BLO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 25 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BLO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1092

Appeal from: BLO15 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2016] FCCA 423
File number: SAD 89 of 2016
Judge: CHARLESWORTH J
Date of judgment: 18 September 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – late request for Tribunal to obtain oral evidence from a witness – whether Tribunal obliged to give and failed to give genuine consideration to the request – whether Tribunal erred by rejecting visa applicant’s claims without having regard to corroborative evidence – evidence not corroborative in critical respect – whether obtaining oral evidence from witness could have resolved inconsistency between claims of visa applicant and witness
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5, 31, 36, 65, 361, 425A, 426, 474

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), cl 790.221(2)

Cases cited:

Chen v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 56

Gjonej v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 159

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v MZYYL (2012) 207 FCR 211

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39, (2009) 259 ALR 429

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Maltsin (2005) 88 ALD 304

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30, (2003) 198 ALR 59

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34

Date of hearing: 1 August 2016
Registry: South Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 45
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr P d’Assumpcao
Solicitor for the First Respondent: The Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

SAD 89 of 2016
BETWEEN:

BLO15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

CHARLESWORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 SEPTEMBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, fixed in the amount of $5,000.00.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CHARLESWORTH J:

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) published as BLO15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 423.

  2. The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the then-named Refugee Review Tribunal, which had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

  3. For the reasons given bellow, the appeal should be dismissed.

    VISA CRITERIA

  4. A…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read BLO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1092
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court involves an appeal by the appellant, BLO15, against a decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The appellant is seeking a protection visa and challenges the decision of the Minister, which was affirmed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, to refuse his application. The core of the dispute revolves around the appellant's claims of threats made against him and his friend in 2011, an incident referred to as the Chilaw incident, and whether these were appropriately considered in the visa application process. The appellant argues that the Tribunal failed to properly consider his request for oral evidence from a witness, Mr K, who could corroborate his claims. Additionally, the appellant contends that the Tribunal erred by rejecting his claims without considering corroborative evidence and that obtaining oral evidence from Mr K could have resolved inconsistencies in the testimonies.

The legal issues the court had to decide pertain to whether the Tribunal was obliged to consider the appellant's requests for oral evidence from Mr K and whether it erred in rejecting the appellant's claims without taking into account corroborative evidence. The court examined the statutory framework governing the Tribunal's obligations and the extent to which it must consider a request for oral evidence. The court also considered whether the evidence provided by Mr K was indeed corroborative in a critical respect and whether the failure to obtain oral evidence from Mr K affected the outcome of the visa application.

In its reasoning, the court found that the Tribunal was not strictly obliged to obtain oral evidence from Mr K, as the appellant did not formally request this under the relevant statutory provision. The court noted that while the Tribunal must genuinely consider such a request, it is not required to comply with it. The court further determined that the evidence provided by Mr K was not corroborative in a critical respect and that the failure to obtain oral evidence did not prejudice the appellant's case. The court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding that the appellant's claims concerning the Chilaw incident were implausible and that the appellant had not established that he was a person to whom Australia owes a protection obligation.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal, fixed at $5,000.00. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to statutory procedures when making requests for evidence in immigration tribunal proceedings and highlights the need for credible and consistent evidence to support claims for protection visas.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, fixed in the amount of $5,000.00.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I will refer to this incident at the Chilaw incident. The appellant’s migration agent gave the following explanation for the appellant’s failure to raise the Chilaw incident when he made his application for the protection visa in January 2013:The Applicant did not mention the threats made against him and his friend in about August 2011 as he did not see it as a significant matter to be included in his claims for protection at the time of lodgement of his Protection Visa application and his interview of 31 July 2013. However, since becoming aware of [Mr D’s] murder in about August 2013, the Applicant fears that he will also be killed as per the previous threats made in 2011.THE DELEGATE’S DECISION The delegate found the appellant’s claims concerning the Chilaw incident to lack plausibility. She did not accept that the men involved in the incident would have been so angered by it so as to murder Mr D two years later. The delegate said it was “purely speculation” that those responsible for Mr D’s murder were the same group of men involved in the Chilaw incident.PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL The appellant applied for review of the delegate’s decision on 6 January 2014. In October 2014, the Tribunal sent a notice to the appellant under s 425A of the Act inviting him to appear before it at a hearing scheduled for 9 December 2014. In his response to the invitation to appear, the appellant made a statement to the effect that he made no request for the Tribunal to obtain oral evidence from any person. On 8 December 2014, being the day before the Tribunal’s hearing, the appellant’s migration agent again wrote to the Tribunal advising that the appellant relied on certain claims made by a person I will refer to as Mr K concerning the Chilaw incident. Mr K had since arrived in Australia and, the letter stated, he had given the appellant “permission to include him in his claims”. The facts asserted by Mr K are set out in the 8 December letter, but the letter does not otherwise contain any request that Mr K appear to give evidence at the Tribunal’s hearing and Mr K did not in fact attend in person at the Tribunal hearing to give oral evidence. During the course of the hearing, the Tribunal member stated that the assertions of fact made in the 8 December 2014 letter were of little probative value. The Tribunal noted that no request had been made by the appellant for the Tribunal to obtain oral evidence from any person. With the agreement of the appellant’s migration agent, the Tribunal member nonetheless attempted to contact Mr K by telephone to obtain evidence from him through the use of a Tamil interpreter who was then present at the hearing. Mr K indicated he had some difficulty understanding what was being said through the interpreter. Submissions made on behalf of the appellant at a later time indicate that the appellant himself had stated to the Tribunal member that Mr K’s language was Singhalese. The Tribunal member said to Mr K “Oh, you are not Tamil” and terminated the phone call shortly thereafter. At that juncture, the appellant sought an adjournment so as to present oral evidence from Mr K in person in support of his claims. The request for the adjournment was denied. However, the Tribunal did provide an opportunity to the appellant to provide a statutory declaration from Mr K. A statutory declaration was subsequently provided under the cover of a letter from the appellant’s migration agent dated 2 February 2015. The letter states:… Should the Tribunal have any concerns about any of the information contained within the statutory declaration, we would kindly ask that [Mr K] be provided the opportunity to present oral evidence in support of his statutory declaration.The Applicant confirms that he is aware that [Mr K] speaks Tamil but was very confused and distressed during his Tribunal hearing, which led him to state that [Mr K] speaks Singhalese.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

These questions interrelate and may be considered together.CONSIDERATION The starting point is that the Tribunal was, in the performance of its review function, obliged to afford the appellant the opportunity to give evidence and present arguments: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553 at [33]; Gjonej v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 159 at [17] (Allsop CJ). In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Maltsin (2005) 88 ALD 304, Kenny and Lander JJ said that whether there has been a breach of the rules of procedural fairness ordinarily depends in large part on the terms of the governing statute. Their Honours continued: (at [31], Spender J agreeing at [1]):Where there is an obligation to accord procedural fairness, what is practically required to discharge the obligation depends on the relevant statutory provisions, the nature of the inquiry, and the subject-matter and circumstances of the case: see Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 584–5; 62 ALR 321 at 346–7 per Mason J, CLR 614; ALR 369 per Brennan J and CLR 633; ALR 383 per Deane J; also Aala at [59] per Gaudron and Gummow JJ and Haoucher v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1990) 169 CLR 648 at 652–3; 93 ALR 51 at 52; 19 ALD 577 at 578 per Deane J. As I have mentioned, the Tribunal gave a notice to the appellant of an invitation to appear before it. The notice was issued pursuant to s 425A of the Act. Section 426 of the Act relevantly provides:(2) The applicant may, within 7 days after being notified under subsection (1), give the Tribunal written notice that the applicant wants the Tribunal to obtain oral evidence from a person or persons named in the notice.(3) If the Tribunal is notified by an applicant under subsection (2), the Tribunal must have regard to the applicant’s wishes but is not required to obtain evidence (orally or otherwise) from a person named in the applicant’s notice. It is well established that where a review applicant makes a request pursuant to s 426(2) (or an equivalent provision in s 361(2)), the Tribunal must have genuine regard to the request: Maltsin at [38]. But it is not, merely by virtue of the request having been made, obliged to comply with it: Maltsin at [37] (approved by Chen v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 56 at [15]). In determining whether to obtain oral evidence in accordance with such a request, the Tribunal must take into account such matters as the potential importance of the evidence to the outcome of the review, the sufficiency of any written evidence already given by the witness and the length of time necessary to afford an applicant a fair opportunity to present his or her case: Maltsin at [38]. Here, the appellant made no request in accordance with s 426(2) of the Act. Two requests were made at later times, the first during the course of the Tribunal’s hearing, and the second in correspondence from the appellant’s migration agent of 17 February 2015.