Lujans v Yarrabee Coal Company Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ

MATINA LUJANS  APPLICANT

AND

YARRABEE COAL COMPANY PTY LTD & ANOR                   RESPONDENTS

Lujans v Yarrabee Coal Company Pty Ltd
[2008] HCA 51
16 October 2008
S3/2008

ORDER

1.Special leave to appeal against the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 4 December 2007 is granted, the appeal is treated as having been heard instanter, and the appeal is allowed.

2.The orders made by the Court of Appeal are set aside.

3.The matter is remitted to the Court of Appeal for a rehearing of the respondents' appeal to that Court.

4.The respondents are to pay the costs of the applicant in the special leave application and the appeal to this Court.

5.The costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal which led to the orders of 4 December 2007 be in the discretion of the Court of Appeal on the rehearing.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation

B M Toomey QC with S J Longhurst for the applicant (instructed by Russell McLelland Brown)

C T Barry QC with G J Davidson for the respondents (instructed by McCabe Terrill Lawyers)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

Lujans v Yarrabee Coal Company Pty Ltd

Torts – Causation – Road accident – Whether road deceptive due to defendants' maintenance – Whether driver error constituted contributory negligence – Whether driver error sole cause of accident.

Courts – Jurisdiction and powers on appeal – Court of Appeal of Supreme Court of New South Wales – Whether rehearing under Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 75A(5) properly conducted – Whether failure to conduct real review of trial.

Courts – Jurisdiction and powers on appeal – Court of Appeal of Supreme Court of New South Wales – Conduct of rehearing – Whether evidence and trial judge's findings adequately considered – Whether original photographs relied upon – Whether inconsistent evidence taken into account.

Words and phrases – "appeal", "rehearing".

Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 75A.

  1. FRENCH CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ.   After a 29 day trial before the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Cooper AJ sitting without a jury), Matina Luise Laima Lujans ("the plaintiff") obtained a verdict for $8,759,510.55 against Yarrabee Coal Company Pty Ltd ("the first defendant") and Jalgrid Pty Ltd ("the second defendant")[1].  The defendants had a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.  They exercised it, and the Court of Appeal (Ipp and McColl JJA and Handley AJA) allowed the appeal[2]. Section 75A(5) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) provides that an appeal of that kind shall be by way of rehearing. In her application for special leave to appeal to this Court, the plaintiff complains that although the oral hearing in the Court of Appeal lasted…

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Details
Case
[2008] HCA 51
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Lujans against orders made by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales concerning a road accident. The dispute involved allegations that the road's condition, due to the defendant's maintenance, contributed to the accident, and whether the driver's actions constituted contributory negligence or were the sole cause of the incident.

The legal issues before the High Court included whether the Court of Appeal had properly conducted a rehearing under section 75A(5) of the *Supreme Court Act 1970* (NSW), and whether it had failed to undertake a real review of the trial judge's findings. Specifically, the court had to determine if the Court of Appeal adequately considered the evidence, including original photographs, inconsistent testimony, and the findings of the trial judge.

The High Court found that the Court of Appeal's reasoning contained significant flaws, including resting conclusions on copies of photographs rather than originals, overlooking crucial evidence, and appearing to misconstruct other testimony. The court concluded that the Court of Appeal had not conducted the rehearing as required by law, and that the defendants' attempts to justify the Court of Appeal's conclusions by reference to other material did not rectify this fundamental issue.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal, and remitted the matter to the Court of Appeal for a rehearing. The costs of the special leave application and the appeal to the High Court were awarded to the applicant, with the costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal to be determined by that court upon the rehearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Special leave to appeal against the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 4 December 2007 is granted, the appeal is treated as having been heard instanter, and the appeal is allowed.

2. The orders made by the Court of Appeal are set aside.

3. The matter is remitted to the Court of Appeal for a rehearing of the respondents' appeal to that Court.

4. The respondents are to pay the costs of the applicant in the special leave application and the appeal to this Court.

5. The costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal which led to the orders of 4 December 2007 be in the discretion of the Court of Appeal on the rehearing.

(Orders of the Court delivered in joint judgment)

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH CJ CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ
A significant part of the submissions advanced for the defendants did not attempt to defend or deal with the Court of Appeal's resting of its conclusions about the photographs on the copies rather than the originals, its overlooking of Mr Kerimidas's evidence in cross-examination, its apparent misconstruction of Mr Baxter Ian Smith's evidence, and its failure to deal with evidence of the type which Mr O'Loughlin gave as to softness of the shoulder and the direction of travel. Instead much of their opposition to a grant of special leave rested on an endeavour to persuade this Court of the correctness of the Court of Appeal's conclusions by reference to other material. There is some force in the plaintiff's submission that the defendants had attempted to meet her "legitimate criticisms of the conduct of the case in the Court of Appeal by asking this court to embark on the rehearing which the Court of Appeal should have conducted but did not."Conclusion The criticisms advanced by the plaintiff should, in the respects outlined above, be accepted[16]. The primary difficulty with the reasons for judgment of the Court of Appeal is not that analysis reveals that the conclusions stated in them are necessarily wrong. It is that important steps in the Court's reasoning are shown not to be valid. In that sense the Court of Appeal has not reheard the matter as it should[17]. [16]See [10]-[29].[17]See Dwyer v Calco Timbers Pty Ltd (2008) 82 ALJR 669 at 678 [51]; 244 ALR 257 at 269; [2008] HCA 13. Counsel for the plaintiff's preferred position was that this Court should not remit the matter to the Court of Appeal, but perform the function which the Court of Appeal did not perform and decide for itself whether the trial judge's orders should stand or not. That preferred position was reflected in various factual arguments not summarised above directed to showing errors in the Court of Appeal's reasoning, which, even if they were errors, could not be said to reveal a failure to give a rehearing. On an appeal to this Court, in the normal case, its primary duty is to make the order the intermediate appellate court ought to have made. Ordinarily errors of the kinds discussed above are taken into account in deciding what order the intermediate appellate court ought to have made. But to make the order which the Court of Appeal ought to have made is, in the circumstances of this case at least, something which this Court should not do until the Court of Appeal has complied with s 75A(5) of the Supreme Court Act and conducted a rehearing. While it is possible for parties dissatisfied with the results of trials to seek special leave to appeal directly to this Court, and while this course was not uncommonly employed about 40 years ago, the standard practice now is for a rehearing to take place in an intermediate court of appeal first. To adopt the plaintiff's preferred course would in substance be to entertain an application for special leave to appeal directly from the trial judge's orders. It is better to give all parties in this case the opportunity to have the benefits of a rehearing in the Court of Appeal – benefits which they have not yet received. That is particularly so in factual circumstances illustrated by this case. There are grave difficulties in assessing the causes of car accidents which took place without eyewitnesses, save for plaintiffs inevitably open to influence by self-interest and understandably having limited recollection. They are difficulties which it would be hard for this Court to grapple with in the absence of reasons for judgment from an intermediate appellate court generated by a rehearing directed to overcoming those difficulties.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH CJ, CJ, GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ

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