GBS18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GBS18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1366

Appeal from: GBS18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 850
File number: NSD 625 of 2019
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 24 September 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing claims of jurisdictional error by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the appellant was refused a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs – where visa refusal was affirmed upon review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the Administrative Appeals Tribunal did not accept the appellant’s protection claims and evidence and did not find the appellant to be an honest or reliable witness – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal was found not to have misconstrued or misapplied s 426 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether adverse credibility findings by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal were illogical or unreasonable – whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal gave genuine consideration to the appellant’s wishes for nominated witnesses to be called to give evidence pursuant to s 426(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal exercised its discretion under s 426(3) of the Migration Act 1953 (Cth) – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 426, 426(2), 426(3), 476
Cases cited:

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496; [2016] FCAFC 146

CZBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1023

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN (2016) 69 AAR 210; [2016] FCA 516

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99; [2013] FCA 317

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Maltsin (2005) 88 ALD 304; [2005] FCAFC 118

SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253

SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 238 FCR 404; [2015] FCAFC 175

SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 233 FCR 451; [2015] FCA 1089

SZWCO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 51

Date of hearing: 22 November 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 73
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms U Okereke-Fisher
Solicitor for the Appellant: Christopher Levingston & Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 625 of 2019
BETWEEN:

GBS18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

WIGNEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 SEPTEMBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1366
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

GBS18, an Iraqi national, appealed against the Federal Circuit Court's decision affirming the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's (AAT) refusal to grant him a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa. The appellant argued that the Tribunal made jurisdictional errors by dismissing his claims without logical or probative reasoning and by failing to consider his request for certain witnesses to give evidence. The primary judge rejected these contentions and the appellant appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal's adverse credibility findings were illogical or unreasonable and whether the Tribunal properly considered the appellant's request for his nominated witnesses to give evidence under section 426 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court found that the Tribunal provided logical and rational reasons for its adverse credibility findings and that the appellant had not provided sufficient evidence to show that the Tribunal failed to properly consider his request for witnesses.

The court held that the Tribunal genuinely considered the appellant's request for witnesses and exercised its discretion under section 426(3) of the Act reasonably. The appellant did not provide a transcript of the Tribunal hearing or evidence from his migration agent to support his claims that the Tribunal failed to properly consider his request for witnesses. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was not illogical or unreasonable and that the appellant's grounds of appeal were without merit.

The appeal was dismissed and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. The court found that the Tribunal did not err in its consideration of the appellant's claims or in its exercise of discretion under section 426 of the Act. The appellant's appeal was unsuccessful and the Tribunal's decision to refuse him a Protection visa was affirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant raised essentially two grounds of appeal. The first ground was that the primary judge erred in rejecting his contention that the Tribunal’s dismissal of one of the factual claims that he had made in his visa application was not based on or supported by any logical or probative grounds or reasoning. The second ground was that the primary judge erred in rejecting his contention that the Tribunal failed to give real and genuine consideration to his request that the Tribunal obtain oral evidence from three nominated witnesses and that the Tribunal’s refusal to obtain evidence from all those witnesses was unreasonable. BACKGROUND It is unnecessary to give any detailed consideration to the procedural background to this matter given the narrowness of the grounds of appeal. The appellant arrived in Australia on 30 January 2016 on a visitor visa. He applied for a Protection visa on 13 March 2016. His Protection visa application was accompanied by a statutory declaration which addressed the factual basis of his claim that he was a person in respect of whom Australia has, or had, protection obligations for the purposes of s 36(2) of the Act. In summary, the appellant said that he was a business owner in Iraq in an area which was dominated by militias. He claimed that the militias demanded that he and other businesses in the area pay them protection money. The demands were said to amount to “masked bribery and legalised ransoms”, which he and the other businesses could not oppose because that would deprive them of the protections supposedly afforded by the militias. The appellant’s claimed fear of returning to Iraq, however, appeared to be based primarily on certain events that were said to have occurred in mid-2015 and early 2016, immediately before he travelled to Australia. He claimed that, in 2015, three soldiers, one of whom was a Sunni Muslim, were killed during an attempted robbery at a checkpoint. Following that incident, the appellant and a number of other business owners donated money to the families of the dead soldiers each month. That included payments to the family of the dead Sunni soldier. According to the appellant, sometime later, on 25 January 2016, three Shi’a militiamen came to his shop and criticised him for paying money to the family of the Sunni soldier. The appellant, and apparently the militiamen, were all Shi’a Muslims. The militiamen told the appellant that he had betrayed his people and had converted to become a Sunni and “hinted” that they would kill the appellant and turn his “family life into hell”. The appellant claimed that two days later, when he was driving home, a car chased him and fired “gunshots” at him. Fortunately, however, he managed to escape. At that point, the appellant apparently decided to sell everything and close his business. He travelled to Australia within days. Having described that incident, the appellant concluded his statutory declaration in the following terms:I am afraid from the armed militias and the governmental forces because they were blackmailing us all those years and we have lived under continuous threats. I cannot resort to the government for protection because it is weak and cannot provide any kind of protection. I also cannot move to any part of Iraq because it is impossible at the current situation and the deteriorating security situation in Iraq.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellant’s first ground of appeal is accordingly rejected. GROUND 2 – FAILURE OR A REFUSAL TO CALL EVIDENCE FROM WITNESSES There was no dispute that, in his response to the Tribunal’s hearing invitation, the appellant advised the Tribunal that it requested it to take oral evidence from three witnesses: two of the appellant’s brothers and his ex-brother in law. By reason of s 426(3) of the Act, the Tribunal was required to have regard to the appellant’s wishes in that regard, but was not required to obtain evidence, orally or otherwise, from the nominated witnesses. It is well settled that to satisfy the requirement in s 426(3) of the Act, the Tribunal must genuinely apply its mind to the contents of the notice and not merely “go through the motions”: Maltsin at [38]; CZBH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1023 at [44]. It must equally be accepted that, like other discretionary powers under the Act, the discretion to call or not call evidence from witnesses pursuant to s 426(3) of the Act must be exercised reasonably and according to the rules of reason and justice: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18 at [24], [26], [63] and [65]. The relevant questions, in this case, therefore, are whether the Tribunal gave genuine consideration to the appellant’s wishes in relation to the calling of evidence from his three nominated witnesses and whether it ultimately exercised its discretion in relation to the calling of evidence reasonably. The only indication of what transpired in relation to the calling of evidence from the appellant’s nominated witnesses is the statements made in that regard by the Tribunal in its reasons. The appellant did not tender the transcript of the Tribunal hearing in the court below. Nor did he adduce any evidence himself about, for example, why it appears that he eventually decided not to ask the Tribunal to call evidence from two of the three witnesses he had initially nominated, or what the evidence of those witnesses would have been. It should also be noted, in this context, that the appellant was represented by a migration agent at the hearing. The appellant did not adduce any evidence from the migration agent in the court below concerning the appellant’s apparent decision only to have the Tribunal call evidence from one of the witnesses. It would appear from the Tribunal’s reasons that there were two relevant exchanges between the Tribunal and the appellant concerning his request for the Tribunal to call evidence from his three nominated witnesses. The first exchange appeared to occur towards the beginning of the hearing. The Tribunal’s reasons recount that exchange as follows (Reasons at [14]):The [appellant] was advised that he had presented three telephone-contactable witnesses outlined and was asked what evidence he wanted them to give. He claimed that two were brothers and one an ex-brother in law. They knew everything about him and his story. It was put to him that it was his right to call witnesses but if they were all just going to say the one thing there wasn’t much point in calling all three. He claimed that it was up to the Tribunal and it was put to him that a decision on who to call would be made later.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant’s challenge to the Tribunal’s decision in his Circuit Court application was based on three grounds. The primary judge rejected all three grounds: GBS18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 850 (Judgment). It is, however, only necessary to consider the primary judge’s findings in relation to the two grounds which are the subject of this appeal. The first ground (which was ground 3 in the amended application filed in the Circuit Court) concerned the Tribunal’s rejection of the appellant’s claim that the militias demanded money from him for protection. The Tribunal’s rejection of that claim was said to expose jurisdictional error because it was said to be “based on adverse findings of fact founded upon credibility, where the adverse findings as to credibility were founded simply upon an assessment as to whether the [a]ppellant is to be believed or disbelieved.” The primary judge rejected that contention. His Honour interpreted the ground as amounting to a claim of legal unreasonableness and found, in that context, that the Tribunal “provided logical and rational reasons in support of the adverse credibility findings” and that the adverse credibility findings were not “based on a generic lack of credibility by the [appellant], but rather reflected a reasoned analysis which was logical and rational in respect of the [appellant’s] claims concerning extortion …”: Judgment at [31]. The second ground (which was ground 4 in the amended application) was that the Tribunal had failed to take into account the appellant’s request that the Tribunal call evidence from the appellant’s nominated witnesses, or declined to comply with the appellant’s “wishes” in that regard. That was said to have been unreasonable and to have led to a decision which was “plainly unjust and lacking an evident and intelligent justification.” The primary judge rejected those contentions. His Honour found that it was apparent from the Tribunal’s reasons that the appellant “did not press the Tribunal to call the three witnesses the subject of the response to hearing invitation, and that the Tribunal gave real and genuine consideration to the request and explored with the [appellant] the nature of the evidence that they may adduce and in fact, revisited the matter with the [appellant], and that the [appellant] identified he wished one brother to be called”: Judgment at [33]. The primary judge also noted that the appellant did not suggest, in his post-hearing submissions, that further evidence should have been called from the other two witnesses: Judgment at [34].GROUNDS OF APPEAL AND SUBMISSIONS There were two grounds of appeal. The first related to the primary judge’s rejection of the challenge to the Tribunal’s finding concerning the so-called “[e]xtortion [c]laim”. The second related to the primary judge’s rejection of the appellant’s contention that the Tribunal failed to have regard to his request to call his nominated witnesses, or that the Tribunal’s rejection of that request was unreasonable.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established