Gin & Hing (No 4)
[2024] FedCFamC1A 247
•19 December 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Gin & Hing (No 4) [2024] FedCFamC1A 247
Appeal from: Gin & Hing (No 11) [2024] FedCFamC1F 365 Appeal number: NAA 157 of 2024 File number: MLC 4528 of 2010 Judgment of: AUSTIN, HARPER & STRUM JJ Date of judgment: 19 December 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – Where the appellant appeals from a costs order made against him arising from parenting proceedings – Where the respondent conceded the appeal in part – Where the remaining grounds allege bias and errors in reasons – No bias or errors identified – Application in an appeal to adduce further evidence – Where the material the appellant sought to adduce was not relevant to the grounds of appeal – Application dismissed – Appeal allowed in part – Respondent’s application for costs remitted for rehearing – Costs certificates granted. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt VII, ss 11K, 60CC, 117
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules2021 (Cth) rr 12.13, 12.17
Cases cited: Bruce & Bruce (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC1A 33
Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577; [2006] HCA 55
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63
Fitzgerald (as child representative for A (Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania)) & Fish (2005) 33 Fam LR 123; [2005] FamCA 158
Gin & Hing (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC1A 124
Gin & Hing (No 8) [2023] FedCFamC1F 954
Gin & Hing (No 9) [2024] FedCFamC1F 29
Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513; [1979] HCA 63
Harris and Harris (1991) FLC 92-254; [1991] FamCA 124
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488; [2000] HCA 48
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 17
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v B (2004) 219 CLR 365; [2004] HCA 20
NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 214 ALR 264; [2004] FCAFC 328
New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118; [2013] HCA 26
Paysen & Laukien (2020) FLC 93-960; [2020] FamCAFC 101
Prantage & Prantage (Costs) [2014] FamCA 850
Reid v Commercial Club (Albury) Ltd [2014] NSWCA 98
Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128; [2016] NSWCA 88
Saklani & Valder (2023) 68 Fam LR 237; [2023] FedCFamC1A 163
SCAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668
Shipton & Garwood (2024) FLC 94-189; [2024] FedCFamC1A 83
Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568; [1989] HCA 44
Number of paragraphs: 46 Date of hearing: 12 December 2024 Place: Heard in Melbourne, delivered in Newcastle The Appellant: Litigant in person Counsel for the Respondent: Dr Smith Solicitor for the Respondent: Clancy & Triado ORDERS
NAA 157 of 2024
MLC 4528 of 2010FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MR GIN
Appellant
AND: MS HING
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
AUSTIN, HARPER & STRUM JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
19 DECEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Appeal NAA 157 of 2024 be allowed in part.
2.Orders 1 and 2 made by the primary judge on 31 May 2024 be set aside.
3.The respondent’s application for the costs of proceedings MLC 4528 of 2010 from 8 May 2019 to 22 November 2023, being the subject of Orders 1 and 2 made on 31 May 2024, be remitted for rehearing together with the rehearing to take place pursuant to Order 4 made on 7 August 2024 in appeal NAA 353 of 2023.
4.The appeal be otherwise dismissed.
5.The Application in an Appeal filed on 14 November 2024 be dismissed.
6.The appellant’s oral application to rely upon an affidavit sworn or affirmed on 11 December 2024 be dismissed.
7.The respondent be granted:
(a)a costs certificate pursuant to s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the respondent in respect of the costs incurred by her in the appeal; and
(b)a costs certificate pursuant to s 8 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act1981 (Cth) being a certificate that, in the opinion of the Court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise payments under that Act to the respondent in respect of the costs incurred by her in relation to the rehearing pursuant to Order 3 above.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonyms Gin & Hing have been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
AUSTIN, HARPER & STRUM JJ:
This is an appeal from orders of a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) awarding costs against the appellant father (“appellant”) who was the respondent in parenting proceedings under Pt VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). The respondent to the appeal is the mother (“respondent”).
The costs orders appealed from are as follows:
1.The [appellant] must pay the [respondent’s] costs of and incidental to this proceeding from 8 May 2019 to 22 November 2023.
2.The costs assessed in order one above must be assessed by a registrar on a party/party basis such assessment to be completed by 29 July 2024.
3.The [respondent’s] costs of and incidental to the [appellant’s] unsuccessful stay application must be assessed by a registrar on a party/party basis and once assessed, paid by the [appellant] within 30 days of the registrar assessing those party/party costs.
4.The [appellant’s] application in a proceeding dated 20 May 2024 is dismissed.
5.The [appellant] must pay the [respondent’s] costs of $3,000 of and incidental to the [appellant’s] 20 May 2024 application.
These orders arise from three separate judgments delivered and published together on 31 May 2024, following a hearing on 17 May 2024: Orders 1 and 2 concerning the costs of the trial leading to the final judgment in the parenting proceedings; Order 3 concerning the appellant’s failed application for a stay pending his appeal from the final judgment; and Orders 4 and 5 dismissing with costs an application made by the appellant on 20 May 2024 seeking leave to rely upon further submissions and another affidavit after the hearing on costs had been concluded on 17 May 2024 (“application to reopen”). We will refer to these judgments collectively as the “costs judgments”.
BACKGROUND
The parties were married in 2009 and separated either in March or April 2010. There is one child of the relationship.
Orders 1 and 2 flow from the delivery of the final judgment on 22 November 2023 (Gin & Hing (No 8) [2023] FedCFamC1F 954). The trial leading to the final judgment ran from 8 May 2019 to 22 November 2023, over more than four years and 30 hearing days, and concerned the parenting orders to be made for the child of the relationship.
The appellant appealed the final judgment. On 7 August 2024, after the costs judgments had been delivered, the Full Court allowed the appeal on the single ground that the learned primary judge failed to properly consider s 60CC(3)(d) of the Act and erred in acting upon the views of the child expressed as a 10 year old when she had become a teenager by the time the final judgment was delivered (Gin & Hing (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC1A 124 (“Gin & Hing (No 3)”) at [56]–[59]). However, it is relevant to note that the Full Court at [61] also expressed the view that the primary judge was obliged to take steps to confine cross examination and set aside sufficient hearing time to bring the matter to finality in a much shorter time frame than 30 days over four years.
THE APPEAL
Section 117 governs the award of costs in proceedings under the Act. An award of costs involves an exercise of judicial discretion. It is well-settled that appeals from discretionary judgments must establish the type of error identified by the High Court in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504–505, such as where the primary judge acts upon a wrong principle, takes account of extraneous or irrelevant matters, mistakes the facts, or does not take into account some material consideration or reaches a plainly unreasonable or unjust outcome. It is not enough that the appellate court may have come to a different decision on the same facts; rather it must be “well satisfied that the primary judge was plainly wrong” and did not properly exercise the relevant judicial discretion (Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513 at 519).
Costs orders by a trial judge are peculiarly an exercise of their discretion with which an appellate court will interfere only in rare cases, unless the result is plainly unjust or wrong (Paysen & Laukien (2020) FLC 93-960 at [32]; Harris and Harris (1991) FLC 92-254 at 78,711).
When exercising the discretion to award costs against a party, the Court must have regard to the factors set out in s 117(2A) of the Act. It is well settled that no one factor in s 117(2A) has priority, nor must more than one factor be satisfied; rather, any one factor may be sufficient (Prantage & Prantage (Costs) [2014] FamCA 850 at [12]; Fitzgerald (as child representative for A (Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania)) & Fish (2005) 33 Fam LR 123 at [41]).
The appellant’s Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 12 September 2024 identified 11 grounds of appeal. However, the respondent in her written submissions, by reason of the Full Court decision in Gin & Hing (No 3), conceded this appeal insofar as it related to the costs judgment leading to Orders 1 and 2. These orders were based upon the primary judge’s conclusions that the appellant had engaged in conduct which unnecessarily extended the hearing, such as protracted cross examination of the expert witness Ms N and manipulating translations of transcripts (s 117(2A)(c) of the Act) and had been wholly unsuccessful in the final judgment (s 117(2A)(e)).
We agree that, the final judgment having been set aside and the costs brought about by the length of the trial not being entirely attributable to the appellant, the primary judge’s basis for Orders 1 and 2 regarding the costs of the proceedings between 8 May 2019 and 22 November 2023 has been removed or at least brought seriously into question. Accordingly, the appeal should be allowed in respect of those orders. As a result, it is unnecessary to address Grounds 1, 2, 10(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g). The remaining grounds of appeal requiring consideration are Grounds 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11.
The orders remaining subject to appeal are Orders 3, 4 and 5. As mentioned, Order 3 concerns the costs of the appellant’s unsuccessful application for a stay pending appeal. The primary judge delivered separate reasons for refusing the appellant’s application for the stay (Gin & Hing (No 9) [2024] FedCFamC1F 29). There was no appeal from this judgment.
Order 5 flows from Order 4. Although there was some irregularity in the manner in which the appellant sought to bring his application to reopen to the attention of the primary judge, the respondent made submissions about it and sought its summary dismissal. As noted, the primary judge dealt with the application to reopen and made Orders 4 and 5 dismissing it with costs.
Application in an Appeal
On 14 November 2024 the appellant filed an Application in an Appeal which sought leave to rely upon material produced on subpoena by the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (“AHPRA”) in relation to Ms N and leave to adduce the transcript of the hearing of the appellant’s stay application before the primary judge. The appellant also sought leave to rely upon an additional 20 pages of submissions.
Since the present appeal is conceded in relation to Orders 1 and 2 and will be allowed in relation to those orders, the material produced by AHPRA can have no relevance to Grounds 3, 4, 5, 6 and 11, nor save Grounds 7, 8 and 9 which, as will be explained, are incompetent. The proposed additional submissions engaged in an extensive analysis of the conduct of the primary judge at the hearing of the appellant’s stay application on 30 January 2024 by reference to the transcript, claiming for example the primary judge was “self-righteous”, blind to problems with Ms N and in some sort of collusive relationship with senior counsel or the respondent. Again, this material is irrelevant.
The appellant laboured the submission that, since the final judgment was set aside in Gin & Hing (No 3), his stay application should have succeeded, so he should not have been ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of that failed application. This argument is misconceived. A judgment of a superior court of record is correct and valid unless and until set aside on appeal or quashed by prerogative writ (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v B (2004) 219 CLR 365 at 393; New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118 at [19], [32]–[33], [38], [41], [56]–[57]). The appellant concedes that his stay application was wholly unsuccessful and the stay judgment was not the subject of any appeal. The costs judgment resulting from the stay judgment and the subject of this appeal, is a separate judgment, after a different hearing. This appeal is not a vehicle to mount some oblique challenge to the earlier stay judgment. Therefore, any problems with the evidence of Ms N and whatever may have happened at the hearing of the stay application can have no relevance to any grounds of appeal concerning Orders 3, 4 or 5.
The Application in an Appeal will be dismissed.
On 11 December 2024, the day before the hearing of the appeal, the appellant affirmed or swore a further affidavit. At the hearing of the appeal he made an oral application to rely upon the affidavit. The respondent opposed this. The affidavit was not filed in accordance with any direction of the Court. It contained nothing of any relevance to the remaining issues in the appeal. The appellant conceded the proposed evidence did not relate to the identification of any error raised by his grounds of appeal.
Leave to rely upon the affidavit will be refused.
Ground 5 – The trial judge was biased (actual and/or apprehended) against the appellant and in favour of the respondent
Grounds of appeal alleging bias strike at the validity and acceptability of the trial and its outcome; thus, they must be dealt with first (Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577 at 581, 611–612, 634; Royal Guardian Mortgage Management Pty Ltd v Nguyen (2016) 332 ALR 128 at [9]–[10]).
Apart from the wording of Ground 5 itself, the relevant part of the appellant’s Summary of Argument concerning allegations of bias is limited to the following paragraphs:
19.An informed lay member of the public would reasonably conclude that the trial judge was primarily motivated to make a cost order against the [appellant] and ignored evidence, relevant information, duties and signs that otherwise suggest that he should not do so, and was biased against the [appellant].
20.An informed lay member of the public would reasonably view that the trial judge had failed to perform his duties to the Australian government and public in this case, especially after evidence was presented to His Honour regarding the suspension.
21.The attitude and view of the trial judge suggest actual bias by the outcome of making the [appellant] pay for the [respondent’s] costs of trial that involved inordinate delay and the wrong outcome due to wrong application of the law, and in ignoring and belittling the Family Law Act and ignoring key information that required the Court to investigate to ensure the Family Law Act was respected, applied and complied with.
22.The outcome, and the timing of the outcome (cost order despite appeal on foot) in itself suggest bias and use of power in an abusive and punitive way against a parent who was a Respondent and who opposed change due to undermining and parental alienation, whereby the Court had relied on family reporter evidence when it was not permitted to do so by law.
These submissions and the formulation of Ground 5 show the appellant claims both actual and apprehended bias against him on the part of the primary judge, although his submissions did not keep them clearly separate. The appellant made no oral submissions in support of Ground 5.
We observe that the appellant’s initial arguments under this ground suggested it was primarily directed to Orders 1 and 2 rather than the remaining orders appealed from. To that extent, Ground 5 became otiose by the respondent conceding the appeal in relation to those orders. However, paragraph 22 asserts bias in relation to the costs judgments, so it is necessary to address Ground 5.
Actual bias focuses on the subjective state of mind of the decision-maker. It exists where the decision-maker has a closed mind which is not open to persuasion; it may be shown where the decision-maker has acted with a sufficient degree of partisanship or hostility towards one party (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [36], [72]–[73], [111], [185]–[187]). A finding of actual bias is a grave matter and requires that an allegation of actual bias must be distinctly made and clearly proved on cogent evidence and no finding of actual bias should be lightly made, even if the relevant bias is subconscious, provided it is real (Reid v Commercial Club (Albury) Ltd [2014] NSWCA 98 at [68], [73]; Bruce & Bruce (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC1A 33 at [143], [144]).
An apprehension of bias moves the focus from the subjective state of mind of the decision-maker to the putative objective perception of a reasonably informed lay observer. The principles are well-known. The complainant must identify what it is said that might lead a judge to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits; and articulate the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits (Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at [11]; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 (“Ebner”) at [8]). An apprehension must be real and not a remote possibility (Ebner at [7]) and it must be based on an inference or inferences from proven facts not mere speculation (Saklani & Valder (2023) 68 Fam LR 237 at [225]).
The basis for any finding of bias will generally lie in the record of the conduct of the decision-maker at the relevant hearing or in the reasons for judgment or both. However, it has long been recognised that it will be a rare and exceptional case where actual bias can be demonstrated solely from the published reasons for decision, although hostile conduct during a hearing in combination with the reasons for judgment may support an inference of actual bias or raise an apprehension of bias (Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 (“Vakauta”) at 572–574; SCAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668 at [38]; NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 214 ALR 264 at [117], [120] per Allsop CJ; Shipton & Garwood (2024) FLC 94-189 (“Shipton”) at [73]–[77]).
The appropriate time to raise objections of bias is at the hearing itself, at the time of the impugned conduct of the judge, especially where a party has legal representation, rather than wait until the contents of the judgment are known (Vakauta at 572–574). A failure to complain of bias at the time of hearing, or shortly thereafter, and a failure to explain a delay in doing so, waives a complainant’s right to raise grounds of bias or to claim a revival of allegedly biased conduct within the reasons for judgment (Shipton at [61]–[62], [67]–[68] per the Full Court).
Some of the appellant’s submissions suggested the primary judge betrayed a hostile attitude towards him and failed to take account of important information about Ms N. The appellant also pointed to the timing of the costs judgments and its outcome as demonstrating bias.
The appellant did not refer to the conduct of the costs hearing on 17 May 2024 in support of his claims of bias. He provided no cogent evidence of bias, such as an entrenched hostile attitude on the part of the primary judge, infecting Orders 3, 4 or 5. We do not accept any inference of bias appears from the costs judgments themselves.
The timing of the costs judgments cannot demonstrate bias. The Court is empowered to award costs on its own initiative, upon application at any stage of proceedings or within 28 days of delivery of final judgment (r 12.13 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules2021 (Cth) (“Rules”)).
By the date of the costs hearing the appellant was well acquainted with the procedure of seeking the primary judge’s recusal for alleged bias, having made such application during the trial (recorded at [19] of the costs judgment). The appellant was represented by counsel at the hearing of his stay application and no reference to bias, actual or apprehended, was made then. More to the point, the appellant was also represented at the costs hearing, and again no application seeking recusal of the primary judge was made prior to, during or after that hearing.
In short, the appellant did not explain how any of the matters to which he points, including the timing of the costs hearing and the ensuing judgments, support a conclusion that the primary judge’s mind was not open to persuasion, nor identify what might lead the judge to have based his costs decision other than on its legal and factual merits, in respect of the stay application or the application to reopen.
Ground 5 fails.
Ground 3 – Stay application
This ground challenges Order 3, being the costs order resulting from the appellant’s failed stay application. The ground as formulated asserts the primary judge’s refusal of a stay was “incorrect and/or negligent”. As mentioned above at [16], the appellant was convinced the stay judgment was “unjust” because the final judgment was set aside on appeal; thus, he argued, his stay application should have succeeded and the costs order should never have been made against him. The appellant asserted various reasons why the primary judge’s decision on the stay application was open to criticism. We have already explained that these criticisms are irrelevant to the costs order because the stay judgment was never appealed and the ensuing costs judgment was entirely separate, based upon a separate exercise of discretion. The appellant does not identify any error in the relevant part of the costs judgment leading to Order 3. The appellant was wholly unsuccessful in seeking a stay (s 117(2A)(e)) which is sufficient basis for Order 3.
Ground 3 fails.
Grounds 4 and 6 – Costs of application to reopen
These grounds relate to the order for the appellant to pay the costs of the respondent of his application sent to the primary judge on 20 May 2024, fixed in the amount of $3,000. They make reference to s 11K of the Act and, yet again, an assertion about the suspension of the single expert Ms N, and the timing of the costs judgment being delivered before the appeal was determined.
The primary judge recorded the background to Orders 4 and 5 as follows:
39. Without leave, on 20 May 2024 the [appellant] sent an email to registry staff (not to my associate) together with –
(a) an unissued application in a proceeding for “leave to file and rely on the amended and second affidavit on 20 May 2024 and the additional submissions filed 20 May 2024 with respect to the [respondent’s] costs application” (his words); and
(b) an affidavit received by the registry at 9.49am on 20 May 2024 being the [appellant’s] most recent affidavit and exhibits thereto.
He continued at [42]:
… I am not bound to accept [the appellant’s] latest rash of submissions and affidavits. He filed those without leave. No order was made permitting him to file an application in a proceeding on 20 May 2024 or a further affidavit, this one made on 20 May 2024. The costs debate concluded on 17 May. All relevant affidavits and submissions had been filed and served prior to 17 May. Somehow and for some reason the [appellant] took it upon himself to unilaterally prepare court documents after I announced that I would consider my decision. Such an approach was entirely consistent with the shambolic and chaotic manner in which he conducted the trial itself. It must not be overlooked that he has applied to the full court for leave to adduce new evidence that was not adduced before me.
It is evident that the primary judge had regard to the conduct of the appellant in ordering these costs (s 117(2A)(c)). This is a sufficient basis for the order. It is open to the Court to make an order for costs in a fixed amount under r 12.17(1) of the Rules. Rule 12.17(3) provides that in fixing an amount of costs the Court may have regard to the reasonableness of a party’s behaviour in the proceedings. The appellant did not argue the quantum was unreasonable or excessive.
While the primary judge did not make specific reference to the Rules, it is tolerably clear he did not consider the conduct of the appellant reasonable in applying to reopen the evidence in the costs hearing.
The matters identified in Grounds 4 and 6 fail to demonstrate any error in the reasoning of the primary judge supporting Orders 4 and 5. Section 11K and the material relating to Ms N bear no relation to his reasons for making the costs order in Order 5.
Grounds 4 and 6 fail.
Grounds 7, 8 and 9
Grounds 7, 8 and 9 raise discrete problems and can be dealt with briefly. They relate to the expert witness Ms N. It was common ground in this appeal that after final judgment was reserved and before it was delivered on 22 November 2023, information came to light that Ms N had been the subject of disciplinary proceedings before the Psychology Notification Committee which resulted in her suspension from practice.
Many of the appellant’s submissions, together with Grounds 7, 8 and 9, fixated on Ms N directly. Those grounds assert Ms N has lost an immunity from being sued for damages, seek a refund of the fees paid to her and assert that she should be liable to pay legal costs of the parties. The appellant then seeks orders in this appeal reflecting the terms of these grounds. Such proposed orders and the grounds relating to them are incompetent. Ms N is not a party to this appeal, and this is not the appropriate forum in which to seek relief against her. The appellant’s complaints about Ms N do not arise from the costs judgments supporting Orders 3, 4 or 5, do not identify any error in those costs judgments and orders 7, 8 and 9 sought on appeal could not conceivably be made by this Court. This part of the appeal also must be dismissed.
Ground 11
The appellant claims the costs orders are manifestly unjust. He did not explain either in writing or orally why the costs orders for the failed stay application and attempt to reopen were manifestly unjust. Ground 11 fails.
CONCLUSION
The appeal will be allowed in part, but otherwise dismissed. Orders 1 and 2 made by the primary judge are set aside. Orders 3, 4 and 5 are undisturbed. The costs application the subject of Orders 1 and 2 is remitted for rehearing by a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) other than the primary judge in conjunction with the parenting proceedings remitted for rehearing in accordance with Order 4 made on 7 August 2024 in appeal NAA 353 of 2023.
I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justices Austin, Harper & Strum. Associate:
Dated: 19 December 2024
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