De Aguiar v Villa Dalmacia Aged Care Association Inc
[2019] WADC 130
•20 SEPTEMBER 2019
JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: DE AGUIAR -v- VILLA DALMACIA AGED CARE ASSOCIATION INC [2019] WADC 130
CORAM: GLANCY DCJ
HEARD: 19 JUNE 2019
DELIVERED : 20 SEPTEMBER 2019
FILE NO/S: APP 20 of 2019
BETWEEN: DELFINA DE AGUIAR
Appellant
AND
VILLA DALMACIA AGED CARE ASSOCIATION INC
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : WORKERS' COMPENSATION ARBITRATION SERVICE (WA)
Coram: ARBITRATOR POWLES
File Number : A53022
Catchwords:
Worker's compensation - Appeal - Section 247 of the Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) - Question of law - Whether arbitrator failed to correctly apply the provisions of sch 1, cl 7 when read with s 18 and s 21 - Whether subsequent period of incapacity resulted from prior compensable injury - Meaning of 'results from' - Onus and standard of proof
Legislation:
Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA)
Result:
Leave to appeal dismissed
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Mr A J Stewart |
| Respondent | : | Mr C C Rimmer |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Chapmans Barristers & Solicitors |
| Respondent | : | Sparke Helmore Lawyers |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
BHP Biliton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Brady [2008] WASCA 250
Catholic Education Office of WA v Granitto [2012] WASCA 266
Kooragang Cement Pty Ltd v Bates (1994) 35 NSWLR 452
Leggett v Argyle Diamond Mines Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 182
Massih v Electricity Networks Corporation (t/as Western Power) [2016] WADC 146
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Al-Miahi [2001] FCA 744
Pacific Industrial Co v Jakovljevic [2008] WASCA 60
Pedley v West Coast College of TAFE [2006] WACC C21‑2006
Suleski v Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd [2018] WASCA 147
Treasure v WA Country Health Service [2010] WACC C17-2010
West v BGC Australia Pty Ltd [2019] WADC 20
Wilson v Bentley Health Service [2007] WACC C31‑2007
GLANCY DCJ:
Introduction
Ms De Aguiar, the appellant, was certified as having no capacity for work from 5 February 2018 - 8 April 2018. On 7 February 2019, Arbitrator Powles (the arbitrator) found Ms De Aguiar was not entitled to be paid weekly payments of compensation under the Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) (WCIMA) in relation to that period of incapacity on the basis that Ms De Aguiar had failed to prove to the requisite standard that the incapacity resulted from a compensable injury which she had sustained on 8 March 2016: De Aguiar v Villa Dalmacia Aged Care Association, (unreported, A53022 (Powles W) 7 February 2019).
Ms De Aguiar has appealed the arbitrator's decision.
Leave to appeal is required.
For the reasons set out below I would refuse leave to appeal.
Background
By way of background, it is not in dispute that:
1.On 8 March 2016, Ms De Aguiar was employed as an assistant in nursing/carer by the Villa Dalmacia Nursing Home (Villa Dalmacia).
2.On 8 March 2016, Ms De Aguiar injured her right hand and wrist in the course of her employment.
3.Villa Dalmacia accepted liability for a 'right hand sprain' injury and Ms De Aguiar received weekly payments of compensation pursuant to the WCIMA for the period she was unable to work as a result of that injury.
4.After about five weeks Ms De Aguiar returned to working her normal duties.
5.From September 2016 - April 2017 Ms De Aguiar was again certified as having no capacity for work. It was accepted that that period of incapacity was a result of the original compensable injury. Accordingly, Ms De Aguiar received compensation under the WCIMA for this period.
6.In April 2017, Ms De Aguiar returned to work and continued working until 5 February 2018. At that time she was again certified as having no capacity for work because of right wrist symptoms.
7.Ms De Aguiar claimed compensation under the WCIMA for the period from 5 February 2018 - 8 April 2018 on the basis that the incapacity was a result of the original compensable injury. She also claimed that medical and other statutory expenses related to the 8 March 2016 injury should be paid to her pursuant to cl 17 and cl 19 of sch 1 to the WCIMA.
8.Villa Dalmacia disputed that it was liable to compensate Ms De Aguiar. It said that her incapacity from 5 February 2018 - 8 April 2018 did not result from the original compensable injury.
9.On 7 February 2019, the arbitrator dismissed Ms De Aguiar's claim for compensation on the basis that there was not sufficient evidence to establish on the balance of probabilities, that the 2016 injury was a material contributing cause of the incapacity commencing in February 2018.
Grounds of appeal and orders sought
Ms De Aguiar says that the period of incapacity from 5 February 2018 - 8 April 2018 is compensable under the WCIMA because it results from the compensable injury which she suffered in 2016.
In her amended notice of appeal dated 6 May 2019, Ms De Aguiar raises one ground of appeal. It states:
The Arbitrator erred in law in wrongly interpreting and/or applying the provisions of Schedule 1, clause 7 of the WCIMA, when read with s.18 and s.21 of the WCIMA.
In her amended notice of appeal Ms De Aguiar sought orders that the decision made by the arbitrator on 7 February 2019 be quashed and that the matter be remitted to another arbitrator for determination according to law. At the hearing before me it was submitted that if the appeal is upheld I may be able to substitute my own decision for that of the arbitrator based on the medical evidence which was before the arbitrator.
Appeal book
The appellant did not file and serve an amended appeal book as was required by the order made by Registrar Kubacz on 7 May 2019.
Ultimately, at the hearing it was agreed that the appeal book dated 12 April 2019 but filed 15 April 2019 could stand as the appeal book for use in the appeal on the understanding that certain documents were to be treated as being excluded from it.[1]
[1] The documents which the parties agreed were to be excluded were A 6, A 22, A 29, A 31, A 35, A 49, A 66, the Work Focus/ Return to work documents pages 14 – 18, the applicant's further statement dated 2 February 2018 and par 38 of the applicant's witness statement dated 14 August 2018. It was agreed that these documents would not form part of the Appeal Book because they were not before the arbitrator.
Relevant provisions pf the WCIMA
Section 18 of the WCIMA, provides that an employer is liable to pay compensation 'if an injury to a worker occurs'. Compensation is to be paid in accordance with sch 1 to the WCIMA.
Section 21 of the WCIMA provides that an employer is liable to pay compensation under the Act from the date of incapacity resulting from the injury, but that cl 9 applies in any case.
Clause 9 of sch 1 provides as follows:
Where a total or partial incapacity for work does not result from the injury but the worker is obliged to obtain medical or surgical, dental, physiotherapy or chiropractic advice or treatment, clauses 17, 18, 18A and 19 apply in so far as they may be applicable.
The term 'injury' is defined in WCIMA s 5(1), as follows:
injury means -
(a)a personal injury by accident arising out of or in the course of the employment, or whilst the worker is acting under the employer's instructions; or
(b)a disease because of which injury occurs under section 32 or 33; or
(c)a disease contracted by a worker in the course of his employment at or away from his place of employment and to which the employment was a contributing factor and contributed to a significant degree; or
(d)the recurrence, aggravation, or acceleration of any pre-existing disease where the employment was a contributing factor to that recurrence, aggravation, or acceleration and contributed to a significant degree; or
(e)a loss of function that occurs in the circumstances in section 49,
but does not include a disease caused by stress if the stress wholly or predominantly arises from a matter mentioned in subsection (4) unless the matter is mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection and is unreasonable and harsh on the part of the employer;
Section 5(5) of the WCIMA provides:
In determining whether the employment contributed, or contributed to a significant degree, to the contraction, recurrence, aggravation or acceleration of a disease for purposes of the definitions of injury and relevant employment, the following shall be taken into account -
(a)the duration of the employment; and
(b)the nature of, and particular tasks involved in, the employment; and
(c)the likelihood of the contraction, recurrence, aggravation or acceleration of the disease occurring despite the employment; and
(d)the existence of any hereditary factors in relation to the contraction, recurrence, aggravation or acceleration of the disease; and
(e)matters affecting the worker's health generally; and
(f)activities of the worker not related to the employment.
Schedule 1 cl 7 of the WCIMA provides:
(1)Subject to section 56 and subclause (3), when total incapacity for work results from the injury a weekly payment during the incapacity equal to the weekly earnings of the worker calculated and varied in accordance with this Schedule.
(2)Subject to section 56 and subclause (3), where partial incapacity for work results from the injury, a weekly payment during the partial incapacity equal to the amount by which the total weekly earnings of the worker calculated and varied in accordance with this Schedule would exceed the weekly amount exclusive of payments for overtime or any bonus or allowance which he is earning or is able to earn in some suitable employment or business after the occurrence of the injury.
(3)An entitlement of a worker to weekly payments for an injury under this Act ceases if and when the total weekly payments for that injury reaches the prescribed amount, unless an arbitrator makes an order to the contrary under section 217, and there shall be no revival of, or increase in, that entitlement upon any subsequent increase in the prescribed amount.
(4)Nothing in subclause (3) affects the liability of an employer for, and the entitlement of a worker to, expenses as are provided for in clauses 9, 17, 18, 18A, and 19 but subject to the limitations on those expenses as provided in clauses 17(1) and 18A(1CA) and (1C).
(5)Unless otherwise authorised by WorkCover WA, compensation shall be paid by the employer to the worker at the employer's usual place of payment of wages on the employer's usual pay days or, at the request of the worker shall be sent by prepaid post to the worker's address.
(6)A worker when fulfilling any requirement of an arbitrator made under section 156B, is deemed for the purposes of this clause to be totally incapacitated.
Jurisdiction of this court to determine appeal
By WCIMA s 247(1), a party to a dispute before the arbitrator may, with the leave of the District Court, appeal to the District Court against a decision of the arbitrator where written reasons for the arbitrator's decision under pt XI are given to a party.
Section 247(2) of the WCIMA provides that, subject to s 247(3), the District Court is not to grant leave to appeal unless certain criteria are met. Those criteria include that an error of law is involved (WCIMA s 47(2)). In this case Ms De Aguiar says that a question of law is involved.
An appeal under s 247 of the WCIMA is by way of review of the decision appealed against: s 247(5). No fresh evidence, or evidence in addition to or substitution for the evidence received in relation to the decision appealed against can be given without the leave of the court (WCIMA s 247(6)).
No application to lead fresh evidence was made in this appeal.
In order for the appeal to succeed, the appellant must establish that the arbitrator has made an error of law: Catholic Education Office of WA v Granitto [2012] WASCA 266 [53] – [54]; BHP Biliton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Brady [2008] WASCA 250 [3].
Once an error involving a question of law has been identified, the District Court must then, by reason of WCIMA s 247(5), conduct a real review of the arbitrator's decision: Pacific Industrial Co v Jakovljevic [2008] WASCA 60 [20] – [25] (Wheeler JA); Catholic Education Office of WA v Granitto [2012] WASCA 266 [56] - [57] (Murphy JA).
As her Honour Judge Sweeney put it in West v BGC Australia Pty Ltd [2019] WADC 20 [10]:
… [o]nce this court decides that a question of law is involved and leave to appeal has been granted, the court is not limited to considering or reviewing errors of law. To so limit the review and preclude the reviews of error of fact is to confuse 'a necessary precondition to the grant of leave … with the task to be undertaken during the course of a review': Pacific Industrial Co v Jakovljevic [2008] WASCA 60, [19]. A review is not limited merely to the correction of errors of law, and is broader than an appeal in the strict sense: Pacific Industrial Co v Jakovljevic [20] – [26] (Wheeler JA) referring to the judgments of Kirby P in Boston Clothing Pty Ltd v Margaronis (1992) 27 NSWLR 580, 586 and Pullin JA in Sotico Pty Ltd v Wilson [2007] WASCA 112 [46]. That is to be contrasted to an appeal from this court to the Supreme Court pursuant to s 254 of the Act which provides that an appeal to that court 'must relate to a question of law' …
Where, following the grant of leave, a review is undertaken by the appellate court, the appellant must still provide a proper basis for disturbing the arbitrator's decision by demonstrating some error in it: Pacific Industrial v Jakovljevic [20], [26].
In order to establish that a question of law is involved, it is necessary to show that an error of law or an error of mixed law and fact has occurred. In that regard, several principles can be drawn from the relevant authorities, including Suleski v Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd [2018] WASCA 147 [19] and Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Al-Miahi [2001] FCA 744. Those principles can be expressed as follows:
1.a finding of fact in the absence of any supporting evidence is a question of law;
2.whether there is evidence of a fact is a question of law;
3.whether an inference can be drawn from facts is a question of law;
4.there is no error of law simply from the making of a wrong finding of fact;
5.want of logic is not synonymous with an error of law;
6.whether facts as found meet a statutory definition is a question of law;
7.taking into account irrelevant considerations is an error of law;
8.failing to take into account a relevant consideration is an error of law;
9.where a statute uses words according to their common understanding and the question is whether the facts found fall within these words, the question is a question of fact; and
10.where it is necessary to engage in a process of construction of the meaning of a word or phrase in a statute, a question of law will be involved but the question may be a mixed one of law and fact.
Onus of proof
Cases in the workers' compensation jurisdiction proceed on the basis that the worker has the burden to prove his or her claim on the balance of probabilities: Massih v Electricity Networks Corporation (t/as Western Power) [2016] WADC 146 [27] (Schoombee DCJ). Thus, in this case, Ms De Aguiar had the onus of proving on the balance of probabilities that her incapacity for work from 5 February 2018 - 8 April 2018 resulted from the original compensable injury which was occasioned on 8 March 2016 (i.e., the right wrist sprain).
In Massih her Honour Judge Schoombee also said [72] that where the employer seeks to contend that a pre-existing condition was the sole cause of incapacity, then the employer bears an evidentiary burden to show that there were pre-existing conditions which would have in any event resulted in the incapacity manifesting itself at that time.
Arbitrator's identification of applicable legal principles
The arbitrator set out what she regarded as being the applicable legal principles at [9] – [19] of her reasons. They are:
1.Pursuant to WCIMA s 18 and s 21, if an injury occurs, an employer is liable to pay compensation from the date of any incapacity for work which results from that injury.
2.The appellant carried the onus of proving on the balance of probabilities that:
a.she was incapacitated for work from 5 February 2018 – 8 April 2018; and
b.the incapacity resulted from the injury of 8 March 2016; and
c.she has needed treatment in connection with the 8 March 2016 injury for which she has incurred or is likely to incur reasonable medical and associated expenses.
3.A period of incapacity for work 'results from' a work-related injury if the injury is a material contributing cause of the incapacity. It need not be the only contributing cause: Leggett v Argyle Diamond Mines Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 182.
4.Whether the incapacity results from a work related injury is a question of fact to be decided on broad common sense lines. A common sense evaluation of the causal chain is what is required: Kooragang Cement Pty Ltd v Bates (1994) 35 NSWLR 452.
5.It is not necessary for there to have been a continuity of symptoms between the onset of an injury and the commencement of a period of incapacity although such continuity is capable of evidencing a causal connection: Pedley v West Coast College of TAFE [2006] WACC C21‑2006;
6.A worker is entitled to compensation if the effects of a compensable injury are aggravated by the presence of another disease, or if another disease is aggravated by the compensable injury: Wilson v Bentley Health Service [2007] WACC C31‑2007;
7.Napier v BHP Billiton (Worsley Alumina) Pty Ltd [2015] WASCA 230 which is the definitive authority on the interpretation of WCIMA sch 1 cl 17 provides:
(i)the relevant medical or surgical treatment must be by a medical practitioner for the purpose of alleviating, remedying, curing or preventing the deterioration of the injury (as defined in s 5(1) of the WCIMA) of the worker which is compensable under the WCIMA or any symptoms or effects wholly or partly caused by or attributable to the compensable injury ([108] (Buss JA) and [127] (Newnes JA)); and
(iii)that for an entitlement to expenses, the expense that has been or is likely to be incurred must be reasonable. For it to be reasonable it must have a connection with the compensable injury. The connection is a necessary, but not of itself sufficient, condition of reasonableness ([12] (McClure P)).
Evidence before the arbitrator
The arbitrator reviewed the medical evidence at [37] – [61] of her reasons. Ms De Aguiar does not submit that the arbitrator misunderstood that evidence or failed to take into account any relevant medical evidence.
The arbitrator found by reference to the medical evidence that in 2016 Ms De Aguiar was diagnosed with a right wrist sprain and that after becoming incapacitated for work in 2018 she was diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis in her right and left wrists. She found that rheumatoid arthritis was a contributing factor to her incapacity in 2018 (reasons [92]). The arbitrator found that Ms De Aguiar had responded well to the treatment for the arthritis (reasons [91]).
The arbitrator also had regard to Ms De Aguiar's own evidence about her symptoms since 2016. She gave evidence as to the continuing symptoms in her right wrist between the occurrence of the compensable injury in 2016 and the period of incapacity for work in 2018.
Ms De Aguiar's evidence and the arbitrator's findings in respect of it are set out at [80] – [87] of the reasons. The arbitrator noted that on 22 January 2018 the symptoms which Ms De Aguiar described were 'slightly different from those previously documented by her GP' and at that time included swelling of the right wrist and reduced movement, whereas no swelling had been reported in March 2016.
Arbitrator's reasons and conclusion
The arbitrator considered Ms De Aguiar's evidence. She expressly acknowledged that Ms De Aguiar's evidence of continuing symptoms in her right wrist between the occurrence of the compensable injury and her incapacity in 2018 was capable of establishing a causal connection between the injury and the later period of incapacity. The arbitrator acknowledged that the compensable injury does not have to be the sole cause of the period of incapacity. The arbitrator accepted that where there are multiple causes of incapacity the question to be determined is whether the compensable injury is a material contributing cause.
The arbitrator found that in this case Ms De Aguiar's evidence was not adequate to establish a causal connection between the injury and the later period of incapacity for the following reasons:
1.The appellant's description of symptoms was vague and non‑specific. The arbitrator said 'it is possible her symptoms of aching and pain to her right wrist were like those she suffered when the injury occurred, it is also possible her symptoms were like those she has because she has rheumatoid arthritis' (reasons [88]);
2.Apart from the period of accepted recurrence of incapacity as a result of the compensable injury, there is no contemporaneous evidence where a doctor has described ongoing symptoms like those she experienced at the time of the occurrence of the injury. In February 2018, Dr Jarrett reported that Ms De Aguiar's symptoms were subtly different and noticeably more severe than previously (reasons [89]);
3.The non-specific symptoms, which were not supported by contemporaneous medical evidence, were not sufficient to establish a causal connection between the injury and the later period of incapacity (reasons [90]);
4.In November 2018, Ms De Aguiar's right wrist symptoms had responded to the medication she was prescribed for her rheumatoid arthritis and her wrist was not swollen; she had normal range of movement, was back at work and coping satisfactorily (reasons [91]).
The arbitrator then dealt with the medical evidence which had been adduced by both parties and found that there was no persuasive evidence before her from a medical practitioner expressing an opinion that Ms De Aguiar's compensable injury contributed to her incapacity for work in 2018 (reasons [98]).
The arbitrator then concluded that Ms De Aguiar had not established that her incapacity during the period from 5 February 2018 - 8 April 2018 resulted from her compensable 2016 injury. Consequently she dismissed Ms De Aguiar's application for weekly payments of compensation (reasons [102]).
The arbitrator dismissed Ms De Aguiar's claim for statutory expenses because Ms De Aguiar had not advised of the nature of the medical or other expenses claims and had not adduced any accounts or invoices into evidence (reasons [104]). This meant that the arbitrator was unable to make any finding that there were reasonable medical or other expenses that she had incurred or is likely to incur for treatment required as a result of her compensable injury (reasons [104] – [105]).
Ms De Aguiar's complaint about the application of the principles to the facts
While Ms De Aguiar submits the arbitrator erred in law by wrongly interpreting the provisions of sch 1 cl 7 (read with WCIMA s 18 and s 21), it is not said that any of the legal principles set out in her reasons were wrong.
Rather, Ms De Aguiar's submission is that the arbitrator failed to apply the 'results from' test. That is, Ms De Aguiar contends that the arbitrator failed to apply the correct test for determining whether a period of incapacity for work 'results from' a compensable injury. Ms De Aguiar submits that the failure arose from the arbitrator's failure to apply the principles set out by Commissioner McCann (as he then was) in Wilson and Treasure v WA Country Health Service [2010] WACC C17-2010 which, Ms De Aguiar submits, 'nails down the practicalities' of how the principles in Kooragan and Leggett are to be applied.[2]
[2] ts 3 (19 June 2019).
Ms De Aguiar relies upon the following passage from Commissioner McCann's judgment in Wilson:
However, it is necessary to bear in mind that the distinction is not always a clear one, because an employer is required to take the worker as it finds him (see Compensations Magistrate Hogan at [30] citing Latham CJ in Ward v Corrimal-Balgownie Colliers Ltd (1938) 61 CLR 120) as a result of which the worker is entitled to compensation if the effects of a compensable injury are aggravated by the presence of a pre‑existing disease, or if a pre-existing disease is aggravated by the compensable injury. In those situations the compensable injury in its broad, metamorphic state is capable of being 'a starting point' for incapacitating sequalae, just as the back injury was a starting point in Kooragang, and those sequelae are prima facie compensable.
Ms De Aguiar also relies upon the following statement of Commissioner McCann in Treasure (at [7]):
The ratio decidendi of Leggett itself is that a period of incapacity is causally connected to a compensable injury, notwithstanding there is an interval between them and the symptoms of the injury settled during that interval, provided that the injury materially contributed to the incapacity.
Ms De Aguiar submits that the arbitrator failed to view the accepted wrist injury in its 'broad, metamorphic state' as being the starting point of the enquiry and thereafter to carry out a common sense evaluation of the causal chain. Instead she submits that the arbitrator erroneously looked for a direct or proximate link between the wrist symptoms complained of in 2018 and the 2016 injury, which the arbitrator framed as a 'right hand sprain injury'. Ms De Aguiar says that in doing so, the arbitrator failed to properly analyse the true nature of the work injury and to consider whether the rheumatoid arthritis suffered by the appellant could be said to be 'incapacitating sequelae'. It is submitted that the arbitrator unnecessarily and erroneously focused on the question of whether the symptoms suffered in 2018 were similar or identical to those suffered in 2016.
Ms De Aguiar submits that compensation is payable if the effects of the injury are aggravated by the presence of a pre-existing disease or if a pre-existing disease is aggravated by the compensable injury unless her incapacitated state was an inevitable consequence of the pre‑existing disease: in which case the causal connection will be too attenuated or severed.[3]
[3] ts 10 – 11 (19 June 2019).
Ms De Aguair submits that, having found that arthritis was a contributing cause of her incapacity, the arbitrator was wrong to then ask whether it was a material contributing cause. Ms De Aguiar submits that, in order for a worker to be successful in such circumstances, she merely had to show that the pre-existing condition had some effect on the compensable injury, alternatively, if the compensable injury had an effect on the pre‑existing condition, then the employer must show that the pre‑existing condition (or other injury or condition) is the sole cause of the incapacity.[4]
[4] ts 13 (19 May 2019).
Conclusion
It is clear from the passage of former Commissioner McCann in Treasure quoted above that, contrary to Ms De Aguiar's submission, a period of subsequent incapacity is compensable only if the original compensable injury materially contributed to the incapacity.
It can be seen from the above that the arbitrator correctly identified the legal test to be applied in determining whether Ms De Aguiar's incapacity for work in 2018 resulted from her compensable injury in 2016.
It is also apparent that the arbitrator recognised that it was possible that the later injury resulted from the former but was not so satisfied on the balance of probabilities. The arbitrator's finding that Ms De Aguiar had not established a causal connection between the 2016 injury and the 2018 period of incapacity was open on the evidence before her. That was a finding of fact rather than a conclusion of law. Consequently, the finding is not able to be challenged in these proceedings.
No error of law having been identified in the arbitrator's decision, leave to appeal must be refused.
Costs
There is no reason why costs should not follow the event.
Orders
In light of the above I propose to make the following orders:
1.Leave to appeal is refused.
2.The appellant do pay the respondent's costs to be taxed if not agreed.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia.
CH
Associate to Judge Glancy19 SEPTEMBER 2019
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