Khan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Khan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 1091

File number(s): SYG 3028 of 2020
Judgment of: JUDGE ELDERSHAW
Date of judgment: 15 July 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa – Review of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal”) decision – Allegation that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error – Where the applicant alleges procedural unfairness as a consequence of the reconstitution of the Tribunal – Where s 19A of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) enables the Tribunal to be reconstituted – Where the applicant alleges that without a written transcript of the first Tribunal hearing the reconstituted Tribunal Member could not make findings about the applicant’s credibility – Where the applicant alleges “apparent” bias on the part of the Tribunal Member – Where bias on behalf of the Tribunal Member was not made out – Where the applicant was found not to be a genuine temporary entrant – Where the applicant alleges that the Member did not give proper consideration to documentary evidence – Where the applicant did not avail himself of opportunities to provide further documentary evidence to the Tribunal – Application dismissed
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 19A, 19D

Migration Act1958 (Cth), ss 375A, 474, 476

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), sch 2 cl 500

Cases cited:

Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510

CHT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2030

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 175; [2018] FCAFC 2

Frugtneit v Tax Practitioners’ Board (2018) 74 AAR 279

Frugtniet v Tax Practitioners’ Board [2019] FCAFC 193

Kaur v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 2026

Kioa & West (1985) 159 CLR 550

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429; [2009] HCA 39

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12; [2004] HCA 32

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Re; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407; [2000] HCA 1

Minister for Immigration v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 17

Plaintiff M61/2010 v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

SCAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 668

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152; [20065] HCA 63

SZHKA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 172 FCR 1

SZQHH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 200 FCR 223; [2012] FCAFC 45

Division: General
Number of paragraphs: 132
Date of hearing: 11 March 2025 and 6 June 2025
Place: Sydney
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr N. Cearney
Solicitor for the Applicant: BNS Lawyers
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms S. Lloyd (MinterEllison)
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance save as to costs

ORDERS

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1091
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Khan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, Khan, sought judicial review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which had dismissed his application for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa. The primary issue before the court was whether the AAT's decision was affected by jurisdictional error, specifically in relation to the reconstitution of the tribunal panel between two hearings. Khan argued that the procedural unfairness resulting from this reconstitution meant that the tribunal member who presided over the subsequent hearing could not properly assess his credibility without a written transcript of the first hearing. Additionally, Khan claimed that the tribunal member exhibited apparent bias, and that the tribunal did not give proper consideration to documentary evidence submitted by him.

The court examined the legal framework under which the tribunal can be reconstituted and found that there was no jurisdictional error in the tribunal's decision. The court noted that section 19D(4) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) allows a tribunal member to consider any record of proceedings before a previously constituted tribunal, including evidence taken in those proceedings. The court found that there was no requirement for a fresh hearing and that the tribunal member was entitled to rely on the previous record, as per the decision in Frugtniet. Furthermore, the court dismissed Khan's claims of bias, stating that the tribunal member's findings of credibility were based on an evaluation of Khan's inconsistent evidence across both hearings. The court concluded that the tribunal's assessment of Khan's credibility was a matter for the tribunal to determine, and that the tribunal had not erred in giving weight to inconsistencies in Khan's oral testimony.

In relation to the documentary evidence, the court held that it was open to the tribunal to make findings based on the documentary evidence presented. The tribunal was not required to make an obvious enquiry about a critical fact if it was easily ascertainable, and the tribunal had considered the documentary evidence provided by Khan. The court found that the tribunal was not obliged to accept Khan's documentary evidence as overcoming the inconsistencies in his oral testimony. The court also noted that Khan had not availed himself of opportunities to provide further documentary evidence to the tribunal. Therefore, the tribunal's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error.

The court dismissed Khan's application for judicial review, finding that the tribunal had not erred in its decision and that Khan's claims of procedural unfairness and bias were unfounded.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Ground Five is expressed as:5. Denial of Proper and Reasonable Consideration of Evidence5.1. By disproportionately focusing on perceived inconsistencies in oral testimony, the Tribunal neglected its duty to duly engage with key independent evidence, including Certificates of Enrolment (CoEs) and financial records showing a 40% ownership stake in Icon Fashion Limited.5.2. The Tribunal 's selective engagement with evidence disregarded the need for proper evaluative consideration of all material presented. In addition to his oral submissions, the applicant’s written submission relating to Ground Five are that:a)The Tribunal placed disproportionate weight on oral testimony while failing to engage with key independent evidence, including Certificates of Enrolment (CoEs) and financial statements demonstrating the Applicant’s 40% ownership stake in Icon Fashion Limited. b)This selective engagement fails to meet the expectations laid down in Wu Shan Liang v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 185 CLR 259, where thoughtful consideration of all relevant evidence is necessitated. In his affidavit filed on 4 April 2025, the applicant deposed that he submitted evidence to substantiate compliance with visa conditions, his genuine temporary entrant status and his ties to Bangladesh, thereafter, referencing materials found at CB53, CB117 to 118, CB119 to 160, CB164, CB167 and CB171. The applicant submits at paragraph 5 of his 4 April 2025 affidavit that:Despite this evidence, the Tribunal dismissed key materials and placed disproportionate reliance on perceived inconsistencies in my responses to its questions. The Minister submitted that: (a)the Tribunal acknowledged the documentary evidence provided by the applicant including his Certificates of Enrolment and shareholding in the factory but was not satisfied that such evidence overcame inconsistencies in his evidence which led to the finding that he was undertaking his current study to maintain residence in Australia; (b)the Tribunal considered the evidence from the applicant’s family but was not satisfied that this evidence overcame its concerns arising from the applicant’s oral evidence;(c)it was open to the Tribunal to make those findings and the weight attributed to the evidence was a matter for the Tribunal: Peko Wallsend Ltd at [41] per Mason J; (d)as to “Particular 4.2” (which I take to be a typographical error that is intended to read “Ground 5.2”), the Minister submitted that the Tribunal does not have a general duty to make enquiries: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12; [2004] HCA 32 at [43] per Gummow and Hayne JJ; and (e)This was not a case where the Tribunal failed to make an “obvious enquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which is easily ascertained”: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 259 ALR 429; [2009] HCA 39 at [25] per French CJ, Gummw, Hayne, Crennan, Keifel and Bell JJ.Ground Five: Discussion

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 29 October 2020, the hearing before Tribunal Member Cullen was conducted at which time the applicant gave evidence and presented arguments by telephone. The transcript of the 29 October 2020 hearing is Annexure B to the applicant’s affidavit dated 4 April 2025. Without derogation from the totality of the transcript, I note: (a)Member Cullen asked the applicant whether he was studying to just stay in Australia or for some future career aim or value to his future. The applicant responded “Yeah, it is value to my future. As I told, like I have to manage people when I go back to overseas. Like, there are 200 people working in my factory and I have to handle this. There are different sections of the accounting section, human resources section and everything” (transcript page 2); (b)Member Cullen ascertained that the applicant was a 40 per cent shareholder in the factory and asked who owned the other 60 per cent share, to which the applicant stated, “My uncle”. In response to “And it is just your uncle as the family member involved?”, the applicant said “Yes” (transcript page 2);(c)the applicant said that his uncle is the Managing Director of the factory and his father works in the accounting section but he is retired and sometimes helps as a consultant (transcript page 3);(d)Member Cullen raised with the applicant that, at the first hearing, the applicant’s evidence was that his father was involved in the factory, not the uncle and that he never mentioned the uncle. The applicant said “I think I have mentioned and if I have not mentioned, then maybe I missed it. But my father is retired because of my mother’s health condition …” (transcript page 5). Member Cullen asked “But your father was only a consultant. Your uncle was there”, to which the applicant said “My uncle was there, Member. My uncle has been always there, okay…” (transcript page 6);(e)Member Cullen identified that the duration of the applicant’s stay in Australia of 11 years raised the question of whether he is a temporary entrant. The applicant responded: Member, what happened, I got married, then my mum got sick. I went to Bangladesh to establish the factory. I was having difficult times. And then in 2017, like, I could not – I previously – if you see my record, like when I first came for two years’ student visa, I had completed, after that I got married. After getting married, I went to Bangladesh because my mum was sick. Then I thought I will do the [inaudible]. I went a couple of times over there and established the factory. Then I came back again and I was having some issues, so I decided, okay, let’s learn something for the future. Because I could not from – after I got married, I could not do what, like, if I wanted to study something or I wanted to buy a car, I could not do on that time.” (f)Member Cullen asked: “Why couldn’t you study while you were married?” to which the applicant responded: “I could not because I was just busy with the washing and other stuff. I could not” (transcript page 8).The Tribunal’s decision and its reasons

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister’s legal representative submitted that, to the extent there is an issue about a telephone hearing, there is no evidence that the applicant expressed discomfort with that approach, having answered “No” to both questions in the Second Hearing Invitation. CONSIDERATION Ground One Ground One is expressed as:1.Procedural Error: Flawed and Improper Reconstitution of Tribunal Hearings1.1. The Tribunal failed to preserve procedural fairness by improperly reconstituting the panel between two hearings without ensuring an independent re-evaluation of the case.1.2. Member Gabrielle Cullen, who presided over the subsequent hearing on 29 October 2020, improperly relied on evidence and testimony given before Member Linda Young during the prior hearing on 5 June 2019. This was particularly problematic in circumstances where issues of credibility or fact. critical to the Applicant's case, ought to have been determined by the first member who heard the evidence (i.e .. Member Linda Young).1.3. The improper reconstitution of the Tribunal was flawed. conducted ultra vires. And undermined the Applicant's right to procedural fairness and the opportunity for critical evidence to be thoroughly and independently assessed.1.4. This procedural defect precluded an impartial reassessment of material evidence and contravened established principles of procedural fairness.1.5. The Applicant was denied the opportunity to have his evidence, credibility, and case presented and evaluated afresh by an unconstrained Tribunal member. This constitutes jurisdictional error. In addition to his oral submissions, the applicant’s written submission relating to Ground One are that:a)The Tribunal failed to preserve procedural fairness by improperly reconstituting the panel between two hearings, replacing Member Young with Member Cullen without providing proper notice or ensuring that the applicant’s case was reassessed independently. b)Member Cullen’s reliance on incomplete credibility determinations made by Member Young prejudiced the proceedings, undermining the applicant’s right to have evidence considered impartially. This procedural defect violated fundamental principles of procedural fairness articulated in Miniter for Immigration v Eschetu (1999) 197 CLR 611. c)Procedural fairness mandated a full independent re-evaluation of all credibility determinations and evidence, which was absent in this case. The Tribunal’s actions amounted to a jurisdictional error requiring judicial intervention. Under the heading “Response to Respondent’s Submissions”, the applicant further submitted that the respondent’s argument that the applicant had an ample opportunity to prepare submissions ignores the impact of the improper Tribunal panel reconstitution and the prejudgment tainting the subsequent hearings, and that the issues before the Court concern “procedural irregularities undermined by Tribunal inconsistencies in membership.” In addition to her oral submissions, the respondent’s written submissions relating to Ground One may be summarised as:(a)section 19D(2) of the AAT Act empowers the President of the Tribunal to revoke a direction pursuant to s 19A(1) of the AAT Act if one of the criteria in s 19D(2)(a) and (b) are satisfied, and that pursuant to s 19D(4), if the Tribunal is reconstituted by the President, it “must continue the hearing and may have regard to any record of the proceeding before the Tribunal as previously constituted (including a record of any evidence taken in the proceeding)”;(b)the power conferred by s 19D(4) of the AAT Act leaves it largely to the Tribunal to determine how it is to be informed;(c)there was no obligation on Member Cullen to conduct a fresh hearing, only to finish the review and that she was entitled to have regard to any record of the proceedings before Member Young pursuant to s 19D(4) of the AAT Act (per Frugtniet Full Court at [43]);and (d)the findings of credibility were based on an evaluation of the applicant’s inconsistent evidence across the two hearing days and were thus findings of fact which were for Member Cullen to determine: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Re; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407; [2000] HCA 1 at [67] per McHugh J. Accordingly, the reconstitution of the Tribunal did not cause an unfairness to the applicant per CHT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2030 at [44]-[45] per Judge Driver.Ground One: Discussion