SCAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SCAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668

MIGRATION – submission that reasons of decision published by the Refugee Review Tribunal demonstrate actual bias rejected – application dismissed.

Ratumaiwai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 311 cited
Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 162 ALR 1 cited
R v Hickman;  ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 referred to
NACL v Refugee Tribunal and Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 643 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 178 ALR 421 applied
Sun Zhan Qui v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 81 FCR 71 referred to
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs I[1996] FCA 902 referred to
re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs;  ex parte ‘A’ [2001] HCA 77; 185 ALR 491 referred to
Yit v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 885 followed
SAAG v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 547 referred to
Gooliah v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (1967) 63 DLR (2d) 224 referred to
SBAN v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 591 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs;  Ex Parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 cited

SCAA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

S 50 OF 2002

von DOUSSA J
ADELAIDE
30 MAY 2002


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 50 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

SCAA
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

von DOUSSA J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 MAY 2002

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Application dismissed.

2.Applicant to pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S 50 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

SCAA
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

von DOUSSA J

DATE:

30 MAY 2002

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1993 (Cth) to set aside a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 16 January 2002 which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant a protection visa to the applicant. 

    Factual Background

  2. The applicant is a Stateless person, formerly resident in Gaza in the Occupied Territories.  He arrived in Australia illegally on 6 June 2001.  On 1 July 2001 he lodged an application for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).  Section 36(2) of the Act relevantly provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant is a non-citizen in Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol as those expressions are defined in s 5(1) of the Act.  Under…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 668
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court involved the Stateless applicant, formerly resident in Gaza in the Occupied Territories, who sought a review of a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision by a delegate of the respondent not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The applicant had arrived in Australia illegally and applied for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958. The key legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal had committed a jurisdictional error by failing to properly address a critical issue raised on the material before it, whether the Tribunal had failed to apply the law properly to the facts in determining whether the applicant’s fear of persecution was well founded, and whether the Tribunal had wrongly assumed its jurisdiction by undertaking its task with actual bias. The court considered each of these grounds in turn and found that the Tribunal’s decision was not subject to review under the statutory regime. The court concluded that the Tribunal’s decision was final and conclusive and could not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court. The court dismissed the application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application dismissed.

2. Applicant to pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1993 (Cth) to set aside a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 16 January 2002 which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant a protection visa to the applicant. Factual Background The applicant is a Stateless person, formerly resident in Gaza in the Occupied Territories. He arrived in Australia illegally on 6 June 2001. On 1 July 2001 he lodged an application for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (the Act). Section 36(2) of the Act relevantly provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant is a non-citizen in Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol as those expressions are defined in s 5(1) of the Act. Under the Refugees Convention and the Refugees Protocol, subject to certain qualifications including the qualification in Article 1D, Australia has protection obligations to a person who is a refugee as defined in Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention, namely a person who:“… owing to well founded fear of being persecuted by reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” The applicant was interviewed by an officer of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs after his arrival in Australia, before he lodged his application for a protection visa. He gave a lengthy account of his background and of the reasons why he claimed to be a refugee. With his visa application the applicant provided a further statement which repeated the information earlier given. That information was again repeated in evidence by the applicant before the Tribunal. The applicant has throughout given a generally consistent account of his background and of the factual basis upon which his claim to refugee status is made. In summary, the applicant said that he was born in Khan Younis in Palestine in 1972. He received thirteen years education until 1991. From 1992 to 1995 he worked as a labourer in Israel. From 1996 to 1998 he was a soldier with the Palestinian Authority and from 1999 up until the end of October 1999, he was again a labourer in Israel. He married in 1995. His wife is resident in Gaza and is also a Palestinian. His parents and thirteen brothers and sisters currently reside in Palestine. The applicant left Palestine on 25 January 2001, and travelled to Australia via Egypt, Malaysia and Indonesia. He said initially that he travelled on a genuine Palestinian Authority passport which was thrown away at the direction of a smuggler who arranged for his journey from Indonesia to Australia. In later communications with the Department and the Tribunal, questions arose as to the genuineness of his passport, which in turn caused the Tribunal to have some concerns about the applicant’s credibility. However those concerns do not appear to have been material to the Tribunal’s decision.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It will be apparent from the foregoing that the applicant’s claim that he had a well founded fear of persecution on account of a perceived political opinion failed on credibility grounds. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had been threatened in the manner alleged by Hamas, and was not satisfied that the Palestinian Authority had any continuing suspicion that the applicant was an Israeli collaborator. In these circumstances, there was at the time of the decision no objective basis for any subjective fear of persecution held by the applicant, were he to return to Gaza. Submissions on review and decision thereon The application to this Court is subject to the statutory regime under Part 8 of the Act which came into force on 2 October 2001. The decision under challenge is a privative clause decision within the meaning of s 474 of the Act. Section 474(1) provides that:“(1) A privative clause decision:(a)is final and conclusive; and(b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.” The applicant nevertheless contended that the Tribunal’s decision is reviewable by this Court and should be set aside because the Tribunal made jurisdictional error by failing to properly address a critical issue raised on the material before it (the first ground); and in failing to apply the law properly to the facts before it in determining whether the applicant’s fear of persecution was well founded (the second ground); and on the ground that the Tribunal had wrongly assumed its jurisdiction by undertaking its task with actual bias (the third ground). It is contended that each of these grounds falls outside the scope of s 474(1). I deal with the merits of each of these grounds in turn.Ground 1 Counsel contended that the Tribunal fell into error by looking at the events outlined by the applicant in a piecemeal fashion, and in doing so failed to give proper consideration to the significance of the fact that the applicant had been a deserter from his role as a soldier in the Palestinian Authority. Counsel argued that there may have been greater significance to the desertion than the Tribunal attributed to that event. Counsel posed by way of possibility that the applicant may have been perceived by the Palestinian Authority as a conscientious objector who held political opinions adverse to its cause. Counsel conceded that there was no evidence given by the applicant to suggest this, but contended that the Tribunal should have looked behind the story given by the applicant to explore whether the possibility of other reasons or consequences of his desertion could give rise to a real chance of persecution in the event that the applicant returned to Gaza. When counsel was asked what further enquiries it was suggested the Tribunal should have made, counsel indicated that the Tribunal should have explored the point in greater depth with the applicant in the course of the Tribunal hearing.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established