FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Russell v Polites Investments Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 11
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 11
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the mere filing of an appeal constituted "other sufficient cause" under Section 52(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) to prevent the making of a sequestration order. Additionally, the court had to assess whether the appeals themselves had any substantive merit that could constitute "other sufficient cause". The court needed to determine if there was an abuse of process or a stifling of litigation by the appellant.
The court found that no error was discernible in the Federal Magistrate’s decision. It held that the filing of the notices of appeal did not constitute "other sufficient cause" under the statute. Furthermore, the court found that there was no substantive merit in the appeals themselves. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, and the costs were awarded to Polites Investments Pty Ltd, certified fit for Counsel. The decision confirmed that the appellant's appeal was without merit, and the Federal Magistrate's ruling was upheld.
ORDERS:
1. The Interlocutory Application filed on 25 October 2011 is dismissed.
2. The Notice of Appeal filed on 14 July 2011 is dismissed.
3. The Appellant is to pay the costs of the Respondent, certified fit for Counsel.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Interlocutory Application filed on 25 October 2011 is dismissed.
2. The Notice of Appeal filed on 14 July 2011 is dismissed.
3. The Appellant is to pay the costs of the Respondent, certified fit for Counsel.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case came before the court following an appeal by Mr Russell against an earlier decision by a Federal Magistrate. The Federal Magistrate had dismissed Mr Russell's application for an adjournment of the hearing of the creditor's petition. Mr Russell then filed a Notice of Appeal on 14 July 2011. An Interlocutory Application was subsequently filed on 25 October 2011, which was also dismissed by the Federal Magistrate. The appeal against the Federal Magistrate's decisions was heard by the court, which considered the merits of the appeals and the application for adjournment.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appeal is to be dismissed. THE MAKING OF A SEQUESTRATION ORDER – GENERAL PRINCIPLES Section 52 of the Bankruptcy Act1966 (Cth), the section of immediate relevance to the present appeal, provides in part as follows:Proceedings and order on creditor's petition (1)At the hearing of a creditor’s petition, the Court shall require proof of: (a) the matters stated in the petition (for which purpose the Court may accept the affidavit verifying the petition as sufficient); (b) service of the petition; and (c) the fact that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing; and, if it is satisfied with the proof of those matters, may make a sequestration order against the estate of the debtor. (1A) …(1B) …(2)If the Court is not satisfied with the proof of any of those matters, or is satisfied by the debtor: (a) that he or she is able to pay his or her debts; or (b) that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not to be made; it may dismiss the petition. (3)The Court may, if it thinks fit, upon such terms and conditions as it thinks proper, stay all proceedings under a sequestration order for a period not exceeding 21 days. (4)…(5)… Upon proof of the matters set forth in s 52(1) a petitioning creditor has been said to have a “prima facie right” to the making of a sequestration order: DeputyCommissioner of Taxation v Cumins [2008] FCA 353 at [14], 101 ALD 78 at 81. Gilmour J there helpfully summarised the general principles to be applied as follows:[14] On proof of the matters mentioned in s 52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act) a petitioning creditor has a prima facie right to the making of a sequestration order and the court will proceed to make a sequestration order unless the court is satisfied that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order should not be made: s 52(2)(b) of the Act; Cain v Whyte (1933) 48 CLR 639 at 646. The onus is on the respondent debtor to demonstrate “sufficient cause”: Commissioner of Taxation v Bayeh (1999) 100 FCR 144; [1999] FCA 1223 at [12].[15] Section 52(2)(b) of the Act is wide enough to entitle the court, in a proper case, to adjourn or dismiss a petition in the exercise of its discretion, where the debtor demonstrates a genuine dispute as to the liability to pay the debt: Re Verma;Ex Parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 4 FCR 181 at 185 and 187. This power is discretionary: Clyne v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1982) 45 ALR 323 at 328.[16] The court is entitled to inquire whether a judgment is founded on a real debt. In general, a court exercising jurisdiction should not proceed to sequestrate the estate of a debtor where an appeal is pending against the judgment relied on as the foundation of the bankruptcy proceedings, provided that the appeal is based on genuine and arguable grounds: Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) (1987) 76 ALR 137 at 148; Bayne v Baillieu (1907) 5 CLR 64, [1907] HCA 39.[17] The mere fact that an appeal has been lodged does not without more, give rise to a duty to postpone the hearing of the petition: in Re Flatau; Ex Parte Scotch Whisky Distillers (1882) 22 QBD 83 (CA) at 84–85; nor will the court as a matter of course inquire into the validity of a judgment debt: Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212 at 222–223, [1972] ALR 307 at 312-314.[18] The test to be applied has been described variously. The judgment debtor must point to grounds having “a real chance of success on appeal”: Re Lewin; Ex Parte Milner (1986) 11 FCR 312 at 318; or ensure “that substantial reasons are given for questioning” whether there was in truth a debt: Wren at 225. It is not enough to rely upon mere assertion. The onus is on the applicant for a stay to show the existence of a genuine dispute by adducing evidence establishing the substantial nature of the grounds of challenge: Re Verma and Re Virendra Kumar Verma; Ex Parte Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (FCA, Beaumont J, 14 November 1984, unreported) referred to with approval in Re Verma at 187: [[2008] FCA 353]In Re Dolman; Ex parte Elder Smith Goldsbrough Mort Ltd (1967) 10 FLR 384 at 391 Gibbs J also referred to a creditor who had proved the existence of a debt and an act of bankruptcy having “what may be called a prima facie right to a sequestration order”. See also: Burgess v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2010] FCA 986 at [37].