Tucker v State of Victoria

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tucker v State of Victoria [2022] FCA 1449    

File number: VID 658 of 2022
Judgment of: ANDERSON J
Date of judgment: 1 December 2022
Date of publication of reasons: 2 December 2022
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal interlocutory orders – where the applicant has no right to appeal pursuant to s 24(1AA) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – application refused
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Bright v Femcare Ltd (2002) 195 ALR 574; [2002] FCA 243

Hastie Group Limited (in liq) v Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd (Formerly Brookfield Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd) (No 3) [2022] FCA 1280

House v King (1936) 55 CLR 449

Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564

Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513

Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Recs and Mgrs Appt) (2011) 85 ACSR 531

Revill v John Holland Group Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 558

Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 956

SZMTM v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 181

Tran v Singh [2019] FCA 70

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Number of paragraphs: 30
Date of hearing: 1 December 2022
Counsel for the applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A Silver with Ms A Tresise
Solicitor for the Respondent: BlueRock Law

ORDERS

VID 658 of 2022
BETWEEN:

TOBIAS JOHN TUCKER

Applicant

AND:

STATE OF VICTORIA

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

ANDERSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 DECEMBER 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The interlocutory application filed 7 November 2022 be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ANDERSON J:
Introduction

  1. By an interlocutory application filed 7 November 2022, the Applicant, Tobias John Tucker (Mr Tucker), has sought leave to appeal from the interlocutory orders of Judge Symons made on 25 October 2022 (the Orders) in the matter of MLG1600/2022 filed in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) (Bankruptcy Proceeding).

  2. Those Orders listed both the creditors’ petition (Petition) and Mr Tucker’s summary judgment application to be heard together on 5 December 2022.

  3. Mr Tucker’s leave application argues that:

    (a)the Orders are attended with sufficient doubt to warrant them being reconsidered on appeal;

    (b)if the Orders are not corrected on appeal, the applicant will suffer substantial injustice; and

    (c)the matter is of great importance and the Court’s approach to listing the summary judgment application at the same time as the trial defeats the efficiency underpinning summary judgment.

  4. Mr Tucker relies upon his written submissions filed 22 November 2022 and 1 December 2022, as well as the following evidence:

    (a)Affidavit of Tobias Tucker dated 7 November 2022;

    (b)Affidavit of Tobias Tucker dated 21 November 2022; and

    (c)Affidavit of Tobias Tucker dated…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1449
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court, Mr. Tucker filed an application seeking leave to appeal interlocutory orders made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2). The court had to decide whether Mr. Tucker had the right to appeal the interlocutory orders under Section 24(1AA) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The central issue was whether the orders in question could be appealed despite the prohibition on such appeals under the Act.

The court examined Section 24(1AA) of the Act, which precludes appeals from orders that defer or postpone hearings. It was established that the orders made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) were decisions to postpone the hearing of Mr. Tucker's summary judgment application to a future date, which is in line with the prohibition on appeals outlined in Section 24(1AA). The court held that Mr. Tucker did not have the right to appeal the interlocutory orders. The court's reasoning was based on the clear language of the Act and relevant case law, which reinforced that the prohibition on appeals from such orders was unqualified.

Consequently, the court dismissed Mr. Tucker's application for leave to appeal. The court ordered that the interlocutory application filed on 7 November 2022 be dismissed and that Mr. Tucker pay the respondent's costs. The dismissal was grounded in the statutory prohibition on appealing interlocutory orders that defer or postpone hearings, as outlined in Section 24(1AA) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory application filed 7 November 2022 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In support of his case, Mr Tucker submits that:(a)the applicant has at least an arguable case for the grant of leave to appeal;(b)there is no risk that the Petition will expire;(c)if a stay is not granted, the applicant stands to have both his application for leave and summary judgment application rendered nugatory by the continued operation of the Orders; and(d)if a stay is not granted, this Court and the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) will be seized with determining the same matter.CONSIDERATION For the reasons that follow, the interlocutory application filed 7 November 2022 will be dismissed.Jurisdiction The rules governing the Federal Court’s appellate jurisdiction for civil proceedings are found in ss 24 and 25 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCAAct). Section 24(1)(d) states that the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from judgments of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) exercising its original jurisdiction under a law of the Commonwealth. A “Judgment” is defined as a “judgment, decree or order, whether final or interlocutory”: s 4 FCA Act. Pursuant to s 24(1A) of the FCA Act, leave to appeal is required for all interlocutory orders. It is my view that Mr Tucker has no right to appeal, even with leave, from the Orders under challenge by virtue of s 24(1AA) of the FCA Act. Pursuant to this section, an appeal must not be brought from a judgment referred to in s 24(1)(d) if the order was a decision to, or not to, adjourn or expedite a hearing: FCA Act s 24(1AA)(b)(ii). This prohibition on bringing an appeal from the refusal by the primary judge to adjourn a hearing is unqualified: Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 956 at [16] (per Bromwich J); see also Tran v Singh [2019] FCA 70 (Thawley J) and Revill v John Holland Group Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 558. The Butterworths Australian Legal Dictionary defines “adjourn” as “to defer or postpone a hearing to a future day or sine die”. The word “adjournment” means “a Court order by which proceedings are postponed, interrupted, or continued at a different time or place before the same court”. Section 24(1AA)(b)(ii) states that a party cannot appeal an order which is “a decision to” … “adjourn … a hearing”. Therefore, incorporating the legal definition of “adjourn”, the section means that a party cannot appeal an order that is a “decision to defer or postpone a hearing to a future day or sine die”. It does not matter that the hearing on 25 October 2022 was not an adjournment hearing. What is relevant for the purposes of s 24(1AA) of the FCA Act is that the consequence of Order 1, which “listed” the summary judgment and trial together on 5 December 2022, was that it was a decision by a Judge to defer or postpone the hearing of the summary judgment application to a future date, namely, the date also fixed for the trial and not to a date prior to the trial date of the Bankruptcy Proceeding.