SZULD v Minister for Immigration
[2017] FCCA 2194
•14 September 2017
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| SZULD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2017] FCCA 2194 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – application by Nepalese citizen for a protection visa – Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed Delegate’s decision not to grant a protection visa – Applicant asserted Administrative Appeals Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by misunderstanding or misinterpreting the meaning of the term “charge” in a criminal law context – Administrative Appeals Tribunal did not misunderstand or misinterpret the term – no jurisdictional error – application for judicial review dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.36 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) |
| Cases cited: Arnell v Harris [1945] KB 60; [1944] 2 All ER 522 |
| Applicant: | SZULD |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1439 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Dowdy |
| Hearing date: | 8 November 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 14 September 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr R W Killalea |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Kazi & Associates |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr T Reilly |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | DLA Piper |
THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ARE AS FOLLOWS
The Second Amended Application filed in this Court on 8 November 2016 is dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1439 of 2014
| SZULD |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The Applicant in this proceeding is a male citizen of Nepal aged 33 years, having been born on 14 February 1984.
By Second Amended Application filed in this Court at the final hearing on 8 November 2016 he seeks to quash and have redetermined a decision of the Second Respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (at the time of decision the Refugee Review Tribunal) (Tribunal) dated 30 April 2014 which affirmed the decision of the Delegate (Delegate) of the First Respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Minister) dated 29 November 2013 refusing to grant to him a Protection (Class XA) visa (Protection visa).
The Applicant using a Nepali passport arrived in Australia from Kathmandu on 27 April 2013 on a Visitor (Subclass 600) visa.
He applied for a Protection visa, the subject of these proceedings, on 5 July 2013.
Relevant Criteria and Law Applicable to Protection Visa Applications
A convenient summary of the grounds and criteria for the grant of a Protection visa can be found in the judgment of Wigney J in SZUIJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1574 at [5]-[7] as follows:
[5]The criteria for the grant of a protection visa are well known. At the time the appellant applied for a protection visa, s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958(Cth) provided that a criterion for a protection visa was that the appellant was a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister was satisfied Australia had protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. In simple terms, Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention in respect of a person who is outside their country of origin and who is unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country, or to return there, on account of them having a well-founded fear of persecution based on reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.
[6]Section 36(2)(aa) of the Act provided an alternative criterion known generally as the complementary protection criterion. A person met the complementary protection criterion if the Minister was satisfied that Australia had protection obligations because the Minister had substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there was a real risk that the non-citizen would suffer significant harm.
[7]The remaining subsections of s 36 and subdivision AL of the Act contained additional provisions about protection visas, including provisions that defined or explained various expressions used in s 36(2)(a) and (aa), such as “significant harm” and “persecution”.
Claims for Protection
The Applicant claimed that while studying in Nepal from 2004 to 2007 he actively supported the Ristrya Parjatantra Party (RPP). He had converted to Christianity in 2003 and travelled around Nepal as a missionary to spread the gospel. He left the RPP due to its extremist pro–Hindu views and because the RPP is an enemy of Christians in Nepal. He claimed to have many enemies in Nepal due to his religious and political affiliations.
He further claimed that in December 2012 he was working with a Korean volunteer team (Korean NGO) providing hydro, wind and solar electricity for poor people in a remote village in Nepal. This was the home area of a Mr Kamal Thapa. The locals in this remote village were drawn to Christianity because the Korean NGO were doing the work in the name of Christ and for this reason, together with the fact that the Applicant was a Christian and had left the RPP, he became the enemy of Mr Kamal Thapa and his cadre who reported him to the police. He was charged by the police with forcible conversion of Hindus to Christianity and paying a bribe (charge). The Applicant claimed that although Nepal’s 2007 interim Constitution protected religious freedom the Government and authorities do not actually respect this freedom and proselytising is prohibited.
In section 48 of his written Protection visa application the Applicant stated as follows:
I AM CHARGED WITH “FORCEFULLY CONVERTING HINDU TO CHRISTIANITY AND PAYING BRIBE” WHICH IS AGAINST NEPALI LAW. ONCE YOU CHARGED IN NEPAL POLICE WILL BIT YOU TO DEATH UNTIL YOU AGREE EVERYTHINGS THEY WANT.
In a written statement forming part of his Protection visa application he said that RRP members were very angry with him and wanted to be supreme in the remote village and obtain a hundred percent of the vote in an election. He said of them:
So they reported to me to the police and I was charged with “Forcefully converting Hindus to Christianity and paying bribe”. I was also accused that I destroy the harmony in the village, bring foreign religion in the village and destroy the peace”.
Decision of Delegate
The Applicant attended an interview with the Delegate on 22 November 2013.
In the result the Delegate found that as a Nepalese citizen the Applicant had a prima facie right to enter and reside in a third country, being India, as a result of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between those two nations and that s.36(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) therefore applied.
Section 36(3) of the Act provides as follows:
(3) Australia is taken not to have protection obligations in respect of a non-citizen who has not taken all possible steps to avail himself or herself of a right to enter and reside in, whether temporarily or permanently and however that right arose or is expressed, any country apart from Australia, including countries of which the non-citizen is a national.
Further, the Delegate found that s.36(3) of the Act was not rendered inapplicable because of s.36(4), (5) or (5A). The Delegate found that the Applicant did not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Refugees Convention reason in India or that there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm in India for the purposes of s.36(4). The Delegate also found that the Applicant did not have a well-founded fear that India would return the Applicant to another country where he would be persecuted for a Refugees Convention reason for the purposes of s.36(5) or that India would return the Applicant to another country where there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm for the purposes of s.36(5A).
Accordingly the Delegate was not satisfied that the Applicant was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations under s.36 of the Act and cl.866.221 of Sch. 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations) and refused to grant him a Protection visa.
Decision of Tribunal
The Applicant applied to the Tribunal on 26 December 2013 for a merits review of the Delegate’s decision.
On 24 April 2014 the Applicant appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments with the assistance of an interpreter in the Nepali and English languages.
From [22] – [38] of its Decision Record the Tribunal considered the Applicant’s claims for protection in Nepal involving both his religion and political opinion. In particular, in relation to the claim by the Applicant that he had been charged by police at the instigation of RRP members while he was working in the remote village with the Korean NGO, the Tribunal stated at [34] – [35] of its Decision Record as follows:
[34]I asked how long it was between the project ending and the charges being filed. I noted that in his statement he said he was charged. The applicant said that the project had finished and he had returned to Lalitpur for Christmas preparations. He said that there had been threats. He had then returned to Makawanpur alone to check on plans for a fourth project. He said that there had been threats during the project and two Christian people from there were beaten.
[35]I asked the applicant what he had been charged with. There was continuing confusion over this question. The applicant said that a case had been filed against him and he also said that a claim had been publicly made against him by the Police. When I asked quite specifically if he had actually been charged with an offence he said yes. I asked if he [had] gone to Court. He repeated that a complaint had been filed. I said that I understood that this was a common procedure in Nepal. I asked again if he had been charged by a Court. The applicant said that the charge was with the police and so the police filed it. He said the Nepalese police could do anything and then there was potential for the politician, Thapa, to influence the case. I said that it appeared from his responses that there had been no Court appearance. The applicant said that there had not been. I asked the applicant if he had ever been detained by the police. He said that he had not been. The applicant said that he went into hiding and he came to know later that the police had come to his house. I asked whom he was informed by. He said it was his family. I noted again that despite the claims made he had not been detained or charged with any offence. He said that he had not been because he was in hiding. He said that his family had been threatened.
In the result the Tribunal concluded at [39] that there were issues which raised doubts about the credibility of the Applicant’s claims for protection in Nepal. However it did not consider it necessary to reach conclusions as to whether Australia had protection obligations to the Applicant under either the Refugees Convention criterion or the complementary protection criterion ground based upon his claims in relation to returning to Nepal because of s.36(3) of the Act to which the Tribunal then turned its attention. Paragraph [39] of its Decision Record stated as follows:
[39]Overall, there are issues which raise doubts about the credibility of the applicant’s claims. In particular I note that the applicant has claimed to have had charges filed against him in Nepal but under questioning confirmed that he had not been to Court to answer any charges. I note his convoluted explanation about files being opened but find there is no evidence that he was of any interest to the authorities because of his work with the Korean NGO or as a Christian. However, for reasons concerning the availability to the applicant of safe third country protection I have not found it necessary to reach conclusion as to whether Australia has protection obligations towards the applicant under the ‘refugee’ criterion or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds based upon his claimed fear of returning to Nepal.
(emphasis supplied)
I take the emphasised part of [39] of the Tribunal decision to constitute a factual finding by the Tribunal that, whatever the type or nature of the charge allegedly brought by the police against the Applicant arising out of his claimed adherence to the Christian religion and his work with the Korean NGO, nothing arising out of these claims satisfied the Tribunal that the Applicant was of any interest to the Nepalese authorities.
Then at [52] of its Decision Record the Tribunal found that the Applicant had “a right to enter and reside in” India within the meaning of s.36(3) of the Act. Mr Killalea, who appeared for the Applicant expressly accepted in the Applicant’s written submissions filed on 24 March 2013 that the Applicant “does not dispute that he may freely enter and remain in India as a citizen of Nepal”.
At [54] – [59] of its Decision Record the Tribunal considered whether for the purposes of s.36(4) of the Act the Applicant might be persecuted for reasons of his religion in India, but for the reasons stated in those paragraphs it found at [59] that it was satisfied that there was not a real chance that he would be persecuted now or in the reasonably foreseeable future for reason of his religion and that his fear of persecution in India was not well founded.
At [60] – [62] of its Decision Record the Tribunal considered whether or not by reason of his political opinion the Applicant would be persecuted now or in the reasonably foreseeable future in India but concluded that the risk to the Applicant in India, because of his political opinion, was farfetched, remote or insubstantial.
At [63] – [69] the Tribunal considered whether or not for any reason the Applicant would face a real risk that he would suffer significant harm in India but concluded that he would not and at [69] found that s.36(4) did not render s.36(3) inapplicable.
At [70] – [80] of its Decision Record the Tribunal considered whether or not for the purposes of s.36(5) and s.36(5A) of the Act India might return the Applicant to Nepal. These paragraphs are also to be read with page 217 of the Court Book which forms part of the summary of the Tribunal hearing contained in Attachment C to the Decision Record.
At [71] and [73] – [76] of its Decision Record the Tribunal recorded further exploration with the Applicant of the charge.
In the result the Tribunal was not satisfied that the Applicant had a well founded fear that India would return him to Nepal either for a Refugees Convention reason or a reason which satisfied the complementary protection criterion. The Tribunal found that the Applicant had the right to enter and reside in India and as a result Australia did not have protection obligations to the Applicant and it affirmed the Delegate’s decision not to grant to the Applicant a Protection visa.
Grounds of Attack on Tribunal Decision in this Court
At the hearing Mr Killalea confined his attack on the Tribunal decision by reference to the Second Amended Application, as follows:
3. The decision of the Tribunal was attended by jurisdictional error as the Tribunal failed to take into account that the applicant’s return might be sought by the Nepalese police if he was in India although not convicted in Nepal:
Particulars
i. Decision CB200, [73], [77]
ii.failed to raise with the applicant that the Tribunal; considered that a person was charged with an offence only if brought before a Court in respect of such an offence; and/or
iii.wrongly proceeded to decision having determined that the applicant was not credible because he had claimed to be charged with offences although he had not been brought before a Court in respect of those offences whereas the case is that a person is charged with an offence before being brought before a Court (if at all)
Particulars
To be drawn from Auscript transcript (being Exhibit D in the proceeding).
In short, I understood Mr Killalea to submit in both his oral and written submissions that the Tribunal acted under the erroneous misapprehension that for a person to be “charged” he or she had to appear in Court pursuant to the charge, whereas in truth a person could be “charged” without ever having to appear in Court or actually being convicted. Here, so it was said, the Tribunal erred in being fixated on whether the Applicant had actually appeared in Court or been convicted and did not consider whether or not India might return the Applicant to Nepal on the basis of a complaint or charge that did not result in the Applicant appearing in Court or being convicted.
In particular Mr Killalea submitted that the transcript of the Tribunal hearing at TP 20.19-20 (reproduced in [36] below) established that the Tribunal member was of the belief and opinion that for a person to be “charged” that person had to actually be required to physically attend before the relevant Court to answer the charge.
Affect and Meaning of a “Charge” in Australian Law
It is trite law that there is a clear distinction between a person being charged with a criminal offence and being convicted of a criminal offence.
The charging of a person with a criminal offence, and even the committal for trial for the offence, is incapable of impugning or bearing upon the credit of the person charged. The fact that a person has been charged with the commission of a criminal offence merely evidences that the informant or the person or persons responsible for laying the charge is of the belief that the person has committed the offence. The fact that a person has been charged is no evidence that person has committed the relevant offence: see R v Roberts (2004) 9 VR 295 at 326 [77] and DPP v Newman (2015) 45 VR 302 at 308 [25].
The meaning of the word “charge” in a criminal context carries a degree of ambiguity. In R v D’Eyncourt (1888) 21 QBD 109 at 119 Field J considered that it required a person charged to appear in Court. He said:
I am of opinion that the word “charged” [in s.29 of the Metropolitan Police Courts Act 1839] must be read in its known legal sense, namely, the solemn act of calling before a magistrate an accused person and stating, in his hearing, in order that he may defend himself what is the accusation against him.
Lord Simon LC in Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315 at 323-324 was of a like view:
In para (f) of s.1 of the [Criminal Evidence] Act of 1898 the word “charged” appears five times and it is plain that its meaning in the section is “accused before a court” and not merely “suspected or accused without prosecution”. When the appellant denied that he had ever been “charged” he may fairly be understood to use the word in the sense it bears in the statute and to mean that he had never previously been brought before a criminal court.
In Arnell v Harris [1945] KB 60 at 63 Humphreys J said:
“‘The person charged’ has various different meanings….
And then proceeded to give certain examples.
However, in Gabriel v Williamson (1979) 1 NTR 6 at 14 Toohey J left open whether the work “charged” required an appearance before a Court. He said:
There was some debate at the hearing as to whether “charged” meant the filing of a complaint or whether it involved service of a summons as well. In my view the expression requires not only that a complaint be lodged but that, at least, it be brought to the attention of the defendant by service. That is consistent with the views expressed in Arnell v Harris [1945] KB 60 at 63; [1944] 2 All ER 522, and R v Norfolk quarter Sessions; Ex parte Brunson [1953] 1 QB 503 at 510-11; [1953] 1 All ER 346. Whether it requires his appearance before a court it is unnecessary to decide.
Whilst the above paragraphs concern the distinction in Australian law between a conviction and a mere charge, any rational system of law would inevitably recognise the same distinction.
Tribunal’s Treatment of the Applicant’s Claim to have been “Charged”
In my view it was legitimate and reasonable for the Tribunal, in carrying out its inquisitorial function in considering the Applicant’s claims for protection, to question and explore with the Applicant the type and nature of the charge to which he claimed to have been subject. The Tribunal was entitled to seek to understand what the Applicant actually meant to convey by his claim to have been “charged”. This is what it sought to do in the following relevant portions of the transcript of the Tribunal hearing:
Mr Godfrey: …… So tell me about – it’s not clear from the statements that you made because you said that you were actually charged but you’ve also said that a case was filed against you, which is a different thing. So could you tell me what actually happened? Was there a charge – a complaint made against you or did you actually get charged with an offence?
Interpreter: So actually it wasn’t a complaint. It was actually a case filed against me ..... charged that I was – I was trying to publicise Christianity and – and was trying to convert the people from the village into Christianity forcibly. So the other workers were beaten and almost dead but since I was in another village I – and though I had been receiving death threats one of the brother has .....
Mr Godfrey: So I’m just trying to understand here. Were you actually ever officially charged with any offence?
Interpreter: Yes. And it was proven at that time when I had .....
Mr Godfrey: Sorry. I just want to – so just slowly. Just ..... to make sure I’m understanding – you were charged. Were you charged in a court? You had to actually attend a court and answer the charges.
Interpreter: This charge was .....
Mr Godfrey: Yes. Okay. There’s a big difference as you, I’m sure, know in Nepal and elsewhere of having something that’s filed – a charge filed with the police and actually then having to attend the court and actually defend the charge. So I’m asking if you actually had to attend the court and defend the charge.
Interpreter: The charge was with the police – knowing that the police and – sorry, the police filed the case. So those people who were after all this were also people of ..... Party and because he was a ..... before and ..... was very powerful. It’s the culture of Nepal that people who are in power .....
Mr Godfrey: I can understand what you’re saying but what you appear to be telling me though is that the police had a complaint made against you but you were never ever brought to a court to actually answer the charge. Is that right?
Interpreter: No. Because in Nepal – the way it happens is they make you do what they want you to do and if you don’t agree to that you are locked in the prison in .....
Mr Godfrey: Were you ever detained by the police?
Interpreter: Sorry?
Mr Godfrey: Were you ever detained by the police?
Interpreter: No, I escaped from there and we tried ..... I know that they have been to my house many times.
Mr Godfrey: And we’re talking about this happening in a village some distance away. Are you saying that these people from that police station came to your house .....
Interpreter: So we had informed other police because I was in other place so they informed the police and the police from the ..... as well and then I came to know that they had come looking for me but I was trying – but I was hiding myself as I was ..... friends to
Mr Godfrey: But you were never formally charged with any offence?
Interpreter: So I was informed that police had come to my house searching for me and they had informed that it was a dangerous case that I was involved in and they had circulated this everywhere.
(TP20.1 – 21.17)
………………………………………………………
Mr Godfrey: We’ve established in the discussion earlier on that you haven’t been convicted of any offence in Nepal. Are the – do you – if you were to go to India, do you have any fears that the Indian government would try to return you forcibly to Nepal?
Interpreter: So, according to the Constitution of Nepal, there was something else in the Constitution but they had told me something else, and that way the case that was cited against me it was taken as admission. And maybe because of my previous political career and the hands of the ..... political leaders and also because of my involvement in Christianity regarding publicising about Christianity, and things like this.
Mr Godfrey: ..... talking about the Constitution of Nepal. But you’re talking about whether the Indian government would return you to Nepal.
Interpreter: Maybe ..... once they are politically stable, because they hurt people everywhere for their political parties. And even, like, they have the various organisations at international level for their various political parties. And also because of the ..... it’s easy, but at the same time it’s very unsafe as well.
Mr Godfrey: I just want to pick up on something you said. When we were discussing this question earlier, you said that a case had been filed that there had been no conviction, not even a conviction in absentia, so I don’t accept what you’re telling me about the case being a conviction.
Interpreter: So you’ve had me ..... new country. There is the internal Constitution in place now. ..... the police is in charge of everything. For example, filing the case and deciding or taking the person in custody and things like that.
Mr Godfrey: Yes. But none of that happened. You weren’t taken into custody.
Interpreter: Yes. I wasn’t taken, but there are a number of cases where they have kept people behind the bars, and because of their strong connection to politicians and the support they get from them.
Mr Godfrey: Yes. But the important thing is you weren’t. For your case, the important thing is that you weren’t taken into custody.
Interpreter: Not me, but my other supporters ..... they were taken into custody, but I escaped.
(TP26.46 – 27.38)
………………………………………………………
Mr Godfrey: But you had to go through the airport yourself. And as you know from experts, you were checked in the airport. Your passports are checked. Everything is checked. And if the police were looking for you – see, this is where – this is where I’m having difficulty accepting the story. I – I accept that everything up – with the – with the NGO – all that activity. I’m aware of people who have been arrested in ..... for doing – for proselytising. I’m aware of all of that. But I’m not seeing a direct linkage between you and these events. And I’m not finding convincing what you’re telling me about the police complaint. When you say registered as a public case, that sounds a little more than what happens as I understand it, where somebody can go into a police station and say, “I have a complaint against this person,” and it’s recorded. That’s – that happens as a matter of routine, as I’m sure you know. So are you – you seem to be suggesting something more serious than that has happened.
(TP30.22– 30.34)
I do not consider that the questioning and exploration by the Tribunal of the Applicant as disclosed in the transcript of the Tribunal hearing indicates that the Tribunal had a closed mind or settled view as to what the term “charge” denoted or signified. Rather the Tribunal was seeking to legitimately explore with the Applicant what he actually claimed to have happened to him at the time that he claimed to have been “charged”, in an effort to gauge its seriousness and significance for the Applicant’s claims for protection. In my view there was nothing “capricious” or “irrational” or “lacking in evident or intelligible justification” in the Tribunal so conducting itself.
At [34]-[35] of its Decision Record (see [17] above) the Tribunal recorded the substance of its questioning of the Applicant at the hearing in connection with the charge and at [39] the Tribunal found that the Applicant was of no interest to the Nepalese authorities: see [18]-[19] above. This general finding subsumed and impliedly rejected his claimed fear of harm arising out of the charge if he returned to Nepal.
At [71] the Tribunal recorded that the Applicant agreed that he had not been convicted of any offence in Nepal but nevertheless contended that the case against him in Nepal was the equivalent of a conviction.
At [73]-[78] under the heading of “Credibility Issues” the Tribunal again considered the charge. At [73] the Tribunal recorded that it did not accept the Applicant’s claim of fear of return by India to Nepal because of the “charge in Nepal” as credible, as there had been no conviction recorded against him while the Applicant was in Nepal and no conviction in absentia since he had left Nepal. In my view it was legally reasonable for the Tribunal to make a distinction between a charge being laid and an actual conviction consequent upon a charge and in giving weight to the fact that, as the Applicant had not been convicted, there was nothing to suggest that the Indian authorities would return the Applicant to Nepal.
At [76] the Tribunal recorded its querying of the Applicant about whether or not there was any documentary evidence that a “case” had ever been registered against him in Nepal and questioned why he had not been arrested at Kathmandu Airport on his departure if there had been any charge previously made against him.
In the result at [79] the Tribunal recorded that it was not satisfied that the Applicant had a well-founded fear that India would return him to Nepal or any other country.
It is clear that the Tribunal had substantial concerns about the credibility of the Applicant’s claims to have been “charged” in Nepal. However, it was not necessary for the Tribunal in its Decision Record to express a finding that his claims in this regard were false or that he had lied about them: Minister for Immigration v SZNPG (2010) 115 ALD 303 at [24]-[26] per North, Lander and Katzmann JJ. The Tribunal gave the Applicant a full opportunity to persuade it that there had been some sort of case brought against him in Nepal. The Tribunal put to the Applicant its difficulties about this claim to him, including whether the Applicant had been to Court and whether he had any documentary evidence about the case and why, if there had been such a case, he had been able to leave Kathmandu Airport using his own passport.
In the result it was sufficient for the Tribunal to find and record that, whatever might be the position about the charge in Nepal, there was no evidence that he was of any interest to the Nepalese authorities because of his work with the Korean NGO or as a Christian and that nothing in relation to the charge or case meant that India would return him to Nepal. In coming to these conclusions the Tribunal did not commit jurisdictional error.
Conclusion
The Applicant has failed to establish that the decision of the Tribunal was affected by jurisdictional error and the Second Amended Application filed in this Court is to be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Dowdy
Date: 14 September 2017
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