SZVIF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZVIF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2016] FCA 601

Appeal from: SZVIF v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 532
File number: NSD 374 of 2016
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 26 May 2016
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2A), 91R(3), 476
Cases cited:

Chen v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 56

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CZBP [2014] FCAFC 105

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP (2010) 184 FCR 485

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs;  Ex Parte ApplicantS20/2002 (2003) 73 ALD 1

Date of hearing: 26 May 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 41
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr T Galvin of Minter Ellison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 374 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SZVIF

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

WIGNEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 MAY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript)

WIGNEY J:

  1. The appellant is a citizen of China who has sought asylum in Australia.  Her attempts to secure a protection visa from the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, have thus far been unsuccessful. The Minister’s delegate refused the appellant’s visa application in March 2014.  The Refugee Review Tribunal subsequently rejected the appellant’s review application and affirmed the delegate’s decision. The appellant then challenged the Tribunal’s decision in judicial review proceedings commenced in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.  The primary judge dismissed the appellant’s application with costs.  The appellant now appeals to this Court from the judgment of the Circuit Court.

    THE APPELLANT’S PROTECTION VISA CLAIMS

  2. The criteria for the grant of a protection visa are well known. At the time the appellant applied for a protection visa s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provided that a criterion for a protection visa is that the appellant is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugee Convention. In simple terms, Australia has protection obligations under the Refugee Convention in respect of a person who is outside their country of origin and who is unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country, or to return there, on account of them having a well-founded fear of persecution based…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 601
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a Chinese national, appealed against the decision of the Tribunal which dismissed her application for a protection visa. The Tribunal had found that the appellant was not a credible witness and that she did not meet the requirements for a protection visa because she had not provided truthful evidence about her Falun Gong activities in China and Australia. The appellant sought a review of the Tribunal’s decision in the Federal Court of Australia. The primary issue before the Court was whether the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the appellant’s credibility and in its findings concerning her Falun Gong activities. The Court considered whether the Tribunal had properly exercised its discretion in assessing the appellant’s credibility and whether it was open to the Tribunal to find that the appellant had commenced her Falun Gong activities in Australia for the purpose of supporting her protection visa application.

The Court found that the Tribunal had not erred in its assessment of the appellant’s credibility. The Court accepted the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant’s evidence was not credible, particularly in relation to her Falun Gong encounter in New York and her arrest in China. The Court found that the Tribunal had properly considered the inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence and had provided adequate reasons for its findings. The Court also found that it was open to the Tribunal to find that the appellant had commenced her Falun Gong activities in Australia for the purpose of supporting her protection visa application. The Court accepted that the appellant had commenced her activities three months after her arrival in Australia and in the same month that she applied for a protection visa. The Court found that if she was a genuine practitioner, she would have joined a Falun Gong group sooner. The Court rejected the appellant’s explanation for her delay in seeking out a Falun Gong group in Australia.

The Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs. The Court found that the Tribunal had properly exercised its discretion and that its findings were supported by the evidence. The Court held that the appellant had not demonstrated that the Tribunal had made an error of law or had failed to exercise its discretion properly. The Court concluded that the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success and that it should be dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In March 2014 a delegate of the Minister refused the appellant’s protection visa application. The delegate found that the appellant did not meet the protection visa criteria essentially because she was not satisfied that the appellant had given truthful evidence about her supposed Falun Gong activities, either in China or Australia.THE TRIBUNAL PROCEEDINGS AND DECISION In April 2014 the appellant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s adverse decision. Before the Tribunal, the appellant relied on a number of documents, including documents that she had previously provided to the Minister or the Minister’s delegate. Those documents mainly related to her Falun Gong activities in Australia and included photographs of the appellant at Falun Gong events in Australia. The appellant also relied on three witness statements: one from a person purporting to corroborate the appellant’s claims concerning her encounter with a Falun Gong practitioner in New York; a statement from a person supporting the appellant’s claim that she was a genuine Falun Gong practitioner, with reference to her practice of Falun Gong in Australia; and one from a person purporting to corroborate the appellant’s evidence that she was arrested in China. The appellant did not request the Tribunal to take oral evidence at the hearing from any of the individuals who had supplied statements. In relation to her claim that she was arrested in China, the appellant relied on a document that she said was an invoice for the fine she paid to the police in China The appellant in due course gave evidence before the Tribunal. Unfortunately for the appellant, like the delegate, the Tribunal did not consider the appellant to be an honest or credible witness. In particular, the Tribunal did not believe the appellant’s account of her Falun Gong encounter in New York, or her account of how her association with Falun Gong came to the attention of the authorities in China and led to her arrest. The Tribunal reasoned that the appellant’s account of those events was, in a number of respects, implausible, and not credible. The Tribunal also pointed out a number of inconsistences in the appellant’s evidence. The Tribunal’s rejection of the appellant’s evidence concerning her Falun Gong encounter in New York and her arrest in China led it to effectively dismiss the witness statements that purported to corroborate the appellant’s evidence of those events. The Tribunal found that that those witness statements did not “genuinely reflect actual events”. The Tribunal also did not accept that the police invoice was genuine. The Tribunal referred to independent information that suggested that fraudulent documents are frequently used and readily available in China. The Tribunal did accept some of the appellant’s evidence. In particular, it accepted that the appellant had been practicing Falun Gong in Australia. The Tribunal found, however, that the appellant was not a genuine practitioner in Australia. Rather, she had commenced her Falun Gong activities for the purpose of supporting her protection visa application. The Tribunal pointed, in that regard, to the fact that the appellant commenced her activities three months after her arrival in Australia and in the same month that she applied for a protection visa. The Tribunal reasoned that if she was a genuine practitioner, she would have joined a Falun Gong group sooner. The Tribunal did not accept the appellant’s explanation for her delay in seeking out a Falun Gong group in Australia. The Tribunal’s findings concerning the appellant’s motivation in engaging in Falun Gong activities in Australia led it to disregard those activities in assessing the Refugee Convention criterion as it was required to do by s 91R(3) of the Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established