BYN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 45 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BYN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 834

Appeal from: BYN16 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2928
File number: NSD 2045 of 2018
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 16 June 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where primary judge dismissed judicial review application of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) – whether AAT failed to properly consider any claims – whether AAT erred in not later requesting oral evidence after none given by certain individuals at hearing – whether AAT failed to comply with s 424AA or s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the AAT erred in declining to telephone two prospective witnesses – whether Tribunal failed to make inquiries about critical facts – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 91R(3), 424, 424AA, 4242AA(1), 424A, 424A(2A), 424A(3)(b), 424A(3)(ba), 425, 426, 426(2), 426(3), 429A

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) Art 1A(2)

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967)

Cases cited:

AAM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1143

AYX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 262 FCR 317; [2018] FCAFC 103

BOX16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 801

CZBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1023

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Maltsin (2005) 88 ALD 304; [2005] FCAFC 118

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 111 ALD 15; [2009] HCA 39

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLFX (2009) 238 CLR 507; [2009] HCA 31

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 73 ALD 1; [2003] HCA 30

SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 96 ALD 1; [2007] HCA 26

SZDFZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 168 FCR 1; [2008] FCA 390

SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235; [2013] FCAFC 71

SZUIJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1574

SZVBB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1414

VJAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 178

W360/01A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 124 FCR 449; [2002] FCAFC 211

Date of hearing: 15 February 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 91
Counsel for the Appellants: The appellants appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms K Morris of Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 2045 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BYN16

First Appellant

BZC16

Second Appellant

BZD16

Third Appellant

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read BYN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2020] FCA 834
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in BYN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves three appellants who sought a judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) affirming the refusal of their second application for a protection visa. The applicants argued that the AAT failed to properly consider their claims, did not request oral evidence from certain individuals, and did not comply with specific sections of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Additionally, they contended that the AAT erred in not telephoning two prospective witnesses and in not making inquiries about critical facts. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the applicants' judicial review application, a decision which the applicants now appeal to the Federal Court.

The primary legal issues the court had to address were whether the AAT failed to properly consider the applicants' claims, whether it erred in not requesting oral evidence, and whether it breached its obligations under sections 424AA and 424A of the Migration Act by not telephoning two prospective witnesses and failing to make inquiries about critical facts. The court had to examine the procedural fairness and correctness of the AAT's decision in light of the statutory framework governing migration law and judicial review.

The Federal Court, after reviewing the evidence and the submissions, found that the AAT had not erred in its handling of the applicants' claims. The court held that the inconsistencies in the applicants' statements were not sufficient to constitute information for the purposes of section 424A of the Act. It further found that the AAT's decision not to take oral evidence from the two witnesses was not legally unreasonable, as the Tribunal already had sufficient evidence from the written submissions provided by the witnesses. Additionally, the court held that the AAT was not obliged to make inquiries about the authenticity of documents or to verify statements made by the authors of those documents. The court concluded that the AAT had exercised its discretion fairly and in accordance with the law.

The appeal was dismissed, and the court ordered that the first and second appellants pay the first respondent's costs. This outcome reflects the court's determination that the AAT's decision was not legally flawed and that the applicants' grounds for appeal were not substantiated.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The first and second appellants pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

To address those grounds of appeal, it is necessary to briefly consider the procedural background to the appellants’ visa applications, the nature of the protection claims advanced by them, the reasons given by the Tribunal, in the second review application, for affirming the decision under review and the primary judge’s reasons for rejecting the appellants’ review grounds which are now the subject of appeal.BACKGROUND The appellants first applied for protection visas on 1 March 2010. In the submitted applications, only the first appellant claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution, or to be at risk of suffering serious harm, if returned to Bangladesh. The second and third appellants were listed as members of the family unit who did not make their own specific protection claims. The appellants’ protection visa application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 25 October 2010. That decision was affirmed by the (then) Refugee Review Tribunal on 18 February 2011. On 4 October 2012, the appellants lodged a second protection visa application following the decision of the Full Court in SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235; [2013] FCAFC 71. That decision confirmed that there was no basis for preventing a person from making a second protection visa application based on a criterion that did not form the basis of the previous unsuccessful application. The appellants’ second protection visa application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 15 December 2014. That decision was in turn affirmed on review by the Tribunal in a Statement of Decision and Reasons dated 3 July 2016. It is that decision by the Tribunal which was the subject of the unsuccessful judicial review application in the Circuit Court which is the subject of this appeal. The appellants, who were not legally represented in the Circuit Court, raised many and varied grounds challenging the conduct of the review by the Tribunal and its decision. The primary judge rejected all of those grounds and dismissed the application: BYN16 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2928 (Judgment). Before considering the Tribunal’s Reasons and the primary judge’s Judgment, it is necessary to briefly summarise the nature of the protection claims that were made in support of the appellants’ protection visa application. THE APPELLANTS’ CLAIMS There were two alternative criterion which applied to protection visas at the time of the appellants’ second visa application. The first criterion was that the applicant was a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister was satisfied Australia had protection obligations under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) (Refugees Convention), as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967) (Refugees Protocol): s 36(2)(a) of the Act. In simple terms, Australia had protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended in respect of persons who had a well-founded fear of persecution in their country of nationality or habitual residence for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The appellants’ first visa application was refused on the basis that they did not satisfy this criterion.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The primary judge found that the inconsistencies were not “information” for the purposes of s 424A of the Act: Judgment at [64]. That was because “previous statements the [first appellant] made which the Tribunal considered to be inconsistent with the claims the [first appellant] made before it” could not be characterised as being information which in its “terms” contained a “rejection, denial or undermining” of the appellants’ case. His Honour cited Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLFX (2009) 238 CLR 507; [2009] HCA 31 at [22] in support of the proposition that information which did not contain a “rejection, denial or undermining” of an applicant’s case was not information for the purposes of s 424A of the Act. Failure to take oral evidence by telephone from two witnesses This ground related to the Tribunal refusing or declining to telephone Mr DH and Mr YAS for the purpose of taking oral evidence from them. This ground coincides with the appellants’ third appeal ground. The primary judge rejected the appellants’ contention that it was legally unreasonable for it to refuse to take oral evidence over the telephone from Mr DH and Mr YAS. His Honour gave four reasons for why that was not unreasonable: first, the Tribunal already had the evidence that those witnesses proposed to give in the form of letters that they had provided; second, there was no evidence explaining why the two witnesses had failed to, or were not able to, attend the hearing as had been earlier foreshadowed; third, there was nothing to suggest that giving evidence over the telephone would have added weight to the evidence of the two witnesses; and fourth, the Tribunal was under no duty to take oral evidence from the witnesses with a view to “exploring inconsistencies between the matters it had identified between the letters [Mr DH and Mr YAS] had written and between those letters and claims the [first appellant] made”: Judgment at [69].Failure to make inquiries The appellants contended that the Tribunal failed to make inquiries about the authenticity of documents that were said to be “from BNP leaders from Australia”: see Judgment at [71]. This ground coincides with the appellants’ fourth appeal ground. The primary judge rejected this ground on two bases. The first was that the Tribunal had accepted the authenticity of the documents that the appellants had provided from persons who were said to hold positions with organisations associated with the BNP: Judgment at [71]. The second was that, to the extent that the appellants’ complaint was that the Tribunal should have made inquiries with the authors of the documents to “verify the statements made by the authors”, the primary judge found that “the Tribunal was under no obligation to make inquiries of [Mr DH and Mr YAS] or any other author of any document the [first appellant] applied for the purpose of verifying the matters asserted in the documents”: Judgment at [72].THE APPEAL

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellants, who were not legally represented in the Circuit Court, raised many and varied grounds challenging the conduct of the review by the Tribunal and its decision. The primary judge rejected all of those grounds and dismissed the application: BYN16 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2928 (Judgment). Before considering the Tribunal’s Reasons and the primary judge’s Judgment, it is necessary to briefly summarise the nature of the protection claims that were made in support of the appellants’ protection visa application. THE APPELLANTS’ CLAIMS There were two alternative criterion which applied to protection visas at the time of the appellants’ second visa application. The first criterion was that the applicant was a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister was satisfied Australia had protection obligations under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) (Refugees Convention), as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967) (Refugees Protocol): s 36(2)(a) of the Act. In simple terms, Australia had protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended in respect of persons who had a well-founded fear of persecution in their country of nationality or habitual residence for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The appellants’ first visa application was refused on the basis that they did not satisfy this criterion. The alternative criterion, known generally as the “complementary protection criterion”, was that the applicant was a non-citizen in respect of whom the Minister was satisfied Australia had protection obligations because the Minister had substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there was a real risk that the non-citizen would suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. This criterion was inserted into the Act after the appellants’ first unsuccessful visa application. Its insertion enabled the appellants to make a second protection visa application. In both the first and second protection visa applications which were lodged by the appellants, only the first appellant made substantive claims for protection. The second and third appellants applied for protection visas solely on the basis that they were members of the first appellant’s family unit. They did not make their own separate or independent claims for protection. As will be seen, this is an important consideration in relation to some of the appellants’ appeal grounds. The first appellant’s claims for protection and evidence were set out at some length by the Tribunal (Reasons at [4]-[86]) and summarised by the primary judge (Judgment at [4]-[8]). It is unnecessary to set out the claims in detail again.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the appellants' various grounds of appeal, including the AAT's consideration of claims, its handling of oral evidence, compliance with statutory provisions, the decision not to contact prospective witnesses, and the inquiry into critical facts. The court found that the AAT's handling of the claims and evidence was within its discretionary powers and did not constitute an error of law. Regarding the AAT's failure to request oral evidence, the court reasoned that the AAT had sufficient material before it and the absence of additional oral evidence did not prejudice the appellants' case. Concerning the compliance with sections 424AA and 424A of the Migration Act, the court determined that the information in question did not meet the statutory definition of 'information' that would trigger the AAT's duty to inform the appellants. The court also held that the AAT's decision not to telephone prospective witnesses was not legally unreasonable, given the evidence already available. Finally, the court concluded that the AAT had no obligation to make further inquiries into the authenticity of documents provided, as it was not required to verify the contents of such documents. The ratio decidendi of this case lies in the affirmation of the broad discretion afforded to the AAT in migration review proceedings and the limited scope of judicial review in such contexts. The court distinguished its approach from cases where the AAT's failure to consider material evidence or information would constitute a legally significant error.