Chen v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Chen v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 56

Citation: Chen v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 56
Appeal from: Chen v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2010] FMCA 950
Parties: XIAOPING CHEN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 1796 of 2010
Judges: BENNETT, NICHOLAS AND YATES JJ
Date of judgment: 21 April 2011
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether jurisdictional error in Tribunal’s decision not to call witnesses to give oral evidence – whether jurisdictional error in Tribunal making credibility finding in reasons before assessing other evidence – whether finding of Tribunal was a jurisdictional fact – whether jurisdictional error in Tribunal overlooking evidence in circumstances where Tribunal’s attention was not drawn to the evidence – whether jurisdictional error in Tribunal placing little weight on witness statements provided by relatives of visa applicant because relatives had an interest in the outcome of the proceedings  
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 361
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) 1.15A
Cases cited: HosseinAvesta v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs  [2002] FCAFC 121 applied
Khan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 21 cited
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 273 ALR 223 applied
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG (2010) 115 ALD 303 applied
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP (2010) 184 FCR 485 applied
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Maltsin (2005) 88 ALD 304 distinguished
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZBEL (2006) 228 CLR 152 cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 applied
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 cited
SZOHB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 1394 applied
W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 185 ALR 703 cited
Waterford v The Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 applied
Date of hearing: 21 February 2011
Date of last submissions: 24 February 2011
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 58
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr B Zipser
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1796 of 2010

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

XIAO PING CHEN
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

BENNETT, NICHOLAS AND YATES JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

21 APRIL 2011

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCAFC 56
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Chen v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the appellant challenged the decisions made by the Migration Review Tribunal regarding the admissibility and weight of evidence presented in the context of an immigration application. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had erred in its handling of the evidence, including the decision not to call certain witnesses to give oral evidence, making credibility findings without assessing other evidence, overlooking certain evidence, and undervaluing the statements provided by relatives of the visa applicant. The central issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had committed jurisdictional errors in these respects.

The court examined the principles set out in previous cases such as Maltsin and SZGUR, which highlighted the inquisitorial nature of the Tribunal's process and its discretion in deciding whether to call additional witnesses for oral evidence. In Maltsin, the court found that the Tribunal had breached its procedural obligations under the Migration Act by not genuinely considering the applicant's notice to call additional witnesses. However, in the present case, the Tribunal had accepted the evidence presented by the appellant's witnesses, despite not calling them to give oral evidence. The court held that the Tribunal's acceptance of the written statements as evidence and its reference to this evidence in its reasons demonstrated that it had considered the request appropriately. The Tribunal's reasons were sufficient to show that it had genuinely applied its mind to the evidence, and any criticism of the Tribunal's reasoning did not amount to jurisdictional error.

The court concluded that the Tribunal had not committed any jurisdictional error in its handling of the evidence. The Tribunal's acceptance of the evidence and its reasoned consideration of it were in line with the principles established in previous cases. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant relies on Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Maltsin (2005) 88 ALD 304 and submits that the reasoning of the Full Court applies to this case. The decision in Maltsin In Maltsin, the principal issue before the Tribunal was whether the particular visa applicant was Mr Maltsin’s “spouse” within the meaning of reg 1.15A of the Regulations. The Tribunal had concluded that the relationship between them did not meet the description in that regulation and confirmed the delegate’s decision. The Federal Magistrate had concluded that there was a denial of procedural fairness before the Tribunal. Justices Kenny and Lander (with whom Spender J agreed) pointed out that the provisions of Part 5 of the Act, including s 361(3), emphasise that the Tribunal’s process is essentially inquisitorial in nature (at [36]). Their Honours also pointed out that only the Tribunal can examine a witness whose oral evidence the Tribunal has determined to obtain. Their Honours accepted at [37] that the Tribunal does not err if, notwithstanding that an applicant wants oral evidence to be obtained from persons, the Tribunal decides not to obtain such evidence. That is so even in circumstances where, as in Maltsin, notice had been given by an applicant under s 361(2) of the Act and the Tribunal had acted in conformity with s 361(3). Sections 361(2) and 361(3) provide that:(2)The applicant may, within 7 days after being notified under subsection (1), give the Tribunal written notice that the applicant wants the Tribunal to obtain oral evidence from a person or persons named in the notice.(3)If the Tribunal is notified by an applicant under subsection (2) or (2A), the Tribunal must have regard to the applicant’s notice but is not required to comply with it. In this circumstance, their Honours said at [37] that ‘there is no obligation on the Tribunal to take oral evidence from anyone other than the applicant’. However, their Honours continued to discuss the fact that the Tribunal must genuinely apply its mind to the contents of the notice and, in particular, to the question whether it should take the oral evidence of nominated individuals in accordance with an applicant’s wishes. This was in the context of the Tribunal’s obligation where the invitation to appear before it is ‘real and meaningful and not just an empty gesture’. Their Honours said at [38] that the Tribunal must take account of such matters as the relevance and potential importance to the outcome of the review of the evidence that could be given by a nominated witness, the sufficiency of any written evidence that has already been given by a witness and the length of time that would afford the applicant a fair opportunity to put his or her case before the particular Tribunal. The question in Maltsin was whether or not the Tribunal had given genuine consideration to the notice given by Mr Maltsin under s 361(2) to take evidence from the prospective witnesses. The Tribunal had asked Mr Maltsin’s representative ‘about the value of the evidence’ of the prospective witnesses but, before receiving an answer, the Tribunal made it plain that it did not have sufficient time to hear much more than the evidence of Mr Maltsin and the visa applicant. The answer to the question was that the proposed witnesses’ evidence was ‘pretty much the same’ as that of other witnesses to be called. The Minister relied on the fact that Mr Maltsin’s representative apparently accepted the course proposed by the Tribunal member (at [41]). However, their Honours did not accept that it was clear that the representative was agreeing to a review in which some of the witnesses would not be permitted to give oral evidence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Justices Kenny and Lander concluded that the Tribunal had breached s 361(3) and the rules of procedural fairness such that the decision was infected with jurisdictional error. It was important in their Honours’ consideration that Mr Maltsin had given written notice to the Tribunal that he wanted it to take oral evidence from himself and four other people, all of whom attended the hearing. The Tribunal had heard the oral evidence of only two of the people that Mr Maltsin had named in the notice. The Tribunal did not hear oral evidence from at least one other person who attended the hearing with Mr Maltsin, apparently for the purpose of giving evidence (at [34]).Consideration of ground 1 In Maltsin, as in the present case, the Tribunal’s own time constraints affected the decision to call the witnesses to give oral evidence. However, in the present case, crucially, the Tribunal accepted the evidence of the witnesses, whereas in Maltsin it did not take oral evidence from those witnesses and then found them to be deceitful. It is important to understand that the decision in Maltsin concerned the Tribunal’s obligations under s 361(3) when a notice is given under s 361(2). This was in the context of Kenny and Lander JJ’s reiteration of the Tribunal’s right to control its inquisitorial function. No such notice was given by the appellant in this case. Accepting that the Tribunal in the present case was obliged to have regard to the evidence of the witnesses that the appellant brought to the Tribunal hearing, it cannot be said that the Tribunal failed to do so. It received information that the evidence those witnesses wished to give was the same as in their written statements. It referred to that evidence and indeed accepted it as evidence that those witnesses did and could give, as in the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 273 ALR 223. The Tribunal’s reasons were sufficient to demonstrate that it had considered the request. It made express reference to the witnesses’ evidence so far as it was relevant. Any criticism on the part of the Tribunal of the way in which it reasoned about that evidence does not disclose jurisdictional error (SZGUR at [33] per French CJ and Kiefel J, with whom Heydon and Crennan JJ agreed). As Gummow J said in SZGUR at [70] (Heydon and Crennan JJ agreeing): An inference that the Tribunal did or omitted to do some act in the course of its review, not being a matter which [the Act] requires the Tribunal to set out, should not be drawn lightly. It cannot be said, as the appellant submits, that the appellant did not have a real opportunity to give evidence and present argument (cf Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553 at [33]). The Tribunal accepted the evidence. It was in no doubt about it. It was not obliged to ask the witnesses to expand on the evidence (cf Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZBEL (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [47]).