Miller v Ghosh (No.5)
[2018] FCCA 3760
•17 December 2018
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| MILLER v GHOSH (No.5) | [2018] FCCA 3760 |
| Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Whether application in a case filed in court by respondent should be summarily dismissed – whether respondent has reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting any of the claims for relief made in the application in a case – whether it would be an abuse of process to permit the respondent to proceed with the application in a case – application in a case dismissed. |
| Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss.5, 43, 52, 58 |
| Cases cited: Ace Contractors & Staff Pty Ltd v Westgarth Development Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 728 |
| Applicant: | RODNEY MILLER |
| Respondent: | RATNA GHOSH |
| File Number: | SYG 235 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Manousaridis |
| Hearing date: | 15 November 2018 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 13 December 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 17 December 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| No appearance by, or on behalf of, the applicant |
| Respondent in person, assisted by a litigation representative, Mr S Piscopo |
ORDERS
Pursuant to r.13.10 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), and the implied incidental power of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, the application in a case filed in Court by the respondent on 15 November 2018 is dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 235 of 2015
| RODNEY MILLER |
Applicant
And
| RATNA GHOSH |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
In these reasons for judgment I consider whether an application in a case dated 28 June 2018 that I gave leave to the respondent, Dr Ghosh, to file in Court on 15 November 2018, should be summarily dismissed.
Background
Much of the necessary background to the question I consider in these reasons for judgment is contained in the reasons for judgment I delivered on 3 April 2018 in Miller v Ghosh (No.4).[1] On that day I dismissed an application in a case filed by Dr Ghosh. I did so after Dr Ghosh, by her counsel, said she did not wish to proceed with the application. Dr Ghosh withdrew her application after I had indicated to her counsel that, given the nature of the allegations on which the application was based, I had a number of concerns about whether Dr Ghosh should be permitted to proceed with it.
[1] [2018] FCCA 1738
In addition to ordering that the application in a case be dismissed, I ordered that Dr Ghosh was not to file any further application in this proceeding without first obtaining the leave of the Court. On 28 June 2018 Dr Ghosh lodged with the Registry a further application in a case dated 28 June 2018 with a request that the matter come before me to determine whether I should permit Dr Ghosh to proceed with it. After a number of communications between my chambers and Dr Ghosh and a barrister whom she appeared to have retained, I listed the matter for an administrative hearing before me on 15 November 2018. On 14 November 2018 my associate received an email from a Mr Samuel Piscopo who described himself as an insolvency practitioner, and who said Dr Ghosh had sought his assistance for the hearing. Mr Piscopo attached a document titled “Brief Outline of Submissions”.
On 15 November 2018 the matter came before me. I identified the affidavits on which Dr Ghosh wished to rely, these being the affidavits made by Dr Ghosh on 8 December 2017 (which was lodged for filing on 12 March 2018), 3 April 2018, and on 29 August 2018. I also I heard submissions from Mr Piscopo. At the end of the hearing I ordered that there be filed in Court and made returnable instanter the application in a case dated 28 June 2018. I also made directions permitting Dr Ghosh to file further affidavits. Dr Ghosh provided to my chambers an affidavit made on 6 December 2018 for the purposes of a proceeding in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, and written submissions.
Orders sought in the application in a case
In her application in a case dated 28 June 2018 Dr Ghosh seeks the following orders (emphasis in original):
1.Set aside or vary the sequestration order of 30 September 2016 pursuant to rule 16.05(2)(b), (e) or (3), or rule 16.01 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001
2.In the alternative to 1, set aside the sequestration order of 30 September 2016 on the basis of new evidence as to solvency
3.In the alternative to 1 and 2, Stay the sequestration order of 30 September 2016 pursuant to the BANKRUPTCY ACT 1966 – SECT 60 Stay of legal proceedings, or rule 13.09 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 pending final determination of this application, and pending proof of debt as in (4), and pending final determination of Appeal 2017/190932 in Court of Appeal against Rodney Miller
4.Order the trustee provides a list of all provable debt pursuant to the BANKRUPTCY ACT 1966 – SECT 82 Debts provable in bankruptcy, as of 21/10/16 and 28/6/18 to the applicant within 7 days
5.Set aside the sequestration order of 30 September 2016 pursuant to rule 16.05(2)(b), of Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, Fraud, unless the trustee provides proof of debt as of 21/10/2016 to verify his statement to FCA of 21/10/16, by the 1st return date of this application
6.Order that Mr Tony Maher provides proof of payment of costs by Rodney Miller, with copies of bank statements, credit card receipts and ATO receipts, and full disclosure of Mr Miller’s source of funding including all legal aid grants obtained for and on behalf of Mr Miller and Mrs Miller,
7.Order that the trustee repays the applicant all rent and other funds seized since 30/9/16, with interest, and provides a full disclosure statement of all funds seized and how they have been disbursed, with a trust account statement as of 28/6/18 listing all transactions since 30/9/16
8.Costs for this application, for the Federal Court and High Court proceedings
I will consider each order sought and the submissions on which Dr Ghosh relies in support of each ground.
Order 1
Dr Ghosh relies on r.16.01, r.16.05(2)(b) and (e), and r.16.05(3) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) (FCC Rules). Rule 16.01 of the FFC Rules does not provide an independent source of power to set aside the sequestration order made against the estate of Dr Ghosh; that rule simply provides that the Court may, at any stage in a proceeding, give any judgment or make an order even if the claim was not made in an originating process.
Paragraph (b) of r.16.05(2) of the FCC Rules provides that the Court may set aside an order, after it has been entered, if “the order was obtained by fraud”. Dr Ghosh claims that “her affidavits of 12 March 2018 [being, in fact, Dr Ghosh’s affidavit made on 8 December 2017], 3 April 2018, and 6 December 2018, prove that the petitioning creditor Mr Rodney Miller, and his trustee obtained the sequestration order by fraud on 30/9/2016, and have conducted the proceedings by fraud and collusion, and an abuse of process”.[2] The affidavits on which Dr Ghosh relies, however, make general allegations of fraud; and Dr Ghosh has not attempted to identify from the material contained in those affidavits the precise fraud it is alleged Mr Miller and the trustee are alleged to have engaged in or the facts and matters on which Dr Ghosh would rely if she were to articulate the fraud in which she alleges Mr Miller and the trustee have engaged in.
[2] Written Submissions 12.12.18. Case SYG 235/2015, [2]
In Angelides v James Stedman Hendersons Sweets Ltd Isaacs ACJ said it “has long been . . . a settled rule that where fraud of a defendant is relied on, it must be distinctly charged and particularised”.[3] The Full Federal Court referred to this principle in Fuller v Toms:[4]
It is well established that allegations of fraud “are to be precisely pleaded and particularised with some specificity”: Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] NSWSC 599 at [43]; Rajski v Bainton (1990) 22 NSWLR 125 at 135; Davy v Garrett [1877] 7 Ch D 473 at 489. It is not enough for fraud to be inferred from the facts pleaded: Davy v Garrett at 489; Oldfield Knott Architects Pty Ltd v Ortiz Investments Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 255 at [35].
[3] [1927] HCA 34; (1927) 40 CLR 43, at page 63
[4] [2012] FCAFC 155, [49]
It would also be useful to set out the following passage from the judgment of Ipp J in Knott Architects Pty Ltd v Ortiz Investments Pty Ltd:[5]
More than 100 years ago, it was said that “no rule was more clearly settled than that fraud must be distinctly alleged and as distinctly proved, and that it was not allowable to leave fraud to be inferred from the facts” (Davy v Garrett [1877] 7 Ch D 473 at 489 per Thesiger LJ). In Belmont Finance Corporation Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd [1979] Ch 250 at 268 Buckley LJ was concerned with whether the facts alleged in a statement of claim were sufficient to bring home to the defendants a charge that the object of an alleged conspiracy was a dishonest one and that they actually knew or must be taken to have known that that was so. He said:
An allegation of dishonesty must be pleaded clearly and with particularity. That is laid down by the rules and it is a well-recognised rule of practice. This does not import that the word ‘fraud’ or the word ‘dishonesty’ must necessarily be used ... The facts alleged may sufficiently demonstrate that dishonesty is allegedly involved, but where the facts are complicated this may not be so clear, and in such a case it is incumbent upon the pleader to make it clear when dishonesty is alleged. If he uses language which is equivocal, rendering it doubtful whether he is in fact relying on the alleged dishonesty of the transaction, this will be fatal; the allegation of its dishonest nature will not have been pleaded with sufficient clarity."
[5] [2000] WASCA 255 at [35] (Wallwork agreeing, at [93]
These principles apply to parties whether they are legally represented or not.[6]
[6] In Fuller v Toms the party alleging fraud was not legally represented.
In these circumstances, it would be futile to permit Dr Ghosh to apply for order 1 on the basis of fraud because the lack of particularity in her allegations of fraud would inevitably induce an application for summary dismissal, and such application would be bound to succeed. More importantly, it would be an abuse of the process of this Court to permit Dr Ghosh to initiate a case based on fraud where that allegation is not properly alleged or particularised, but instead depends on fraud to be inferred from facts and matters alleged in the affidavits on which Dr Ghosh relies.
I next turn to Dr Ghosh’s reliance on r.16.05(2)(e) of the FCC Rules, which provides that the Court may set aside an order if the order does not reflect the intention of the Court. Dr Ghosh submits it was not the intention of the Court in making the sequestration order “to deprive Dr Ghosh of ALL her income and assets, which is what the sequestration order has done”.[7] Dr Ghosh further submits that the sequestration order has no utility because Mr Miller’s intention in seeking the sequestration order was to prevent Dr Ghosh from suing Mr Miller further, but Dr Ghosh can still maintain her defamation proceedings against Mr Miller. In the absence of any utility in the making of the sequestration order, Dr Ghosh submits, the sequestration order has deprived Dr Ghosh of her assets and income, and this could never have been the intention of the Court in making the sequestration order.
[7] Written Submissions 12.12.18. Case SYG 235/2015, [16]
It is not arguable that I did not intend to make a sequestration order. That Dr Ghosh was deprived of control of her assets and income is a consequence that s.58 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act) attaches to the making of a sequestration order.
Finally, there is r.16.05(3) of the FCC Rules, which provides that r.16.05 does not affect the power of the Court to vary or terminate the operation of an order by a further order. This does not confer on the Court an independent power to set aside a sequestration order; it only preserves such power as the Court may otherwise have to vary or terminate orders it has made.
For these reasons, Dr Ghosh would have no reasonable prospects of obtaining an order in terms of order 1 of the application in a case.
Order 2
Dr Ghosh makes the following submissions in support of order 2.[8]
The respondent in these proceedings, Dr Ratna Ghosh, states she was solvent as of the date of the sequestration order, 30 September 2016, as per the financial statement for period ending 30 September 2016, as in Annexure “A” and is solvent now. She states the Court erred in finding her insolvent, and the sequestration order ought to be set aside.
[8] Written Submissions 12.12.18. Case SYG 235/2015, [1]
Annexure “A” is a document prepared by “Hunter Accounting Services” described as “Financial Statements Dr Ratna Ghosh Period ended 30 September 2016”. It consists of a balance sheet showing Dr Ghosh had net assets of $765,966.58 as at 30 September 2016. This balance sheet, however, does not even arguably constitute evidence of solvency. To see why, it will be necessary to set out some principles relating to the relevance of solvency to the making of a sequestration order under s.52 of the Bankruptcy Act, and what “solvency” means in that context.
Before the Court can make a sequestration order it must be satisfied that the matters specified in s.43 and s.52(1) of the Bankruptcy Act are proved. These include the matters stated in the creditor’s petition, and that the debt or debts on which the petitioning creditor relies is or are still owing. The Court must also be satisfied that the relevant provisions of the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Bankruptcy Rules) have also been complied with, subject to the Court’s discretion to dispense with compliance of those rules. [9] If the Court is satisfied with the proof of the matters specified in s.43 and s.52(1) of the Act, and that the requirements of the Bankruptcy Rules have been met (or their compliance otherwise dispensed with), the Court may make a sequestration order. If the Court is not so satisfied it must dismiss the petition, or if, under s.52(2) of the Act, the Court “is satisfied by the debtor (a) that he or she is able to pay his or her debts; (b) that for some other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not be made”, the Court may dismiss the petition.[10]
[9] See Burrell v Reavill Farm Pty Ltd & Ors [2014] FCCA 1449 at [48]
[10] Act, s.52(2)
Subsection 52(2)(a) of the Act does not use the word “solvent”;[11] nor does it use the words “as and when they become due and payable”.[12] It simply says “he or she is able to pay his or her debts”. In other words, s.52(2)(a) does not in terms require the debtor to be “solvent”. Notwithstanding the omission of these words from s.52(2)(a) of the Act, the cases have construed that paragraph as requiring the Court to be satisfied the debtor is “solvent” in the sense of not being “insolvent” as that term was explained in Sandell v Porter:[13]
Insolvency is expressed in s. 95 [of the Bankruptcy Act 1924] as an inability to pay debts as they fall due out of the debtor’s own money. But the debtor’s own moneys are not limited to his cash resources immediately available. They extend to moneys which he can procure by realization by sale or by mortgage or pledge of his assets within a relatively short time – relative to the nature and amount of the debts and to the circumstances, including the nature of the business, of the debtor. The conclusion of insolvency ought to be clear from a consideration of the debtor’s financial position in its entirety and generally speaking ought not to be drawn simply from evidence of a temporary lack of liquidity. It is the debtor’s inability, utilizing such cash resources as he has or can command through the use of his assets, to meet his debts as they fall due which indicates insolvency. Whether that state of his affairs has arrived is a question for the Court and not one as to which expert evidence may be given in terms though no doubt experts may speak as to the likelihood of any of the debtor’s assets or capacities yielding ready cash in sufficient time to meet the debts as they fall due.
[11] Being a term which is defined in s.5(2) of the Act.
[12] Which is part of the definition of “solvent” in s.5(2) of the Act.
[13] (1966) 115 CLR 666 at 670-671. The cases which so construed s.52(2)(a) of the Act were identified by Cowdroy J in Rigg v Baker [2006] FCAFC 179 at [104].
Some of the relevant principles for determining whether, on this approach, a debtor is able to pay his or her debts were usefully stated by Driver FM (as his Honour then was) in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Caporale as follows:[14]
The inquiry emphasises that it involves a consideration of the ability to command cash resources through his or her own assets. The Court must also look at the level of the debtor’s recurrent expenses and earnings in addition to whether there are cash resources from assets.
A respondent debtor bears the onus of proving to the Court that their assets are sufficient to pay their liabilities as and when they become due and payable. It is not sufficient to simply show an excess of assets over liabilities. The respondent debtor must also establish that their assets are available to be realised and that they are capable of ready realisation.
[14] [2013] FMCA 5, at [23] and [24]
Finally, it is relevant to refer to what is required to prove solvency. Speaking in the context of corporate insolvency, Weinberg J in Ace Contractors & Staff Pty Ltd v Westgarth Development Pty Ltd said that to discharge the onus proving solvency “the Court should ordinarily be presented with the “fullest and best” evidence of the financial position of the respondent”; and that “unaudited accounts and unverified claims of ownership or valuation are not ordinarily probative of solvency. Nor are bald assertions of solvency arising from a general review of the accounts, even if made by qualified accountants who have detailed knowledge of how those accounts were prepared”.[15]
[15] [1999] FCA 728, at [44]
It will now be apparent why the balance sheet does not even arguably constitute evidence of solvency. First, it does not set out the income and expenses of Dr Ghosh. It is not possible, therefore, to determine whether Dr Ghosh was in a position to pay her debts. Second, the balance sheet relies on unverified assertions of the value of the assets it identifies.
Dr Ghosh, therefore, would have no reasonable prospects of obtaining an order in terms of order 2 of the application in a case.
Orders 3 and 4
These two orders should be considered together. Order 4 seeks an order that the trustee give to Dr Ghosh a list of all provable debts, and that the sequestration order be stayed until that occurs. The basis of the claim for this order appears to be contained in the “Brief Outline of Submissions” prepared by Piscopo. It is there claimed that all of Dr Ghosh’s creditors have claims pursuant to costs orders, but those costs remain unassessed; the communications between Dr Ghosh and the trustee have broken down to such an extent that the trustee does not reply to her correspondence; and the trustee has failed to comply with reasonable requests for information “as required by Section 70-56 of the Insolvency Schedule (Bankruptcy)”. It is also stated that Dr Ghosh requested the trustee “to give her an amount of how much is required to pay out creditors and costs”. This may be intended to imply that Dr Ghosh has requested the trustee to provide an amount that Dr Ghosh would need to pay to end her bankruptcy, but the trustee has refused that request.
These submissions do not attempt to identify the information Dr Ghosh has sought from the trustee, when she sought that information, and the trustee’s response to Dr Ghosh’s request for information. In her affidavit of 8 December 2017 Dr Ghosh asserts the trustee failed to “provide any evidence of provable debt other than the $12,000.00 of debt on the creditor’s petition”. That assertion assumes some communications between Dr Ghosh and the trustee, but the communications are not otherwise identified in her affidavit. In paragraph 22 of her affidavit of 29 August 2018 Dr Ghosh asserts “the trustee has failed to provide a list of provable debts”; but, again, although this implies some communications between Dr Ghosh and the trustee, Dr Ghosh does not identify in her affidavit any communications in which she has requested the trustee provide to her, but the trustee has refused to provide, information concerning provable debts or any other matter relevant to Dr Ghosh’s bankruptcy. Finally, Dr Ghosh’s affidavit of 3 April 2018 and 6 December 2018 do not identify requests for a list of provable debts.
There is another matter that I should note. It is not reasonably arguable that Dr Ghosh has made a request of the trustee for details of the amount she would need to pay to end her bankruptcy with a view to her paying that amount to the trustee. That is so because it is clear from her affidavits that she challenges not only the debt on the basis of which the sequestration order was made, but also the costs and fees the trustee claims he incurred and earned in the course of his administration of Dr Ghosh’s estate.
Dr Ghosh, therefore, would have no reasonable prospects of obtaining orders in terms of orders 3 or 4 of the application in a case.
Order 5
This order seeks a stay of the sequestration order pending the trustee providing a proof of debt to verify evidence the trustee gave in an affidavit that was read in the proceeding before Farrell J in the Federal Court of Australia. The trustee’s evidence to which this ground is directed appears to be that identified in paragraph 12 of Dr Ghosh’s affidavit made on 8 December 2018. It is there asserted that the trustee gave “false sworn testimony”. That allegation is not supported by any particulars or evidence.
In those circumstances it would be futile to permit Dr Ghosh to apply for order 5 on the basis of fraud because the lack of particularity in her allegations of fraud against the trustee would inevitably induce an application for summary dismissal, and such application would be bound to succeed. More importantly, it would be an abuse of the process of this Court to permit Dr Ghosh to initiate a case based on fraud where that allegation is not clearly articulated or otherwise particularised.
Dr Ghosh, therefore, would have no reasonable prospects of obtaining an order in terms of order 5 of the application in a case.
Order 6
This order requires that Mr Maher, the solicitor who acted for Mr Miller, provide proof that Mr Miller paid the legal fees and costs Mr Maher charged and incurred in the course of his acting for Mr Miller. It appears the relevance of this order is to establish that Mr Miller never paid any of Mr Miller’s fees and, for that reason, was not entitled to claim costs out of the estate of Dr Ghosh. There are two difficulties with this ground. First, there is nothing to suggest that Mr Miller did not assume any liability to pay Mr Maher’s costs. Second, even if correct, there is no evidence of any proceeding or application being on foot challenging Mr Miller’s claims for costs in this proceeding in aid of which the Court could make an order in terms of order 6.
Dr Ghosh, therefore, would also have no reasonable prospects of obtaining an order in terms of order 6 of the application in a case.
Order 7
Order 7 requires that the trustee repay to Dr Ghosh all rent and other funds seized since 30 September 2016 together with interest, and provide a full disclosure statement of all funds and how they have been disbursed, with a trust account statement listing all transactions since 30 September 2016. The basis on which Dr Ghosh claims this order appears to be the general allegations of fraudulent and other improper behaviour by the trustee asserted by Dr Ghosh in her affidavits.
I have already found that Dr Ghosh has not attempted to identify from the material contained in her affidavits the particular fraud the trustee is alleged to have engaged in, or the facts and matters on which Dr Ghosh would rely if she were to articulate the fraud in which she alleges the trustee engaged in. In those circumstances it would be futile to permit Dr Ghosh to apply for order 7 on the basis of fraud because the lack of particularity in her allegations of fraud against the trustee would inevitably induce an application for summary dismissal, and such application would be bound to succeed. More importantly, it would be an abuse of the process of this Court to permit Dr Ghosh to initiate a case based on fraud where that allegation is not clearly articulated or otherwise particularised.
Dr Ghosh, therefore, would have no reasonable prospects of obtaining an order in terms of order 7 of the application in a case.
Other matters
There are a number of other matters I should address.
First, in his “Brief Outline of Submissions” Mr Piscopo requests that I grant a stay of the sequestration order to enable Dr Ghosh time to refinance her properties. The Court has no power to order a stay for such purpose. In any event, given Dr Ghosh disputes the debt on which Dr Miller relied for seeking the sequestration order, and Dr Ghosh also disputes the amounts the trustee claims he earned and incurred in administering Dr Ghosh’s bankrupt estate, there is no prospect that Dr Ghosh would agree to pay the amounts the trustee would require Dr Ghosh pay to end her bankruptcy.
Second, in her written submissions,[16] Dr Ghosh submits there is sufficient reason to go behind the debt on the basis of which the sequestration order was made. Whether or not there is sufficient reason to go behind that debt is not a matter I can now determine. That matter ought to have been raised at the hearing of the application for a sequestration order.
[16] Written Submissions 12.12.18. Case SYG 235/2015, [5]-[15]
Third, in her written submissions,[17] Dr Ghosh asserts that the trustee has claimed the entire rent of a property even though Dr Ghosh holds only a quarter share of the property, with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) holding a half interest as mortgagee, and another person holding a quarter interest. Dr Ghosh submits the trustee is entitled to only one quarter of the rents. Even if these assertions are correct, Dr Ghosh is not entitled to rely on the trustee’s asserted violations of the rights of the CBA or of the other person as a ground for preventing the trustee from recovering rent that it is asserted belongs to the CBA or to the other person. It is only the CBA or the other person who can take action against the trustee in relation to any infringement by the trustee of the CBA’s or other person’s interests in the property.
[17] Written Submissions 12.12.18. Case SYG 235/2015, [20]-[26]
Fourth, Dr Ghosh says that on 24 September 2018 she obtained a costs order against Mr Miller in Court of Appeal proceeding 2017/190932. That is not a matter that is relevant to any of the orders Dr Ghosh is seeking in her application in a case.
Disposition
For these reasons Dr Ghosh has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the application in a case dated 28 June 2018 and I am satisfied it would be an abuse of the process of this Court for me to permit Dr Ghosh to pursue the claims for relief contained in the application in a case. I propose, therefore, to dismiss the application in a case pursuant to r.13.10 of the FCC Rules, and also pursuant to the Court’s implied incidental power to control its own processes.[18]
[18] Pardo v Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee [2000] FCA 355, [53]: “Like the power of the Court to punish for contempt, even if such power is not to be found in some express statutory provision, it has its source in chapter 3 of the Constitution. Like the power to deal with contempts, it is “inherent” and is “a power of self-protection or a power incidental to the function of superintending the administration of justice”.”
I should finally note how I propose to deal with the material on which Dr Ghosh relied. I will arrange for Dr Ghosh’s affidavits of 3 April 2018 and 29 August 2018 to be filed electronically. Given the affidavits made on 8 December 2018 and 6 December 2018 were not prepared in connection with proceedings in this Court, I will mark these affidavits as exhibit A. I will also arrange for Dr Ghosh’s written submissions and the “Brief Outline of Submissions” to be uploaded into the electronic court file.
I certify that the preceding forty-three (43) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Manousaridis
Associate:
Date: 17 December 2018
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