JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: BEASLEY -v- FORTESCUE METALS GROUP LTD [2020] WADC 118
CORAM: GETHING DCJ
HEARD: 19 & 24 AUGUST 2020
DELIVERED : 27 AUGUST 2020
FILE NO/S: APP 2 of 2020
BETWEEN: KAREN ANNETTE BEASLEY
Appellant
AND
FORTESCUE METALS GROUP LTD
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : WORKCOVER WA ARBITRATION SERVICE
Coram: ARBITRATOR FLETCHER
File Number : A53856
Catchwords:
Workers' compensation - Appeal from Arbitrator - Whether judgment against a plaintiff in a District Court action precludes further applications in the WorkCover jurisdiction in respect of the same injury
Legislation:
Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA), s 91, s 92, s 93P, s 217
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Mr M J Lourey |
| Respondent | : | Mr C C Rimmer |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Chapmans Lawyers |
| Respondent | : | Sparke Helmore Lawyers |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Armet v CFC Consolidated Pty Ltd [2019] WASCA 165
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321
Beasley v Pilbara Mining Alliance Pty Ltd [2019] WADC 56
BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Brady [2008] WASCA 250
Costa v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 200
Engine Protection Equipment Pty Ltd v Miller [2018] WASCA 55
Ivanhoe Gold Corporation Ltd v Symonds [1906] HCA 71; (1906) 4 CLR 642
Jenkins v Western Australian Department of Training [1999] WASCA 199
Marks v Coles Supermarkets [2020] WADC 36
Mohammadi v Bethune [2018] WASCA 98
Pacific Industrial Co v Jakovljevic [2008] WASCA 60
Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97
Suleski v Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd [2018] WASCA 147
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362
Ta v Lucky Import and Export Co Pty Ltd [2002] WASCA 65
GETHING DCJ:
Overview
At all material times, the Appellant, Karen Beasley, was an employee of the Respondent, Fortescue Metals Group Ltd, for the purposes of the Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) (WCIMA). During her employment she sustained two injuries. The first was on 17 August 2012, and involved a neck and arm injury (First Injury). The Respondent accepted liability for the First Injury and the Appellant was paid weekly compensation payments until on or about 16 November 2012 when she was medically cleared to return to work earning her pre-accident wage.
The second injury occurred on 30 March 2013, and was again to the Appellant's neck and arm (Second Injury). The Respondent accepted liability for the Second Injury and the Appellant was paid weekly payments until the end of 2014 or beginning of 2015 when the prescribed amount limiting weekly payments was exhausted.
In March 2015 the Appellant elected to seek damages from the Respondent at common law for losses said to arise from the Second Injury. She commenced proceedings in the District…
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- Case
- [2020] WADC 118
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiff's prior judgment in the District Court action precluded him from making further applications in the WorkCover jurisdiction in respect of the same injury. The court had to interpret relevant statutory provisions to determine if the plaintiff's right to appeal was still available to him.
The court examined the principles of statutory construction, as outlined in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Mohammadi v Bethune, which emphasised the importance of interpreting statutory provisions in their context and purpose. The court noted that the primary objective of statutory construction is to construe provisions so that they are consistent with the language and purpose of the statute. In applying these principles, the court found that the statutory purpose must be discerned from what the legislation says, rather than any assumptions about the desired reach or operation of relevant provisions. The court also referred to section 18 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), which states that a construction promoting the purpose or object underlying the written law shall be preferred to one that would not.
In light of the statutory construction principles and the statutory purpose, the court determined that the plaintiff's prior judgment in the District Court action did not preclude him from making further applications in the WorkCover jurisdiction concerning the same injury. The court found that the plaintiff's right to appeal was still available to him, as the statutory provisions did not expressly or impliedly prohibit such an appeal.
The court ordered that the plaintiff's appeal against the arbitrator's decision was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the WorkCover Authority of Western Australia for further consideration.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The principles of statutory construction are well settled and are conveniently summarised in the following passage from the decision of Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection:[18]The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose … Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense … This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected.[18] SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362 [14] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle & Gordon JJ) (references omitted). Cited with approval in: Costa v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 200 [43] (Buss P & Mazza JA); Mohammadi v Bethune [2018] WASCA 98 [31] (judgment of the court). In Mohammadi v Bethune the Court of Appeal, after referring to this passage, added:[19]The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute ... The objective discernment of the statutory purpose is integral to contextual construction. The statutory purpose may be discerned from an express statement of purpose in the statute, inference from its text and structure and, where appropriate, reference to extrinsic materials … The purpose must be discerned from what the legislation says, as distinct from any assumptions about the desired or desirable reach or operation of relevant provisions … Discernment of statutory purpose is particularly significant in cases, commonly encountered, where the constructional choice presented is from 'a range of potential meanings, some of which may be less immediately obvious or more awkward than others, but none of which is wholly ungrammatical or unnatural' … In such a case, the choice 'turns less on linguistic fit than on evaluation of the relevant coherence of the alternatives with identified statutory objects or policies' …Thus, the material provisions of the Act must be understood, if possible, as parts of a coherent whole ...[19] Mohammadi [32] - [35] (references omitted). Further, in 'the interpretation of a provision of a written law, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the written law or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object'.[20][20] Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) (IA) s 18.