Suleski v Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   SULESKI -v- PILBARA IRON COMPANY (SERVICES) PTY LTD  [2018] WASCA 147

CORAM:   MURPHY JA

MITCHELL JA

BEECH JA

HEARD:   17 AUGUST 2018

DELIVERED          :   17 AUGUST 2018

PUBLISHED           :   24 AUGUST 2018

FILE NO/S:   CACV 92 of 2017

BETWEEN:   SPASE SULESKI

Appellant

AND

PILBARA IRON COMPANY (SERVICES) PTY LTD

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram:   HERRON DCJ

Citation: PILBARA IRON COMPANY (SERVICES) PTY LTD -v- SULESKI [2017] WADC 114

File Number             :   APP 71 of 2016


Catchwords:

Worker's Compensation - Disease caused by stress from discipline - Compensation not payable unless disease predominantly arose from discipline which was unreasonable and harsh on the part of the employer - Arbitrator concluded that the disease was predominantly caused by discipline which was unreasonable and harsh on the part of the employer - On appeal primary judge found that the arbitrator misapprehended the scope of the inquiry he was required to undertake - Where leave to appeal was required for the appeal to the District Court and leave could only be granted if the appeal involved a question of law - Whether appeal to District Court involved a question of law

Legislation:

Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA), s 5, s 18, s 247, s 254

Result:

Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : Mr J R Brooksby
Respondent : Mr D R Clyne

Solicitors:

Appellant : Slater & Gordon
Respondent : Jackson MacDonald

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Forrest & Forrest Pty Ltd v Minister for Mines and Petroleum [2017] WASCA 153; (2017) 51 WAR 425

Hossain v Minister for Immigration [2018] HCA 34

Jenkins v Western Australian Department of Training [1999] WASCA 199

Medical Board of Australia v Woollard [2017] WASCA 64; (2017) 51 WAR 32

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97; (2007) 33 WAR 361

REASONS OF THE COURT:

  1. At the conclusion of the hearing of this appeal, the court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal.  These are our reasons for making those orders.

  2. The appellant (Mr Suleski), was employed as a crane supervisor by the respondent (Pilbara Iron).  At a meeting with his superintendent on 22 August 2013, Mr Suleski was placed on a performance management plan.  He subsequently developed a disease, characterised as either an adjustment disorder or depressive disorder.  This disease rendered Mr Suleski totally incapacitated to perform work as a supervisor, and all forms of work involving heavy machinery.

  3. Section 18 of the Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) (Act) provides that, if an injury of a worker occurs, the employer shall, subject to the Act, be liable to pay compensation in accordance with sch 1 to the Act.

  4. 'Injury' is defined by s…

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Details
Case
[2018] WASCA 147
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Suleski v Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd was a case heard by the Supreme Court of Western Australia, which later moved to the District Court, concerning a claim for workers' compensation. The appellant, Suleski, claimed that a disease he developed was predominantly caused by stress from discipline that was unreasonable and harsh on the part of the employer, Pilbara Iron Company. The primary issue was whether the disease was predominantly caused by discipline that was unreasonable and harsh on the part of the employer, as required by statute. The arbitrator had concluded that the disease was predominantly caused by such discipline, but on appeal, the primary judge found that the arbitrator had misapprehended the scope of the inquiry he was required to undertake.

The central legal issue was whether the appeal to the District Court involved a question of law. The appeal to the District Court required leave, which could only be granted if the appeal involved a question of law. The court needed to determine whether the primary judge's decision involved a question of law, specifically whether the arbitrator's misapprehension of the scope of his inquiry constituted a jurisdictional error. The court examined whether the arbitrator's error could have made a difference to the ultimate decision and whether the misapprehension constituted a jurisdictional error. The court found that the question of whether the arbitrator exceeded his power by proceeding on the basis of a material misunderstanding of the scope of his inquiry was indeed a question of law.

The court concluded that none of the grounds of appeal had any reasonable prospect of succeeding, and thus refused leave to appeal. The court found that the primary judge's conclusions that the arbitrator failed to undertake the required inquiry and thus misunderstood the scope of the inquiry he was required to undertake were correct. The court dismissed the appeal, stating that the appeal did not involve a question of law as required by statute. The appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the primary judge was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

This additional ground is merely another way of formulating the question identified at [10] above. We do not accept the proposition made in this ground. A decision‑maker may err in law by misconstruing or misunderstanding the nature and scope of his or her power, irrespective of whether or not the material before the decision‑maker is capable of supporting his or her ultimate conclusion. A material misapprehension by a decision‑maker of the nature and limits of his or her power ordinarily constitutes a jurisdictional error.[20] So long as the misapprehension could have made a difference to the ultimate decision,[21] the existence of jurisdictional error will not ordinarily be denied by evidence which is merely capable of supporting the ultimate decision. In the present case, the question of whether the arbitrator exceeded his power by proceeding on the basis of a material misunderstanding of the scope of his inquiry is a question of law. [20] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332 [71]; Forrest & Forrest Pty Ltd v Minister for Mines and Petroleum [2017] WASCA 153; (2017) 51 WAR 425 [91]; Hossain v Minister for Immigration [2018] HCA 34 [29].[21] Hossain [30], [72]. Some of the supplementary written submissions and the oral submissions advanced on Mr Suleski's behalf appeared to contend that the primary judge erred in construing the Act and the arbitrator's reasons.[22] To that extent, the submissions extend beyond the grounds of appeal, as amended. In any event, nothing in the written and oral submissions advanced on behalf of Mr Suleski provides any proper basis for doubting the correctness of the primary judge's conclusion that, on its proper construction, the Act required the arbitrator to consider whether, in all of the circumstances looked at objectively, the discipline was unreasonable and harsh on the part of the employer. Nor do those submissions provide any proper basis for doubting the correctness of the primary judge's conclusions that the arbitrator failed to undertake such an inquiry, and thus misunderstood the scope of the inquiry he was required to undertake.[22] Appellant's Proposed Supplementary Submissions, par 12, 16, 19, 21, 27, 29; Appeal ts 6 - 7, 22, 30 - 32. Therefore, we refused leave to appeal under s 254(b) of the Act on the basis that none of the grounds of appeal have any reasonable prospect of succeeding, and dismissed the appeal.