BTF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BTF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 647

Appeal from: BTF15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 3293
File number: NSD 1721 of 2015
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 3 June 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION — decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal to decline to question  two people who gave written statements corroborative of appellant’s claim — whether decision legally unreasonable
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 414, 415, 420, 422B, 424, 424C, 425, 425A, 426, 427, 429A
Cases cited:

Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL)

CZBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1023

Kruger v The Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Re Minister for Immigration; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 (2003) 201 ALR 437; [2003] HCA 60

Date of hearing: 2 May 2016
Date of last submissions: 4 May 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 59
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr L Karp
Solicitor for the Appellant: Kinslor Prince Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr P Knowles
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a Submitting Notice

ORDERS

NSD 1721 of 2015
BETWEEN:

BTF15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 JUNE 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The question at the heart of this appeal is whether it was legally unreasonable for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to decline to take oral evidence from two allegedly corroborative witnesses who had provided written statements, before deciding that either they or the appellant should be disbelieved.  For the reasons set out below, I have concluded that it was not.

    Background

  2. The appellant is a Rwandan national.  He applied to the Minister for a protection visa claiming to fear persecution on the grounds of his political activities and opinion, as well as his Hutu ethnicity.  The application was rejected by the Minister’s delegate.  On review by the Tribunal the delegate’s decision was affirmed, essentially because the Tribunal was convinced that the appellant’s claims were false.  In reaching that opinion, the Tribunal put the written statements of the two witnesses to one side, concluding that the statements were fabrications.

    The appellant’s claims

  3. In his application for a protection visa, the appellant gave a long history of adversity suffered by him and his family.  He said that he had been arrested and imprisoned several times in Rwanda and that he and his family members lived in exile in the Democratic Republic of Congo for some…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 647
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Court of Australia heard an appeal against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) in the matter of BTF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The appellant, a Rwandan national, challenged the AAT's decision not to call two witnesses who provided written statements that were allegedly corroborative of his claim for a protection visa. The central issue before the court was whether the AAT's decision to not call these witnesses was legally unreasonable. The appellant argued that the AAT's failure to question these witnesses constituted a denial of a reasonable opportunity to present his case.

The court considered whether the AAT's decision not to take oral evidence from the two witnesses was legally unreasonable. The appellant had given written notice to the AAT of his wish to have the witnesses provide oral evidence, but this notice was outside the prescribed time. The court noted that the appellant's case was not that the AAT was obliged to call the witnesses but that the AAT had a discretion to do so and was obliged to exercise that discretion reasonably. The court found that the AAT's decision not to call the witnesses was not unreasonable as it was based on an evident and intelligible justification. The court concluded that the decision was not made in an arbitrary or irrational manner, and therefore, the appeal should be dismissed.

The Federal Court held that the appeal was not successful and dismissed it. The appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs. The court found that the AAT's decision not to call the witnesses was not legally unreasonable and did not constitute a denial of a reasonable opportunity to present the appellant's case. The court further found that the AAT's decision was based on an evident and intelligible justification, and therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The question at the heart of this appeal is whether it was legally unreasonable for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to decline to take oral evidence from two allegedly corroborative witnesses who had provided written statements, before deciding that either they or the appellant should be disbelieved. For the reasons set out below, I have concluded that it was not. Background The appellant is a Rwandan national. He applied to the Minister for a protection visa claiming to fear persecution on the grounds of his political activities and opinion, as well as his Hutu ethnicity. The application was rejected by the Minister’s delegate. On review by the Tribunal the delegate’s decision was affirmed, essentially because the Tribunal was convinced that the appellant’s claims were false. In reaching that opinion, the Tribunal put the written statements of the two witnesses to one side, concluding that the statements were fabrications. The appellant’s claims In his application for a protection visa, the appellant gave a long history of adversity suffered by him and his family. He said that he had been arrested and imprisoned several times in Rwanda and that he and his family members lived in exile in the Democratic Republic of Congo for some time, though they later returned to Rwanda. He said that his parents had spent 10 years in prison on false allegations and that, after his family returned to Rwanda, his brother was kidnapped by soldiers of the Rwandan Patriotic Army, never to be seen again. He also said that he had personally “experienced threats” in recent times, following his opposition to government policies aimed at ordering citizens to contribute to funds for the Tutsi “RPF” ruling party and other government projects. He said he feared that if he were to return to Rwanda he would be arrested, imprisoned, tortured and murdered by the Rwandan government. He claimed that this would happen to him because he was a well-educated Hutu from the Northern Province, who was involved in anti-government activities. The decision record of the Tribunal sets out the more detailed evidence the appellant gave about his mistreatment in recent times. According to the Tribunal, the appellant said that he moved to Uganda in 2008, where he undertook a Master of Science degree. He then returned to Rwanda in 2010 to undertake a research component of his course at a local educational institution (the Institute). While undertaking his research he became involved in a new opposition political party and was arrested and detained by police for four nights after criticising the RPF in a bar. Later, he returned to Uganda, where he completed his degree, before coming back to Rwanda in May 2011 and taking up a position as an assistant lecturer at the Institute. He obtained that position with the assistance of the Dean of the Institute’s Faculty of Engineering. The appellant said that the Dean knew his father and his father’s friend, and was a fellow Hutu from northern Rwanda.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Grounds 1 and 2 were dealt with together in submissions as variations of the same proposition: that the decision not to take oral evidence from the authors of the two statements was legally unreasonable. The proposition advanced by ground 2 of the show cause application in the court below (that the appellant had been denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case) was not advanced on appeal. Was the decision not to take oral evidence from the two witnesses legally unreasonable? The appellant gave the Tribunal written notice that he wanted the Tribunal to obtain oral evidence from Mr B and Dr T. But (in contrast to the position in CZBH) he did not do so within the prescribed time. If he had, then, as s 426(3) makes clear, the Tribunal would have been required to consider his wishes, but it would not have been required to fulfil them. The Minister submitted that the appellant’s case depends on the Tribunal being obliged in the circumstances of the case to receive oral evidence from the authors of the statements, despite the fact that his request was made outside the time allowed by s 426(2) and when, even if it had been made within that time, the Tribunal’s only obligation would have been to consider the request. The Minister argued that the appellant could be in no more privileged position because his request failed to trigger the obligation under the subsection than he would have been had his request fallen within its terms. This submission is misconceived. The appellant’s case is not that the Tribunal was obliged to call them; it is that the Tribunal had a discretion to do so and that it was obliged to exercise that discretion reasonably, both of which propositions the Minister rightly accepted. That discretion is conferred by s 429A of the Migration Act and it is independent of the regime in s 426. Every statutory discretion must be exercised reasonably: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 and the cases referred to there. The legislature is taken to have so intended: Kruger v The Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1 at 36 (Brennan CJ); Li at [28]–[29] (French CJ), [63] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ), and [88]–[89] (Gageler J). The “indicia” of legal unreasonableness are to be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the particular statutory provisions “in issue” in a given case: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [48]. As the plurality explained in Li, at [76], a court may infer unreasonableness in the exercise of a statutory discretion where, even if reasons are given, it is not possible to understand how the decision was reached (see, too, French CJ at [27]). Their Honours said (also at [76]) that “[u]nreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification”. In the court below and on appeal, the appellant contended that the decision not to take oral evidence from the two witnesses was one lacking in intelligible justification.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Thus, while it might well have been preferable for the Tribunal to have interrogated the two individuals before coming to a concluded view about the appellant’s credibility, I am not persuaded that its decision not to do so lacked an evident and intelligible justification. It follows that ground 1 is not made out. As the foundation for the challenge to the primary judge’s reasons in ground 2 is that the decision did lack that justification, ground 2 also fails. Conclusion I am not persuaded that the primary judge erred as alleged. The appeal should therefore be dismissed. Costs should follow the event. There will be orders accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The central issue in this case was whether the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to not take oral evidence from two corroborative witnesses was legally unreasonable. The appellant argued that the Tribunal's failure to take oral evidence from these witnesses was unreasonable as it deprived him of a fair opportunity to present his case. The court noted that the appellant had not provided written notice of his intention to call these witnesses within the prescribed time frame, and as such, the Tribunal was not obligated to consider their oral testimony. However, the court acknowledged that the Tribunal had a discretion to call these witnesses and that this discretion must be exercised reasonably. The court considered whether the Tribunal's decision not to call the witnesses was legally unreasonable, taking into account the subject matter, scope, and purpose of the relevant statutory provisions. Ultimately, the court found that the Tribunal's decision was not unreasonable as it had an intelligible justification for not calling the witnesses to give oral evidence. This conclusion was based on the fact that the Tribunal had already formed a view on the appellant's credibility and found the written statements from the witnesses to be fabrications. The court also noted that while it might have been preferable for the Tribunal to have interrogated the two individuals before coming to a concluded view about the appellant's credibility, it was not persuaded that the decision not to do so lacked an evident and intelligible justification. As such, the court dismissed the appeal and held that the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was not legally unreasonable. The court also held that the appellant did not have a reasonable opportunity to present his case due to the Tribunal's failure to take oral evidence from the witnesses. The court found that the Tribunal's decision not to call the witnesses was not legally unreasonable, and therefore, the appellant was not denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case. The court's decision in this case followed the principles established in previous cases such as Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, where the court held that every statutory discretion must be exercised reasonably. The court also relied on the case of Kruger v The Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, which held that the legislature is taken to have intended that statutory discretions be exercised reasonably. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal has a discretion to call witnesses to give oral evidence, and this discretion must be exercised reasonably. The court also clarified that the Tribunal's failure to call witnesses to give oral evidence does not necessarily mean that the appellant was denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case. The court's decision in this case followed the principles established in previous cases and did not depart from any prior authority.