Saklani & Valder

Case [2023] FedCFamC1A 163


FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Saklani & Valder [2023] FedCFamC1A 163

Appeal from: Valder & Saklani(No 3) [2023] FedCFamC1F 98
Appeal number(s): NAA 67 of 2023
File number(s): CAC 2098 of 2016
Judgment of: ALDRIDGE, JARRETT & STRUM JJ
Date of judgment: 22 September 2023
Catchwords:

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – BANKRUPTCY – Where the primary judge set aside property settlement orders made by consent between the appellant and the cross-appellant – Where an order was made in the Supreme Court of New South Wales for equitable compensation to be paid by the cross-appellant to the first respondent – Where the cross-appellant became bankrupt on his own petition – Where the first respondent was a creditor to the bankrupt estate of the cross-appellant – Where the first respondent was successful in her claims under s 79A and s 106B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) before the primary judge – Where the primary judge ordered that the first respondent should be paid her equitable compensation from the sale of the land – Where the remaining assets of the appellant and cross-appellant were to be divided as agreed between them – Where the appellant contends that the primary judge erred in ordering the first respondent be paid her equitable compensation before the property is divided between the appellant and cross-appellant – Whether the orders made were just and equitable – Adequacy of reasons – Error of law – Challenges to weight – Where an order of the primary judge is amended by the Full Court to avoid double payment – Where there is no opposition by the parties to that order being amended – Otherwise, no error established – Appeal dismissed – Appellant and cross-appellant to pay the costs of the first respondent in a fixed sum.

FAMILY LAW – CROSS-APPEAL – BANKRUPTCY – Where the cross-appellant contends the primary judge erred by treating the land as divisible property – Whether the first respondent would have been able to recover her debt under the original consent orders – Application of s 75(2)(ha) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Costs order – Procedural fairness – Error of law – Whether the cross-appellant’s discharge from bankruptcy released him from any claims of the first respondent – Where the first respondent remained a claimant with a right to prove in the estate as a creditor – No error established – Cross-appeal dismissed – Cross-appellant and appellant to pay the costs of the first respondent in a fixed sum.

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – APPLICATION IN AN APPEAL – RECUSAL – Where the cross-appellant sought for the disqualification of each member of the Full Court – Where the cross-appellant filed this application after the appeal was heard – Apprehended bias – Separate reasons provided by each judge – Where the relevant test is well established by Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 – Where the test is not satisfied – Application…

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AGLC
Saklani & Valder [2023] FedCFamC1A 163
Case
[2023] FedCFamC1A 163
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the appellant, Ms Saklani, and the cross-appellant, Mr B Saklani, appealed against the decision of the primary judge, which set aside property settlement orders made by consent. The first respondent, Ms Valder, was successful in her claims under sections 79A and 106B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) before the primary judge. The primary judge ordered that the first respondent should be paid her equitable compensation from the sale of the land. The remaining assets of the appellant and cross-appellant were to be divided as agreed between them. The appellant contended that the primary judge erred in ordering the first respondent to be paid her equitable compensation before the property was divided between the appellant and cross-appellant.

The court had to determine whether the orders made were just and equitable, whether there was an error of law, and whether the challenges to weight were valid. The Full Court amended the order of the primary judge to avoid double payment and there was no opposition by the parties to that order being amended. Otherwise, no error was established. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant and cross-appellant were to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal and cross-appeal fixed in the sum of $13,923.51 within 28 days. The cross-appellant was to pay the first respondent's costs of the Application in an Appeal fixed in the sum of $1,200 within 28 days.

The cross-appellant contended that the primary judge erred by treating the land as divisible property and whether the first respondent would have been able to recover her debt under the original consent orders. The application of section 75(2)(ha) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) was also considered. The court held that no error was established and the cross-appeal was dismissed. The cross-appellant and appellant were to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal and cross-appeal fixed in the sum of $13,923.51 within 28 days.

The cross-appellant also sought for the disqualification of each member of the Full Court on the basis of apprehended bias. The application was filed after the appeal was heard and the court held that the test for recusal was not satisfied. The application was dismissed, and the cross-appellant was to pay the first respondent's costs of the Application in an Appeal fixed in the sum of $1,200 within 28 days.

Orders

Orders of the court

NAA 67 of 2023

CAC 2098 of 2016

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTION

BETWEEN:

MS SAKLANI

Appellant/Second Cross-Respondent

AND:

MS VALDER

First Respondent/First Cross-Respondent

MR B SAKLANI

Second Respondent/Cross-appellant

MR C SAKLANI (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent/Third Cross-Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

ALDRIDGE, JARRETT & STRUM JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

22 SEPTEMBER 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The Application in an Appeal filed on 24 July 2023 is dismissed.

2. The appeal is allowed in part.

3. The cross-appeal is allowed in part.

4. Order 4(e) made on 24 February 2023 is varied as follows:

4. …

(e) in payment of so much of the sum of $1,602,705.89 that remains outstanding following compliance with Order 4(a) herein, to the third and fourth respondents.

5. Orders 5 and 6 made on 24 February 2023 are varied as follows:

5. Following agreement in writing between the applicant trustee and first respondent or assessment, due determination of the applicant’s proof of debt as it relates to costs in the equity proceedings yet to be assessed, the costs of the equity proceedings the amount so determined will be paid to the applicant subject to the terms of the orders of Katzmann J dated 8 November 2016 from the sum in Order 4(d) above and any balance will be paid to the first respondent.

6. In the event that the applicant has not commenced the application for assessment of costs within 28 days of the monies being placed in the controlled monies account as required by Order 4(d) then the monies are to be paid to the first respondent.

The first respondent has liberty to apply to the primary judge in relation to any issue of delay arising in respect of Order 5.

6. The appeal is otherwise dismissed.

7. The cross-appeal is otherwise dismissed.

8. The appellant and the cross-appellant, jointly and severally, are to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal and cross-appeal fixed in the sum of $13,923.51 within 28 days.

9. The cross-appellant is the pay the first respondent’s costs of the Application in an Appeal fixed in the sum of $1,200 within 28 days.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

That leaves my association with Mr Ash in chambers and the rare occasional meeting since. That is not enough to draw the requisite apprehension of impartiality. The “bizarre” decision in Valder Essentially, the position of the cross-appellant is that the decision in that appeal was so bizarre and extraordinary that it could only be explained by bias, albeit, “subconscious or unintended bias” (Cross-Appellant’s affidavit filed on 24 July 2023, paragraph 21). Whilst that may be the opinion of the cross-appellant, it was not universally shared. The cross-appellant sought special leave to appeal the decision in Valder. It was refused. The High Court said that “there is no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision of the Full Court” (Saklani v Valder & Anor [2022] HCASL 20). The subjective opinion of the cross-appellant is not sufficient to meet the relevant test, which is objective.The use of the word “fraud” It is important to note the context in which the word “fraud” appears in the transcript of the hearing of the appeal. It appears 13 times and the word fraudulent twice. The first use of the word arose in a discussion which commenced with the following exchange:ALDRIDGE J: But that begs the question of what the proceedings are in respect of the provable debt, because proceedings to set aside a transaction under 37A of the Conveyancing Act are proceedings in respect of a provable debt, clearly, but that has been well now established as somewhere where a creditor can act to recover property for the benefit of the bankrupt estate.[SENIOR COUNSEL FOR THE CROSS-APPELLANT]: Your Honour, I don’t dispute that proposition.ALDRIDGE J: All right.(Transcript 28 June 2023, p.37 lines 15–23)It then continued:[SENIOR COUNSEL FOR THE CROSS-APPELLANT]: But what I do submit is that in the circumstances of this case, the creditor could bring the action in respect of her provable debt and hold any proceeds for the benefit of the creditors generally. But it’s not the trustee, and the fact that she might be acting in a way that has a benefit for the estate doesn’t mean that she suddenly becomes armed with powers under sections 118 through to 122 - - -JARRETT J: Agreed. And I absolutely agree.[SENIOR COUNSEL FOR THE CROSS-APPELLANT]: - - - or that she has sought to propound a case under 37A of the Conveyancing Act.ALDRIDGE J: No, no. Here, she’s - - -JARRETT J: Agreed.ALDRIDGE J: - - - exercising her rights under section 79A of the Bankruptcy Act [sic] and 106B, which are to the same effect as, essentially, 37A – that where through fraudulent activity, funds are removed from the reach of the court, there’s a remedy to bring those funds back under the control. [SENIOR COUNSEL FOR THE CROSS-APPELLANT]:Your Honour, there was never – in this – in the circumstances of this case, your Honours know from the materials that my client was a senior solicitor in various government employments. He also gave evidence, which was unchallenged, as to his thinking in relation to dealing with the consent orders. There was never a suggestion or a finding that could be possibly made that he had engaged in any fraudulent activity. And if there was a claim for fraud, as your Honours know, at least in this country, it has got to be distinctly pleaded and proved, and you don’t just get convicted on the odour or the feel or the vibe of the matter. You get convicted, as it were, or a finding is made against you - - -ALDRIDGE J: But the - - -[SENIOR COUNSEL FOR THE CROSS-APPELLANT]: - - - if there are well set out, documented particulars of fraud which are alleged and which you have the opportunity of meeting, and that was not something that occurred in this case nor - - -STRUM J: He excluded a debt that should have been – that it has been found should have been brought to the attention of the court in the making of the consent orders, [senior counsel for the cross-appellant].[SENIOR COUNSEL FOR THE CROSS-APPELLANT]: Your Honour - - -STRUM J: And as I read his evidence, he seems to be suggesting that because he had a lawyer – seemed to be of the opinion that because he had obtained special leave, it was a – to put it colloquially – a shoo-in. It seems to me to be a very rash - - -[SENIOR COUNSEL FOR THE CROSS-APPELLANT]: Well, your Honour - - - STRUM J: - - - position to take for a lawyer, [senior counsel for the cross-appellant].[SENIOR COUNSEL FOR THE CROSS-APPELLANT]: Well, your Honour, firstly, so far as the debt was concerned, he gave credible evidence, which wasn’t challenged, that he didn’t consider that the person was a creditor, because there was no calculation of the equitable compensation at that point.JARRETT J: No, that can’t be right. And you just told me – told us that he’s a senior lawyer. There was a judgment against him for compensation to be assessed. That’s clearly a liability – clearly a liability.…[SENIOR COUNSEL FOR THE CROSS-APPELLANT]: Yes. It’s contingent on a number of factors, I accept, your Honours. Now, your Honours, I don’t want to get sidetracked, because so far as this court is concerned, this is coming up on an appeal, obviously, and there has been no pleading of a case that this was fraud, and it wasn’t ever a case that was particularised as being a fraud.…ALDRIDGE J: Let’s not get too tied up in the word “fraud”, Mr McGovern. There’s no finding of fraud as such. But the point I was trying to make is that section 79A and 106B are analogous to 37A of the Conveyancing Act – that give creditors rights to recover property that has been moved that had at least the effect of preventing that property being used to pay the creditor’s debt. [SENIOR COUNSEL FOR THE CROSS-APPELLANT]: Well, your Honour, we submit that - - - ALDRIDGE J: That’s the purpose – evident purpose of those sections. And what Katzmann J and the court in Fraser did – and so where the trustee is not prepared to undertake the recovery proceedings, we will authorise a creditor to do so on behalf of the body of creditors. [SENIOR COUNSEL FOR THE CROSS-APPELLANT]: Well, that’s wrong, your Honour.(Transcript 28 June 2023, p.37 lines 25 to p.39 line 16)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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