s nomination if criteria prescribed under s 140GB were satisfied. It is also common ground that Ms Le’s application met that criteria. An applicant had to achieve a score for vocational English (as defined in reg 1.15B) in particular prescribed tests. It was common ground that Ms Le had not met those tests. Hence, the sole issue before the Tribunal was whether or not it was satisfied that exceptional circumstances applied in her case so that it would meet the criterion in subcl 856.213(c)(ii). The application to the Tribunal

Decision

Reasons for decision

As I have said, that finding may have been open to the Tribunal, if it had considered Mr Vong’s material as evidence. But it was not entitled to ignore that material by finding that there was no such evidence. Accordingly, its decision miscarried by its jurisdictional error in ignoring relevant material.Conclusion For these reasons, I am of opinion that the appeal must be allowed, the decision of the Tribunal set aside and the matter remitted to it to be dealt with in accordance with law. The Minister submitted that, in light of the conclusion to which I have come, I should not disturb the order for costs in his favour made by the trial judge. Ms Le argued that his Honour’s order for costs should be set aside and that there be no order for costs below. The point on which the appeal has turned had not been argued below and Ms Le failed to disturb his Honour’s decision on the ground of appeal that his Honour had erred in his consideration of the way in which the Tribunal had applied the test of “exceptional circumstances”. I am of opinion that in those circumstances it would not be appropriate to disturb his Honour’s order for costs. The Minister accepts that costs of the appeal should follow the event. I will order that he pay Ms Le’s costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister argued that, if Mr Vong’s self-styled “submissions” could amount to evidence, those did not go beyond being mere assertions as to matters that lacked any independent or corroborative support. He contended that a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons showed that in par [21], it demonstrated that it had been looking for independent or other corroborative material before it could be satisfied that the assertions as to the difficulties in finding an employee to fill the position that Ms Le obtained in mid-2009 were as substantial as claimed. The Minister submitted that, although par [22] was expressed differently, the Tribunal proceeded along the same lines, namely, that it was explaining the substratum of its findings that it ultimately made at the end of [23]. There it found it was not satisfied that Ms Le’s position was so unique that Little Miss Saigon would be unable to find a suitably qualified person with vocational English to fill it or that her employment had been essential for the success and growth or maintaining the business in its target market. Consideration In my opinion, a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons does not support Ms Le’s argument that it had set a standard or criterion that she had to satisfy, in order to establish that her circumstances were exceptional, as being “so unique” or that she had been “essential” to the business in a way that created a jurisdictional error. Rather, the Tribunal was, as the trial judge found, addressing the way in which Ms Le had framed her case to be granted the visa. That case was based on Mr Vong’s evidence or submission:… without the nominee in this position, the sponsoring business would not be able to compete let alone succeed in the market, and without the position itself, the business would have a difficult time to succeed. In other words, the Tribunal made a finding that it was not satisfied that Ms Le met that particular description, nor that Mr Vong’s description bespoke a degree of uniqueness and essentiality for her to fill the position which she had. In Wu Shan Liang 185 CLR at 272, Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ explained that:… a court should not be “concerned with looseness in the language … nor with unhappy phrasing” of the reasons of an administrative decision-maker. … “The reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error.”These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. In the present context, any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision. (footnotes omitted)