FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Van Dung v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FedCFamC2G 106
File number(s): MLG 1446 of 2017 Judgment of: JUDGE RILEY Date of judgment: 1 October 2021 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – subclass 801 partner visa – whether the Tribunal took into account irrelevant considerations – whether the Tribunal conducted itself in such a way as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 ss 5F, 359A, 360(1) and (2)(a)
Migration Regulations 1994 reg.1.15A
Cases cited: BOX16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 80
CNY17v Minister (2019) 268 CLR 76; (2019) 375 ALR 47; [2019] HCA 50
He v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 255 FCR 41; (2017) 161 ALD 1; [2017] FCAFC 206
Goodwin v Commissioner of Police[2012] NSWCA 379
Meadows v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 90 FCR 370; (1998) 54 ALD 654
Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls(2011) 244 CLR 427; (2011) 282 ALR 685; (2011) 86 ALJR 14; [2011] HCA 48
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40 at 162 CLR 39
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Jia Legeng(2001) 205 CLR 507; (2001) 65 ALD 1; (2001) 178 ALR 421; (2001) 75 ALJR 679; (2001) 22(6) Leg Rep 2; [2001] HCA 17
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Maltsin (2005) 88 ALD 304; [2005] FCAFC 118
NADH of 2001 v Ministerfor Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs(2004) 214 ALR 264; [2004] FCAFC 328
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 (2003) 75 ALD 1; (2003) 201 ALR 437; (2003) 77 ALJR 1909; [2003] HCA 60
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H(2001) 179 ALR 425; (2001) 75 ALJR 982; (2001) 9 Leg Rep 20; [2001] HCA 28
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; (2006) 93 ALD 300; (2006) 231 ALR 592; (2006) 81 ALJR 515; [2006] HCA 63
SZUIJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1574
Division Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 267 Date of last submission/s: 17 August 2021 Date of hearing: 10 August 2021 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant Roz Germov Solicitor for the Applicant MP Migration Law Solicitor advocate for the First Respondent Sophie Roberts Solicitor for the First Respondent Mills Oakley Counsel for the Second Respondent No appearance Solicitor for the Second Respondent Mills Oakley ORDERS
MLG 1446 of 2017 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: PHAM VAN DUNG
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE RILEY
DATE OF ORDER:
1 OCTOBER 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application filed on 6 July 2017 be…
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- Case
- [2021] FedCFamC2G 106
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court was required to decide were whether the Tribunal took into account irrelevant considerations and whether the Tribunal conducted itself in such a way as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court examined the grounds of judicial review as set out in the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and considered whether the Tribunal had failed to take into account relevant considerations or had taken into account irrelevant considerations. The court also considered whether there was an apprehended bias in the Tribunal's decision-making process.
The court found that the Tribunal had not taken into account irrelevant considerations and had not conducted itself in such a way as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court held that the Tribunal had considered relevant factors in determining whether the applicant and his wife were in a genuine relationship, and had not given undue weight to any irrelevant considerations. The court also found that there was no apprehended bias in the Tribunal's decision-making process, as the Tribunal had not shown any partiality or prejudice towards the applicant or his wife.
The final orders of the court were that the application for judicial review be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was not flawed and that there were no grounds for setting it aside. The court also held that the applicant's application for judicial review was an abuse of process and that the respondent was entitled to costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As can be seen, ground 1 contains two subgrounds, namely:(a)taking into account irrelevant considerations: ground 1(c); and(b)apprehended bias: ground 1(d).GROUND 1(C): IRRELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS As is well known, the test for whether a decision maker took into account irrelevant considerations was explained by Mason J (as his Honour then was) in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40 at 162 CLR 39 to 42 as follows:15. The failure of a decision-maker to take into account a relevant consideration in the making of an administrative decision is one instance of an abuse of discretion entitling a party with sufficient standing to seek judicial review of ultra vires administrative action. That ground now appears in s.5(2)(b) of the ADJR Act which, in this regard, is substantially declaratory of the common law. Together with the related ground of taking into account irrelevant considerations, it has been discussed in a number of decided cases, which have established the following propositions:(a)The ground of failure to take into account a relevant consideration can only be made out if a decision-maker fails to take into account a consideration which he is bound to take into account in making that decision ... The statement of Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation[1947] EWCA Civ 1; (1948) 1 KB 223, at p 228, that a decision-maker must take into account those matters which he “ought to have regard to" should not be understood in any different sense in view of his Lordship’s statement on the following page that a person entrusted with a discretion” must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider".(b)What factors a decision-maker is bound to consider in making the decision is determined by construction of the statute conferring the discretion. If the statute expressly states the considerations to be taken into account, it will often be necessary for the court to decide whether those enumerated factors are exhaustive or merely inclusive. If the relevant factors - and in this context I use this expression to refer to the factors which the decision-maker is bound to consider - are not expressly stated, they must be determined by implication from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act. In the context of judicial review on the ground of taking into account irrelevant considerations, this Court has held that, where a statute confers a discretion which in its terms is unconfined, the factors that may be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion are similarly unconfined, except in so far as there may be found in the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statute some implied limitation on the factors to which the decision-maker may legitimately have regard … . By analogy, where the ground of review is that a relevant consideration has not been taken into account and the discretion is unconfined by the terms of the statute, the court will not find that the decision-maker is bound to take a particular matter into account unless an implication that he is bound to do so is to be found in the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act.(c)Not every consideration that a decision-maker is bound to take into account but fails to take into account will justify the court setting aside the impugned decision and ordering that the discretion be re-exercised according to law. A factor might be so insignificant that the failure to take it into account could not have materially affected the decision … A similar principle has been enunciated in cases where regard has been had to irrelevant considerations in the making of an administrative decision … (d)The limited role of a court reviewing the exercise of an administrative discretion must constantly be borne in mind. It is not the function of the court to substitute its own decision for that of the administrator by exercising a discretion which the legislature has vested in the administrator. Its role is to set limits on the exercise of that discretion, and a decision made within those boundaries cannot be impugned … .It follows that, in the absence of any statutory indication of the weight to be given to various considerations, it is generally for the decision-maker and not the court to determine the appropriate weight to be given to the matters which are required to be taken into account in exercising the statutory power … I say “generally” because both principle and authority indicate that in some circumstances a court may set aside an administrative decision which has failed to give adequate weight to a relevant factor of great importance, or has given excessive weight to a relevant factor of no great importance. The preferred ground on which this is done, however, is not the failure to take into account relevant considerations or the taking into account of irrelevant considerations, but that the decision is “manifestly unreasonable”. This ground of review was considered by Lord Greene M.R. in Wednesbury Corporation, at pp.230, 233-234, in which his Lordship said that it would only be made out if it were shown that the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have come to it. This ground is now expressed in ss.5(2)(g) and 6(2)(g) of the ADJR Act in these terms. The test has been embraced in both Australia and England … However, in its application, there has been considerable diversity in the readiness with which courts have found the test to be satisfied … But guidance may be found in the close analogy between judicial review of administrative action and appellate review of a judicial discretion. In the context of the latter, it has been held that an appellate court may review a discretionary judgment that has failed to give proper weight to a particular matter, but it will be slow to do so because a mere preference for a different result will not suffice … . So too in the context of administrative law, a court should proceed with caution when reviewing an administrative decision on the ground that it does not give proper weight to relevant factors, lest it exceed its supervisory role by reviewing the decision on its merits.(e)The principles stated above apply to an administrative decision made by a Minister of the Crown … However, in conformity with the principle expressed in (b) above, namely that relevant considerations may be gleaned from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act, where the decision is made by a Minister of the Crown, due allowance may have to be made for the taking into account of broader policy considerations which may be relevant to the exercise of a ministerial discretion.