CZBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CZBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1023

Citation: CZBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1023
Appeal from: CZBH & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 2210
Parties: CZBH and CZBI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: ACD 1 of 2014
Judge: RANGIAH J
Date of judgment: 24 September 2014
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from dismissal by Federal Circuit Court of an application to review decision of Refugee Review Tribunal (“Tribunal”) – appellants’ solicitor gave notice under s 426(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) to obtain oral evidence from two witnesses – Tribunal gave no reasons for deciding not to obtain oral evidence – Tribunal exercised discretion under s 426(3) of the Act unreasonably – appeal allowed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 424AA, 426, 427, 428, 429A
Cases cited: Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353 cited
Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 cited
Chen v Minister for Immigrationand Ethnic Affairs (1994) 48 FCR 591 cited
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 cited
Kaurv Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 915 cited
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 139 ALD 50; [2014] FCAFC 1 cited
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Maltsin (2005) 88 ALD 118; [2005] FCAFC 118 applied
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165; [2003] HCA 30 cited
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 cited
VJAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 178 cited
VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158 cited
W360/01A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 211 cited
Date of hearing: 23 May 2014
Date of last submissions: 13 June 2014
Place: Brisbane (via video link to Canberra)
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr C McKeown with Mr A Anforth
Solicitor for the Appellants: Capital Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms R Francois
Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 1 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

CZBH
First Appellant

CZBI
Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RANGIAH J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 SEPTEMBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is allowed.

2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 20 December 2013 are set aside.

3.The decision of the second respondent made on 1 May 2012 is quashed.

4.The second respondent determine…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1023
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of CZBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellants, citizens of Pakistan, challenged the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) which declined to hear oral evidence from the appellants' fathers during the review of a refusal of Protection (Class XA) visas. The Tribunal based its decision on written statements provided by the fathers. The appellants argued that the Tribunal's refusal to hear oral evidence denied them natural justice and that the Tribunal exercised its discretion unreasonably. They further argued that the Tribunal found the written statements to be contrived without proper basis, as the oral evidence was not considered. The Circuit Court dismissed the appeal, leading to this appeal to the Federal Court.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal exercised its discretion under section 426(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) unreasonably by not obtaining oral evidence from the appellants' fathers. The court also considered whether the Tribunal's finding that the written statements were contrived was unfair given the refusal to take oral evidence. The appellants contended that the Tribunal's decision not to obtain oral evidence was capricious, and they were denied natural justice. The respondent argued that the Tribunal had not refused to consider the fathers' evidence but rather had not decided to obtain it, and the appellants' argument was factually incorrect.

The court held that the Tribunal had indeed exercised its discretion against obtaining oral evidence from the fathers, and this was a matter of law, not fact. The court found that the Tribunal's decision not to obtain oral evidence was indeed capricious and that this decision deprived the appellants of natural justice. The court also found that the Tribunal's finding that the written statements were contrived was unfair in the absence of oral evidence. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, quashed the decision of the Tribunal, and remitted the matter back for reconsideration according to law. The court further ordered that the respondent pay the appellants' costs.

This decision highlights the importance of procedural fairness in administrative law and the need for decision-makers to properly exercise their discretion. The court underscored that denying a party the opportunity to present oral evidence can be a significant procedural defect, especially when the decision-maker subsequently bases its findings on written submissions that were not subjected to cross-examination or corroboration.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 20 December 2013 are set aside.

3. The decision of the second respondent made on 1 May 2012 is quashed.

4. The second respondent determine the appellants’ application for review of the decision of the first respondent’s delegate made on 18 November 2011 according to law.

5. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the application to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and the costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In order to place these grounds in context, it is necessary to set out something of the background and history of the litigation. Background The appellants are each citizens of Pakistan. The first appellant is the wife of the second appellant. It is convenient to refer to the first appellant as “the wife” and the second appellant as “the husband”. The wife’s evidence to the Tribunal was that she came from a “backward and conservative” part of Pakistan. There was conflict within her extended family. Her father moved his immediate family to Islamabad in 1979 as a result of the family problems. The wife claimed that her uncle wanted her to marry her cousin. She and her father rejected the proposal, which led to threats against her parents. The wife met the second appellant in 2002 and they began a sexual relationship in 2004. They decided to get engaged, but had to wait until January 2005 when they secured their parents’ blessings to get married. They were married on 7 July 2007. The wife claimed that after she became engaged, her uncle threatened her family and her fiancé. The uncle threatened to kidnap her and force her to marry someone else. She stated her family were forced to move to another house to avoid the ongoing threats. She stated that after her marriage she received many threatening calls. The husband was then living with his family in Australia and he arranged for his wife to join him in August 2008. The wife returned to Pakistan on 1 October 2010. She stated that in Pakistan she again received death threats and threats of kidnapping. As a result, she returned to Australia on 10 December 2010. The appellants claimed that they could not return to Pakistan because they fear life-threatening harm from the wife’s extended family. The wife claimed that she fears persecution because of her nationality or membership of a particular social group in the absence of effective state protection. She submitted that a “love marriage” is taboo in her country and violates family expectations. She stated that the particular social group she belonged to was “a person who is in a forbidden love marriage relationship and is therefore vulnerable to violent reprisals”. She also claimed she and her husband face serious harm from family or conservative elements in Pakistani society because they had a sexual relationship before their marriage. The delegate’s decision The appellants applied for Protection (Class XA) visas on 25 July 2011. The application was also in respect of their children. The first respondent’s delegate decided on 18 October 2011 to refuse to grant the visas because the appellants were not persons to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) (“Convention”). The basis of the decision was that the harm feared by the appellants was not related to a Convention ground.The Tribunal’s hearing On 9 November 2011, the appellants applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decisions. The Tribunal invited the appellants to attend an oral hearing to be conducted by video link on 21 March 2012. The appellant’s legal advisor completed and returned a form entitled “Response to Hearing Invitation”. In that form, the advisor requested that the Tribunal take oral evidence from the father of each of the appellants and gave a very brief description of their evidence and its relevance. The advisor provided telephone numbers at which the fathers could be contacted.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The wife claimed that she fears persecution because of her nationality or membership of a particular social group in the absence of effective state protection. She submitted that a “love marriage” is taboo in her country and violates family expectations. She stated that the particular social group she belonged to was “a person who is in a forbidden love marriage relationship and is therefore vulnerable to violent reprisals”. She also claimed she and her husband face serious harm from family or conservative elements in Pakistani society because they had a sexual relationship before their marriage. The delegate’s decision The appellants applied for Protection (Class XA) visas on 25 July 2011. The application was also in respect of their children. The first respondent’s delegate decided on 18 October 2011 to refuse to grant the visas because the appellants were not persons to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) (“Convention”). The basis of the decision was that the harm feared by the appellants was not related to a Convention ground.The Tribunal’s hearing On 9 November 2011, the appellants applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decisions. The Tribunal invited the appellants to attend an oral hearing to be conducted by video link on 21 March 2012. The appellant’s legal advisor completed and returned a form entitled “Response to Hearing Invitation”. In that form, the advisor requested that the Tribunal take oral evidence from the father of each of the appellants and gave a very brief description of their evidence and its relevance. The advisor provided telephone numbers at which the fathers could be contacted. On 20 March 2012, the day before the oral hearing, the appellants’ legal advisor provided to the Tribunal a written submission accompanied by a number of documents. Amongst those documents was a statement from the father of the husband who said that his son had a love marriage and that both families were initially against the marriage. The father said that there had been threats over the telephone, the caller saying that his son had acted against Sharia law. He said that the caller would not hesitate to commit murder and that the future of his son was very dark. A statement from the wife’s father was also provided to the Tribunal. He stated that initially the immediate families of the appellants were not in favour of the marriage, but they eventually agreed to arrange the marriage. He said that when the marriage came to the attention of his extended family, they threatened to kill the appellants because the marriage was against Sharia law. The extended family threatened that the appellants should be presented before a Jirga (a tribal council) so that they may be punished by death. He stated that after his daughter left for Australia, he received telephone calls from unknown people who threatened that if she returned to Pakistan she would be killed. He gave details of two such telephone calls.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I interpret the Circuit Court’s reasons as meaning that the Tribunal had not committed jurisdictional error by refusing to receive the fathers’ oral evidence in circumstances where it said it would, and did, consider written statements. It is not apparent that the Circuit Court considered the submission that the Tribunal’s finding that the statements were contrived was unfair in circumstances where the Tribunal had refused to take the oral evidence.Consideration The appellants’ notice of appeal contains two grounds. The first ground alleges that the Circuit Court erred in finding that the Tribunal’s apprehended bias had been cured by giving the appellants the opportunity to provide written submissions after the hearing. That ground contains an assumption that the Circuit Court made a finding of apprehended bias on the part of the Tribunal. That assumption is patently unfounded, and the appellants eventually shifted their focus to argue that the Circuit Court erred in failing to find that there was apprehended bias on the part of the Tribunal. The appellants’ second ground of appeal is that the Circuit Court failed to deal with the appellants’ argument that the Tribunal denied the appellants natural justice by refusing to hear the oral evidence of the appellants’ fathers and then finding that their written statements were contrived to enhance the application. The appellants’ case as argued also departed from the way this ground was pleaded. They argued that s 426(3) required the Tribunal to explain why it had decided not to obtain the oral evidence. Their case as argued also incorporated their written submissions made to the Circuit Court in which they argued that the Tribunal had acted capriciously. The first respondent submitted that these arguments were not raised before the Circuit Court and that leave is required to raise them before this Court. I am satisfied that the appellants raised at least the argument that the decision not to obtain oral evidence was capricious. To the extent that leave is otherwise required, I would grant the appellants leave as only issues of law, not fact, are raised, the first respondent has had an opportunity to deal with the arguments and there is ultimately some merit in the arguments: cf. VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158 at [48]. It is convenient to commence with the second tranche of the appellants’ arguments. The first respondent argued that, contrary to the appellants’ assertion, the Tribunal made no decision to refuse to consider the fathers’ evidence. The first respondent submitted that the appellants’ argument therefore fails at a factual level. I consider that the Tribunal clearly declined to obtain oral evidence from the fathers (see the passages at [47] and [48] of these reasons). It makes no difference to the appellants’ argument whether the Tribunal is characterised as having refused or declined to obtain the oral evidence. What is relevant is that the Tribunal exercised its discretionary powers against obtaining the fathers’ oral evidence.