SZUIJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 49 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZUIJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2016] FCA 1574

Appeal from: SZUIJ v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 247
File number(s): NSD 348 of 2016
Judge(s): WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 22 December 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – refusal of application for protection visa by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection – where Refugee Review Tribunal affirmed decision of the delegate – where Federal Circuit Court dismissed appellant’s appeal – where appellant gave notice under s 426(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) that the Refugee Review Tribunal take oral evidence from witnesses – where some witnesses provided written statements which were submitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal – where appellant confirmed that evidence of witnesses would not deviate from written statements – where Tribunal Member indicated that a decision would be made on whether to take oral evidence during the course of the hearing – where Tribunal Member determined that oral evidence was not required – where adverse credit findings made – whether decision not to call evidence resulted in legal unfairness and a denial of procedural fairness, or breach of s 426(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 36(2), 91R(3), 425, 426(3)
Cases cited:

CZBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1023

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Maltsin (2005) 88 ALD 304

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 111 ALD 15

SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294

SZVBB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1414

VJAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 178

Date of hearing: 27 May 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 86
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Searle with Mr P Bodisco (Pro Bono)
Solicitor for the Appellant: Michaela Byers Solicitor
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms L Buchanan of Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 348 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SZUIJ

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

WIGNEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 DECEMBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant to pay the costs of the first respondent.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

WIGNEY J:

  1. The appellant is a citizen of China. She has sought asylum in Australia because she says that…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read SZUIJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1574
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZUIJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a citizen of China, sought a protection visa from the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The appellant's application was initially declined by a delegate, and this decision was affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appellant's appeal against this decision. The appellant sought to have oral evidence taken from witnesses, but the Tribunal decided not to call such evidence. The appellant contended that this decision resulted in legal unfairness and a denial of procedural fairness, or a breach of section 426(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The central legal issues in this case were whether the decision of the Tribunal not to call oral evidence from witnesses was legally unreasonable and whether this decision resulted in a denial of procedural fairness or a breach of section 426(3) of the Migration Act. The court examined the nature and quality of the Tribunal's decision, considering whether it fit descriptions of legally unreasonable decisions such as being “plainly unjust”, “arbitrary”, “capricious”, “irrational”, “lacking in evident or intelligible justification” or “obviously disproportionate”. The court also considered whether the outcome of the decision was unreasonable having regard to the subject matter, scope and purpose of section 426 of the Migration Act.

The court found that the Tribunal's decision not to call oral evidence from the appellant's witnesses was not legally unreasonable. The reasons provided by the Tribunal for not calling oral evidence were considered in light of the purpose and scope of the power in section 426(3) and common law principles concerning reasonableness in decision-making. The court held that the Tribunal's decision to decline to take oral evidence from the appellant's witnesses did not fit any of the descriptions of legally unreasonable decisions. The outcome of the decision was also found to be reasonable in the context of the purpose of section 426 of the Migration Act, which is to provide for the taking of oral evidence where the provision of evidence in a written or documentary form is inadequate or unsatisfactory.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent. The court held that the Tribunal's decision not to call oral evidence from the appellant's witnesses did not result in legal unfairness or a denial of procedural fairness, nor did it breach section 426(3) of the Migration Act. The factual findings made by the Tribunal, which were based almost entirely on an adverse conclusion concerning the appellant's credibility and the reliability of her claims and evidence, completely undermined the basis of the appellant's claims for a protection visa.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant to pay the costs of the first respondent.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is perhaps possible to imagine a case where the Tribunal’s consideration of the applicant’s request to call oral evidence from a witness would be vitiated by the Tribunal’s serious misconception of the nature and relevance of the evidence of the witness. In this case, however, even if it could be concluded there was a misconception by the Tribunal, it was by no means a significant or serious misconception, such that it could be concluded that the Tribunal had not given the appellant’s wishes real or meaningful consideration.Was the decision not to call oral evidence unreasonable? The appellant’s contention that the Tribunal’s decision not to call oral evidence from the witnesses was legally unreasonable must also be rejected for essentially the same reasons. The Tribunal’s decision not to take oral evidence from the appellant’s three witnesses, for the reason it gave, was not unreasonable in any case. It is unnecessary in the circumstances to discuss in any detail the concept of legal unreasonableness. The concept was given detailed consideration by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 and by the Full Court of this Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1; and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158. The concept is not amenable to minute and rigidly-defined categorisation or a precise textual formulary: Stretton at 3 [2], 5 [10] (Allsop CJ), 19-20 [62] (Griffiths J) and 29 [91] (Wigney J); Eden at 172 [65]. There could be no doubt that legal reasonableness, or the absence of legal unreasonableness, was an essential element in the lawful exercise by the Tribunal of its power under s 426(3) to decline to call oral evidence from a witness when requested to do so by an applicant. The task of determining whether the Tribunal’s decision not to call oral evidence from the witnesses was legally unreasonable involves the evaluation of the nature and quality of the decision by reference to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the power in s 426(3) and the common law principles concerning reasonableness in decision-making: cf. Stretton at 4-5 [7], 5-6 [11] (Allsop CJ); Eden at 171-172 [63]. Because the Tribunal gave reasons, albeit fairly short reasons, for not calling oral evidence, the reasons provide the focus for the evaluation: Singh at 446-447 [45]-[47]; Eden at 172 [64]. While there is no precise test, as it were, for legal unreasonableness, expressions that have been utilised to describe legally unreasonable decisions include “plainly unjust”, “arbitrary”, “capricious”, “irrational” , “lacking in evident or intelligible justification” and “obviously disproportionate”. The Tribunal’s decision to decline to take oral evidence from the appellant’s witnesses fits none of those descriptions. Nor is there any basis to conclude that the outcome of the Tribunal’s decision was in any sense unreasonable having regard to the subject matter, scope and purpose of s 426(3) of the Migration Act. As discussed earlier, a review by the Tribunal is inquisitorial, not adversarial. It is up to the Tribunal to determine how and in what circumstances it takes evidence for the purposes of the review, though it would appear that the process is intended to be predominantly documentary. The Tribunal’s objective is to provide a mechanism for review that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick. The evident purpose of s 426, considered in context, is to provide for the taking of oral evidence where the provision of evidence in a written or documentary form is for some reason inadequate or unsatisfactory. It is plain from the text of s 426(3) that, while the Tribunal is required to have regard to the applicant’s wishes, it is not required to take the evidence from the witness orally.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Following the hearing the appellant’s representative sent written submissions to the Tribunal. Those written submissions included the following: Failure to take evidence from witnesses After the adjournment of the hearing and before the Member telephoned the applicant’s husband, the Member made the finding “I accept you have participated in Falun Gong activities in Australia” and decided not to take evidence from the three witnesses who attended the hearing. However, after questioning the applicant’s husband the Member raised adverse information as the inconsistencies between the applicant and her husband’s evidence as to her practice of Falun Gong in Australia. The three witnesses have been Falun Gong practitioners for many years and were the most appropriate persons to give evidence as to the applicant’s practice of Falun Gong. Please do not hesitate to contact this office for further information. (emphasis in original)THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION AND REASONS The Tribunal found that it was not satisfied that the appellant met either the Refugees Convention or complementary protection criteria for the grant of a protection visa. The basal reason given by the Tribunal for its adverse finding in that regard was that it did not believe the evidence given by the appellant concerning relevant events in China. The Tribunal found that the appellant had fabricated her claims concerning her Falun Gong activities in China. It rejected her evidence concerning her arrest and mistreatment by the Chinese authorities. The Tribunal found that the appellant was not a genuine Falun Gong practitioner and that she would not seek to practice Falun Gong if she returned to China. As for the appellant’s practice of Falun Gong while she was in Australia, the Tribunal accepted that the appellant had engaged in Falun Gong activities in Australia. It was not, however, satisfied that the appellant engaged in those activities otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening her claim to be a refugee within the meaning of the Refugees Convention. The Tribunal disregarded that conduct in determining whether the appellant satisfied the Refugees Convention criterion, as it was required to do by s 91R(3) of the Migration Act. The Tribunal also found that it was not satisfied that the Chinese authorities were aware of any of the appellant’s Falun Gong activities while she was in Australia. As a result, she was unlikely to be of any adverse interest to the Chinese authorities on account of those activities if she returns to China. The factual findings made by the Tribunal were based almost entirely on an adverse conclusion that the Tribunal reached concerning the appellant’s credibility and the reliability of her claims and evidence. The factual findings completely undermined the basis of both the appellant’s claim that she feared she would be persecuted if she returned to China, and her claim that there was a real risk that she would suffer significant harm if she returned to China.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established