Van Dung v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Van Dung v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FedCFamC2G 106

File number(s): MLG 1446 of 2017
Judgment of: JUDGE RILEY
Date of judgment: 1 October 2021
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – subclass 801 partner visa – whether the Tribunal took into account irrelevant considerations – whether the Tribunal conducted itself in such a way as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 ss 5F, 359A, 360(1) and (2)(a)

Migration Regulations 1994 reg.1.15A

Cases cited:

BOX16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 80

CNY17v Minister (2019) 268 CLR 76; (2019) 375 ALR 47; [2019] HCA 50

He v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 255 FCR 41; (2017) 161 ALD 1; [2017] FCAFC 206

Goodwin v Commissioner of Police[2012] NSWCA 379

Meadows v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 90 FCR 370; (1998) 54 ALD 654

Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls(2011) 244 CLR 427; (2011) 282 ALR 685; (2011) 86 ALJR 14; [2011] HCA 48

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40 at 162 CLR 39

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Jia Legeng(2001) 205 CLR 507; (2001) 65 ALD 1; (2001) 178 ALR 421; (2001) 75 ALJR 679; (2001) 22(6) Leg Rep 2; [2001] HCA 17

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Maltsin (2005) 88 ALD 304; [2005] FCAFC 118

NADH of 2001 v Ministerfor Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs(2004) 214 ALR 264; [2004] FCAFC 328

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 (2003) 75 ALD 1; (2003) 201 ALR 437; (2003) 77 ALJR 1909; [2003] HCA 60

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H(2001) 179 ALR 425; (2001) 75 ALJR 982; (2001) 9 Leg Rep 20; [2001] HCA 28

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; (2006) 93 ALD 300; (2006) 231 ALR 592; (2006) 81 ALJR 515; [2006] HCA 63

SZUIJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1574

Division  Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 267
Date of last submission/s: 17 August 2021
Date of hearing: 10 August 2021
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicant Roz Germov
Solicitor for the Applicant MP Migration Law
Solicitor advocate for the First Respondent Sophie Roberts
Solicitor for the First Respondent Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent No appearance
Solicitor for the Second Respondent Mills Oakley

ORDERS

MLG 1446 of 2017

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

PHAM VAN DUNG
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE RILEY

DATE OF ORDER:

1 OCTOBER 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application filed on 6 July 2017 be…

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Details
Case
[2021] FedCFamC2G 106
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Van Dung v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves an application for judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant, a Vietnamese national, a partner visa. The applicant's application for a permanent partner visa was refused on the basis that the delegate was not satisfied that the applicant was in a genuine relationship with his Australian citizen wife. The applicant sought review of this decision in the Migration and Refugee Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which upheld the original decision. The applicant then sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision.

The legal issues the court was required to decide were whether the Tribunal took into account irrelevant considerations and whether the Tribunal conducted itself in such a way as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court examined the grounds of judicial review as set out in the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) and considered whether the Tribunal had failed to take into account relevant considerations or had taken into account irrelevant considerations. The court also considered whether there was an apprehended bias in the Tribunal's decision-making process.

The court found that the Tribunal had not taken into account irrelevant considerations and had not conducted itself in such a way as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court held that the Tribunal had considered relevant factors in determining whether the applicant and his wife were in a genuine relationship, and had not given undue weight to any irrelevant considerations. The court also found that there was no apprehended bias in the Tribunal's decision-making process, as the Tribunal had not shown any partiality or prejudice towards the applicant or his wife.

The final orders of the court were that the application for judicial review be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was not flawed and that there were no grounds for setting it aside. The court also held that the applicant's application for judicial review was an abuse of process and that the respondent was entitled to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application for review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). In that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a partner visa.BACKGROUND In section A of his written submissions filed on 19 July 2021, the applicant provided the following background to the matter: 1.The Applicant is a male Vietnamese national now aged 29 who arrived in Australia on 15 March 2011 as the holder of a student visa authorising him to remain in Australia until 27 December 2016: Court Book (“CB”)-3, 45. 2.On 19 November 2012, the Applicant lodged an application for a subclass 820 Partner Provisional visa (“the subclass 820 partner visa”) with the First Respondent’s Department: CB 2-25. 3.The Applicant was sponsored for the subclass 820 partner visa by his wife, Tran Thu Thao Do (“Ms Do”), an Australian citizen by birth: CB-11; CB 26-34. 4.The couple met on 15 May 2011 and they married on 17 November 2012: CB-14; 60.5.The Applicant was granted a subclass 820 partner visa on 19 September 2014: CB 141-145. 6.The Applicant lodged an application for a subclass 801 Permanent Partner visa (“the subclass 801 partner visa”) on 9 May 2015: CB 193-208. 7.The couple have a son, … , who was born [in] … March 2015 in Prairiewood, New South Wales: CB 208. 8.The subclass 801 partner visa application was refused on 6 January 2016 on the basis that the First Respondent’s delegate, (“the primary decision-maker”), was not satisfied that the couple were in a genuine relationship: CB 256-260.9.The Applicant sought review in the Migration and Refugee Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) on 9 January 2016:CB 274-275; 300-301.10.In a letter dated 20 March 2017, the Tribunal invited the Applicant to comment on information in the Tribunal’s possession that alleged the Applicant was not in a genuine relationship with his wife and that he was in a relationship with another woman (Ms Thu Thao Nguyen – “Ms Nguyen”) with whom he had travelled to Vietnam on two occasions without the presence of his wife, Ms Do: CB-456.11.In a letter dated 20 March 2017, the Tribunal invited the Applicant to provide DNA evidence for the purpose of demonstrating that he was the biological father of [the sponsor’s child]: CB-460.12.The Applicant, through his legal representative, responded to the invitation to comment by email dated 4 April 2017 in which he denied the allegation concerning Ms Nguyen and advised that he and Ms Nguyen were friends since high school and that she was married and had her own family. The purpose of the Applicant’s travel to Vietnam was to take part in a property settlement arising out of his parents’ divorce: CB- 462. 13.The Applicant’s representative responded to the Tribunal’s request for a DNA test in an email dated 10 April 2017 advising that the couple did not wish to undergo that procedure as they had sufficient evidence to demonstrate that they had cohabited as spouses: CB 468-469.14.Ms Do suffered a miscarriage on 17 June 2016: CB-394 and was pregnant for a third time by December 2016: CB-393. 15.The Applicant and his wife attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 4 May 2017: CB-466. 16.The Tribunal affirmed the decision to refuse the subclass 801 visa on 2 June 2017 because it was not satisfied that the Applicant and his wife were in a genuine spousal relationship: CB 573-584. 17.The Applicant filed an application for judicial review with this Honourable Court on 6 July 2017.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In his written submissions filed on 2 August 2021, the Minister provided the following summary of the Tribunal’s reasons:The Tribunal’s Decision15.On 6 January 2016, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision (CB 573-584). 16.The Tribunal accepted that the parties were validly married (CB 574, [7]) and acknowledged that “a substantial amount of documentary evidence” had been presented which sought to address the various aspects of the relationship, but did not accept that such evidence was “dispositive of the issues” because “such documents and evidence can be obtained whether or not the relationship is genuine” (CB 575, [8]). 17.In relation to the parties’ living arrangements (reg 1.15(3)(b)(ii)), the Tribunal found the applicant’s evidence that he had not informed the Department of Public Housing that he had been living with the sponsor and his mother-in-law in public housing since 2012 showed his “willingness” to be untruthful with various government agencies (CB 575, [9]). 18.The Tribunal noted the delegate’s decision indicated that the parties had failed to inform Centrelink about their marriage and recorded the applicant’s evidence at the hearing that he knew they were doing the wrong thing by not informing Centrelink but were “short on money” (CB 575, [10]). The Tribunal found this also indicated the parties were willing to provide false information to government agencies in order to achieve benefits and that their “deliberate decision” to provide false information to Centrelink was relevant to its assessment of their overall credibility and the truthfulness of their claims in relation to the Partner visa application (CB 575-576, [10]-[11]). 19.Whilst it accepted that just because the applicant had been untruthful with government agencies it did not necessarily follow that his relationship with the sponsor was not genuine, but noted that its adverse findings were not based solely on these matters but on a “variety of factors” (CB 576, [12]). 20.In relation to the applicant’s evidence that he had stopped studying “about half a year” after he had come to Australia on a Student visa, the Tribunal found that his apparent lack of concern about the fact that he had been breaching the condition on his Student visa for two years by not studying indicated that he was willing to be untruthful in his dealings with “Immigration” in order to stay in Australia (CB 576, [13]). 21.Based on the applicant’s evidence that when the parties decided to get married, they sought the assistance of a migration agent before finding a marriage celebrant, the Tribunal had concerns that the applicant’s motivation for entering the marriage was to assist his migration to Australia (CB 576, [14]). In addition, given the parties’ claim to have committed to the relationship after the applicant had stopped studying and “must have realised that he could not have obtained another student visa”, the Tribunal formed the view that the applicant lacked commitment to the relationship and that being able to remain in Australia was “the sole reason for the marriage” (CB 577, [14]). 22.In relation to the allegations about the applicant’s relationship with Ms Nguyen, the Tribunal: found the fact that Ms Nguyen was married did not necessarily mean she was in a genuine and committed relationship with her partner, in the same way that the applicant’s marriage to the sponsor did not necessarily mean that he was her spouse (CB 577, [15]); accepted that the applicant and Ms Nguyen had a close relationship but found that did not allay its concerns about his overseas travel with Ms Nguyen and not the sponsor (CB 577, [16]); and found the applicant’s explanations as to why he and Ms Nguyen had travelled to Vietnam at the same time in 2013 and 2015 were “utterly implausible” and “unconvincing” (CB 577, [17]). The Tribunal observed that it would not normally consider an allegation received by the Department to be “helpful or probative” but in this case found the applicant’s travel with Ms Nguyen and the fact that the sponsor had not accompanied him supported the allegation. Accordingly, the Tribunal placed some weight on the allegation which suggested that the applicant was in a relationship with Ms Nguyen and not the sponsor (CB 577-578, [18]). 23.The Tribunal also placed “significant weight” on the parties’ refusal to undertake DNA testing to confirm the paternity of the child (CB 578, [19]). The Tribunal found the applicant was “well aware” that the paternity of the child was a live issue and a significant one (CB 578, [20]). It was not satisfied that the sponsor would be adversely affected if her child was to undertake DNA testing, as claimed by the applicant, as it would not involve her or her unborn child in any way (CB 578, [21]). The Tribunal was also not satisfied that the applicant was unable to cover the cost of DNA testing, as he had been able to find the funds for the visa application, migration agent’s fees, the review fees and various other expenses (CB 579, [23]). The Tribunal found the parties’ refusal to undertake testing indicated that they were aware the applicant was not the father of the child (CB 579, [25]). On the basis of the applicant’s refusal to undertake DNA testing and his very limited knowledge about the child, the Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant was the father of the sponsor’s child (CB 578-580, [26]-[29]). 24.Further, given the applicant’s lack of knowledge about the circumstances of the sponsor’s miscarriage, the Tribunal was not satisfied that he was the father of the sponsor’s second pregnancy that resulted in miscarriage, or that the parties relied on each other for comfort or emotional support and found the sponsor’s decision to have children in another relationship indicated that the relationship was not to the exclusion of all others (CB 581, [30]-[32]). 25.The Tribunal had regard to and made express findings in relation to the matters contained in reg 1.15A(3)(a)(ii),(iii),(iv) and (v)1 (CB 581-582, [34]-[47]). The Tribunal relevantly:a.Considered the financial aspects of the relationship (CB 582, [34]-[37]) and was not satisfied that they had any joint liabilities, pooled their financial resources or shared day-today household expenses (CB 582, [37]); b.Accepted that there were a number of statements from third parties who were prepared to state that the relationship was genuine and that the couple had provided photographic evidence of joint social activities but found they had been “somewhat selective” in their presentation as a couple because of their failure to inform Centrelink and the Department of Housing about their marriage (CB 582, [38]); c.Accepted the parties were living together but found that did not necessarily mean they had established a joint household and was not satisfied that the parties had joint responsibility and care for the child (CB 582, [39]); and d.Was not satisfied that the couple provided each other with companionship and emotional support or that they saw the relationship as a long term one or had a mutual commitment to the relationship (CB 584, [47) due to the sponsor’s poor recollection of the arrangements for their marriage (CB 583, [41]) and the applicant’s decision to travel to Vietnam while the sponsor was heavily pregnant (CB 583, [45]-[46]). 26.Whilst the Tribunal accepted that certain aspects of the relationship pointed to its genuine nature, it found that the applicant and sponsor were not credible and was not satisfied their relationship was genuine and continuing or to the exclusion of others (CB 384, [48]-[49]). 27.The Tribunal affirmed the decision under review on the basis that it was not satisfied the applicant met cl 801.221 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations (CB 384, [50]-[52]).LEGISLATION

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As can be seen, ground 1 contains two subgrounds, namely:(a)taking into account irrelevant considerations: ground 1(c); and(b)apprehended bias: ground 1(d).GROUND 1(C): IRRELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS As is well known, the test for whether a decision maker took into account irrelevant considerations was explained by Mason J (as his Honour then was) in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40 at 162 CLR 39 to 42 as follows:15. The failure of a decision-maker to take into account a relevant consideration in the making of an administrative decision is one instance of an abuse of discretion entitling a party with sufficient standing to seek judicial review of ultra vires administrative action. That ground now appears in s.5(2)(b) of the ADJR Act which, in this regard, is substantially declaratory of the common law. Together with the related ground of taking into account irrelevant considerations, it has been discussed in a number of decided cases, which have established the following propositions:(a)The ground of failure to take into account a relevant consideration can only be made out if a decision-maker fails to take into account a consideration which he is bound to take into account in making that decision ... The statement of Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation[1947] EWCA Civ 1; (1948) 1 KB 223, at p 228, that a decision-maker must take into account those matters which he “ought to have regard to" should not be understood in any different sense in view of his Lordship’s statement on the following page that a person entrusted with a discretion” must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider".(b)What factors a decision-maker is bound to consider in making the decision is determined by construction of the statute conferring the discretion. If the statute expressly states the considerations to be taken into account, it will often be necessary for the court to decide whether those enumerated factors are exhaustive or merely inclusive. If the relevant factors - and in this context I use this expression to refer to the factors which the decision-maker is bound to consider - are not expressly stated, they must be determined by implication from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act. In the context of judicial review on the ground of taking into account irrelevant considerations, this Court has held that, where a statute confers a discretion which in its terms is unconfined, the factors that may be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion are similarly unconfined, except in so far as there may be found in the subject matter, scope and purpose of the statute some implied limitation on the factors to which the decision-maker may legitimately have regard … . By analogy, where the ground of review is that a relevant consideration has not been taken into account and the discretion is unconfined by the terms of the statute, the court will not find that the decision-maker is bound to take a particular matter into account unless an implication that he is bound to do so is to be found in the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act.(c)Not every consideration that a decision-maker is bound to take into account but fails to take into account will justify the court setting aside the impugned decision and ordering that the discretion be re-exercised according to law. A factor might be so insignificant that the failure to take it into account could not have materially affected the decision … A similar principle has been enunciated in cases where regard has been had to irrelevant considerations in the making of an administrative decision … (d)The limited role of a court reviewing the exercise of an administrative discretion must constantly be borne in mind. It is not the function of the court to substitute its own decision for that of the administrator by exercising a discretion which the legislature has vested in the administrator. Its role is to set limits on the exercise of that discretion, and a decision made within those boundaries cannot be impugned … .It follows that, in the absence of any statutory indication of the weight to be given to various considerations, it is generally for the decision-maker and not the court to determine the appropriate weight to be given to the matters which are required to be taken into account in exercising the statutory power … I say “generally” because both principle and authority indicate that in some circumstances a court may set aside an administrative decision which has failed to give adequate weight to a relevant factor of great importance, or has given excessive weight to a relevant factor of no great importance. The preferred ground on which this is done, however, is not the failure to take into account relevant considerations or the taking into account of irrelevant considerations, but that the decision is “manifestly unreasonable”. This ground of review was considered by Lord Greene M.R. in Wednesbury Corporation, at pp.230, 233-234, in which his Lordship said that it would only be made out if it were shown that the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have come to it. This ground is now expressed in ss.5(2)(g) and 6(2)(g) of the ADJR Act in these terms. The test has been embraced in both Australia and England … However, in its application, there has been considerable diversity in the readiness with which courts have found the test to be satisfied … But guidance may be found in the close analogy between judicial review of administrative action and appellate review of a judicial discretion. In the context of the latter, it has been held that an appellate court may review a discretionary judgment that has failed to give proper weight to a particular matter, but it will be slow to do so because a mere preference for a different result will not suffice … . So too in the context of administrative law, a court should proceed with caution when reviewing an administrative decision on the ground that it does not give proper weight to relevant factors, lest it exceed its supervisory role by reviewing the decision on its merits.(e)The principles stated above apply to an administrative decision made by a Minister of the Crown … However, in conformity with the principle expressed in (b) above, namely that relevant considerations may be gleaned from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act, where the decision is made by a Minister of the Crown, due allowance may have to be made for the taking into account of broader policy considerations which may be relevant to the exercise of a ministerial discretion.