Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed)

Link copied
Case Copied 53 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed)
[2011] FCAFC 117

Citation: Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2011] FCAFC 117
Appeal from: Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Oswal [2011] FCA 424
Parties:

PANKAJ OSWAL v BURRUP FERTILISERS PTY LTD (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) (ACN 095 441 151)

RADHIKA OSWAL and COMICAL ALI MILITANT VEGETARIAN PTY LTD (ACN 129 229 172) v BURRUP FERTILISERS PTY LTD (RECEIVERS AND MANAGERS APPOINTED) (ACN 095 441 151)

File numbers: WAD 142 of 2011
WAD 146 of 2011
Judges: MANSFIELD, DOWSETT & FOSTER JJ
Date of judgment: 1 September 2011
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – applications for leave to appeal a decision to refuse stay of Federal Court proceeding where Supreme Court proceeding on foot – proceeding in Federal Court issued shortly after Supreme Court proceeding instituted, raising overlapping issues – some parties to proceedings different – different relief sought – stay applications refused – whether the primary judge’s decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration by the Full Court – where it be desirable that all issues be heard and determined in one proceeding, while the other is stayed, or that by cross-vesting the two actions they be heard together – where the parties have made no attempt to resolve which action should proceed or the most desirable course – where the interests of justice do not simply demand that the proceeding which was commenced first in time be pursued.

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules

Cases cited:

Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Oswal [2011] FCA 424 cited
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 cited
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564 cited
Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 applied
Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 267 ALR 12 cited
Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 cited
Re Will of FD Gilbert (dec.) (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318 cited
Bomanite Pty Ltd v Slatex Corp Aust Pty Ltd (1991) 32 FCR 379 cited
Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v The Boots Company (Australia) Pty Ltd (1992) 34 FCR 287 applied
Union Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd v The Caradale (1937) 56 CLR 277 cited
Henry v Henry (1996) 185 CLR 571 considered
Jeffrey & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 75 cited
Voth v Manildra Far North Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 cited

Date of hearing: 10 June 2011
Date of last submissions: 17 June 2011
Place: Adelaide (via video link with Perth)
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 116
Counsel for the Applicant in WAD 142 of 2011: P Collinson SC and E Dias
Solicitor for the Applicant in WAD 142 of 2011: Murcia Pestill Hillard Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent…
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers A... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2011] FCAFC 117
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Oswal v Burrup Fertilisers Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed), the applicants sought leave to appeal against the decision of the primary judge to refuse a stay of the proceeding in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The case involved overlapping issues between the Supreme Court proceeding, initiated shortly after the Federal Court proceeding, with some parties differing and different relief sought in each case. The primary judge had refused applications for a stay of the Supreme Court proceeding, and the applicants argued that this decision was flawed and that leave to appeal should be granted.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge’s decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by the Full Court, whether it would be desirable for all issues to be heard and determined in one proceeding while the other is stayed, or if by cross-vesting the two actions they could be heard together, and whether the interests of justice demanded that the proceeding which was commenced first in time be pursued.

The court found that the primary judge had correctly considered the relevant factors, and there was no substantial injustice in refusing the application for leave to appeal. The court noted that although the proceedings involved overlapping issues, the relief sought in each case was different. The applicants had not attempted to resolve which action should proceed or the most desirable course, and the interests of justice did not demand that the proceeding which was commenced first in time be pursued. Therefore, the application for leave to appeal was refused.

The final orders of the court were that the application for leave to appeal from the order of the Court made on 29 April 2011 refusing to stay the proceeding in WAD 66 of 2011 was refused, and the applicants were to pay the respondent costs of the application. The entry of orders was dealt with in Order 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal from the order of the Court made on 29 April 2011 refusing to stay the proceeding in WAD 66 of 2011 is refused.

2. The applicant pay to the respondent costs of the application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Order 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

1. The application for leave to appeal from the order of the Court made on 29 April 2011 refusing to stay the proceeding in WAD 66 of 2011 is refused.

2. The applicants pay to the respondent costs of the application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Order 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The principal argument for PO and RO was that it was inappropriate to allow the WA Action to continue to finality, given the timing of and the nature of the Victorian Action and the orders sought. It was contended that his Honour should have given effect to the observations of Dixon J in Union Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd v The Caradale (1937) 56 CLR 277 (Union Steamship) at 281. The primary Judge considered that decision at [17]:… in relation to situations involving multiple proceedings with respect to the same subject matter in different courts in Australia that ‘[t]he inconvenience and embarrassment of allowing two independent actions involving the same question of liability to proceed contemporaneously in different courts needs no elaboration’.THE REASONS FOR THE PRIMARY DECISION The primary Judge addressed in sequence the particular considerations addressed by counsel for the parties, as drawn from the observations in Sterling Pharmaceuticals referred to above. As to the fact that the Victorian Action was the first in time, after considering the communications between the parties, the primary Judge remarked at [31]:I also accept the receivers’ submission that the earlier commencement of the Victorian proceeding is not as important (in this dispute at least) as the question of the relative status of the respective proceedings, another consideration in the Sterling Pharmaceuticals list. The status of the respective proceedings is not dissimilar. The only step which has been taken in the Victorian proceedings since the commencement of the action was the filing of the defence which has been the subject of close examination in the course of argument on this motion. The only correspondence which has been received from Mrs Oswal’s lawyers pertaining to the conduct of the action was a letter of 14 April 2011 (being the day after the stay motion was filed in the Federal Court proceeding) proposing certain directions nearly four weeks after the Victorian Supreme Court wrote to the parties requesting that they confer about the directions to be made. His Honour was not persuaded that there was any real significance in the Victorian Action being the first in time, as neither action was significantly more advanced than the other. His Honour said that both actions were in their infancy at [33]. Under the heading “Material Effect”, that is “whether the termination of one proceeding is likely to have a material effect on the other”, the primary judge clearly understood the contention that the resolution of the Victorian Action might determine whether the WA Action would continue at all. He accepted that the determination of the Victorian Action is likely to have a material effect on the WA Action because, if the appointment of the Receivers was found to be invalid, control of BFPL would revert to the directors of BFPL who would then need to determine whether to proceed with the WA Action. He accepted that there will probably be significant commonality in the pleadings and evidence in both actions. He adverted to the fact that neither PO nor CAMV are parties to the Victorian Action, although they may be bound by some form of issue estoppel as privies of RO. He noted that PO had acknowledged in submissions that he had been at all times aware of the proposed WA Action, and of the Victorian Action. He noted that, as the argument was then advanced, the primary issue in dispute in the Victorian Action was whether there was a “material adverse effect” as defined in the relevant finance documents so as to justify the appointment of the Receivers. In the WA Action, the primary issues of fact were said to be whether PO directed or procured the extensive payments about which BFPL complains and if so whether those payments were made in breach of PO’s statutory and fiduciary duties, as well as whether the payments (assuming them to have been made in breach of those duties) constituted a “material adverse effect” on BFPL. He recognised that whilst, at that time, some of the issues differed it was possible that the issues in the two proceedings may increasingly align. Even if the Victorian Action was successful, the primary Judge referred to the prospect that BFPL through its directors might in any event seek to maintain and prosecute the WA Action. He noted that the issue in the Victorian Action was only whether the appointment of the Receivers was valid, and would not (at least as presently formulated) determine any of the rights to relief claimed in the WA Action by BFPL against the PO, RO or CAMV.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In our view, the issue of whether substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal were refused should first be addressed.CONSIDERATION(1) Substantial injustice? The Victorian Action and the WA Action, when each was instituted, appeared to address different questions. The Victorian Action was a challenge to the validity of the appointment of the Receivers. The WA Action was a claim by the Receivers through BFPL that PO as its managing director had breached his duties to its detriment. When the Receivers (and other defendants) in the Victorian Action filed their Defence, no counterclaim was made against RO, nor any third party claim made against PO or CAMV, so the relief claimed in the two actions remained different. However, closer analysis of the Statement of Claim in the Victorian Action indicates that the assertion by RO as to why the Receivers were not validly appointed involves allegations about matters of fact which, to a significant degree, although not completely, are matters of fact alleged by BFPL in the WA Action. It is important to understand how that overlap occurs. In the Victorian Action the Statement of Claim asserted that the appointment of the Receivers was upon the basis of an “Event of Default” which was the occurrence of an event or series of events which had a “material adverse effect” upon the affairs of BFPL. The relevant Event of Default is expressed in [25(c)] of the Statement of Claim in the following terms:that payments allegedly made by BFPL, at the direction of Pankaj Oswal as managing director of BFPL, to or for the benefit of Pankaj Oswal in his capacity as trustee for the Burrup Trust, in the period 1 April 2010 to 30 September 2010 which were allegedly not in the ordinary course of BFPL’s business, had had a material adverse effect on the business, assets and financial condition of BFPL (which was alleged to constitute an Event of Default under clause 11.1(bb) of the SBSA). It is then asserted that there was no ground for the appointment of the Receivers because, relevantly, at [29(e)] it was asserted:no Event of Default within clause 11.1(bb) of the SBSA subsisted because, even if payments were made by BFPL at the direction of Pankaj Oswal as managing director for the benefit of Pankaj Oswal as trustee of the Burrup Trust (which is not admitted), and even if such payments were not in the ordinary course of BFPL’s business (which again is not admitted) any such payments did not result in a material adverse effect on the business, assets and financial condition of BFPL within the meaning of clause 11.1(bb) of the SBSA. Consequently, as already mentioned, a declaration is sought that the purported appointment of the Receivers of BFPL on 17 December 2010 was invalid and of no effect, and consequential orders are sought removing the Receivers from office or restraining them from acting in that capacity. The proceeding may be further complicated by the need for RO to establish her status to have brought the Victorian Action. Her status is said to arise because BFPL had not itself taken steps to challenge the appointment of the Receivers, and, as she contends:The absence of any challenge to the appointment of the Receivers by BHL and/or BFPL is contrary to the interests of the members of BHL as a whole because:(a) BHL owns all of the issued shares in BFPL;(b)the Receivers are in possession of those shares without proper authority;(c)the Receivers are in a position to sell those shares, to the detriment of BHL;(d)further, the Receivers are in a position of control with respect to the conduct of the affairs of BFPL, including (without limitation) being in possession of its property the subject of the BFPL Charge, without property authority;(e)the Receivers are in a position to sell that property;(f)the Receivers are in a position to exercise control over the conduct of BFPL’s affairs, without power;(g)the matters referred to in paragraphs (d) to (f) above are to the detriment of BFPL, particularly in circumstances where BFPL was at the time of the purported appointment of the Receivers, and continues to be, a profitable company; and(h)the matters referred to in paragraphs 32(d) to (g) above are also to the detriment of BHL as the owner of the shares in BFPL.