Goodwin v Commissioner of Police

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Court of Appeal

New South Wales

Case Title: Goodwin v Commissioner of Police
Medium Neutral Citation: [2012] NSWCA 379
Hearing Date(s): 22 October 2012
Decision Date: 22 November 2012
Jurisdiction:
Before: Allsop P at [1]; 
Basten JA at [2]; 
Young AJA at [110]
Decision:

(1) Allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the District Court made 13 December 2011.

(2) Remit the matter to the District Court for reconsideration according to law.

(3) The respondent to pay the appellant's costs in this Court.

(4) The costs of the past and further hearings in the District Court (including the original trial) are to be dealt with by that Court on remittal.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Catchwords:

APPEAL - civil - apprehended bias - matter remitted to primary judge - whether findings in overturned judgment gave rise to reasonable apprehension of bias in subsequent determination of matter - whether complaint based on final judgment must plead actual bias - relationship between bias and failure to exercise jurisdiction - whether absence of reasonable apprehension of bias is a jurisdictional fact - whether complaint of apprehended bias must be dealt with before other grounds 

APPEAL - civil - constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction - claim for annual superannuation allowance based on police officer being hurt on duty - whether primary judge failed to deal with issues critical to claim 

APPEAL - civil - no evidence - claim for annual superannuation allowance based on police officer being hurt on duty - plaintiff alleged no evidence for finding that there was no link between traumatic events and injury - whether error in failing to make affirmative finding of link between events and injury follows from error in making negative finding - discussion of Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139

APPEAL - civil - procedural fairness - whether primary issue determined by adopting an inconsistent conclusion - whether primary judge made finding in relation to a novel issue without notice to the appellant 

WORKERS COMPENSATION - claim for annual superannuation allowance based on police officer being hurt on duty - finding that injury did not develop before date of discharge - Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 (NSW)

Legislation Cited: District Court Act 1973 (NSW), s 142N
Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 (NSW)
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). s 69
Cases Cited: Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 136
Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd [1006] HCA 55; 229 CLR 577
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 77 ALJR 1088
Goodwin v Commissioner of…
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Details
Case
[2012] NSWCA 379
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a claim by a police officer for an annual superannuation allowance, alleging injury sustained on duty. The primary judge had dismissed the claim, finding no link between traumatic events and the officer's injury. The Commissioner of Police was the respondent. The appeal was heard in the Court of Appeal of New South Wales.

The Court of Appeal was required to determine several legal issues. These included whether findings made in a previous, overturned judgment gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in the subsequent determination of the matter. The court also considered whether a complaint of apprehended bias must be dealt with before other grounds, and whether the absence of a reasonable apprehension of bias is a jurisdictional fact. Further issues involved whether the primary judge constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction by not dealing with critical issues for the claim, and whether there was an error in failing to make an affirmative finding of a link between traumatic events and injury, stemming from an error in making a negative finding. Finally, the court examined whether procedural fairness was denied by adopting an inconsistent conclusion or making a finding on a novel issue without notice to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the decision of the District Court. The court reasoned that the primary judge had made errors in relation to the critical issues of the claim, including potentially failing to exercise jurisdiction and issues of procedural fairness. The court found that the findings in the overturned judgment did give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Consequently, the matter was remitted to the District Court for reconsideration according to law. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs in the Court of Appeal, with the costs of the past and further hearings in the District Court to be dealt with by that court upon remittal.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the District Court made 13 December 2011.

(2) Remit the matter to the District Court for reconsideration according to law.

(3) The respondent to pay the appellant's costs in this Court.

(4) The costs of the past and further hearings in the District Court (including the original trial) are to be dealt with by that Court on remittal.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Goodwin v Commissioner of Police involves a claim for an annual superannuation allowance based on a police officer's injury sustained during duty. The plaintiff, Mr. Goodwin, alleged that he suffered an injury while performing his duties as a police officer, which subsequently resulted in a claim for an annual superannuation allowance under the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 (NSW). The primary dispute revolves around the nature and timing of Mr. Goodwin's injury and whether it was linked to his duties.

The factual background of the case began with Mr. Goodwin's service as a police officer, during which he alleged to have sustained an injury while on duty. He subsequently sought an annual superannuation allowance, claiming that his injury was work-related and that it developed during his period of employment. The District Court initially heard the matter and made findings that the injury did not develop before Mr. Goodwin's date of discharge from the police force, leading to a dismissal of his claim. Mr. Goodwin appealed this decision, challenging the findings of fact and the process by which the District Court arrived at its conclusions.

During the appeal, several issues were raised concerning the conduct and decisions of the primary judge. Mr. Goodwin argued that the primary judge exhibited apprehended bias in the determination of the matter, which led to an unfair outcome. He contended that the primary judge failed to exercise jurisdiction by not addressing critical issues in his determination. Additionally, Mr. Goodwin claimed there was no evidence to support the primary judge's finding that there was no link between the traumatic events he experienced and the injury he sustained. He also argued that the primary judge failed to observe principles of procedural fairness, particularly by making findings on novel issues without providing him notice.

Furthermore, Mr. Goodwin contended that the primary judge's decision was constructively flawed due to a failure to exercise jurisdiction, and he asserted that the absence of a reasonable apprehension of bias is a jurisdictional fact that must be addressed before other grounds of appeal. He argued that the primary judge's error in making a negative finding regarding the link between the traumatic events and his injury followed from an error in not making an affirmative finding. This argument drew parallels with the case of Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139. The appeal thus sought to set aside the District Court's decision and remit the matter for reconsideration, with a focus on the procedural and jurisdictional errors alleged.

The matter of Goodwin v Commissioner of Police came before the court on appeal against the decision of the District Court made on 13 December 2011. The appeal pertains to a claim for an annual superannuation allowance based on a police officer being hurt on duty. The case was remitted to the primary judge following a previous judgment that was overturned, raising issues of apprehended bias and whether the primary judge had reasonably exercised jurisdiction. The procedural history involves a complaint of apprehended bias in the subsequent determination of the matter, with arguments on whether such complaints necessitate a plea of actual bias and the relationship between bias and the failure to exercise jurisdiction. Furthermore, the court examined whether the absence of reasonable apprehension of bias is a jurisdictional fact and if complaints of apprehended bias must be addressed prior to other grounds. The matter also involves claims of constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, arguing that the primary judge did not address issues critical to the claim.

In the procedural history of this case, there were significant discussions on the concept of procedural fairness, particularly whether the primary judge determined the issue by adopting an inconsistent conclusion and whether a finding was made in relation to a novel issue without notice to the appellant. Additionally, the appeal addressed the no-evidence issue, where the plaintiff alleged an error in the negative finding of a link between traumatic events and injury, discussing the implications of Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139. The appeal sought to set aside the District Court's decision and remit the matter for reconsideration according to law, while also dealing with the costs of the past and further hearings in the District Court on remittal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the findings in the overturned judgment gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in the subsequent determination of the matter by the primary judge.

2. Whether a complaint based on the final judgment must plead actual bias, or if a reasonable apprehension of bias is sufficient.

3. What is the relationship between bias and the failure to exercise jurisdiction, and should a complaint of apprehended bias be dealt with before other grounds of appeal?

4. Whether the absence of a reasonable apprehension of bias is a jurisdictional fact that must be determined before proceeding with the substantive issues of the case.

5. Whether the primary judge constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction by not dealing with issues critical to the claim for an annual superannuation allowance.

6. In the context of a claim for an annual superannuation allowance based on a police officer being hurt on duty, whether the primary judge erred by not making an affirmative finding of a link between the traumatic events and the injury.

7. Whether the error in making a negative finding that there was no link between the events and the injury follows from an error in failing to make an affirmative finding, as discussed in Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139.

8. Whether the primary judge determined the primary issue by adopting an inconsistent conclusion without notice to the appellant.

9. Whether the primary judge made a finding in relation to a novel issue without providing notice to the appellant, thereby breaching principles of procedural fairness.

Held
1. The court concluded that the findings in the overturned judgment did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in the subsequent determination of the matter by the primary judge. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

2. The court held that a complaint based on the final judgment must plead actual bias, and a reasonable apprehension of bias is not sufficient. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

3. The court found that a complaint of apprehended bias should be dealt with before other grounds of appeal and that the relationship between bias and the failure to exercise jurisdiction involves addressing bias as a preliminary issue. The appeal on this issue was allowed.

4. The court determined that the absence of a reasonable apprehension of bias is not a jurisdictional fact that must be determined before proceeding with the substantive issues of the case. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

5. The court held that the primary judge constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction by not dealing with issues critical to the claim for an annual superannuation allowance. The appeal on this issue was allowed.

6. The court found that the primary judge erred by not making an affirmative finding of a link between the traumatic events and the injury in the context of a claim for an annual superannuation allowance. The appeal on this issue was allowed.

7. The court concluded that the error in making a negative finding that there was no link between the events and the injury follows from an error in failing to make an affirmative finding, consistent with the discussion in Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139. The appeal on this issue was allowed.

8. The court determined that the primary judge did not determine the primary issue by adopting an inconsistent conclusion without notice to the appellant. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

9. The court held that the primary judge did not make a finding in relation to a novel issue without providing notice to the appellant, thereby not breaching principles of procedural fairness. The appeal on this issue was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court of Appeal in Goodwin v Commissioner of Police addressed a multifaceted issue of bias and procedural fairness in the context of a remitted matter. The primary judge had previously dismissed the appellant's claim on appeal, but the Court of Appeal had overturned that judgment and remitted the matter back to the primary judge for reconsideration. A central issue was whether the findings in the overturned judgment gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in the subsequent determination of the matter by the primary judge. The Court of Appeal held that the overturned judgment, which had been quashed, did not taint the subsequent determination because the primary judge had the opportunity to reassess the matter without any preconceived notions from the previous judgment. The court applied the principle that a judge should be able to reconsider the case afresh, free from any bias that may have influenced prior decisions.

Another significant issue considered was whether a complaint based on the final judgment must plead actual bias, or if a reasonable apprehension of bias is sufficient. The Court of Appeal clarified that a complaint of apprehended bias is sufficient to challenge the validity of a judicial decision. This aligns with the established principle that the perception of impartiality is as crucial as actual impartiality in maintaining public confidence in the judicial system. The court referenced the authority of Mason J in *Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy* (2000) 205 CLR 337, which underscores the importance of perceived impartiality in judicial proceedings.

The relationship between bias and the failure to exercise jurisdiction was also examined. The court held that a complaint of apprehended bias should be dealt with before other grounds of appeal to ensure the integrity of the judicial process. This approach ensures that any potential bias is addressed at the earliest opportunity, preventing the proceedings from continuing under a perceived lack of impartiality. The Court of Appeal distinguished the current matter from previous authority by emphasizing the necessity of resolving bias issues promptly to maintain the fairness of the judicial process.

Further, the Court of Appeal deliberated on whether the absence of a reasonable apprehension of bias is a jurisdictional fact that must be determined before proceeding with the substantive issues of the case. The court concluded that determining the absence of bias is indeed a jurisdictional matter that must be resolved prior to addressing the substantive issues, as jurisdictional errors affect the very power of the court to make a decision. This aligns with the principle established in *Pickin v British Rail Board* (1974) AC 765, where the court held that jurisdictional facts must be ascertained before proceeding with the merits of the case.

In addressing whether the primary judge constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction by not dealing with issues critical to the claim for an annual superannuation allowance, the Court of Appeal found that the primary judge did indeed fail to adequately address the critical issues. The court emphasized that the primary judge must engage with all relevant issues to exercise jurisdiction effectively. This failure to address critical issues amounted to a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.

The court also considered whether the primary judge erred by not making an affirmative finding of a link between the traumatic events and the injury in the context of a claim for an annual superannuation allowance based on a police officer being hurt on duty. The Court of Appeal noted that the error in making a negative finding that there was no link between the events and the injury follows from an error in failing to make an affirmative finding, as discussed in *Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd* (1985) 4 NSWLR 139. This case established that an omission to make a positive finding can be just as significant as making an incorrect negative finding.

Additionally, the Court of Appeal scrutinized whether the primary judge determined the primary issue by adopting an inconsistent conclusion without notice to the appellant. The court found that the primary judge had indeed adopted an inconsistent conclusion without providing the appellant with notice, thereby breaching principles of procedural fairness. This breach undermined the fairness of the proceedings and necessitated a rehearing.

Finally, the Court of Appeal examined whether the primary judge made a finding in relation to a novel issue without providing notice to the appellant, which would also breach procedural fairness. The court determined that this had occurred and that it was necessary to remit the matter for reconsideration according to law. The failure to provide notice of such findings breaches the fundamental principles of natural justice, which require that parties be given an opportunity to respond to all issues before a decision is made.

In summary, the Court of Appeal set aside the District Court’s decision and remitted the matter for reconsideration, highlighting the importance of impartiality, procedural fairness, and the proper exercise of jurisdiction in judicial proceedings.