FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Le v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2016] FCA 1455
Appeal from: Le & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 874 File number: NSD 649 of 2016 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 17 August 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – visa applicant applied for employer nomination residence visa – Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – whether visa applicant fell within “exceptional circumstances” under subcl 856.213(c)(ii) – where “exceptional circumstances” not defined – where Tribunal applied tests of “so unique” and “essential” in considering whether “exceptional circumstances” – whether Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by departing from ordinary meaning of “exceptional circumstances”
MIGRATION – where Tribunal found there was “no evidence” of the visa applicant’s “exceptional circumstances” – where nominating employer provided a document in support of visa application that contained factual matters regarding the visa applicant’s “exceptional circumstances” – whether Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by ignoring relevant material which would have affected the Tribunal’s exercise of its power
Legislation: Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.15B, subcl 856.213(c)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 140E, 140GB
Cases cited: Hatcher v Cohn (2004) 139 FCR 425
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS (2014) 309 ALR 67
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Date of hearing: 1, 17 August 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 43 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr LJ Karp Solicitor for the Appellants: Vietaust Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Francois Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers ORDERS
NSD 649 of 2016 BETWEEN: THI XUAN THAO LE
First Appellant
PHU SON HO
Second Appellant
MINH TRUNG HO
Third Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 AUGUST 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave be granted to the appellants to file and rely on the amended notice of appeal annexed to the affidavit of Cuong Nguyen of 2 August 2016.
2.Order 1 made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 18 April 2016 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:
(a)the decision of the second respondent made on 4 October 2013 be quashed;
(b)the application for review be remitted to the second respondent to hear and determine according to law.
3.The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)RARES J:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing the appellants’…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1455
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the Tribunal had erred in its interpretation of "exceptional circumstances" by applying tests of "so unique" and "essential" which were not supported by the ordinary meaning of the term. The court further found that the Tribunal had committed a jurisdictional error by ignoring a document provided by Ms Le's employer, which contained factual information about her exceptional circumstances. This document would have affected the Tribunal's exercise of its power to decide the matter.
The court allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the Tribunal, and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal to be dealt with in accordance with law. The Federal Circuit Court's order for costs in favour of the Minister was upheld, and the Minister was ordered to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal. The court emphasised the importance of properly considering all relevant material and correctly interpreting legal terms in administrative decisions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave be granted to the appellants to file and rely on the amended notice of appeal annexed to the affidavit of Cuong Nguyen of 2 August 2016.
2. Order 1 made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 18 April 2016 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:
(a) the decision of the second respondent made on 4 October 2013 be quashed;
(b) the application for review be remitted to the second respondent to hear and determine according to law.
3. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister argued that, if Mr Vong’s self-styled “submissions” could amount to evidence, those did not go beyond being mere assertions as to matters that lacked any independent or corroborative support. He contended that a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons showed that in par [21], it demonstrated that it had been looking for independent or other corroborative material before it could be satisfied that the assertions as to the difficulties in finding an employee to fill the position that Ms Le obtained in mid-2009 were as substantial as claimed. The Minister submitted that, although par [22] was expressed differently, the Tribunal proceeded along the same lines, namely, that it was explaining the substratum of its findings that it ultimately made at the end of [23]. There it found it was not satisfied that Ms Le’s position was so unique that Little Miss Saigon would be unable to find a suitably qualified person with vocational English to fill it or that her employment had been essential for the success and growth or maintaining the business in its target market. Consideration In my opinion, a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons does not support Ms Le’s argument that it had set a standard or criterion that she had to satisfy, in order to establish that her circumstances were exceptional, as being “so unique” or that she had been “essential” to the business in a way that created a jurisdictional error. Rather, the Tribunal was, as the trial judge found, addressing the way in which Ms Le had framed her case to be granted the visa. That case was based on Mr Vong’s evidence or submission:… without the nominee in this position, the sponsoring business would not be able to compete let alone succeed in the market, and without the position itself, the business would have a difficult time to succeed. In other words, the Tribunal made a finding that it was not satisfied that Ms Le met that particular description, nor that Mr Vong’s description bespoke a degree of uniqueness and essentiality for her to fill the position which she had. In Wu Shan Liang 185 CLR at 272, Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ explained that:… a court should not be “concerned with looseness in the language … nor with unhappy phrasing” of the reasons of an administrative decision-maker. … “The reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error.”These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. In the present context, any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision. (footnotes omitted)