JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: WAITE -v- ALCOA OF AUSTRALIA LTD [2020] WASCA 1
CORAM: MURPHY JA
PRITCHARD JA
VAUGHAN JA
HEARD: 4 DECEMBER 2019
DELIVERED : 17 JANUARY 2020
FILE NO/S: CACV 108 of 2018
BETWEEN: TIMOTHY JOHN WAITE
Appellant
AND
ALCOA OF AUSTRALIA LTD
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: TROY DCJ
File Number : APP 102 of 2017
Catchwords:
Workers' compensation - Appeal from the District Court - Whether appeal related to question of law - Assessment of medical evidence by arbitrator - Arbitrator's finding that the appellant had not established a personal injury by accident - Whether District Court erred in law in finding that the arbitrator had not erred in law in dismissing appellant's claim - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA), s 5(1), s 254
Result:
Appellant's application to adduce additional evidence dismissed
Application for leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | In person |
| Respondent | : | D R Clyne |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | In person |
| Respondent | : | Spyker Legal |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
AB v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2014] NSWCA 122
Ambulance Service of NSW v Daniel [2000] NSWCA 116
Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Srdic (1982) 66 FLR 41
Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139
Clark v Flanagan [1934] HCA 73; (1934) 52 CLR 416
Edelsten v Ward (No 1) (1988) 63 ALJR 345
Engine Protection Equipment Pty Ltd v Miller [2018] WASCA 55
Goodwin v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2012] NSWCA 379
McPhee v S Bennett Ltd (1935) 52 WN (NSW) 8
Michaud v Stefanovski [2016] WASCA 85
Mitchell v Canal Rocks Beach Resort [2002] WASCA 331
O'Brien Glass Industries Pty Ltd v Bahmad [2001] NSWCA 224
Saunders v Public Trustee [2015] WASCA 203
Warley Pty Ltd v Adco Constructions Pty Ltd (1988) 8 BCL 300
Workers' Compensation (Dust Disease) Board v Kelly [2000] NSWCA 57
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:
Summary
This appeal is against the decision of Troy DCJ in Waite v Alcoa of Australia Ltd (primary decision).[1] The primary decision concerned an appeal by the appellant against the decision of Arbitrator Nunn in the Workers' Compensation Arbitration Service (arbitrator's decision).[2] The arbitrator had dismissed the appellant's claim for workers' compensation on the bases that (1) the appellant had not established that he had suffered an 'injury', within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) (Act),[3] as alleged, and (2) in any event, the appellant had claimed for, but was unable to establish, total incapacity, and he had not made or established an alternative claim based on partial incapacity.
[1] Waite v Alcoa of Australia Ltd [2018] WADC 147.
[2] A33756.
[3] Section 5(1) of the Act defines, relevantly for present purposes, 'injury' to mean:
'(a)[A] personal injury by accident arising out of or in…
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- Case
- [2020] WASCA 1
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the principles outlined in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Srdic regarding what constitutes a personal injury by accident. The arbitrator had considered these principles and concluded that while a personal injury by accident might exist even with an internal physiological change, the appellant had not provided a precise identification of the physiological change. The court agreed with the arbitrator that the term'soft tissue injury' was too broad and did not sufficiently identify the specific internal physiological change that had occurred. The arbitrator found that without a precise identification of the injury, it was impossible to determine whether the appellant had established a personal injury by accident.
In light of the reasoning provided by the arbitrator and upheld by the District Court, the court found no error in the District Court's decision. The court confirmed that the appellant had not provided adequate evidence to support a finding that a specific physiological change had occurred on the date of the alleged injury. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the arbitrator was affirmed. The court made no orders for costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The relevant principles concerning a personal injury by accident were set out in the reasons of Toohey J in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Srdic.[33][33] Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Srdic (1982) 66 FLR 41; arbitrator's decision [82]. Having regard to the relevant principles, the arbitrator said it was apparent that a personal injury by accident may exist where there is no more than an internal physiological change that results from some force or pressure exerted within the body. There need not be an external stimuli to render the change. Also, it does not matter if the worker has a predisposing physical condition that renders the worker susceptible to some kind of internal physical injury. The employer is obliged to take the worker as it found him.[34] The appellant's particulars asserted that the injury suffered was a 'soft tissue injury' that triggered subacromial impingement and adhesive capsulitis. In other words, the subacromial impingement and adhesive capsulitis were sequelae resulting from the injury, and not the injury itself.[35][35] Arbitrator's decision [84]. In closing submissions, the appellant's solicitor referred to the relevant soft tissue injury as an 'intrasubstance supraspinatus [tendon] tear', identified in an ultrasound report dated 1 April 2016.[36] The arbitrator said that the immediate question raised by the appellant for determination (see [9.1] above) was whether the appellant suffered a 'soft tissue injury' on 7 February 2016, and whether that was a sufficient description to constitute the relevant physiological change required to ground a finding that there had been a 'personal injury by accident'.[37][37] Arbitrator's decision [85]. To the arbitrator, it appeared uncontroversial that the term 'shoulder injury' was too general a description to permit a finding of what the relevant physiological change was. The arbitrator then said that the question was whether a 'soft tissue injury' was, similarly, too general, or whether the nature of soft tissue injuries could be described as notorious facts, such that a more specific identification of the relevant physiological change was not necessary.[38][38] Arbitrator's decision [88] - [89]. The arbitrator said that what was required was precise identification of the internal physiological change said to have occurred on 7 February 2016. Whilst it might be common knowledge that there is a class of injuries encompassed by the term 'soft tissue injury', use of that broad term does not indicate what part of the body was in fact injured.[39] The term 'soft tissue injury' is not in Mosby's Medical Dictionary,[40] and is, rather, a broad description of a type of injury rather than the identification of a specific injury.[41] The arbitrator said, in effect, that without identifying what the particular soft tissue injury was said to be, merely referring to this broad description of a class of non‑bony injury was insufficient to identify the physiological change required to be identified by the term 'personal injury by accident'.[42][39] Arbitrator's decision [91] - [92].[40] Mosby's Medical Dictionary 9th Ed, 2013.[41] Arbitrator's decision [93].[42] Arbitrator's decision [94].