O'Brien Glass Industries Pty Ltd v Bahmad

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      O'Brien Glass Industries Pty. Limited v. Bahmad [2001]  NSWCA 224

FILE NUMBER(S):
40710/00

HEARING DATE(S):               8th June 2001

JUDGMENT DATE: 11/07/2001

PARTIES:
O'Brien Glass Industries Pty. Ltd. - appellant
Robert Bahmad - respondent

JUDGMENT OF:       Powell JA Beazley JA Hodgson JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Compensation Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          CC31064/99

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Judge Walker

COUNSEL:
Mr. J.D. Hislop QC with Mr. J.W. Catsanos for appellant
Mr. S. Walmsley Sc with Mr. P. Stockley for respondent

SOLICITORS:
PricewaterhouseCoopers Legal, Sydney for appellant
Paul A. Curtis & Co., Sydney for respondent

CATCHWORDS:
WORKERS COMPENSATION - Appeals - Error of law - Denial of procedural fairness - Finding as to credibility - Whether stereotypes wrongly applied - Whether judge should have signalled need for interpreter.  ND

LEGISLATION CITED:

DECISION:
Appeal dismissed with costs

JUDGMENT:

THE SUPREME COURT  

OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL

CA 40710/00
  CC 31064/99

POWELL JA
  BEAZLEY JA
  HODGSON JA

Wednesday 11 July 2001

O’BRIEN GLASS INDUSTRIES PTY. LTD.  V.  BAHMAD

JUDGMENT

  1. POWELL JA:   I agree with the reasons on Hodgson JA as set out below.

  2. BEAZLEY JA:  I also agree with the reasons of Hodgson JA as set out below.

  3. HODGSON JA:  This is an appeal by an employer O’Brien Glass Industries Pty. Limited against an award of workers compensation in favour of a worker Robert Bahmad made by Judge Walker on 10th August 2000.

    BACKGROUND

  4. The respondent had commenced employment with the appellant as a glazier on 25th June 1998.  On 3rd July 1998, he attended with another glazier to repair a broken window high up a steeply pitched iron roof of a church at Newtown.  Their extension ladder did not reach from the ground to the window, and it was placed on a steel exhaust duct suspended above the roof of an annex at the side of the church.  The other glazier climbed the ladder to repair the window, and the respondent held the ladder while he was doing this, for a period of up to twenty-five minutes. 

  5. The respondent’s claim was that, because of the insecure position of the ladder, in order to ensure that it stayed in place, he had to push with all his force from a braced position, demonstrated (as described by the primary judge) as involving bending the right leg at the knee, holding the left leg straight, leaning forwards bent at the waist with arms straight pushing at shoulder height.  The respondent claimed that he felt a sharp pain in his elbows and shoulders during this time. 

  6. The respondent did not report his claimed injury to the appellant, and did not consult a doctor until some days later.  He continued to work for the appellant until 12th August 1998, when his employment was terminated for reasons unconnected with any injury.  Since that time, the respondent claimed that he had done some unpaid work and some small paid jobs as a glazier, but that otherwise he had been unemployed. 

  7. In his…

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Details
Case
[2001] NSWCA 224
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal by O'Brien Glass Industries Pty Ltd against a decision of a primary judge in favour of the respondent, Mr. Bahmad. The appellant argued that the primary judge had denied it procedural fairness by taking into account matters not properly debated during the hearing, specifically concerning the respondent's credibility.

The central legal issue before the appellate court was whether the primary judge's assessment of the respondent's credibility constituted an error of law due to a denial of procedural fairness. This involved determining if the judge had wrongly disregarded inconsistencies in the respondent's evidence or improperly applied stereotypes based on the respondent's background, and whether there was a need to signal the potential requirement for an interpreter.

The court found that while a denial of procedural fairness could vitiate a credibility finding, the primary judge's judgment did not demonstrate a disregard for inconsistencies in the respondent's evidence. Instead, the court interpreted the relevant paragraphs of the judgment as indicating a concern to avoid stereotypes and to assess the respondent as an individual, taking into account observed limitations in his ability to understand questions and his emotional character. These were considered ordinary considerations for assessing witness credibility, and the court found no occasion to signal the need for an interpreter. The court distinguished the present case from *Marelic v. Comcare*, where a tribunal's finding of exaggeration without proper notice was held to be a denial of procedural fairness.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr. Hislop submitted that the cumulative effect of these matters, and other matters referred to in paragraphs 160 to 165 of the judgment, was that the primary judge took the view that he would not hold inconsistencies in the respondent’s evidence against him. By taking that view on the basis of matters not squarely raised and debated before him, the primary judge had denied the appellant procedural fairness. Decision It was conceded by Mr. Hislop that a finding as to the credibility of a witness is a finding of fact, as to which there is no appeal. However, Mr. Hislop submitted that a denial of procedural fairness does amount to an error of law. In my opinion, there are circumstances where a finding as to the credibility of a witness could be vitiated by denial of procedural fairness. If a judge did not take account of plain inconsistencies in a party’s evidence, on a ground never canvassed at the hearing either in evidence or in submissions, then this certainly could amount to a denial of procedural fairness and could constitute an error of law. In this case however, there is no part of the judgment which suggests that the primary judge disregarded inconsistencies in the respondent’s evidence. It is true that paragraph 161 of the judgment, in isolation, could read as suggesting that the primary judge was proposing to give weight to stereotypes concerning the race, culture and ethnic background of the respondent, these being matters as to which no evidence had been led or could be led. However, my opinion is that, on a fair reading of all the paragraphs 160 to 165, they indicate rather that the primary judge was concerned to avoid giving weight to stereotypes of any kind, and to assess the respondent as an individual on the basis of his own observation of him; and on that basis, to have regard to observed limitations in the respondent’s ability to understand questions and to deal appropriately with them, and also to his observed emotional character. These are matters appropriately taken into account in assessing the credibility of witnesses, and do not generally need to be explicitly raised during the course of the hearing. In my opinion, there was in this case no occasion for the primary judge to signal any view as to the need for an interpreter. In my opinion also, the case is very different from Marelic v. Comcare (1993) 121 ALR 114, referred to by Mr. Hislop: in that case, a tribunal had found that an applicant had exaggerated or contrived symptoms that she relied on in relation to a compensation claim, in circumstances where there had been no cross-examination on this matter, and where the other party had expressly disavowed the suggestion that the symptoms were feigned or exaggerated. In those circumstances, the Court held that the tribunal should have communicated the possibility of using its observations of the applicant so as to come to this conclusion. In the present case, however, what was relied on by the primary judge was no more than very ordinary and usual considerations relied on by courts in assessing the credibility of witnesses.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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