CZBH v Minister for Immigration

Link copied
Case Copied 52 min read

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CZBH & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2013] FCCA 2210
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Allegations of bias against Tribunal member – challenge to the conduct of the hearing – alleged failure of Tribunal to consider material relied on by Applicants – alleged failure of Tribunal to call witnesses relied on by the Applicants – failure to adjourn hearing – presence of Applicants’ lawyer and acquiescence in process – remedy of post-hearing submissions.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.420, 422B, 426(3)

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 1967

Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs(2005) 225 CLR 88
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP (2010) 184 FCR 485
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Paul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 396
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 142
SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80
VFAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 102
W360/01A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 124 FCR 449

W. Trumble, L. Brown , A. Stevenson, J. Siefring (eds) Shorter Oxford Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 5th Edition 2002)

M. Abdalla, “Sacred Law in a Secular Land: To What Extent Should Sharī`a Law be Followed in Australia?” (2012) 21 Griffith Law Review 657

Applicants: CZBH & CZBI
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: CAG 41 of 2012
Judgment of: Judge Neville
Hearing date: 3 February 2013
Date of Last Submission: 14 August 2013
Delivered at: Canberra
Delivered on: 20 December 2013

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicants: Mr A Anforth
Solicitors for the Applicants: Capital Lawyers, Canberra
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Francois
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz, Canberra

ORDERS

  1. The Application filed on 4th June 2012 be dismissed.

  2. The parties are to file written submissions of no more than 2 pages in relation to costs within 21 days of the date of these reasons.  Orders in relation to costs will be determined on the basis of the written submissions.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT CANBERRA

CAG 41 of 2012

CZBH & CZBI

Applicants

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This matter was originally heard in February of this year.  It is…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read CZBH v Minister for Immigration and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2013] FCCA 2210
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for judicial review brought by the Applicants against the Minister for Immigration. The dispute arose from a hearing before a Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) where the Applicants alleged a denial of procedural fairness. The Applicants contended that the Tribunal had failed to accord them procedural fairness in several respects, including refusing to take oral evidence from their fathers, refusing an adjournment to address interpreter issues, refusing proper representation by their solicitor, exhibiting bias, failing to understand the case, failing to consider relevant evidence, and making findings without evidence. The court was required to determine whether the MRT’s conduct during the hearing amounted to jurisdictional error, specifically concerning the alleged breaches of procedural fairness.

The court considered whether the Tribunal’s refusal to take oral evidence from the Applicants’ fathers, despite statements from them having been provided, constituted a failure to accord procedural fairness. The Applicants argued that the Tribunal had a duty to consider this oral evidence, even though section 426(3) of the Act did not mandate hearing it. The court also examined the Tribunal’s refusal to grant an adjournment to address concerns about the interpreter's accuracy and the alleged refusal to allow proper representation by the solicitor. The court noted that while there was no "bright line" for jurisdictional error, the overall perception of the process, including any accumulated interference, intolerance, or frustration, needed careful assessment. The court acknowledged the difficult task faced by the Tribunal in balancing an inquisitorial process with statutory requirements, particularly when dealing with non-English speakers and interpreter issues.

The court reasoned that a reasonable opportunity to be heard requires a decision-maker to provide a claimant with the chance to advance their factual material and submissions before reaching a conclusion. It emphasised the importance of reviewing the entire transcript of proceedings rather than isolated sentences. While acknowledging that the Applicants' complaints, individually or collectively, did not definitively fall foul of the requirement for an "apparently fair process," the court found the case to be borderline. It noted that the opportunity afforded to the Applicants to provide further written submissions after the hearing was an important step that could mitigate deficiencies in the process. Ultimately, the court concluded that, while arguable, the Applicants had not established that the Tribunal’s conduct amounted to a failure to provide an apparently fair process.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The TM then said (transcript reference 01:32:38) (emphasis added):I'm not going to ring the parents in Pakistan and in South Africa. If you want me to consider evidence from them, get them to put something in writing and submit it to me when you make your submission. It will be recalled that the Applicants’ solicitor had already provided the Tribunal with statements from their parents. On its face, the TM either was unaware of them or otherwise had forgotten their existence, although they had been provided to the Tribunal only the day prior to the hearing. Presumably, in the light of his comments earlier in the hearing, this was his “determination” regarding calling the family witnesses relied upon by the Applicants. He determined that he would not do so. At the time, he gave no reason for not doing so. After summarising the timetable for written submissions and associated matters, the hearing before the Tribunal concluded. According to the transcript provided, the duration of the hearing was approximately one hour and thirty-five minutes. For ease of reference I note each of the grounds of review set out in the Application filed on 4th June 2012. The Applicants there assert that the Tribunal:(a)failed to accord the Applicants procedural fairness by refusing to take evidence from the Applicants’ Fathers;(b)failed to accord the Applicants procedural fairness by refusing to allow an adjournment to address a problem with the accuracy of the interpreter;(c)failed to accord the Applicants procedural fairness by refusing to allow them to be properly represented by their solicitor;(d)was biased;(e)failed ‘to understand the nature of the case’ put by the Applicants;(f)failed to take into account a relevant consideration, being the evidence of Mr Khan, a lawyer from Pakistan; and(g)made findings for which there was no evidence, being that the Applicant Wife’s extended family did not intend to harm the Applicants. It will be seen that there are three grounds of review that relate to alleged lack of procedural fairness. The first ground is: the Tribunal failed to accord the Applicants procedural fairness by refusing to take evidence from the Applicants’ Fathers. The Applicants contend that with (a) the nomination of the Fathers as witnesses (on 8th March) and (b) the filing of statements from those witnesses (on 20th March), the Tribunal was under a duty to have regard to the oral evidence from the witnesses nominated. While the Applicants acknowledge that s.426(3) of the Act does not require the Tribunal to hear the oral evidence, the Tribunal must have regard to “the Applicants wishes but is not required to obtain evidence (orally or otherwise) from a person named in the Applicants’ notice.” The Applicants also rely upon, among other cases, the Full Court decision in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP, where the joint judgment of North and Lander JJ said, at [38] and [39]:[10][38] The RRT would fall into jurisdictional error if, after making an adverse credibility finding, it simply refused to consider the corroborative evidence. Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; 198 ALR 59 does not sanction a practice of disregarding corroborative evidence. It still requires that the corroborative evidence be assessed and weighed in the balance with all the other evidence. Consequently, the observation concerning the dicta of McHugh and Gummow JJ at [49] in Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; 198 ALR 59 made in SZDGC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1638; (2008) 105 ALD 25 at [23] is probably misdirected. Those observations addressed the situation where the corroborative evidence was disregarded. [39] On the other hand, it should be remembered that McHugh and Gummow JJ questioned whether the separate consideration of corroborative evidence was a preferable practice. The RRT should normally assess all the evidence together. Otherwise, it might be thought that the corroborative evidence is treated as a lesser category of evidence and that the RRT has not paid sufficient regard to it.[10] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP (2010) 184 FCR 485.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Of particular significance in the current matter is Flick J’s further comment, at [35], where his Honour said (emphasis added):A reasonable opportunity to be heard, it is concluded, requires that a decision-maker provide a claimant with an opportunity to be heard and an opportunity for the claimant to advance the entirety of his factual material and submissions before a conclusion is reached. In SZRUI, at [75], Robertson J said that the “whole of the transcript of proceedings must be reviewed rather than sentences taken in isolation.” It is also apposite to record that in SZRUI, at [83], Robertson J noted the important caution in relation to a Tribunal’s conduct which fails to distinguish or “elides relevance with process.” In the current matter, the Court has the benefit of a type-script of the hearing before the Tribunal, which was provided by the First Respondent’s solicitors. The Court also had the benefit of listening to the whole of the recording of the proceeding before the Tribunal, as did Counsel for the parties (and their solicitors), in the course of the hearing in this Court. The recording was regularly stopped so that (a) Counsel could comment/make submissions, and (b) the Court could ask questions in relation to what was being played in open Court. The Court was also provided with a CD of the hearing before the Tribunal. Rather like cases where jurisdictional error is alleged, in relation to which jurisprudential concept or principle there is rarely any “bright line” of demarcation as to what is and what is not such error, just so here: there is no “bright line” or startlingly obvious error in the conduct of the Tribunal hearing. Rather, it is more a matter of perception of the process, the accumulated perception of interference, intolerance (in admittedly not ideal circumstances) and degrees of frustration, all of which need to be assessed by careful attention as to how the process before the Tribunal was conducted and in doing so, to assess what Allsop CJ described as an “apparently fair process.” This must, in my view, take into account the opportunity afforded to the Applicants after the hearing to provide further written submissions. While not a panacea for any serious defects in the hearing or the process more generally, it is nonetheless an important extra step that may ameliorate or mitigate any relevant deficiencies in the process. Accepting that the Tribunal has the difficult task of (a) conducting an inquisitorial process, (b) in accordance with the not always readily comprehensible prescriptions of the Act, (c) with persons whose native tongue is not English, (d) to deal with an interpreter in relation to whose work the Applicants, at times, expressed doubt, (e) to ensure that relevant evidence - and any relevant doubts held by the Tribunal - are put to the Applicants, (f) dealing all the while with the difficult factual and legal issues before it, striking a proper balance between informality and proper process is no easy feat. All that said, the complaints relating to the conduct of the hearing – either individually or collectively – in my view do not fall foul of the need for the “apparently fair process” to which Allsop CJ referred in SZRUI that was their due. That said, it is a border-line case, and it is reasonably arguable that the Applicants have made out their case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.