Fitzgerald (as child representative for A (Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania)) v Fish and Another

[2005] FamCA 158

FAMILY LAW ACT 1975

IN THE FULL COURT OF THE
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AT MELBOURNE Appeal No. SA61 of 2004

File No. HBF1090 of 2003

IN THE MATTER OF: PBF as Child Representative for AF (Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania)

Appellant

AND: TRF

First Respondent

AND: LKL

Second Respondent

CORAM: KAY,WARNICK, BOLAND JJ

DATE OF HEARING: 28 FEBRUARY 2005

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11 MARCH 2005

JUDGMENT OF THE FULL COURT

Appearances: Mr Fitzgerald of Counsel, instructed by Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania, 158 Liverpool Street, Hobart, Tasmania, 7000 as appellant.

Mr Blissenden of Counsel, instructed by Avery Partners, Barristers and Solicitors, 120 Main Road, Moonah, Tasmania, 7009 appeared for the first respondent.
Ms Baker of Counsel, instructed by Murdoch Clarke, Solicitors, 10 Victoria Streeet, Hobart, Tasmania, 7000 appeared for the second respondent.

Name of Appeal	PBF as Child Representative for AF (Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania) and TRF and LKL
Appeal Number	SA61 of 2004
Date of Appeal Hearing	28 February 2005
Date of Judgment	11 March 2005
Coram	Kay, Warnick and Boland JJ

Catchwords: COSTS – STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – Proceedings for parenting orders in relation to a child of the parties were started by the father in July 2003, with a child representative appointed by order of a Deputy Registrar in August 2003 - On 24 August 2004 the matter settled and consent orders were entered into – On 3 September 2004 the child representative brought an application seeking that the mother and father equally pay the professional fees and disbursements incurred by the child representative – This application was dismissed at first instance - The trial Judge applied s117 of the Family Law Act 1975, as amended by the Family Law Amendment Act No. 138 of 2003 – The amendments relied upon at the hearing commenced on 14 January 2004, but transitional provisions stated that the amendments only applied to proceedings commenced after that date – Whether “proceedings” related to the application for costs or the application commenced in July 2003 – The Full Court found that the amendments to the Family Law Act did not apply – COSTS OF CHILD REPRESENTATION– FACTORS – Clear expression by the trial Judge that, as a matter of law there “…must be more than the financial capacity of the parents or either of them to meet the costs of the child representative before the court may make a costs order.” – Error by trial Judge in so expressing the law – The Full Court stated that there is nothing to prevent any relevant factor being the sole foundation for an order for costs – RE-EXERCISE OF DISCRETION – Consideration of the two lines of authority, pre-amendment – Financial circumstances of the mother and father justified an order

Appeal Allowed and discretion re – exercised. Each respondent to contribute the sum of $2,500 towards the costs of the child representative. Costs certificates granted to every party.

In the Family Court in Hobart were competing applications between TRF and LKL for parenting orders about residence and contact in relation to their child, AF, born in 1991. In those proceedings, begun by the father in July 2003, a child representative was appointed by order of a Deputy Registrar in August 2003. The applications were listed for a five day trial but were settled and consent orders were made on 24 August 2004. On 3 September 2004, the Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania (the Commission) applied for an order that the mother and father equally pay the professional fees and the disbursements incurred by the child representative. On 15 September 2004 his Honour, Hannon J, dismissed the application by the Commission. The Commission appealed to this court and these reasons are in respect of the disposition of that appeal.
We granted leave, (there was no opposition to the request) to the Commission to amend the Notice of Appeal. The effect of the amendment was to add an assertion that the trial Judge (and all parties) had wrongly proceeded on the basis that amendments to section 117 of the Family Law Act 1975, made by the Family Law Amendment Act 2003, (the Amendment Act) applied to the Commission’s application for costs.
As to the remainder of the four grounds of appeal, the fourth ground is general and effectively relies upon the establishment of the preceding grounds for merit. The first ground attacks the trial Judge’s interpretation of section 117(5) (added by the Amendment Act) and the relationship of that subsection with other subsections of section 117. The ground also attacks certain interpretations by the learned trial Judge of cases involving applications for costs by children’s representatives, decided prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act.
Ground 2 attacks the trial Judge’s dealing with the contents of a report of the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee on the provisions of the Family Law Amendment Bill 2003 (the committee report).
If we conclude that the 2003 amendments did not apply to the Commission’s application, it may well be unnecessary to deal with those assertions that relate to the amendments.
The third ground asserts that the learned trial Judge erred by failing to take into account or give sufficient weight to; the financial circumstances of the parties; the fact that the parties were on notice that costs would be sought by the Commission, that the funds of the Commission are finite and that the broader consequence was that funds allocated to the proceedings could have been allocated otherwise.
We will return to the grounds of appeal after a discussion of the reasons of the trial Judge and background facts and if we find merit in any ground, we will consider the re-exercise of the trial Judge’s discretion.

The reasons of the trial Judge and background facts emerging therefrom

His Honour recorded that the child representative had been appointed on three grounds, namely; that the wishes of AF were a very significant issue in the proceedings, that if orders were made in accordance with the father’s application, AF would be removed from the jurisdiction in that she would be relocated to the United Kingdom and thirdly, if orders were made in accordance with the mother’s application, the two children would be separated (the parties had an elder child born in 1987; he lived with the father and the father’s fiancé in the United Kingdom).
His Honour stated that it was a matter that came well within the guidelines established by the Full Court in Re: K (1994) FLC 92-461 for the appointment of a child representative.
The trial Judge then discussed the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to make a costs order in favour of the Commission, noting that it was not submitted by counsel for either of the respondents to the costs application that the Court did not have jurisdiction.
He then turned to the terms of section 117. He examined the terms of subsections (1) and (2) of that section and what was said by the High Court in Penfold & Penfold (1980) FLC 90-800 about the relationship between those two subsections. He next referred himself to some decisions of the Full Court of the Family Court, saying:
“16. Recent decisions of the Full Court of this Court have made it clear that the making of a costs order in a particular case is a matter for the exercise of discretion and that discretion is extremely broad.…”
His Honour then noted the presence, (by virtue of section 117(2A)) of specific matters to which the court “…shall have regard in considering what order (if any) should be made…” but said that, before considering the specific provisions of that subsection, it was appropriate to consider subsections (3), (4) and (5), that had been inserted into the Family Law Act by Act No.138 of 2003. He set out the terms of those subsections:
“(3)   To avoid doubt, in proceedings in which a child representative has been appointed, the court may make an order under subsection (2) as to costs or security for costs, whether by way of interlocutory order or otherwise, to the effect that each party to the proceedings bears, in such proportion as the court considers just, the costs of the child representative in respect of the proceedings.
(4)     However, in proceedings in which a child representative has been appointed, if:
(a)   a party to the proceedings has received legal aid in respect of the proceedings; or
(b)   The court considers that a party to the proceedings would suffer financial hardship if the party had to bear a proportion of the costs of the child representative;
the court must not make an order under subsection (2) against that party in relation to the costs of the child representative.
(5)     In considering what order (if any) should be made under subsection (2) in proceedings in which a child representative has been appointed, the court must disregard the fact that the child representative is funded under a legal aid scheme or service established under a Commonwealth, State or Territory law or approved by the Attorney-General.”
Of these subsections, his Honour said:
“23. The effect of subsection (3) is to clarify any doubts about the jurisdiction of the Court to exercise a discretion to make a costs order in favour of a child representative in appropriate circumstances, while subsection (4) provides for the circumstances in which such a costs order will not be made. Paragraph (a) of subsection (4) is not relevant to the present case as neither party has been in receipt of Legal Aid in respect of the proceedings, while paragraph (b) falls for consideration under subsection (2A)(a) of the factors to which the Court is required to have regard.
24. In the course of the application, it was submitted that subsection (5) has the effect of depriving the Court of the jurisdiction to make a costs order in favour of a child representative where the child representative is funded under a legal aid scheme or a service established under a Commonwealth, State or Territory law or approved by the Attorney-General. In my opinion the contrary is the case and the intent of subsection (5) is to make it abundantly clear that the fact that a child representative is funded in the manner referred to in the subsection is not to be taken into account by the Court in denying to make or in the making of a costs order in favour of a child representative.
25. In paragraph 3.6 of the report of Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee on the “Provisions of the Family Law Amendment Bill 2003”, the Committee recommended the amendment by reference to the decisions of Faulks J in Harris v Harris (unreported decision of 2000) and Cripps v Cripps (unreported decision 4 April 2002) where his Honour said that if the legislature intended parents to bear the costs of the child representative it would have enacted a provision to that effect. The Committee contrasted this statement by reference to the decision of Lindenmayer J in Telfor and Telfor (sic) (1996) FLC 92-688 where his Honour said that parents should contribute to the costs of a child representative in light of the finite resources of Legal Aid. His Honour found that there were reasons attributable to the conduct of the parties in that case that justified a costs order in favour of the child representative.”
His Honour then referred to a submission made by counsel for the parents in these terms:
“26.   In the present case, counsel for the respondent parents submitted that there must be more than the financial capacity of the parents or either of them to meet the costs of the child representative before the Court may make a costs order. It was submitted that in those cases where an order has been made the conduct of the parties has been the subject of criticism. In my opinion there is merit in that submission (see Telfor and Telfor (sic)).
27.    If the financial capacity of the parties, or either of them, were to be the determining factor their financial circumstances would have to be compared with those of the Legal Aid Commission and such a comparison would not be reasonably possible, given the individual circumstances of the parties and the source of funds of the Commission. It is not sufficient to justify a costs order that the parties or either of them has the capacity to meet such an order. If that were so it would lead to a decision in many cases that costs follow the event, namely that parties to parenting matters would automatically be responsible for the costs of the child representative if they or one of them, had the financial capacity to do so. That is not the proper interpretation of the Act.
28. Subsection 117(3) gives the Court a discretion to make an order for costs in favour of the child representative and that discretion must be exercised having regard to the factors set out in subsection(2A). There is nothing in the facts of the present case that activates the discretion in favour of the child representative. The parties here have the financial capacity to meet an order for costs. However that is not sufficient reason to exercise the discretion. There is no other relevant factor such as the parties, or either of them, acting unreasonably in the proceedings or any inappropriate conduct in the proceedings that would justify a costs order having regard to the factors in Section 117(2A).
29.    The order of the Court is that child representative’s application for costs be dismissed.”

Ground 1(f)

This ground reads:
“1. That the Learned Judge erred in law or alternatively misdirected himself on the law:
(f)By applying the Family Law amendment Act No.138 of 2003 particularly the amendments to Section 117 of the said Act being subsections 3), 4), 5) to the application before him.”
Section 3 of the Amendment Act provided:
“3. Schedule(s)
Each Act that is specified in a schedule to this Act is amended or repealed as set out in the applicable items in the schedule concerned, and any other item in a schedule to this Act has effect according to its terms.”
Schedule 7, Item 29A, added to what was previously the end of section 117, the three subsections set out earlier in our discussion of the reasons of the trial Judge. Item 35(2) in schedule 7, appearing in Part II – Application of Amendments reads:
“Items 29 and 29A apply to proceedings instituted in the court after the commencement of this item”.
Section 2 of the Amendment Act provided that item 29A commence on the 28^th day after the day on which the Act received the Royal Assent. Consequently, item 29A commenced on 14 January 2004.
As earlier noted, on 3 September 2004, the Commission filed the application relating to costs.
For the mother and father, it is argued that, in the light of the transitional provision to the effect that the amendments to section 117 applied to:
“…proceedings initiated in the Court after the commencement of this item”
and having regard to the definition contained in section 4 of the Family Law Act namely:
“‘proceedings’ means a proceeding in a court, whether between parties or not, and includes cross-proceedings or an incidental proceeding in the course of or in connexion with a proceeding.”
the amendments applied to the application for costs dealt with by the learned trial Judge.
We do not agree.
The only proceedings referred to in subsections (3), (4) and (5) of section 117 (added by the Amendment Act) are:
“…proceedings in which a child representative has been appointed…”
Each of the subsections then makes provision with regard to the powers of the court and the manner of their exercise, with regard to “the proceedings”.
The application for costs made by the child representative was not a proceeding in which a child representative had been appointed. It was a proceeding seeking costs in respect of proceedings in which a child representative had been appointed.
Thus, since the proceedings in which the child representative had been appointed were commenced well before the commencement of item 29A, by virtue of item 35(2), the amendments made by item 29A did not apply to the Commission’s application for costs.
We do not consider that any ambiguity arises in relation to the interpretation of item 35(2) in schedule 7 of the Amendment Act. However, in the event that that view is incorrect, we have had regard to extrinsic material in aid of the interpretation of that item, in particular, of the term “proceedings”.
The Family Law Amendment Bill 2003, as initially presented, proposed amendment to section 117 (item 29), constituted by the repeal of subsection 1 and the substitution of a new subsection 1, paragraph (b) of which read:
“in proceedings in which a child representative has been appointed, each party to the proceedings must bear, in such proportion as the court considers just, the costs of the child representative in respect of the proceedings.”
While proposed subsection 1(A) provided that paragraph (1)(b) did not apply to a party to proceedings who had received Legal Aid in respect of the proceedings or whom the court considered would suffer financial hardship if the party had to bear the party’s proportion of the costs of the child representative the proposed amendment represented a marked change to the exposure of a party in relevant proceedings, to the costs of the child representative. If the provision was retrospective parties who may have themselves sought, or consented to, the appointment of a child representative in proceedings, would be exposed to a liability of which they were not aware at the time.
One would not usually expect retrospectivity in such circumstances.
Certainly, if retrospectivity was intended, one would expect the clearest of statements to that effect.
In fact, the bill as initially presented included PART 2 – Application of Amendments in schedule 7, within which item 35(2) provided:
“Item 29 applies to proceedings instituted in the court after the commencement of this item.”
The explanatory memorandum accompanying the bill said:
“Item 29 dealing with the new provisions concerning the costs of child representatives only applies to proceedings instituted after the commencement of this item.”
While the explanatory memorandum does not entirely exclude the argument put on behalf of the mother and father in this appeal, in our view, reference to the extrinsic material reinforces the conclusion to which we have otherwise come.
It follows from what we have said that, in applying the Amendment Act to the application of the children’s representative, the learned Judge was in error. The error was as to the state of the law at the relevant time. It was not a point in respect of which, had it been raised at the hearing, either the mother or father would have called additional evidence before the trial Judge. We accept, as was submitted on behalf of the Commission, that this court has power to allow the appeal on this point, notwithstanding that it was not the subject of submissions below. This proposition was not opposed by counsel, either for the mother or the father.

Grounds 1(e) and 3(a)

Ground 1(e) asserted:
“1. That the Learned Judge erred in law or alternatively misdirected himself on the law:
(e)that the parents’ capacity was not, of itself, pursuant to Section 117(2A)(a), a “matter relevant to costs order” for the purposes of Section 117(2);”
Ground 3(a) provided:
“3. In dismissing the Application by the Appellant the Learned Judge erred in the exercise of his discretion by failing to take into account and/or not giving sufficient weight to, inter alia,:-
(a)The financial circumstances of the Respondents;…”
We have previously quoted in full paragraphs 26 to 28 inclusive of the trial Judge’s judgment, but since they contain the conclusions challenged by these grounds, we repeat most of them here.
“26.   In the present case, counsel for the respondent parents submitted that there must be more than the financial capacity of the parents or either of them to meet the costs of the child representative before the Court may make a costs order. It was submitted that in those cases where an order has been made the conduct of the parties has been the subject of criticism. In my opinion there is merit in that submission (see Telfor and Telfor (sic)).
27.    If the financial capacity of the parties, or either of them, were to be the determining factor their financial circumstances would have to be compared with those of the Legal Aid Commission and such a comparison would not be reasonably possible, given the individual circumstances of the parties and the source of funds of the Commission. It is not sufficient to justify a costs order that the parties or either of them has the capacity to meet such an order. If that were so it would lead to a decision in many cases that costs follow the event, namely that parties to parenting matters would automatically be responsible for the costs of the child representative if they or one of them, had the financial capacity to do so. That is not the proper interpretation of the Act.
28.    …The parties here have the financial capacity to meet an order for costs. However that is not sufficient reason to exercise the discretion. There is no other relevant factor…that would justify a costs order…”

Read alone, the references in paragraph 28 to the financial capacity of the parties might be seen as no more than a reference to their circumstances in the particular context of this case.
However, the references to financial capacity in paragraphs 26 and 27, contrary to argument on behalf of the mother and father, are in our view, clear expressions by the learned Judge that, as a matter of law there “…must be more than the financial capacity of the parents or either of them to meet the costs of the child representative before the court may make a costs order.” It is our view, that in so expressing the law, the learned trial Judge was in error.
The introductory words of subsection (2A) of section 117 are:
“In considering what order (if any) should be made under sub-section (2) the court shall have regard to:”
A number of factors are then listed in the subparagraphs. The financial circumstances of each of the parties to the proceedings is the first mentioned factor. Nowhere in subsection 2(A) or elsewhere in section 117, is there any prescription that more than one factor must be present before an order for costs is made nor of comparative weight of the factors set out in subsection 2(A). As a consequence, there is nothing to prevent any factor being the sole foundation for an order for costs.
Accordingly, we consider that there is merit in these grounds.

Re-exercise of discretion

All parties sought that in the event we found merit in any ground, we re-exercise the discretion that was vested in the trial Judge.
In accordance with our earlier findings in this re-exercise, we apply section 117 of the Family Law Act as it stood prior to the amendments made by the Amendment Act.
We have already recorded the findings of the learned trial Judge about the appropriateness of the appointment of the child representative in the substantive proceedings. We also note that there were no findings of any conduct of either party considered relevant to costs. As the issues were resolved by the parties, there is no question of success or failure by one or the other in the proceedings.
In the circumstances, the matters in our view relevant to the application of the Commission are the financial circumstances of each of the parties to the proceedings and, possibly, the financial position of the Commission.
No submissions were made to us about the financial circumstances of the parties, the findings of the learned trial Judge that the parties had the financial capacity to meet the order sought by the Commission obviously being accepted. The statements of financial circumstances of each party are before us and we have had regard to them. The father had an average weekly income of $1,632.00. The mother worked part-time as a nurse and had an average weekly income of $722.00. Each party is a member of a superannuation fund.
Via the affidavit of a Mr C, a legal practitioner employed by the Commission, it was established that at the date of that affidavit (3 September 2004) the child representative’s total grant of aid was $7,130.00.
Mr C also deposed that it was a matter of uncontroversial fact arising from the affidavits and statements of financial circumstances of the parties that the gross matrimonial asset pool was valued between $450,000.00 and $871,946.00.
The orders for property settlement provided for a payment by the mother to the father of $52,325.00. They also provided for a further payment of $31,200.00, the mother to be discharged from the obligation to make that payment upon the registration of a child support agreement. There was to be a transfer from the father to the mother of an interest he had in a property at Hobart and a payment by him to her of $6,240.00, though he was to be discharged from that obligation upon the registration of a child support agreement.
We are of the view that the circumstances of the parties are such that, of themselves, they could justify an order for payment of at least some of the Commission’s costs.
As to the question of the state of the law, prior to the Amendment Act, about the regard that might be had to the financial position of the Commission in an application such as was before the learned trial Judge, it seems generally agreed in the submissions before us that there were two “lines” of authority.
On the one hand, were the decisions of Telfer and Telfer (1996) FLC 92-688, S v S (1997) FLC 92-762 and a decision of the Full Court in Re: David (Costs) (1998) FLC 92-809.
On the other hand, were decisions of Faulks J (as he then was) in Harris v Harris [2000] FamCA 2141 and Cripps v Cripps (CA 1040 of 1999, April 2002) [2002] FamCA 1502.
In Telfer, Lindenmayer J, dealing with an application by a separate representative for an order that the parties pay that representative’s costs of and incidental to proceedings which had settled, and in making that order, referred to the financial circumstances of the parties as a relevant matter under paragraph (a) of s 117(2A) of the Family Law Act and continued:
“I suppose in this context, when the applicant for costs is the separate representative, one ought to also take account of the financial resources of the separate representative which are essentially those of the Australian Legal Aid Office.”
His Honour returned to that point later, when he discussed a passage in the judgment of Mushin J in MacDonald and MacDonald (1994) FLC-508. Lindenmayer J, said:
“With respect, I do not share his Honour’s view that, as a matter of principle, the fact that the costs of the separate representative would otherwise be borne by the finite resources of the Legal Aid fund is not relevant to the exercise of discretion under s 117(2A) paragraph (g). Rather, I take the view that it is relevant for the court to take that matter into account in the exercise of its discretion.
As indicated, the funds of the Legal Aid Office are finite; they are subject to very heavy demands in all areas, not the least of which is the area of legal aid for separate representatives for children in proceedings before this court. I think it is relevant for the court to consider, in the exercise of discretion as to costs, that the funds of such a body ought not to be exhausted in proceedings where there are other available means of providing the funds for the representation of the relevant children, and particularly where the necessity for that representation arises essentially out of conflict between the parties, rather than out of any deep-seated issues relating to the welfare of the children.”
In Re: David (Costs) the Court, consisting of Nicholson CJ, Lindenmayer and Buckley JJ, expressed:
“…agreement with the approach taken in Telfer so far as the exercise of the discretion under section 117(2A) is concerned.” (page 85,148)
The position taken by Faulks J was that the question of any limitations of resources of Legal Aid authorities was not relevant, quite apart from the question of evidentiary support for findings about the extent of those resources.
In Cripps, his Honour expressed the view:
“12. …It is also proper, in my opinion, that the primary funding for such a representative should be from the public purse.…”
His Honour also said:
“35. Ms Proctor, contrary to the proposition contended for by Lindenmayer J in Telfer v Telfer suggested that the parties’ financial circumstances were inferior to those of the Children’s representative and that disparity is a matter that should be taken into account under section 117(2A)(a) in refusing the application for costs. She remarked somewhat ironically that the Legal Aid Commission had “buckets of money”. In my opinion that somewhat tentatively and frivolously advanced proposition is no more appropriately taken into account than was (with due respect to him) the opinion of Lindenmayer J to suggest (presumably from some external source) that the funds available to the Legal Aid Commissions were limited. If matters are to be taken into account by a court, then, generally speaking, in my opinion, they should be the subject of evidence, not alleged notoriety.
36. Moreover, I do not accept within the context of section 117 that it is appropriate that the public purse should in some way be protected or preferred to the means and assets of the parties.…”
It seems to us that the differences between Lindemayer J and Faulks J may have been resolved by the decision in Re: David (Costs), but for our purposes, we approach the matter in this way.
If Re: David (Costs) confirmed that it was relevant in applications such as that with which we are concerned, to have regard to the financial position of the Commission and we found that the Commission had “finite” funds, that circumstance would probably support the order which we are inclined to make any way, on a consideration of the financial circumstances of the parties.
We do however express concerns about evidentiary support for conclusions about the resources of the Commission, or any other Legal Aid authority. These resources may well vary from time to time. Moreover, there is an inherent difficulty in comparing the resources of a government funded body, whether “finite” or not, which are nonetheless probably of a very different dimension to the circumstances of private parties.
In this case, even if we adopted the views of Faulks J, we would not alter our opinion of the justice of an order that the parties share, to some extent, the costs of the Commission.
We think it unnecessary to say more about the differing authorities, given the diminishing situations to which the law, as it stood prior to the Amendment Act, might apply.
In all the circumstances, we consider that each party should contribute the sum of $2,500.00 towards the costs of the child representative.
We were not addressed upon the question of time for payment of any order that we might make, but we consider that 60 days from the date of these orders ought be adequate or as otherwise agreed with the Commission.

Costs of the appeal

Each party requested certificates in the event of success of the appeal and we consider the grant of certificates appropriate.

ORDERS

That the appeal be allowed.
That the order made by the Honourable Justice Hannon on 15 September 2004 be set aside.
That within 60 days of the date of this order or such other time as may be agreed with the Legal Aid Commission (Tasmania) each of the first respondent father TRF and the second respondent mother LKL pay the sum of $2,500.00 towards the professional fees and disbursements of the child representative in HBF 1090 of 2003.
That the court grants to the appellant a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of section 9 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 being a certificate that, in the opinion of the court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the appellant in respect of the costs incurred by the appellant in relation to the appeal.
That the court grants to each of the respondents a costs certificate pursuant to the provisions of section 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 being a certificate that, in the opinion of the court, it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to each of the respondents in respect of the costs incurred by each of the respondents in relation to the appeal.

I certify that the 68 preceding
Paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment delivered by this
Honourable Full Court.
Sgnd:
Associate

[2005] FamCA 158

11 March 2005