FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CZBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1023
Citation: CZBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1023 Appeal from: CZBH & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2013] FCCA 2210 Parties: CZBH and CZBI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: ACD 1 of 2014 Judge: RANGIAH J Date of judgment: 24 September 2014 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from dismissal by Federal Circuit Court of an application to review decision of Refugee Review Tribunal (“Tribunal”) – appellants’ solicitor gave notice under s 426(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) to obtain oral evidence from two witnesses – Tribunal gave no reasons for deciding not to obtain oral evidence – Tribunal exercised discretion under s 426(3) of the Act unreasonably – appeal allowed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 424AA, 426, 427, 428, 429A Cases cited: Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353 cited
Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 cited
Chen v Minister for Immigrationand Ethnic Affairs (1994) 48 FCR 591 cited
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 cited
Kaurv Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 915 cited
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 139 ALD 50; [2014] FCAFC 1 cited
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Maltsin (2005) 88 ALD 118; [2005] FCAFC 118 applied
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165; [2003] HCA 30 cited
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294 cited
VJAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 178 cited
VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158 cited
W360/01A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 211 citedDate of hearing: 23 May 2014 Date of last submissions: 13 June 2014 Place: Brisbane (via video link to Canberra) Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 66 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr C McKeown with Mr A Anforth Solicitor for the Appellants: Capital Lawyers Counsel for the Respondents: Ms R Francois Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
ACD 1 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: CZBH
First AppellantCZBI
Second AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentREFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RANGIAH J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 SEPTEMBER 2014
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE (VIA VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is allowed.
2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 20 December 2013 are set aside.
3.The decision of the second respondent made on 1 May 2012 is quashed.
4.The second respondent determine…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 1023
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal exercised its discretion under section 426(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) unreasonably by not obtaining oral evidence from the appellants' fathers. The court also considered whether the Tribunal's finding that the written statements were contrived was unfair given the refusal to take oral evidence. The appellants contended that the Tribunal's decision not to obtain oral evidence was capricious, and they were denied natural justice. The respondent argued that the Tribunal had not refused to consider the fathers' evidence but rather had not decided to obtain it, and the appellants' argument was factually incorrect.
The court held that the Tribunal had indeed exercised its discretion against obtaining oral evidence from the fathers, and this was a matter of law, not fact. The court found that the Tribunal's decision not to obtain oral evidence was indeed capricious and that this decision deprived the appellants of natural justice. The court also found that the Tribunal's finding that the written statements were contrived was unfair in the absence of oral evidence. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, quashed the decision of the Tribunal, and remitted the matter back for reconsideration according to law. The court further ordered that the respondent pay the appellants' costs.
This decision highlights the importance of procedural fairness in administrative law and the need for decision-makers to properly exercise their discretion. The court underscored that denying a party the opportunity to present oral evidence can be a significant procedural defect, especially when the decision-maker subsequently bases its findings on written submissions that were not subjected to cross-examination or corroboration.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 20 December 2013 are set aside.
3. The decision of the second respondent made on 1 May 2012 is quashed.
4. The second respondent determine the appellants’ application for review of the decision of the first respondent’s delegate made on 18 November 2011 according to law.
5. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the application to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and the costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I interpret the Circuit Court’s reasons as meaning that the Tribunal had not committed jurisdictional error by refusing to receive the fathers’ oral evidence in circumstances where it said it would, and did, consider written statements. It is not apparent that the Circuit Court considered the submission that the Tribunal’s finding that the statements were contrived was unfair in circumstances where the Tribunal had refused to take the oral evidence.Consideration The appellants’ notice of appeal contains two grounds. The first ground alleges that the Circuit Court erred in finding that the Tribunal’s apprehended bias had been cured by giving the appellants the opportunity to provide written submissions after the hearing. That ground contains an assumption that the Circuit Court made a finding of apprehended bias on the part of the Tribunal. That assumption is patently unfounded, and the appellants eventually shifted their focus to argue that the Circuit Court erred in failing to find that there was apprehended bias on the part of the Tribunal. The appellants’ second ground of appeal is that the Circuit Court failed to deal with the appellants’ argument that the Tribunal denied the appellants natural justice by refusing to hear the oral evidence of the appellants’ fathers and then finding that their written statements were contrived to enhance the application. The appellants’ case as argued also departed from the way this ground was pleaded. They argued that s 426(3) required the Tribunal to explain why it had decided not to obtain the oral evidence. Their case as argued also incorporated their written submissions made to the Circuit Court in which they argued that the Tribunal had acted capriciously. The first respondent submitted that these arguments were not raised before the Circuit Court and that leave is required to raise them before this Court. I am satisfied that the appellants raised at least the argument that the decision not to obtain oral evidence was capricious. To the extent that leave is otherwise required, I would grant the appellants leave as only issues of law, not fact, are raised, the first respondent has had an opportunity to deal with the arguments and there is ultimately some merit in the arguments: cf. VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158 at [48]. It is convenient to commence with the second tranche of the appellants’ arguments. The first respondent argued that, contrary to the appellants’ assertion, the Tribunal made no decision to refuse to consider the fathers’ evidence. The first respondent submitted that the appellants’ argument therefore fails at a factual level. I consider that the Tribunal clearly declined to obtain oral evidence from the fathers (see the passages at [47] and [48] of these reasons). It makes no difference to the appellants’ argument whether the Tribunal is characterised as having refused or declined to obtain the oral evidence. What is relevant is that the Tribunal exercised its discretionary powers against obtaining the fathers’ oral evidence.