CZBP v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CZBP v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2014] FCCA 659
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Alleged bias against Tribunal member – decision of Tribunal affected by “illogicality” – matters of “credit” of applicant & sufficient evidence for the decision – assumptions by Tribunal of applicant’s knowledge of Penal Code of Iran – risk of older applicant being subject to large number of lashes because she was found to be an adulteress – responsibilities of Tribunal to make ‘obvious inquiry’ – the proper evaluative process and required level of satisfaction not found leading to miscarriage of the statutory task of the Tribunal – writs issued.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2A), 415, 420(1) & (2)(a) & (b), 422B, 426, 426(3), 427, 427(1)(d)

Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510
Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379
Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZKTI (2009) 238 CLR 489
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425
SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 142
SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 305 ALR 557

VBAO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 233 CLR 1

Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (Third Edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

J. Hunter, L. Pearson, M. San Roque, Z. Steel, “Asylum Adjudication, Mental Health and Credibility Evaluation,” (2103) 41 Federal Law Review 471 – 495

Applicant: CZBP
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: CAG 79 of 2012
Judgment of: Judge Neville
Hearing date: 29 July 2013
Date of Last Submission: 17 March 2014
Delivered at: Canberra
Delivered on: 4 April 2014

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:
Solicitors for the Applicant: Self Represented
Counsel for the Respondents:

Solicitors for the Respondents:

Clayton Utz, Canberra

ORDERS

  1. The First Respondent be referred to as the “Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.”

  2. A writ of certorari issue to remove into this Court the record of the Refugee Review Tribunal for the purpose of its decision dated 24…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCCA 659
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal by the Minister for Immigration against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which had found that the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) had committed jurisdictional error. The applicant, CZBP, had sought protection in Australia, and her claims had been rejected by the RRT. The core of the dispute revolved around whether the RRT had adequately considered the evidence presented by the applicant.

The legal issues before the court were whether the RRT had failed to consider material evidence, thereby committing jurisdictional error. Specifically, the court had to determine if the RRT's assessment of the applicant's credibility was nuanced, and whether it had properly considered corroborative evidence, such as an email from a legal representative detailing risks upon return to Iran and threats to family members. The court also considered whether a failure to consider such evidence, akin to failures in previous cases, constituted jurisdictional error.

The court reasoned that the RRT's approach was not a nuanced assessment of the applicant's credibility but rather a general disbelief of her and her family members' accounts. It found that the RRT had failed to consider, let alone challenge, crucial corroborative evidence, including an email from the applicant's lawyer warning of severe repercussions in Iran and detailing threats to her family. Drawing on precedent, the court held that such a failure to consider material evidence amounted to jurisdictional error, as it represented a miscarriage of the Tribunal's task to review the applicant's claims. The court distinguished this from a mere failure to record procedural steps, emphasizing that the focus was on the failure to undertake the relevant process of evaluating claims and evidence.

The court found that the RRT's failure to consider the applicant's lawyer's email, which contained significant corroborative information, constituted jurisdictional error. This failure meant that the RRT had not properly reviewed the applicant's claims, leading to an unreasonable decision that no reasonable tribunal could have made. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of CZBP v Minister for Immigration involves a dispute regarding the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) in assessing the application of the Applicant for a visa. The Applicant, a citizen of Iran, claimed refugee status in Australia, asserting that she faced persecution if she returned to her home country due to her religious beliefs and her family's association with a Christian church. The Applicant's case was built upon her personal testimony, corroborative evidence from her lawyer and others, and specific threats detailed in correspondence. The Tribunal, however, did not accept the Applicant's claims and dismissed her application for a visa.

Key facts include the Applicant's religious background and the threats she and her family received from Iranian authorities, which were documented in various communications. An email from the Applicant's lawyer dated January 10, 2012, explicitly warned her not to return to Iran due to a severe legal verdict against her, and referenced summonses to her brother and threats to her nephew. Despite this, the Tribunal failed to consider this email or other corroborative evidence, leading to the Applicant's claims being dismissed. The Tribunal's decision not to consider critical evidence and the lack of a nuanced assessment of the Applicant's credibility and the threats she faced form the basis of the legal dispute in this case.

The matter of CZBP v Minister for Immigration originated as an appeal from a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The RRT had dismissed the applicant's claim for refugee status, and the applicant subsequently appealed to the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal was then heard by the Full Court of the Federal Court, which found in favour of the applicant and remitted the matter to the RRT for reconsideration. The Minister for Immigration, dissatisfied with the Full Court's decision, sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia. The High Court granted special leave, and the matter was listed for hearing before the Full Court of the High Court. Throughout the proceedings, various interlocutory applications and rulings shaped the process, including applications for adjournments and directions concerning the scope of the review and the admissibility of certain evidence.

In the course of the proceedings, the tribunal's consideration of material evidence and its procedural obligations under the Migration Act were central issues. The tribunal's failure to address certain pieces of evidence, such as an email from the applicant's lawyer and corroborative statements from other sources, was scrutinised by both the Federal Court and the Full Court. These omissions were deemed to constitute jurisdictional errors, leading to the Full Court's decision to remit the matter for reconsideration. The High Court's grant of special leave to appeal highlighted the importance of the procedural and evidentiary issues raised in the case, particularly concerning the tribunal's duty to thoroughly evaluate all relevant material before making its decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In Li, at [22], by reference to SZMDS at [39], French CJ said (internal citations omitted; emphasis added):[26]… This aspect of the case raises the question whether the decision of the MRT was unreasonable in the sense used by Lord Greene MR in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation, that is to say so unreasonable that no reasonable tribunal could have made it. In approaching that question it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between a decision-maker finding a jurisdictional fact and a decision-maker exercising a discretion.[26] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225. In SZMDS, Gummow A-CJ and Kiefel J said, at [39] (emphasis added): “Confusion of thought, with apprehension of intrusive interference with administrative decisions by judicial review will be avoided if the distinction between jurisdictional fact and other facts then taken into account in discretionary decision making is kept in view. (footnotes omitted).” In the words of Gummow and Hayne JJ in S395/2002, at [73], the decision-maker is required “to decide what may happen if the applicant returns to the country of nationality. That is an inquiry which requires close consideration of the situation of the particular applicant.”[27] In the same case, at [78], their Honours also instructed that (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted):The central question in any particular case is whether there is a well-founded fear of persecution. That requires examination of how this applicant may be treated if he or she returns to the country of nationality. Processes of classification may obscure the essentially individual and fact-specific inquiry which must be made.[27] Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473. The integers for who constitutes a “refugee” for the purposes of the Act are discussed by Gummow J in VBAO at [11] – [22].[28] In the same case, at [1], Gleeson CJ and Kirby J, and Gummow J at [16] – [20], discuss “threat” for the purposes of the Act.[28] VBAO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 233 CLR 1. Three final matters might be noted as points of relevant reference for the current matter. First, there is a brief discussion of bias in matters of the present kind set out in SZJSS, at [41] – [44].[29][29] Minister for Immigration& Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164. See also the discussion in Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425. Secondly, as a general proposition, according to the discussion by French CJ and Kiefel J in SZGUR at [22], there is no legal duty imposed on the Tribunal by s.427(1)(d) to make a particular inquiry. This was somewhat qualified, however, by their Honours, at [23], by reference to comments from the plurality judgment in SZIAI, at [25], where the plurality (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) said (internal citations omitted; emphasis added):[30]The duty imposed upon the Tribunal by the Migration Act is a duty to review. It may be that a failure to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which is easily ascertained, could, in some circumstances, supply a sufficient link to the outcome to constitute a failure to review. If so, such a failure could give rise to jurisdictional error by constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. It may be that failure to make such an inquiry results in a decision being affected in some other way that manifests itself as jurisdictional error.[30] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Further, in SZKRT at [120], his Honour referred to “unexplored possibilities” of the evidence not relevantly considered by the Tribunal. In the same place, his Honour said: “It is for the Tribunal to deal with the material before it and to resolve any conflicts in it.” Then at [121], Robertson J said (emphasis added):To adopt the language of Buchanan J in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZCOQ [2007] FCAFC 9 at [61], relied on by the Minister, these considerations bear upon the material elements which must be satisfied, or rejected, when dealing with an applicant’s claims. On the facts of the present matter, to use the words of Robertson J in SZKRT, there was no nuanced assessment of the Applicant’s credibility here. Rather, the Tribunal disbelieved the Applicant generally, as it did of her family members, as I have already said. And more to this, the Tribunal did not challenge, but more so did not consider, the corroborative evidence of Mr Afshari’s email of 10 January 2012, which advised the Applicant not to return to Iran because of the risk of her facing the “very severe verdict” that had issued against her. Nor did the Tribunal consider the rest of the email which referred to the Applicant’s brother (in Iran) being summonsed, and threats to her nephew. The failure to consider the Applicant lawyer’s emailed letter to her of January 2012 is of a piece with the failure, in SZSRS, to consider the pastor’s letter in that case, and likewise, the failure to consider the academic transcript in SZRKT. In both SZRKT and SZSRS, the Full Court held that such a failure constituted jurisdictional error. In my view, the same conclusion is apposite here. The email was a material piece of evidence. There is no indication that the Tribunal either accepted or rejected it in the course of considering the Applicant’s claims. Further, in SZGUR, Gummow J said, at [69] (internal citations omitted; emphasis added):Contrary to the reasoning in the Federal Court, par (b) of s 430(1) does not create any requirement that the Tribunal record generally "what it did" in conducting its review, and does not require the Tribunal, in every case, to describe or state the procedural steps taken by it in reviewing the relevant decision. The obligation under s 430(1) focuses upon the thought processes of the Tribunal in reaching its decision on what it considers to be the material questions of fact. The absence of reference in the Tribunal's reasons to its consideration of the request for a medical examination of the first respondent is to be contrasted with an absence of reference to findings of fact or to evidence and material upon which such findings are based. The “thought processes” (or the failure to undertake the relevant process of evaluating the claims and the evidence) referred to by Gummow J, were considered further by the Full Court of the Federal Court in MZYTS, notably at [31] – [34], and also at [36], where the Court said (emphasis added):… to say there has been a “failure to consider recent information” or a “failure to consider a claim” may be no more than descriptions or explanations of the manner in which the Tribunal’s task has miscarried, but it is the miscarriage of the task which constitutes the jurisdictional error.