Background
Background to the litigation
The respondent’s consolidated submissions, filed on 20 April 2022, are as follows:1.These are the respondents’ consolidated submissions in relation to the creditor’s petition filed on 15 November 2021. 2.By amended notice of objection filed on 29 March 2022, the respondents oppose the sequestration order and seek for the application to be dismissed pursuant to s 52(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) on grounds that:a.they are able to pay their debts, including the alleged debt the subject of the application; or b.for other sufficient cause, a sequestration order ought not be made, including:i.the respondents have an offsetting claim against the applicants for an amount greater than the amount of the alleged debt (which has been filed recently in the Supreme Court of New South Wales and concerns allegations that the applicants were professionally negligent in the provision of their legal services to the respondents); ii.as a result of the alleged negligence of the applicants, the respondents say that they have been unable to recover a substantial judgment sum and a costs order made in their favour and have incurred even further costs in attempting enforcement of such orders to no avail; and iii.the applicants are otherwise not entitled to the debt the subject of the application by reason of (i) and (ii) above unless and until the negligence proceedings have been heard and determined. 3.The respondents deny that the applicants are entitled to be paid the debt at all. The debt claimed by the applicants relates to fees for legal services provided which the respondents allege were provided negligently and caused them loss and damage. The respondents have put the debt in issue in the proceedings currently on foot in the Supreme Court of New South Wales 2022/00030824. 4.The respondents rely on affidavits sworn by Kai Yin Huang (the first respondent) on 2 February 2022 and 2 March 2022 and an affidavit affirmed by Hao Jie Seow on 1 April 2022. Background 5.In October 2015, a group of family members (the “Petkovski Family”) commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of NSW against the respondents. 6.At around the same time, the respondents retained the applicants as their solicitors in those proceedings. 7.On the advice of the applicants, the respondents filed a cross-claim in the proceedings against the Petkovski Family on the basis of, among other things, a claim for damages for misleading conduct and unconscionable conduct and declaratory relief on the basis of constructive trust; Huang #1 at [6]. 8.The cross-claim which the applicants advised the respondents to file only claimed primary relief against one of the Petkovski Family members, Luben Petkovski, and otherwise pleaded a very narrow case against the other Petkovski Family members. 9.The respondents relied on the applicants as their solicitors in relation to the adequacy of the cross-claim; Huang #2 [5]-[6]. 10.The Court found that Luben Petkovski had engaged in unconscionable conduct, misleading and deceptive conduct and economic duress and that other family members (Diana, Lence and George Petkovski) were knowingly concerned in the unconscionable conduct and that the respondents’ damages would be assessed in a further hearing; Huang #1 at [12] and Annexure B. 11.In the damages hearing, the Court expressly identified its concern about the cross-claim not being properly pleaded to seek relief against the persons that were found to be knowledgably involved in the contravention. As part of that hearing, the Petkovski parties (other than Luben) moved on a motion to set aside the orders concerning their knowing involvement (which the Court said “were the foundation of the compensation sought through this claim”); Huang #1 Annexure C (e.g. para 8, 14, 19, 41, 49-50 of judgment). 12.The Court’s analysis of the adequacy of the pleaded cross-claim (and the way the case was run for the respondents) commenced at paragraph 22 of that judgment; Huang #1 Annexure C. The Court concluded at paragraph 35 that the cross-claim failed to claim relief against the Petkovski parties (other than Luben) despite such parties being knowingly involved in the unconscionable conduct. 13.The judge also concluded at paragraph 51 that due to the failure to plead relief against the Petkovski parties (other than Luben) in the cross-claim, the respondents were not entitled to relief from anyone other than Luben. 14.By judgment delivered on 14 November 2019, the Court ordered Luben Petkovski to pay the respondents in excess of $600,000 in damages; Huang #1 at [15]. 15.On 15 October 2020, Luben Petkovski filed for bankruptcy. The respondents have been unable to recover any of the damages awarded to them in the Petkovski proceedings. They have incurred $57,462.83 in costs to date in attempting to recover the judgment sum, to no avail; Seow affidavit [27]. 16.The respondents allege that, had the cross-claim been properly pleaded, they would have been awarded that same relief against Diana, Lence and George Petkovski (as persons involved in the contravention) and which is likely to have been recoverable against them since, unlike Luben, those other family members hold assets in their names; Huang #1 at [22]. 17.The respondents received legal advice in December 2021 in relation to the adequacy of the applicants’ legal advice in preparing the cross-claim. The respondents filed a Statement of Claim against the applicants for professional negligence in the Supreme Court of NSW on 2 February 2022; Huang #1 Annexure E. 18.In those proceedings, the respondents claim $613,548 in damages and a stay of the orders the subject of the debt in this petition; Huang #2 [9]. 19.If the respondents are made bankrupt, they will not be able to continue with those proceedings and, if so, the serious question about the applicants’ negligence will not be resolved; Huang #2 [10]-[11]. 20.Mr Huang has expressed his aggrievance about the negligent legal services provided by the applicants which has not only caused them to ‘lose out’ on recovering the judgment award to date against the Petkovskis but has also caused him to refuse to pay for the legal fees which essentially caused that loss (such fees being the debt in this petition); Huang #1 at [24]-[25]. The Debt claimed in the petition 21.The Debt claimed in the petition is an amount of $152,205.29 for orders made on 26 February 2020 by the District Court on 26 February 2020 (over 2 years ago). Paragraph 1 of the creditor’s petition and paragraph 2 of the affidavit in support dated 15 November 2021 incorrectly refer to these orders being made by the “Local Court”. 22.Those orders were made following a costs assessment process (carried out by a costs assessor) for legal fees that the applicants had charged to the respondents in the Petkovski proceedings. The Court did not otherwise make any determination on the merits as to whether the applicants were entitled to be paid those legal fees, rather, the Court entered judgment following receipt of the costs assessment certificate from the costs assessor. 23.The applicants sent a letter on 20 January 2021 (some 11 months after the orders were made) seeking payment of their fees; Huang #2 [14]. 24.The respondents were not pleased with the applicants seeking to be paid in circumstances where the applicants essentially failed them as their solicitors in the Petkovski proceedings; Huang #2 [14]. 25.On 3 March 2021, the respondents lodged a complaint to the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner in relation to the applicants; Huang #2 [15]. 26.The OLSC complaint was closed at it related to allegations of professional negligence. However, the respondents were reluctant to commence legal proceedings against the applicants for their negligence in early 2021 and thereafter due to, among other things, the costs involved and the fact that the applicants had not previously pressed for payment of their fees; Huang #2 [17]-[20]. 27.Since then, further time passed during which (1) the applicants did very little, if anything, to obtain payment of their fees the subject of the orders until issuing the bankruptcy notice in late 2021, and (2) the respondents maintained their reluctance to incur the cost of litigating against the applicants particularly in circumstances where the applicants were not chasing them for payment. Legal principles and analysis 28.Section 52(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) provides: (2) If the Court is not satisfied with the proof of any of those matters, or is satisfied by the debtor: (a) that he or she is able to pay his or her debts; or (b) that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not to be made; it may dismiss the petition. Ability to pay their debts – s 52(2)(a) 29.Solvency requires an ability to pay debts as they fall due. This includes both cash on hand and money reasonably quickly realisable by asset realisation. Temporary lack of liquidity will not generally constitute insolvency: Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666; (1966) 40 ALJR 71; CLR at 670.30.What has to be proved is that assets are available to be realised and capable of ready realisation likely to result in payment of outstanding debts within a reasonable time: Re Sanders; Knudsen and Yates (t/a Hargreaves Practice) v Sanders [2003] FCA 1079. 31.The respondents have the ability to draw $250,000 in funds from a lending facility, which would be advanced to them within 14 days of acceptance of the loan offer. The purpose or use of those funds by the respondents is not restrained; Seow affidavit [28]-[29] and Annexure R. 32.Further, the respondents own a number of properties in New South Wales, including a property in Rockdale at 49 Watkin Street, which is not mortgaged; Huang #2 at [21]. It is roughly estimated to have a value of $1.62 million; Huang # 2 Annexure D. 33.Given the respondents can obtain $250,000 in cash within 14 days and also own a property at 49 Watkin Street which has significant value and is free of mortgage, the respondents invite the Court to find that they are plainly able to pay their debts, including the debt the subject of the application ($152,205.29). “Sufficient cause” – s 52(2)(b) 34.For a matter to constitute sufficient cause, the matter must be one of significant weight to displace the interest of the community in avoiding insolvent trading: Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton (No.2) [2017] FCA 629 at [26]–[37]. 35.The concept of “sufficient cause” confers a discretion which in its terms is unconfined, as are the factors to be taken into account by the Court: Baker v Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd [2012] FCA 553 at [35]. 36.The existence of a counter-claim by a respondent may be a “sufficient cause” to dismiss the petition - the question will depend upon an assessment of the particular facts in each case, considered with the interests of the petitioning creditor; St George Bank v Helfenbaum [1999] FCA 1337 at [13]; Totev v Sfar [2008] FCAFC 35 at [78]-[87]. 37.The respondents must show that there is a real claim that is likely to succeed to justify a dismissal or adjournment of the petition: Re Schmidt; Ex Parte Anglewood Pty Ltd (1968) 13 FLR 111 at 116. 38.The respondents say that there is sufficient cause in favour of dismissing the application because:a.they have a claim on foot against the applicants in the Supreme Court of NSW for an amount far greater than the alleged debt; and b.that claim, in fact, also puts in issue whether the order the subject of the debt ought to be stayed (or alternatively, it may form part of the respondents’ damages claim). 39.As referred to above, the cross-claim prepared by the applicants, on behalf of the respondents, in the Petkovski proceedings was defective and it led to an express conclusion by the Court that relief which could have been sought against other Petkovski family members was not available due to the failure to plead it. 40.There can be no doubt that there is a serious question to be addressed in those Supreme Court proceedings. 41.The authorities are uncontroversial in this respect. A solicitor cannot blindly follow the advice of a barrister, rather, they must exercise their own expert professional mind to the substance of the advice received; see e.g. Keddie and Ors v Stacks/Goudkamp Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 254 at [131]-[132]. 42.In relation to the drafting of the cross-claim, Mr Zhang says “I relied on the expertise of [Counsel] when I signed, and caused to be filed, the Amended Cross-Claim”; Zhang #1 [19]. 43.Further, Mr Zhang suggests that he simply signed the cross-claim after having been provided it from Counsel on short notice. Mr Zhang gives no evidence about whether he turned his professional mind to the substance of the cross-claim, in fact, his evidence indicates that he did not; Zhang #2 [9]. 44.Based on Mr Zhang’s own evidence and the findings of the Court that the cross-claim was not properly pleaded, the respondents respectfully submit that they have a strong prima facie case against the applicants for professional negligence which is likely to succeed. 45.Separately but similarly, the respondents say that the negligence of the applicants has caused them to incur further costs in attempting to recover judgment against Luben Petkovski to no avail. The debt in this application is the legal fees for services which the respondents say were not only provided negligently but have caused them to suffer significant financial loss. In the Supreme Court proceedings the respondents claim that the costs order the subject of the debt ought to be stayed pending the resolution of those proceedings. The relation between the legal fees the subject of the debt and the matters the subject of the Supreme Court proceedings are so interrelated to the extent that there is sufficient cause to dismiss the application or at least adjourn the application until the Court makes a finding about such matters in the Supreme Court proceedings. Conclusion 46.For the reasons above, the respondents respectfully submit that the Court should exercise its discretion to dismiss the petition and permit the parties to resolve their issues in the dispute currently before the Supreme Court of NSW. ABILITY OF FIRST RESPONDENT TO PAY HIS DEBTS
Decision
Reasons for decision
The Court is not satisfied that there is an evidentiary basis to support Mr Petkovski performing a role of agency on behalf of the other family members, so as to give rise to any common law cause of action. The Court is not satisfied there is a real or arguable case against the petitions creditors by the new proceedings. The Court is not satisfied that there is a real or arguable case of known facts to support a cause of action either under the first or second limb of Barnes v Addy and therefore no real or arguable case of negligence as against the petitioning creditors.CONCLUSION The petitioning creditors have made out the statutory criteria enlivening the Court’s jurisdiction to make a sequestration order. The first respondent has not satisfied the Court that he is able to pay his debts within s 52(2)(a) of the Act. The findings by the learned Justice in the Supreme Court in respect of the other family members, that was not pleaded, do not carry with them the consequence that there was a real cause of action. As this Court has said, the failure to set aside the declarations for want of jurisdiction is misconceived, but it does not give rise to the existence before this Court of there being a real cause of action. The declarations do not give rise to a factual basis to find that there was such a real cause of action in existence. The reasons of the learned Justice in setting aside the compensation order made clear both the compensation order error and the misconception of no jurisdiction to set aside the declarations. The declarations do not provide an evidentiary basis upon which this Court is satisfied, in respect to the petitioning creditors who are not bound by those declarations, that there was any real cause of action and is not satisfied that there is a real cause of action against the other family members upon facts known by the lawyers at the time of drafting the cross claim. The failure to set aside the declarations and the existence of the declarations do not advance the first respondent’s case in respect of other sufficient cause. The Court is not satisfied that the first respondent has a genuine or real offsetting claim in amount that is equal to or exceeds the judgment debt. The Court is not satisfied that other sufficient cause has been made out as to why a sequestration order ought not to be made. Nor is the Court satisfied that the respondent’s submissions in combination make out other sufficient cause. The Court is not satisfied of other sufficient cause whereby a sequestration order should not be made within s 52(2)(b) of the Act. In the circumstances, the Court is satisfied that this is an appropriate case in which the petitioning creditor is entitled to a sequestration order. Accordingly, the Court makes Orders 1 to 5.